3: The Conference
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In Chapters IV. and V. I shall study in some detail the economic and financial
provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. But it will be easier to appreciate the
true origin of many of these terms if we examine here some of the personal factors which
influenced their preparation. In attempting this task, I touch, inevitably, questions of
motive, on which spectators are liable to error and are not entitled to take on themselves
the responsibilities of final judgment. Yet, if I seem in this chapter to assume sometimes
the liberties which are habitual to historians, but which, in spite of the greater
knowledge with which we speak, we generally hesitate to assume towards contemporaries, let
the reader excuse me when he remembers how greatly, if it is to understand its destiny,
the world needs light, even if it is partial and uncertain, on the complex struggle of
human will and purpose, not yet finished, which, concentrated in the persons of four
individuals in a manner never paralleled, made them, in the first months of 1919, the
microcosm of mankind.
In those parts of the Treaty with which I am here concerned, the lead was taken by the
French, in the sense that it was generally they who made in the first instance the most
definite and the most extreme proposals. This was partly a matter of tactics. When the
final result is expected to be a compromise, it is often prudent to start from an extreme
position; and the French anticipated at the outset - like most other persons - a double
process of compromise, first of all to suit the ideas of their allies and associates, an
secondly in the course of the Peace Conference proper with the Germans themselves. These
tactics were justified by the event. Clemenceau gamed a reputation for moderation with his
colleagues in Council by sometimes throwing over with an air of intellectual impartiality
the more extreme proposals of his ministers; and much went through where the American and
British critics were naturally a little ignorant of the true point at issue, or where too
persistent criticism by France's allies put them in a position which they felt as
invidious, of always appearing to take the enemy's part and to argue his case. Where,
therefore, British and American interests were not seriously involved their criticism grew
slack, and some provisions were thus passed which the French themselves did not take very
seriously, and for which the eleventh-hour decision to allow no discussion with the
Germans removed the opportunity of remedy.
But, apart from tactics, the French had a policy. Although Clemenceau might curtly
abandon the claims of a Klotz or a Loucheur, or close his eyes with an air of fatigue when
French interests were no longer involved in the discussion, he knew which points were
vital, and these he abated little. In so far as the main economic lines of the Treaty
represent an intellectual idea, it is the idea of France and of Clemenceau.
Clemenceau was by far the most eminent member of the Council of Four, and he had taken
the measure of his colleagues. He alone both had an idea and had considered it in all its
consequences. His age, his character, his wit, and his appearance joined to give him
objectivity and a defined outline in an environment of confusion. One could not despise
Clemenceau or dislike him, but only take a different view as to the nature of civilized
man, or indulge, at least, a different hope.
The figure and bearing of Clemenceau are universally familiar. At the Council of Four
he wore a square-tailed coat of very good, thick black broadcloth, and on his hands, which
were never uncovered, gray suéde gloves; his boots were of thick black leather, very
good, but of a country style, and sometimes fastened in front, curiously, by a buckle
instead of laces. His seat in the room in the President's house, where the regular
meetings of the Council of Four were held (as distinguished from their private and
unattended conferences in a smaller chamber below), was on a square brocaded chair in the
middle of the semicircle facing the fireplace, with Signor Orlando on his left, the
President next by the fireplace, and the Prime Minister opposite on the other side of the
fireplace on his right. He carried no papers and no portfolio, and was unattended by any
personal secretary, though several French ministers and officials appropriate to the
particular matter in hand would be present round him. His walk, his hand, and his voice
were not lacking in vigor, but he bore nevertheless, especially after the attempt upon
him, the aspect of a very old man conserving his strength for important occasions. He
spoke seldom, leaving the initial statement of the French case to his ministers or
officials; he closed his eyes often and sat back in his chair with an impassive face of
parchment, his gray gloved hands clasped in front of him. A short sentence, decisive or
cynical, was generally sufficient, a question, an unqualified abandonment of his
ministers, whose face would not be saved, or a display of obstinacy reinforced by a few
words in a piquantly delivered English(1). But speech and
passion were not lacking when they were wanted, and the sudden out-burst of words, often
followed by a fit of deep coughing from the chest, produced their impression rather by
force and surprise than by persuasion.
Not infrequently Mr. Lloyd George, after delivering a speech in English, would, during
the period of its interpretation into French, cross the hearthrug to the President to
reinforce his case by some ad hominem argument in private conversation, or to
sound the ground for a compromise, - and this would sometimes be the signal for a general
upheaval and disorder. The President's advisers would press round him, a moment later the
British experts would dribble across to learn the result or see that all was well, and
next the French would be there, a little suspicious lest the others were arranging
something behind them, until all the room were on their feet and conversation was general
in both languages. My last and most vivid impression is of such a scene - the President
and the Prime Minister as the center of a surging mob and a babel of sound, a welter of
eager, impromptu compromises and counter-compromises, all sound and fury signifying
nothing, on what was an unreal question anyhow, the great issues of the morning's meeting
forgotten and neglected; and Clemenceau silent and aloof on the outskirts - for nothing
which touched the security of France was forward - throned, in his gray gloves, on the
brocade chair, dry in soul and empty of hope, very old and tired, but surveying the scene
with a cynical and almost impish air; and when at last silence was restored and the
company had returned to their places, it was to discover that he had disappeared.
He felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens - unique value in her, nothing else
mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck's. He had one illusion - France; and
one disillusion - mankind, including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. His
principles for the peace can be expressed simply. In the first place, he was a foremost
believer in the view of German psychology that the German understands and can understand
nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or remorse in negotiation, that
there is no advantage he will not take of you, and no extent to which he will not demean
himself for profit, that he is without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never
negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will
he respect you, or you prevent him from cheating you. But it is doubtful how far he
thought these characteristics peculiar to Germany, or whether his candid view of some
other nations was fundamentally different. His philosophy had, therefore, no place for
"sentimentality" in international relations. Nations are real things, of whom
you love one and feel for the rest indifference - or hatred. The glory of the nation you
love is a desirable end,- but generally to be obtained at your neighbor's expense. The
politics power are inevitable, and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or
the end it was fought for; England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade
rival; a mighty chapter had been closed in the secular struggle between the glories of
Germany and of France. Prudence required some measure of lip service to the
"ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen; but it would be
stupid to believe that there is much room in the world, as it really is; for such affairs
as the League of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determination except as an
ingenious formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's own interests.
These, however, are generalities. In tracing the practical details of the Peace which
he thought necessary for the power and the security of France, we must go back to the
historical causes which had operated during his lifetime. Before the France-German war the
populations of France and Germany were approximately equal; but the coal and iron and
shipping of Germany were in their infancy, and the wealth of France was greatly superior.
Even after the loss of Alsace- Lorraine there was no great discrepancy between the real
resources of the two countries. But in the intervening period the relative position had
changed completely. By 1914 the population of Germany was nearly seventy per cent in
excess of that of France; she had become one of the first manufacturing and trading
nations of the world; her technical skill and her means for the production of future
wealth were unequaled. France on the other hand had a stationary or declining population,
and, relatively to others, had fallen seriously behind in wealth and in the power to
produce it.
In spite, therefore, of France's victorious issue from the present struggle (with the
aid, this time, of England and America), her future position remained precarious in the
eyes of one who took the view that European civil war is to be regarded as a normal, or at
least a recurrent, state of affairs for the future, and that the sort of conflicts between
organized great powers which have occupied the past hundred years will also engage the
next. According to this vision of fhe future, European history is to be a perpetual
prize-fight, of which France has won this round, but of which this round is certainly not
the last. From the belief that essentially the old order does not change, being based on
human nature which is always the same, and from a consequent skepticism of all that class
of doctrine which the League of Nations stands for, the policy of France and of Clemenceau
followed logically. For a Peace of magnanimity or of fair and eqal treatment, based on
such "ideology" as the Fourteen Points of the President, could only have the
effect of shorten mg the interval of Germany's recovery and hastening the day when she
will once again hurl at France her greater numbers and her superior resources and
technical skill. Hence the necessity of "guarantees"; and each guarantee that
was taken, by increasing irritation and thus the probability of a subsequent Revanche
by Germany, made necessary yet further provisions to crush. Thus, as soon as this view of
the world is adopted and the other discarded, a demand for a Carthaginian Peace is
inevitable, to the full extent of the momentary power to impose it. For Clemenceau made no
pretense of considering himself bound by the Fourteen Points and left chiefly to others
such concoctions as were necessary from time to time to save the scruples or the face of
the President.
So far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock back and to
undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and
other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system upon
which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal and
transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was
compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony
might be remedied for many generations.
Hence sprang those cumulative provisions for the destruction of highly organized
economic life which we shall examine in the next chapter.
This is the old man, whose most vivid impressions and most lively imagination are of
the past and not of the future. He sees the issue in terms of France and Germany, not of
humanity and of European civilization struggling forwards to a new order. The war has
bitten into his consciousness somewhat differently from ours, and he neither expects nor
hopes that we are at the threshold of a new age.
It happens, however, that it is not only an ideal question that is at issue. My purpose
in this book is to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practically right or
possible. Although the school of thought from which it springs is aware of the economic
factor, it overlooks, nevertheless, the deeper economic tendencies which are to govern the
future. The clock cannot be set back. You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without
setting up such strains in the European structure and letting loose such human and
spiritual forces as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and
your "guarantees," but your institutions, and the existing order of your
Society.
By what legerdemain was this policy substituted for the Fourteen Points, and how did
the president come to accept it? The answer to these questions is difficult and depends on
elements of character and psychology and on the subtle influence of surroundings, which
are hard to detect and harder still to describe. But, if ever the action of a single
individual matters, the collapse of The President has been one of the decisive moral
events of history; and I must make an attempt to explain it. What a place the President
held in the hearts and hopes of the world when he sailed to us in the George
Washington! What a great man came to Europe in those early days of our victory!
In November, 1918, the armies of Foch and the words of Wilson had brought us sudden
escape from what was swallowing up all we cared for. The conditions seemed favorable
beyond any expectation. The victory was so complete that fear need play no part in the
settlement. The enemy had laid down his arms in reliance on a sole firm compact as to the
general character of the Peace, the terms of which seemed to assure a settlement of
justice and magnanimity and a fair hope for a restoration of the broken current of life.
To make assurance certain the President was coming himself to set the seal on his work.
When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence
throughout the world unequaled in history. His bold and measured words carried the peoples
of Europe above and beyond the voices of their own politicians. The enemy peoples trusted
him to carry out the compact he had made with them; and the Allied peoples acknowledged
him not as a victor only but almost as a prophet. In addition to this moral influence the
realities of power were in his hands. The American armies were at the height of their
numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was in complete dependence on the food supplies
of the United States; and financially she was even more absolutely at their mercy. Europe
not only already owed the United States more than she could pay; but only a large measure
of further assistance could save her from starvation and bankruptcy. Never had a
philosopher held such weapons wherewith to bind the princes of this world. How the crowds
of the European capitals pressed about the carriage of the President! With what curiosity,
anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the features and bearing of the man of destiny
who, coming from the West, was to bring healing to the wounds of the ancient parent of his
civilization and lay for us the foundations of the future.
The disillusion was so complete, that some of those who had trusted most hardly dared
speak of it. Could it be true? they asked of those who returned from Paris. Was the Treaty
really as bad as it seemed? What had happened to the President? What weakness or what
misfortune had led to the so extraordinary, so unlooked-for a betrayal?
Yet the causes were very ordinary and human. The President was not a hero or a prophet;
he was not even a philosopher; but a generously intentioned man, with many of the
weaknesses of other human beings, and lacking that dominating intellectual equipment which
would have been necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders whom a
tremendous clash of forces and personalities had brought to the top as triumphant masters
in the swift game of give and take, face to face in Council, -a game of which he had no
experience at all.
We had indeed quite a wrong idea of the President. We knew him to be solitary and
aloof, and believed him very strong-willed and obstinate. We did not figure him as a man
of detail, but the clearness with which he had taken hold of certain main ideas would, we
thought, in combination with his tenacity, enable him to sweep through cobwebs. Besides
these qualities he would have the objectivity, the cultivation, and the wide knowledge of
the student. The great distinction of language which had marked his famous Notes seemed to
indicate a man of lofty and powerful imagination. His portraits indicated a fine presence
and a commanding delivery. With all this he had attained and held with increasing
authority the first position in a country where the arts of the politician are not
neglected. All of which, without expecting the impossible, seemed a fine combination of
qualities for the matter in hand.
The first impression of Mr. Wilson at close quarters was to impair some but not all of
these illusions. His head and features were finely cut and exactly like his photographs,
and the muscles of his neck and the carriage of his head were distinguished. But, like
Odysseus, the President looked wiser when he was seated; and his hands, though capable and
fairly strong, were wanting in sensitiveness and finesse. The first glance at the
President suggested not only that, whatever else he might be, his temperament was not
primarily that of the student or the scholar, but that he had not much even of that
culture of the world which marks M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour as exquisitely cultivated
gentlemen of their class and generation. But more serious than this was not only
insensitive to his surroundings in the external sense, he was not sensitive to his
environment at all. What chance could such a man have against Mr. Lloyd George's unerring,
almost medium-like, sensibility to every one immediately round him! To see the British
Prime Minister watching the company, with six or seven senses not available to ordinary
men, judging character, motive, and subconscious impulse, perceiving what each was
thinking and even what each was going to say next, and compounding with telepathic
instinct the argument or appeal best suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of
his immediate auditor, was to realize that the poor President would be playing blind man's
buff in that party. Never could a man have stepped into the parlor a more perfect and
predestined victim to the finished accomplishments of the Prime Minister. The Old World
was tough in wickedness anyhow; the Old World's heart of stone might blunt the sharpest
blade of the bravest knight-errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a
cavern where the swift and glittering blade was in the hands of the adversary.
But if the President was not the philosopher king, what was he! After all he was a man
who had spent much of his life at a University He was by no means a business man or an
ordinary party politician, but a man of force, personality, and importance. What, then,
was his temperament?
The clue once found was illuminating. The President was like a Nonconformist minister,
perhaps a Presbyterian. His thought and his temperament were essentially theological not
intellectual, with all the strength and the weakness of that manner of thought, feeling,
and expression. It is a type of which there are not now in England and Scotland such
magnificent specimens as formerly; but this description, nevertheless, will give the
ordinary Englishman the distinctest impression of the President.
With this picture of him in mind, we can return to the actual course of events. The
President's program for the World, as set forth in his speeclies and his Notes, had
displayed a spirit and a purpose so admirable that the last desire of his sympathizers was
to criticize details, - the details, they felt, were quite rightly not filled in at
present, but would be in due course. It was common1y believed at the commencement of the
Paris Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a large body of
advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the League of Nations, but for the
embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual Treaty of Peace. But in fact the President
had thought out nothing; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete.
He had no plan, no schema, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of
life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached
a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their
fulfilment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of
Europe.
He not only had no proposals in detail, but he was in many respects, perhaps
inevitably, ill-informed as to European conditions. And not only was he ill-informed -
that was true of Mr. Lloyd George also - but his mind was slow and unadaptable. The
President's slowness amongst the Europeans was noteworthy. He could not, all in a minute;
take in what the rest were saying size up the situation with a glance, frame a reply, and
meet the case by a slight change of ground, and he was liable, therefore, to defeat by the
mere swiftness, apprehension and agility of a Lloyd George. There can seldom have been a
statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President in the agilities of the
council chamber. A moment often arrives when substantial victory is yours if by some
slight appearance of a concession you can save the face of the opposition or conciliate
them by a restatement of your proposal helpful to them and not injurious to anything
essential to yourself. The President was not equipped with this simple and usual
artfulness. His mind was too slow and unresourceful to be ready with any alternatives. The
President was capable of digging his toes in and refusing to budge as he did over Fiume.
But he had no other mode of defense, and it needed as a rule but little maneuvering by his
opponents to prevent matters from coming to such a head until it was too late. By
pleasantness and an appearance of conciliation, the President would be manceuvered off his
ground, would miss the moment for digging his toes in, and, before he knew where he had
been got to, it was too late. Besides, it is impossible month after month in intimate and
ostensibly friendly converse between close associates, to be digging the toes in all the
time. Victory would only have been possible to one who had always a sufliciently lively
apprehension of the position as a whole to reserve his fire and know for certain the rare
exact moments for decisive action. And for that the President was far too slow-minded and
bewildered.
He did not remedy these defects by seeking aid from the collective wisdom of his
lieutenants. He had gathered round him for the economic chapters of the Treaty a very able
group of business men; but they were inexperienced in public affairs, and knew (with one
or two exceptions) little of Europe as he did, and they were only called in irregularly as
he might need them for a particular purpose. Thus the aloofness which had been found
effective in Washington was maintained, and the abnormal reserve of his nature did not
allow near him any one who aspired to moral equality or the continuous exercise of
influence. His fellow plenipotentiaries were dummies; and even the trusted Colonel House,
with vastly more knowledge of men and of Europe than the President, from whose
sensitiveness the President's dullness had gained so much, fell into the background as
time went on. All this was encouraged by his colleagues on the Council of Four, who, by
the break-up of the Council of Ten, completed the isolation which the President's own
temperament had initiated. Thus day after day and week after week, he allowed himself to
be closeted, unsupported, unadvised, and alone, with men much sharper than himself, in
situations of supreme difficulty, where he needed for success every description of
resource, fertility, and knowledge. He allowed himself to be drugged by their atmosphere,
to discuss on the basis of their plans and of their data, and to be led along their paths.
These and other various causes combined to produce the following situation. The reader
must remember that the processes which are here compressed into a few pages took place
slowly, gradually, insidiously, over a period of about five months.
As the President had thought nothing out, the Council was generally working on the
basis of a French or British draft. He had to take up, therefore, a persistent attitude of
obstruction, criticism, and negation, if the draft was to become at all in line with his
own ideas and purpose. If he was met on some points with apparent generosity (for there
was always a safe margin of quite preposterous suggestions which no one took seriously),
it was difficult for him not to yield on others. Compromise was inevitable, and never to
compromise on the essential, very difficult. Besides, he was soon made to appear to be
taking the German part and laid himself open to the suggestion (to which he was foolishly
and unfortunately sensitive) of being "pro-German."
After a display of much principle and dignity in the early days of the Council of Ten,
he discovered that there were certain very important points in the program of his French,
British, or Italian colleague, as the case might be, of which he was incapable of securing
the surrender by the methods of secret diplomacy. What then was he to do in the last
resort? He could let the Conference drag on an endless length by the exercise of sheer
obstinacy. He could break it up and return to America in a rage with nothing settled. Or
he could attempt an appeal to the world over the heads of the Conference. These were
wretched alternatives, against each of which a great deal could be said. They were also
very risky, - especially for a politician. The President's mistaken policy over the
Congressional election had weekened his personal position in his own country and it was by
no means certain that the American public would support him in a position of
intransigency. It would mean a campaign in which the issues would be clouded by every sort
of personal and party consideration, and who could say if right would triumph in a
struggle which would certainly not be decided on its merits? Besides, any open rupture
with his colleagues would certainly bring upon his head the blind passions of
"anti-German" resentment with which the public of all allied countries were
still inspired. They would not listen to his arguments. They would not be cool enough to
treat the issue as one of international morality or of the right governance of Europe. The
cry would simply be that, for various sinister and selfish reasons, the President wished
"to let the Hun off." The almost unanimous voice of the French and British Press
could be anticipated. Thus, if he threw down the gage publicly he might be defeated. And
if he were
defeated, would not the final Peace be far worse than if he were to retain his prestige
and endeavor to make it as good as the limiting conditions of European politics would
allow him? But above all, if he were defeated would he not lose the League of Nations? And
was not this, after all, by far the most important issue for the future happiness of the
world? The Treaty would be altered and softened by time. Much in it which now seemed so
vital would become trifling, and much which was impracticable would for that very reason
never happen. But the League, even in an imperfect form, was permanent; it was the first
commencement of a new principle in the government of the world; Truth and Justice in
international relations could not be established in a few months, - they must be born in
due course by tbe slow gestation of the League. Clemenceau had been clever enough to let
it be seen that he would swallow the League at a price.
At the crisis of his fortunes the President was a lonely man. Caught up in the toils of
the Old World, he stood in great need of sympathy, of moral support, of the enthusiasm of
masses. But buried in the Conference, stifled in the hot and atmosphere of Paris, no echo
reached him from the outer world, and no throb of passion, sympathy, or encouragement from
his silent constitutents in all countries. He felt that the blaze of popularity which had
greeted his arrival in Europe was already dimmed; the Paris Press jeered at him openly;
his political opponents at home were taking advantage of his absence to create an
atmosphere against him; England was cold, critical, and unresponsive. He had so formed his
entourage that he did not receive through private channels the current of faith
and enthusiasm of which the public sources seemed dammed up. He needed, but lacked, the
added strength of collective faith. The German terror still overhung us, and even the
sympathetic public was very cautious; the enemy must not be encouraged, our friends must
be supported, this was not the time for discord or agitations, the President must be
trusted to do his best. And in this drought the flower of the President's faith withered
and dried up.
Thus it came to pass that the President countermanded the George Washington,
which, in a moment of well-founded rage, he had ordered to be in readiness to carry him
from the threacherous halls of Paris back to the seat of his authority, where he could
have felt himself again. But as soon, alas, as he had taken the road of compromise, the
defects, already indicated, of his temperament and of his equipment, were fatally
apparent. He could take the high line; he could practise obstinacy; he could write Notes
from Sinai or Olympus; he could remain unapproachable in the White House or even in the
Council of Ten and be safe. But if he once stepped down to the intimate equality of the
Four, the game was evidently up.
Now it was that what I have called his theological or Presbyterian temperament became
dangerous. Having decided that some concessions were unavoidable, he might have sought by
firmness and address and the use of the financial power of the United States to secure as
much as he could of the substance, even at some sacrifice of the letter. But the President
was not capable of so clear an understanding with himself as this implied. He was too
conscientious. Although compromises were now necessary, he remained a man of principle and
the Fourteen Points a contract absolutely binding upon him. He would do nothing that was
not honorable; he would do nothing that was not just and right; he would do nothing that
was contrary to his great profession of faith. Thus, without any abatement of the verbal
inspiration of the Fourteen Points, they became a document for gloss and interpretation
and for all the intellectual apparatus of self-deception, by which, I daresay, the
President's forefathers had persuaded themselves that the course they thought it necessary
to take was consistent with every syllable of the Pentateuch.
The President's attitude to his colleagues had now become: I want to meet you so far as
I can; I see your difficulties and I should like to be able to agree to what you propose;
but I can do nothing that is not just and right, and you must first of all show me that
what you want does really fall within the words of the pronouncements which are binding on
me. Then began the weaving of that web of sophistry and Jesuitical exegesis that was
finally to clothe with insincerity the language and substance of the whole Treaty. The
word was issued to the witches of all Paris:
Fair is foul, and foul is fair,
Hover through the fog and filthy air.
The subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen were set to work, and produced
many ingenious exercises which might have deceived for more than an hour a cleverer man
than the President.
Thus instead of saying that German-Austria is prohibited from uniting with Germany
except by leave of France (which would be inconsistent with the principle of
self-determination), the Treaty, with delicate draftsmanship, states that "Germany
acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers
which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of
the Council of the League of Nations," which sounds, but is not, quite different. And
who knows but that the President forgot that another part of the Treaty provides that for
this purpose the Council of the League must be unanimous.
Instead of giving Danzig to Poland, the Treaty establishes Danzig as a "Free"
City, but includes this "Free" City within the Polish Customs frontier, entrusts
to Poland the control of the river and railway system, and provides that "the Polish
Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig
as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad."
In placing the river system of Germany under foreign control, the Treaty speaks of
declaring international those "river systems which naturally provide more than one
State with access to the sea, with or without transhipment from one vessel to
another."
Such instances could be multiplied. The honest and intelligible purpose of French
policy, to limit the population of Germany and weaken her economic system, is clothed, for
the President's sake, in the August language of freedom and international
But perhaps the most deoisive moment, in the disintegration of the President's moral
position and the clouding of his mind, was when at last, to the dismay of his advisers, he
allowed himself to be persuaded that the expenditure of the Allied Governments on pensions
and separation allowances could be fairly regarded as "damage done to the civilian
population of the Allied and Associated Powers by German aggression by land, by sea, and
from the air," in a sense in which the other expenses of the war could not be so
regarded. It was a long theological struggle in which, after the rejection of many
different arguments, the President finally capitulated before a masterpiece of the
sophist's art.
At last the work was finished; and the President's conscience was still intact. In
spite of everything, I believe that his temperament allowed him to leave Paris a really
sincere man; and it is probable that to this day he is genuinely convinced that the Treaty
contains practically nothing inconsistent with his former professions.
But the work was too complete, and to this was due the last tragic episode of the
drama. The reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau inevitably took the line that Germany had laid down
her arms on the basis of certain assurances, and that the Treaty in many particulars was
not consistent with these assurances. But this was exactly what the President could not
admit; in. the sweat of solitary contemplation and with prayers to God he had done nothing
that was not just and right; for the President to admit that the German reply had force in
it was to destroy his self-respect and to disrupt the inner equipoise of his soul; and
every instinct of his stubborn nature rose in self-protection. In the language of medical
psychology, to suggest to the President that the Treaty was an abandonment of his
professions was to touch on the raw a Freudian complex. It was a subject intolerable to
discuss, and every subconscious instinct plotted to defeat its further exploration.
Thus it was that Clemenceau brought to success, what had seemed to be, a few months
before, the extraordinary and impossible proposal that the Germans shoud not be heard. If
only the President had not been so conscientious, if only he had not concealed from
himself what he had been doing, even at the last moment he was in a position to have
recovered lost ground and to have achieved some very considerable successes. But the
President was set. His arms and legs had been spliced by the surgeons to a certain
posture, and they must be broken again before they could be altered. To his horror, Mr.
Lloyd George, desiring at the last moment all the moderation he dared, discovered that he
could not in five days persuade the President of error in what it had taken five months to
prove to him to be just and right. After all, it was harder to de-bamboozle this old
Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle him; for the former involved his belief in and
respect for himself.
Thus in the last act the President stood for stubbornness and a refusal of
conciliations.
1. He alone amongst the Four could speak and understand both
languages, Orlando knowing only French and the Prime Minister and President only English;
and it is of historical importance that Orlando and the President had no direct means of
communication.
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