3: America, Enter Stage Left: Military Planning, January-April 1917
<< 2: Exposition: American Military Planning Prior to January 1917 || 4: Over When? Plans for Sending an Immediate Expeditionary Force to France, April-June 1917 >>
Serious military planning began immediately after Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff
presented his note to US Secretary of State Robert Lansing on 31 January 1917. In this
message Germany announced the decision which it had adopted earlier that month at the
council at Pless; namely, the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the waters
around Great Britain, France, Italy and in the Eastern Mediterranean. All ships found
within this zone--military or merchant, enemy or neutral--would be sunk.(1)
Memories of the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 arose both within and beyond
Washington. Still, however, the President believed that the US could remain detached from
the European imbroglio. His last attempt to avert American involvement was a plan to arm
merchant vessels. Such, he earnestly hoped, would restore American trans-Atlantic trade
and at the same time deter Germany from committing some overt act which would lead to war
between the two countries.
Wilson addressed Congress at one o'clock on 26 February, a little more than three weeks
after the break in diplomatic relations with the Kaiser. While admitting that no major
engagements had occurred between US merchant ships and German submarines which would merit
a strong American response, he pointed out that many merchant ships remained in American
ports for fear of the German U-boat. Such, he argued, could achieve the German goal of
stifling neutral commerce. He elaborated:
No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must defend our commerce and the
lives of our people in the midst of the present trying circumstances, with
discretion but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method and the extent
remain to be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should indeed arise. Since it
has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by diplomatic
means against the unwarranted infringements they are suffering at the hands of
Germany, there may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we shall know
how to maintain and for which there is abundant American precedent.
Wilson's Armed-Ship Bill passed the House on 1 March with only fourteen dissenting
votes. The Senate, however, proved less receptive. A successful filibuster stalled the
bill until the end of the legislative session, and Congress adjourned on 4 March without
granting the President's request.(2)
Undaunted, the President sought legal justification for an executive fiat.
Without the approval of Congress, Wilson issued a statement to the press on 12 March
announcing that all American merchant ships sailing through the areas proscribed in the
German note would carry an armed guard, "for the protection of the vessels and the
lives of the persons on board." In retrospect it is difficult to imagine how this
policy would have achieved the President's aims. Armed guards and small deck guns only
posed a threat to a submarine on the surface and thus were not only ineffective, but also
might have further convinced U-boat captains to refrain from announcing their attacks.
Wilson's policy was implemented, but it would not yield the deterrence which he sought.(3)
While Wilson wrestled with and eventually sidestepped a defiant Congress, the War
Department scrambled to assemble the fragments of war-plans which had been created. In a
memorandum to the President on 7 February, Baker outlined the steps so far taken to
address the present crisis. The eight elements of this page-and-a-half sketch included:
(1) a provision for giving the government priority access to the nation's telegraph and
telephone system; (2) the initiation of a study in conjunction with the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad of possible railway transportation requirements; (3) estimates of the supplies
necessary to increase the regular army and National Guard to war strength and to train a
volunteer force tentatively fixed at 500,000 men; (4) arrangements for purchases of items
such as clothing, shoes, food, and tents; (5) the operation of all arsenals on a two-
shift basis for maximum output; (6) the erection of torpedo nets in all Atlantic-coast
harbors; (7) the placement of War Department engineers, personnel, and arsenals at the
disposal of the Navy; and (8) the purchase of land at Montauk Park for the protection of
New York Harbor. Although many of these steps bespeak a much more active role for the
army, it was the last three -- the measures ensuring coastal defense -- which were of most
immediate concern.
This plan offered no hint that the forces mentioned would do any more than guard the
Atlantic harbors; and as with the War Plan Black, no explanation was offered of how
Germany would pose a credible threat to American shores. Although some of Baker's
attention was also drawn beyond American shores to such places as the Philippines and the
Canal Zone in concern for sabotage of interned German merchant vessels, such interest in
US overseas territories was scarcely out of step with existing military policy and was
hardly in recognition of possible American involvement in Europe. There was certainly no
hint that any US soldiers would leave for the Continent within only five months.(4)
Baker and Wilson still sought to downplay military planning. Only two weeks before the
break in US-German relations, the Secretary of War had counseled against sending Major
General Leonard Wood to observe the belligerent countries for the purpose of preparing a
history of the conflict. Baker argued, and Wilson agreed, that rumors of impending
cooperation between the United States and the countries visited by Wood would surely
result from such a trip. Even after the rupture of relations, Baker assured the President
in his note concerning War Department actions taken as of 7 February that "I have
endeavored in every way possible to have these steps carried out without publicity in
order not to give rise either to excitement in our own country or misconstruction
abroad."(5)
Meanwhile Chief of Staff Major General Hugh L. Scott was champing at the bit. In
January he had presented the Franklin Dinner Speech in Philadelphia. Emphasizing that
founding father's "zeal for preparedness in the service of his country," the
Chief of Staff warned:
Nor can it be doubted that were he here tonight, he would urge upon us to arm and go stand in
the ranks ourselves, that we may show ourselves worthy of the sacrifices of our ancestors and
preserve for our children the liberties so dearly bought by suffering and blood, lest it be written
of American as it has been of Jerusalem: 'Oh, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the
prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered you even as
a hen gathereth her chickens under her wing -- but ye would not! behold, your house is left unto
you desolate.'(6)
Critical of what he viewed as an irrational denial of the inevitable, Scott lambasted
the Administration's delay in a letter to Colonel H. J. Slocum, commander of the 13th
Cavalry at Columbus:
The President does not want any action taken that will give any kind of an idea to
Germany that we were getting ready for war. Personally, I think it would be better
for her to get such an idea; it would make her understand in a minute what we
said. . . .I am sorry to lose all this good time, because if we must call out the
volunteers eventually, the cloth is not even woven for their uniforms and we are
not authorized to order it.(7)
Scott was unwilling to sit idle. On the very day after Lansing received the
announcement of unrestricted U-boat warfare, the Chief of Staff directed the War College
Division to consider possible overseas operations in the event of war with Germany. On 2
February he sent Captain Davis's memoranda to the War College for its consideration.
Inspired by the idea of an alternative to the Western Front recommended by the US Military
Attaché in Athens, Scott himself suggested the possibility of a campaign through Holland.(8)
It is unclear whether Baker knew of Scott's actions; if he did, he most certainly did
not inform the President. The form of the War College Division's initial response on 3
February was markedly different from that which the Secretary of War presented to the
President only four days later. Baker had emphasized such steps as obtaining priority
access to the nation's telegraph and telephone lines and erecting torpedo nets in Atlantic
harbors. The General Staff suggested, among other recommendations, that all members of the
National Guard and organized militia not already serving under federal authority be called
into such, that a national secret service be established under military control, that all
aliens submit to registration and surveillance, that national censorship be established,
and most importantly that military cooperation be initiated with the Allies as soon as war
appeared certain and that any troops raised by the United States receive their full
training within the country before being sent abroad. Little common ground existed between
the War College Division's initial recommendations and those which Baker carried to
Wilson, so it is doubtful that the Secretary of War informed the President of the
additional plans being made.(9)
The Chief of Staff almost certainly kept Wilson ignorant as well. In a pair of letters
early that month Scott himself hinted that he had exceeded the Presidential restrictions.
He wrote:
At the present time the President is not taking
any real steps to call out a large force. Of
course we are doing what we can in a quiet way in
the service, but I do not think he wants anything
done which will show foreign nations that we are
getting ready until Germany does some overt act.(10)
Scott repeated this sentiment and much of this wording in another letter on the same
day:
At the present time we are going ahead and doing
what we can in a quiet way. The President desires
no step taken toward mobilization, I suppose in
the hope that Germany will not do any avert act.
I am not able to share in that hope myself, and
would like to be at work with all our force.(11)
It was probably wise that Scott did not alert Wilson of the plans that were being
contemplated, for surely they would have caused a vehement reaction on the President's
part. The effects of the stop-and-start approach to military planning in previous years
were sorely felt when the General Staff set about studying America's potential role in the
Great War. The report concerning possible lines of action through Macedonia relied on
estimates of available American shipping from 1 April 1916 -- almost a year out of date.(12)
Little tangible and detailed planning could take place because the General Staff was
still in the dark concerning what shape the army would take. In response to a letter from
a Massachusetts cadet prematurely eager to serve overseas, Scott complained:
In the case of a real break with Germany, nothing in the way of an
expedition to the other side of the Atlantic can be done until a real
army is raised and trained. Congress has not yet given enough authority
or money to start weaving the cloth for the uniforms of the first contingent.
The raising, training and equipping of a real force is a matter of time, and
at least a year will elapse before we can get such a force ready.(13)
Debates on military policy in Congress remained decidedly detached from the growing
likelihood that America would become involved in the war. Even the break in diplomatic
relations with Germany did little to change this assessment. S. Hubert Dent of Alabama,
the new Chair of the House Military Affairs Committee, announced in mid-February that his
committee had "reached the conclusion unanimously that at least this was not an
opportune time for any radical changes in the military policy of this country." He
declared that the 1917 Army Appropriations Bill would make provisions for a regular force
of only 135,000 soldiers. Committee Member Thomas S. Crago of Pennsylvania correctly
bragged that this bill had been drafted "not as a war measure but as a great peace
measure."(14)
Unlike those measures being considered by the President and Congress, the plans being
weighed by the War College Division significantly departed from previous American military
assessments. The size of the proposed fighting force was hardly exceptional, at least
compared to those previously proposed by the General Staff; the potential policies were
based on an army of 500,000 to 1,000,000 men. The purpose of this force, however, was
notable: it was to be an expeditionary force to Europe. In addition, this study marked a
change in the fundamental approach to American military planning. Instead of forming
policy which was long-term in its focus and only loosely related to the events in Europe
or the current requirements of US foreign relations, this examination was designed to
address the probable uses and needs of the US military.(15)
Although the War College Division rejected the suggestions for a campaign through
either Macedonia or Holland, it did not reject the concept of an expeditionary force. The
main drawback that it saw in these plans was that the armies envisioned exceeded the scope
of current military capacity. In addition to the time required to raise such a force, it
would at least ten months to ship a half million soldiers to the Continent. While this
time scale was not necessarily absurd, Kuhn and the War College Division suggested that
America refrain from sending any units until a complete US Army had been created. From
this suggestion, then, it would be mid- to late-1918 before even the first effects of any
American military participation might be felt. Kuhn concluded, "While the enclosed
studies on Macedonia and Holland cannot be made the basis of any practical plans until our
general relations with other belligerents are settled, they emphasize the fact that a long
period of time must elapse before we can be capable of any effective action under our
modern military conditions. . . ."(16)
A key element of the "modern military conditions"which Kuhn mentioned were
the armaments of a modern fighting force: those fire weapons which had demonstrated their
brutal effectiveness so ruthlessly and had helped to foster the inertia of trench warfare.
In this area, too, America was lacking. Even by the time it finally embarked from New York
in late May 1917, Pershing's force had ready for issue only 285,000 Springfield rifles,
less than 1,500 machine guns, 400 light field guns and 150 heavy field guns. Except for
3-inch shells, the US possessed artillery ammunition sufficient for less than nine hours'
worth of firing, even considering the limited number of guns available. Even though
America would possess significantly larger volumes of these weapons by the end of the
fighting, it was grossly ill-equipped in early 1917.(17)
In addition to equipping a force with modern weapons, the War College Division
recognized that a necessary prerequisite for involvement in the war would be the raising
of a mass army. It therefore took this opportunity to advocate conscription once again.
Four days before Germany's announcement at the end of January, Scott had received at his
own request a "Plan for a National Army" from the War College Division. This
plan had called for a regular army of 310,000 backed by a first line defense of 2,500,000
citizen-reservists who would begin an eleven month program of universal military training
at age nineteen. Some General Staff members, including Assistant Chief of Staff Major
General Tasker H. Bliss, recognized the plan as a political absurdity, especially since
the US was not at war. They suggested instead that the military pursue a policy of
selective rather than universal training, but Scott presented the study to Baker as it
stood. Baker did nothing with the study at that time, but the General Staff would refer to
this examination in the weeks to come and would repeat its calls for some form of a draft
following the rupture of diplomatic relations.(18)
On 14 February Scott received from Kuhn a plan for raising, equipping, quartering and
training an army of 4,000,000 men. Historians Edward Coffman and Timothy K. Nenninger have
claimed that President Wilson endorsed the plan, but it is doubtful that the idea of
conscripting such a large army was so readily accepted. It seems that the War College
Division recognized the slim chance of realizing its plan and felt compelled to issue a
revision. On 20 February Kuhn submitted to Scott, "in view of the fact that it may
not be possible to secure enactment of the legislation required for universal
service," an alternative plan for raising an army of half-a-million men, "under
the provisions of existing law." Although recognizing that political realities might
preclude the adoption of draft legislation, the War College Division nonetheless restated
its support for that approach: "The War College Division is convinced that the _best_
plan for raising such a force involves the adoption of universal liability to military
service."(19)
Support for universal military training was of course nothing new for the military
planners. It was their willingness to consider this approach to raise the Continental Army
which had been one factor in the demise of that plan. Even before the President had
endorsed preparedness, one member of the War College Division, Captain George Van Horn
Moseley, had strongly advocated universal military training in spite of the political
liabilities of such a policy:
We are not concerned with the question as to whether the consideration
of the question of some form of compulsory military training is a practical
one for the party in power but our opinion should be correctly recorded in
answer to the question -- can a practical system of National Defense
adequate to our needs, be established which does not include in some form
the principle of compulsory military training?(20)
Following the retirement of James Hay, the long-time Chair of the House Military
Affairs Committee and habitual opponent of the General Staff, the War College Division had
called for "universal liability to military training in time of peace" in a
December 1916 report concerning the proper military policy of the United States. In
testimony before a Senate Committee on 19 December 1916, the Chief of Staff himself had
advanced the possibility of a peacetime draft to secure the numbers of soldiers required
for adequate defense of the nation: "The time has come when this country must resort
to universal liability to military training and service." With war raging so
distantly, the American public and their representatives were hesitant to support such a
measure. This opposition would eventually yield now that the war seemed much closer, but
the change of heart within the President would not be spurred mainly by military and
strategic considerations. Although Wilson eventually reached the conclusion of the General
Staff concerning conscription, he did so by a significantly different path.(21)
Baker and Wilson had been neither strong supporters nor vehement opponents of the
draft. As early as January 1916 the Secretary of War had expressed sympathy for a draft's
ability to raise a large army while reducing the social and economic disruption associated
with unregulated voluntarism. Through conscription, the Administration could control who
exactly left the workforce to join the military. Wilson had been quite receptive to
Section 79 of the National Defense Act of 1916, the so-called "Hayden joker"
which permitted him to fill vacancies in the National Guard by means of conscription
during wartime "if for any reason there should not be enough voluntary
enlistments." The administration emphasized that this power was limited to wartime
exercise only, however, and did not consider advocating a peacetime draft.(22)
After 3 February 1917, both Baker and the President echoed these ambivalent feelings
toward a draft. Baker and Wilson were at this time committed to reliance upon volunteers
to form the greatest portion of military manpower and were willing to adopt conscription
only after voluntarism began to wane. On 6 February Baker warned Wilson that "great
suspicion would be aroused if compulsory military service were suggested at the outset and
before any opportunity to volunteer had been given." In spite of the arguments of the
nation's military planners, Wilson and Baker viewed the draft as the last, not the first
resort.(23)
On 3 February Baker had asked the War College Division for a plan to raise "a
large volunteer force . . . tentatively fixed at 500,000 men." In its response the
War College Division referred to its "Plan for a National Army" of 27 January
and strongly urged the adoption of universal military service. Baker continued to demand a
force consisting of volunteers, not conscripts, to back up the regulars and National
Guard. Reluctantly the War College Division presented a plan on 15 March for invoking the
Volunteer Act of 1914, but it still enumerated its reasons for favoring conscription.
These reasons were simple and were reiterations of arguments which had been used by Scott
and the General Staff before: the British experience had shown volunteer enlistments to be
unpredictable and fickle, voluntarism was too inelastic to allow for great expansion to
meet the developments of war and conscription remained the only feasible means of raising
such a large army in such a short time with minimum disruption to the rest of society.(24)
Such military rationale, however, would fall upon the President's deaf ears. Contrary
to some historical accounts, the President did not order his Secretary of War to draft
conscription legislation on 4 February. The actual date was 22 February and the bill was
designed to give the President the authority to "raise" (but not to
"use") an army if Germany committed some overt act while Congress was not in
session. Although this legislation did make provisions for conscription, such an approach
would occur only after volunteering began to wane. Even the President's personal decision
for war on 20 March did not alter his desire to rely first and foremost on volunteers for
America's military needs. Scott reported that in a meeting on 24 March the President had
made clear that he would resort to the draft only after the failure of the volunteer
system. Most likely, Wilson wished to avoid a confrontation with those same legislators
who had rejected the Continental Army the previous Spring. The turning point would thus
have to come in the form of a political challenge stronger than the threat posed by the
Congressional Democrats.(25)
In an unexpected volte face Wilson changed his mind on selective service and
put his full weight behind the measure almost immediately after he had made clear once
again that he favored a system of volunteers. Suddenly the President ordered that
volunteers would be used only in the regulars and the National Guard; the remaining force
of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men would be "raised and maintained exclusively by
selective draft." As historian John W. Chambers, II, points out, this change of heart
is significant because in doing so Wilson had thrown his support behind a system of
conscription that flew in the face of antiwar and antidraft sentiment, the tradition of
the volunteer system and perhaps even his support among many of his own party members in
Congress.(26)
Chambers discounts the role of military advice, since both the President and the
Secretary of War had repeatedly heard the same suggestions from Scott and the General
Staff for some time. He rejects the tension of international circumstances as motivating
the President, since war had seemed quite likely since 1 February and since Wilson openly
advocated a volunteer system for a week after the famous Cabinet meeting of 20 March. In
addition, since the Commander-in-Chief had made no decision concerning whether or not to
send an American army overseas, it seems doubtful that his decision resulted from a
thorough understanding of the impending commitment which loomed in the future for the
United States. Chambers concludes that Wilson's decision was motivated in great part by
his desire to thwart the efforts of his political rival Theodore Roosevelt to raise a
volunteer division for immediate service in France. Here again, then, the influence of
political consideration over military analysis is clear.(27)
Early in February the former Rough Rider, now almost sixty years old and blind in one
eye, had written Baker about the possibility of raising a volunteer division and sailing
abroad. Many Republicans supported the former President's idea. In the eventual
congressional debate on the Selective Service Bill, Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts
remarked, "If Roosevelt or any other Pied Piper can whistle 25,000 fanatics after
him, for Heaven's sake give him the chance." Baker, however, gently declined the
suggestion. Unwilling to relent, Roosevelt pressed his proposal throughout the following
weeks. Wilson would clearly never allow such an usurpation of political and military
power. Historian David M. Kennedy notes that "there was . . . a chance that Roosevelt
might contrive to make this martial buffoonery appear to be the stuff of genuine heroism
and adventure-- a demonstration of patriotic success which Republicans could be expected
to use to bludgeon the Democratic administration." The task thus fell to Baker on 20
March to reject Roosevelt's offer more firmly. The Secretary of War explained that
Congress had not yet authorized an army and that general officers must be drawn from the
ranks of the regulars. Roosevelt still refused to yield and sent a telegram on 23 March
reminding Baker that he was "a retired Commander in Chief of the United States Army
and eligible to any position of command over American troops to which I may be
appointed."(28)
Undoubtedly surprised at such audacity, Baker forwarded this message to Wilson on 26
March. Equally astonished, the President called Roosevelt's telegram "one of the most
extraordinary documents I ever read!" He thanked his Secretary of War for allowing
him to "undergo the discipline of temper involved in reading it in silence!" The
following day, 28 March, the President met with Baker and formally approved the exclusive
reliance upon the draft to raise all soldiers beyond those to be formed within the regular
army and the National Guard. Chambers argues that since this policy would preclude any
volunteer units whatsoever, including and especially a division commanded by the Bull
Moose himself, Wilson embraced it. Thus, although the President remained unconvinced by
the pleadings of America's military planners for a long time, he eventually bowed to their
goals. He did so, however, neither because of nor in consultation with these advisors in
the War College Division; his decision was independent of military considerations and was
based instead on political efficacy. While on the surface it appeared that, as James W.
Pohl has noted, "the President, the Secretary of War, and the General Staff were in
accord on the central question of developing manpower through conscription," the
plans of the General Staff and the goals of the President meshed much more by coincidence
than by design.(29)
At 8:32 pm on 2 April 1917, Wilson stood before the Joint Session of Congress. Armed
neutrality had failed to dissuade Germany's submarine campaign, and Wilson believed that
only one avenue remained -- war. Seated directly in front of the Speaker's desk was the
Supreme Court. The Cabinet was on one side while behind them sat, for the first time at
such a joint session, the Diplomatic Corps in full evening dress. The House was called to
order and the Vice-President entered followed by the Senate. All of the senators but
two--Robert M. La Follette and James K. Vardaman--wore or carried a small American flag.
As the ovation died down following his introduction, the President began to read from the
papers on the podium before him:
Gentlemen of the Congress: I have called the
Congress into extraordinary session because
there are serious, very serious choices of policy
to be made, and made immediately, which it was
neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I
should assume the responsibility of making.
The President followed with a thirty-six minute oration documenting the causes which he
believed justified a declaration of war. It was to be a battle joined "for democracy,
for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments,
for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a
concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world
itself at last free." In spite of the President's claim that "what this will
involve is clear," few plans existed beyond the initial decision to adopt
conscription as the method to raise the army. Fundamental choices including whether or not
to send an expeditionary force to Europe, and if so when and where best to exercise
America's military influence, remained to be decided in the weeks and months ahead.(30)
1. Bernstorff to Lansing, 31 January 1917, PWW, 41:74-9.
2. "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 26
February 1917, ibid., 40:283-87; Diary of Colonel Edward House, 4 March 1917, ibid.,
41:331-32. See also Richard Lowitt, "The Armed-Ship Bill Controversy: A Legislative
View," Mid-America 46 (January 1964): 38-47. Lowitt argues, however, that
the caricature of the "little group of willful men" defeating Wilson's bill by
their filibustering tactics is not accurate, since most of the speeches on the legislation
were given by supporters of it.
3. Press Statement, 12 March 1917 (Enclosure II in note from Robert
Lansing, 9 March), PWW, 41:372.
4. Baker to Wilson, 7 February 1917, ibid., 41:151-2; Diary
of Josephus Daniels 20 March 1917, ibid., 41:444-45; See Baker's
correspondence with Colonel Chester Harding, Canal Zone, and Harrison, Manilla, 3-4
February 1917, Box 2, Documents 3, 4, 5, and 8, Baker Papers, LOC.
5. Baker to Wilson 12 January 1917 and Wilson to Baker 13 January
1917, Box 4, Documents 13 and 14, Baker Papers, LOC; Baker to Wilson, 7 February 1917, PWW,
41:151-2.
6. "Franklin Dinner, Philadelphia," 17 January 1917, Box
81, Scott Papers, LOC.
7. Scott to H. J. Slocum, Laredo, Texas, 12 February 1917, Box 27, ibid.
8. Scott to Chief, War College Division, 1-3 February 1917. RG
165/9433-6, NA.
9. Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Graves, General Staff Secretary, to
Scott, 3 February 1917, RG 165/9433-4, NA.
10. Scott to E. R. Hardin, Staten Island, NY, 6 February 1917, Box
27, Scott Papers, LOC.
11. Scott to Mr. Charles B. Rushmore, New York, NY, 6 February
1917, ibid.
12. Kuhn to Scott, Subj: Studies prepared in the Army War College
relating to possible operations in certain European theaters of war, Appendix A, "A
Study of Conditions Affecting Possible Operations in the Macedonian Theater in Case of War
With Germany," 29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.
13. Scott to Lawrence H. Hamilton, Groton School, MA, 9 February
1917, Box 27, Scott Papers, LOC.
14. S. Hubert Dent, 15 February 1917, and Thomas S. Crago, 16
February 1917, Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 2nd Session, 3370
and 3436, quoted in Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon, 186.
15. Kuhn to Scott, "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,"
29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA.
16. Kuhn to Scott, 29 March 1917, RG 165/9433-6, NA; see Chapter 5
of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of the General Staff's evaluation of these
proposals.
17. General John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War,
2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1:26-28. By the time of the Armistice
the US would
have 1,761,00 rifles, 2,106 75 mm guns and 1,485 heavy guns in France, with
approximately half as many of each also in the United States. Many of the products of
America's mobilization, however, would never see use in the war. An example was America's
effort to meet the nation's requirements of gunpowder, estimated by Major General William
Crozier, Army Chief of Ordnance, to be 300 million pounds for the period May 1917 to May
1918. Although founded in December 1917 and created with the goal of producing 700,000
tons of gunpowder per day, Nitro, West Virginia (named after the gunpowder itself--Nitro
Cellulose), was only producing 350 tons per day by November 1918. William D. Wintz, Nitro:
The World War I Boom Town (Charleston, WV: Pictorial Histories Publishing, 1985), 3-
4, 39-42.
18. Kuhn to Scott, "Plan for a National Army," 27 January
1917, RG 165/9876-9, NA. Bliss to Scott, 31 January 1917, RG 165/9876-13, NA.
19. Kuhn to Scott, 14 February 1917, RG 165/9876-29, NA, cited in
Coffman, "The American Military and Strategic Policy in World War I," 72;
Timothy K Nenninger, "American Military Effectiveness in the First World War,"
in Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, The First World War, ed. Allan R.
Millet and Williamson Murray (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 117-18. Coffman and Nenninger do
not elaborate on their claim that Wilson "endorsed" the plan. Graves to Kuhn, 3
February 1917, RG 165/9433-7, and Kuhn to Scott, "Plan for Raising an Army of 500,000
Men," 20 February 1917, RG 165/9433-7.
20. See Joe Decker, "Progressive Reaction to Selective Service
in World War I" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1969), 19-41; Chambers, To
Raise an Army,
73-124; Captain George Van Horn Moseley to Chief of Staff, 1 March 1915, RG 165/9317-2,
NA, cited in Decker, "Progressive Reaction to Selective Service in World War I,"
21-2.
21. War College Division to Scott, 9 December 1916, RG 165/9832-1,
NA. Scott had requested this report on 31 October 1916; Testimony before Senate Committee
on
Military Affairs, 19 December 1916, RG 165/9876-14.
22. Chambers, To Raise an Army, 126-27; Baker to Wilson,
26 December 1916, with enclosed memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder, 26 December 1916, and
Wilson to Baker, 26 December 1916, PWW, 40:327-330. Wilson had issued this
interpretation following challenges to this portion of the 1916 Act brought by Amos
Pinchot, who feared that this provision (originally inserted by Rep. Carl Hayden of
Arizona) amounted to an under-handed attempt at conscription, and who urged its immediate
repeal. Many others also urged the President to revoke that portion of the Act, including
Henry Morgenthau, Lillian D. Wald and Charles T. Hallinan, Editorial Director of the
American Union Against Militarism, who labelled [ sic] Section 79"blood tax" and
threatened that Wilson would lose the votes of 250,000 Quakers and millions of Socialists.
The President demurred, however, and cited that even such strong opponents of the draft as
James Hay largely concurred with the Administration's view. See Pinchot to Wilson, 9
August 1916, Wilson to Pinchot, 11 August 1916, Hallinan to Tumulty, 18 August 1916 and 23
August 1916, Morgenthau to Wilson 20 September 1916, and Wald to Wilson 23 November 1916,
all cited in James W. Pohl, "The General Staff and American Defense Policy: The
Formative Period, 1898-1917" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1967),383-88.
23. Baker to Wilson, 6 February 1917, Box 4, Baker Papers, LOC. See
also Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 22-24.
24. Secretary for Chief of Staff to Kuhn, 3 February 1917, RG
165/9433-7, NA; Kuhn to Scott, Subj: A Plan for an Expansible Army of 500,000 men based
upon Universal Liability to Military Service, 20 February 1917, RG 165/9433-7, and Kuhn to
Scott, Subj: 500,000 Volunteers in Addition to Regular Army and National Guard, 15 March
1917, RG 165/9433-7.
25. The traditionally accepted date of 4 February was
mis-remembered by Crowder in a speech on 15 March 1928 and was accepted in David A.
Lockmiller, Enoch H. Crowder, Soldier, Lawyer, and Statesman(Columbia, MO:
1955),152-54. Others have accepted it with little question, including John K. Ohl,
"Hugh S. Johnson and the Draft, 1917-18," Prologue 8 (Summer 1976): 86;
Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 16; and Frederick S. Calhoun, Power
and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 1986), 163. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for and effects of
this measure, see Chambers, To Raise an Army, 131-35; Scott to Brigadier General
E. St. James Greble, 24 March 1917, Box 28, Scott Papers, LOC.
26. Baker to Wilson, 29 March 1917, Enclosure,"Summary of the
Bill to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States,"PWW,
41:500-01. Eventually the conscripted "National Army" would comprise
seventy-seven percent of the total number of soldiers. See Kennedy, Over Here: The
First World War and American Society, 149-50; Chambers, To Raise an Army,
134-35.
27. For an account of that meeting see "Memorandum of the
Cabinet Meeting, 2:30-5 pm," 20 March 1917, PWW, 41:436-44; Baker to Scott,
Petrograd, Russia, 1 July 1917, Box 3, Document 115, Baker Papers, LOC: "The first
part of Pershing's expeditionary force left about the middle of June. . . . No definite
plan has as yet been made about the dispatch of further troops abroad. . . ." For a
discussion of the eventual decision to send an army overseas, see Chapter 4 of this
thesis; Chambers, To Raise an Army, 134-41.
28. Roosevelt to Baker, 2 and 7 February 1917, and Baker to
Roosevelt, 3 and 9 February 1917, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E.
Morison, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-54), 8:1087-88. See also
Seward W. Livermore, Politics is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress,
1916-1918 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), 15-31; Frederick L.
Paxson, American Democracy and the World War, vol. 2, America at War,
1917-1918 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966 [Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1939]), 7-8; Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 149;
Roosevelt to Baker, 19 March 1917 and Baker to Roosevelt, 20 March 1917, Box 3, Document
59, Baker Papers, LOC. See also Morrison, ed., Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
8:1164; Roosevelt to Baker, 23 March 1917, enclosure in Baker to Wilson, 26 March 1917, PWW,
41:469-71.
29. Wilson to Baker, 27 March 1917, PWW, 41:478; Chambers,
To Raise an Army, 138; Pohl, "The General Staff and American Defense
Policy," 391.
30. "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress," 2 April
1917, PWW, 41:519-27. See also Millis, Road to War, 436-43.
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