11: The Franco-Prussian War
<< 10: The Expansion of Germany || 12: Bismarck and the German Empire >>
Birth of the German Empire and the French Republic
In 1866 the war between the two great powers of Germany, in which
most of the smaller powers were concerned, led to more decided
measures, in the absorption by Prussia of the weaker states, the
formation of a North German League among the remaining states of
the north, and the offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia
of the south German states. By the treaty of peace with Austria,
that power was excluded from the German League, and Prussia
remained the dominant power in Germany. A constitution for the
League was adopted in 1867, providing for a Diet, or legislative
council of the League, elected by the direct votes of the people,
and an army, which was to be under the command of the Prussian
king and subject to the military laws of Prussia. Each state in
the League bound itself to supply a specified sum for the support
of the army.
Here was a union with a backbone - an army and a budget - and
Bismarck had done more in the five years of his ministry in
forming a united Germany than his predecessors had done in fifty
years. But the idea of union and alliance between kindred states
was then widely in the air. Such a union had been practically
completed in Italy, and Hungary in 1867 regained her ancient
rights, which had been taken from her in 1849, being given a
separate government, with Francis Joseph, the emperor of Austria,
as its king. It was natural that the common blood of the Germans
should lead them to a political confederation, and equally
natural that Prussia, which so overshadowed the smaller states in
strength, should be the leading element in the alliance.
Yet, though Prussia had concluded military agreements with the
states of southern Germany and held them also by means of the
Zollverein, this was far from bringing about a peaceful
realization of unity. The southern states, not merely the
sovereigns only, but the peoples, have always had little taste
for Prussian leadership, and after 1866 this feeling was very
visible. For this reason Bismarck felt it important to instigate
a war against France. Union against the foreigner was to complete
political unity. This subject has been dealt with in the
preceding chapter, and we need here merely to repeat that warlike
sentiments were in the air in 1867, in regard to the desire of
Napoleon III to add to his empire the little duchy of Luxembourg
and Bismarck's opposition to this desire. France was not then in
a favorable condition for war, and the matter was finally settled
by declaring Luxembourg a neutral state and ordering the walls
around its capital to be destroyed.
CAUSES OF HOSTILE RELATIONS
In spite of this settlement, it remained certain to everybody
that a conflict would break out in a short time between France
and Prussia. We have seen what reasons Bismarck had for such a
war. Napoleon III's government, justly censured by opinion for
the weakness which it had shown in 1866, was eager to retrieve
the fault it had then committed. Yet the weakness of the
administration continued and prevented it from adopting the
indispensable military measures that it should have done. The
enemies of power were declaiming against standing armies, which
they declared useless. The government deputies were afraid to
dissatisfy their constituents by aggravating the burdens of the
service. Marshal Niel, minister of war, tried indeed to adopt
measures with a view to the seemingly inevitable conflict. He
caused to be elaborated a plan of campaign, a system of
transportation by railway, an arrangement for the chief places of
the east to be armed with rifled cannon. But the Chamber grudged
him the appropriations for the increase of the army, asking him
if "he wished to make France a vast barracks." "Take care," he
answered the opposition, "lest you make it a vast cemetery."
Accordingly, when the mobile national guard had been created,
made up of all the young men who had not been drawn by lot,
organization was given to it only on paper, and it was never
drilled. Leboeuf, who succeeded Niel in August, 1869, abandoned,
moreover, most of his predecessor's plans. He even neglected to
do anything towards carrying out on the eastern frontier any of
the works of defense already recommended as urgent by the
generals of the restoration.
And thus time passed on until the eventful year 1870. By that
year Prussia had completed its work among the north German states
and was ready for the issue of hostilities, if this should be
necessary. On the other hand, Napoleon, who had found his
prestige in France from various causes decreasing, felt obliged
in 1870 to depart from his policy of personal rule and give that
country a constitutional government. This proposal was submitted
to a vote of the people and was sustained by an immense majority.
He also took occasion to state that "peace was never more assured
than at the present time." This assurance gave satisfaction to
the world, yet it was a false one, for war was probably at that
moment assured.
DISCONTENT IN FRANCE
There were alarming signs in France. The opposition to
Napoleonism was steadily gaining power. A bad harvest was
threatened - a serious source of discontent. The parliament was
discussing the reversal of the sentence of banishment against the
Orleans family. These indications of a change in public sentiment
appeared to call for some act that would aid in restoring the
popularity of the emperor. And of all the acts that could be
devised a national war seemed the most promising. If the Rhine
frontier, which every Frenchman regarded as the natural boundary
of the empire, could be regained by the arms of the nation,
discontent and opposition would vanish, the name of Napoleon
would win back its old prestige, and the reign of Bonapartism
would be firmly established.
Acts speak louder than words, and the acts of Napoleon were not
in accord with his assurances of peace. Extensive military
preparations began, and the forces of the empire were
strengthened by land and sea, while great trust was placed in a
new weapon, of murderous powers, called the Mitrailleuse, the
predecessor of the machine gun, and capable of discharging
twenty-five balls at once.
CAUSES OF HOSTILE RELATIONS
On the other hand, there were abundant indications of discontent
in Germany, where a variety of parties inveighed against the
rapacious policy of Prussia, and where Bismarck had sown a deep
crop of hate. It was believed in France that the minor states
would not support Prussia in a war. In Austria the defeat of 1866
rankled, and hostilities against Prussia on the part of France
seemed certain to win sympathy and support in that composite
empire. Colonel Stoffel, the French military envoy at Berlin,
declared that Prussia would be found abundantly prepared for a
struggle; but his warnings went unheeded in the French Cabinet,
and the warlike preparations continued.
Napoleon did not have to go far for an excuse for the war upon
which he was resolved. One was prepared for him in that potent
source of trouble, the succession to the throne of Spain. In that
country there had for years been no end of trouble, revolts,
Carlist risings, wars and rumors of wars. The government of Queen
Isabella, with its endless intrigues, plots and alternation of
despotism and anarchy, and the pronounced immorality of the
queen, had become so distasteful to the people that finally,
after several years of revolts and armed risings, she was driven
from her throne by a revolution, and for a time Spain was without
a monarch and was ruled on the republican principles.
But this arrangement did not prove satisfactory. The party in
opposition looked around for a king, and negotiations began with
a distant relative of the Prussian royal family, Leopold of
Hohenzollern. Prince Leopold accepted the offer, and informed the
king of Prussia of his decision.
The news of this event caused great excitement in Paris, and the
Prussian government was advised of the painful feeling to which
the incident had given rise. The answer from Berlin that the
Prussian government had no concern in the matter, and that Prince
Leopold was free to act on his own account, did not allay the
excitement. The demand for war grew violent and clamorous, the
voices of the feeble opposition in the Chambers were drowned, and
the journalists and war partisans were confident of a short and
glorious campaign and a triumphant march to Berlin.
The hostile feeling was reduced when King William of Prussia,
though he declined to prohibit Prince Leopold from accepting the
crown, expressed his concurrence with the decision of the prince
when he withdrew his acceptance of the dangerous offer. This
decision was regarded as sufficient, even in Paris; but it did
not seem to be so in the palace, where an excuse for a
declaration of war was ardently desired. The emperor's purpose
was enhanced by the influence of the empress, and it was finally
declared that the Prussian king had aggrieved France in
permitting the prince to become a candidate for the throne
without consulting the French Cabinet.
WAR WITH PRUSSIA DECLARED
Satisfaction for this shadowy source of offense was demanded, but
King William firmly refused to say any more on the subject and
declined to stand in the way of Prince Leopold if he should again
accept the offer of the Spanish throne. This refusal was declared
to be an offense to the honor and a threat to the safety of
France. The war party was so strongly in the ascendant that all
opposition was now looked upon as lack of patriotism, and on the
15th of July the Prime Minister Ollivier announced that the
reserves were to be called out and the necessary measures taken
to secure the honor and security of France. When the declaration
of war was hurled against Prussia the whole nation seemed in
harmony with it and public opinion appeared for once to have
become a unit throughout France.
Rarely in the history of the world has so trivial a cause given
rise to such stupendous military and political events as took
place in France in a brief interval following this blind leap
into hostilities. Instead of a triumphant march to Berlin and the
dictation of peace from its palace, France was to find itself in
two months' time without an emperor or an army, and in a few
months more completely subdued and occupied by foreign troops,
while Paris had been made the scene of a terrible siege and a
frightful communistic riot, and a republic had succeeded the
empire. It was such a series of events as have seldom been
compressed within the short interval of half a year.
In truth Napoleon and his advisers were blinded by their hopes to
the true state of affairs. The army on which they depended, and
which they assumed to be in a high state of efficiency and
discipline, was lacking in almost every requisite of an efficient
force. The first Napoleon had been his own minister of war. The
third Napoleon, when told by his war minister that "not a single
button was wanted on a single gaiter," took the words for the
fact, and hurled an army without supplies and organization
against the most thoroughly organized army the world had ever
known. That the French were as brave as the Germans goes without
saying; they fought desperately, but from the first confusion
reigned in their movements, while military science of the highest
kind dominated those of the Germans.
Napoleon was equally mistaken as to the state of affairs in
Germany. The disunion upon which he counted vanished at the first
threat of war. All Germany felt itself threatened and joined
hands in defense. The declaration of war was received there with
as deep an enthusiasm as in France and excited a fervent
eagerness for the struggle. The new popular song, DIE WACHT AM
RHEIN ("The Watch on the Rhine"), spread rapidly from end to end
of the country, and indicated the resolution of the German people
to defend to the death the frontier stream of their country.
SELF-DECEPTION OF THE FRENCH
The French looked for a parade march to Berlin, even fixing the
day of their entrance into that city - August 15th, the emperor's
birthday. On the contrary, they failed to set their foot on
German territory, and soon found themselves engaged in a death
struggle with the invaders of their own land. In truth, while the
Prussian diplomacy was conducted by Bismarck, the ablest
statesman Prussia had ever known, the movements of the army were
directed by far the best tactician Europe then possessed, the
famous Von Moltke, to whose strategy the rapid success of the war
against Austria had been due. In the war with France Von Moltke,
though too old to lead the armies in person, was virtually
commander-in-chief, and arranged those masterly combinations
which overthrew all the power of France in so remarkably brief a
period. Under his directions, from the moment war was declared
everything worked with clock-like precision. It was said that Von
Moltke had only to touch a bell and all went forward. As it was,
the Crown Prince Frederick fell upon the French while still
unprepared, won the first battle, and steadily held the advantage
to the end, the French being beaten by the strategy that kept the
Germans in superior strength at all decisive points.
But to return to the events of war. On July 23, 1870, the Emperor
Napoleon, after making his wife, Eugenie regent of France, set
out with his son at the head of the army, full of high hopes of
victory and triumph. By the end of July King William had also set
out from Berlin to join the armies that were then in rapid
motion, towards the frontier.
The emperor made his way to Metz, where was stationed his main
army, about 200,000 strong, under Marshals Bazaine and Canrobert
and General Bourgaki. Further east, under Marshal MacMahon, the
hero of Magenta, was the southern army, of about 100,000 men. A
third army occupied the camp at Chalons, while a well-manned
fleet set sail for the Baltic, to blockade the harbors and assail
the coast of Germany. The German army was likewise in three
divisions, the first, of 61,000 men, under General Steinmetz; the
second, of 206,000 men, under Prince Frederick Charles; and the
third, of 180,000 men, under the crown prince and General
Blumenthal. The king, commander-in-chief of the whole, was in the
center, and with him the general staff under the guidance of the
alert von Moltke. Bismarck and the minister of war Von Roon were
also present, and so rapid was the movement of these great forces
that in two weeks after the order to march was given 300,000
armed Germans stood in rank along the Rhine.
FIRST MEETING OF THE ARMIES
The two armies first came together on August 2d, near Saarbruck,
on the frontier line of the hostile kingdoms. It was the one
success of the French, for the Prussians, after a fight in which
both sides lost equally, retired in good order. This was
proclaimed by the French papers as a brilliant victory, and
filled the people with undue hopes of glory. It was the last
favorable report, for they were quickly overwhelmed with tidings
of defeat and disaster.
Weissenburg, on the borders of Rhenish Bavaria, had been invested
by a division of MacMahon's army. On August 4th the right wing of
the army of the Crown Prince Frederick attacked and repulsed this
investing force after a hot engagement, in which its leader,
General Douay, was killed, and the loss on both sides was heavy.
Two days later occurred a battle which decided the fate of the
whole war, that of Worth-Reideshofen, where the army of the crown
prince met that of MacMahon, and after a desperate struggle,
which continued for fifteen hours, completely defeated him, with
very heavy losses on both sides. MacMahon retreated in haste
towards the army at Chalons, while the crown prince took
possession of Alsace, and prepared for the reduction of the
fortresses on the Rhine, from Strasburg to Belfort. On the same
day as that of the battle of Worth, General Steinmetz stormed the
heights of Spicheren, and, though at great loss of life, drove
Frossard from those heights and back upon Metz.
The occupation of Alsace was followed by that of Lorraine, by the
Prussian army under King William, who took possession of Nancy
and the country surrounding on August 11th. These two provinces
had at one time belonged to Germany, and it was the aim of the
Prussians to retain them as the chief anticipated prize of the
war. Meanwhile the world looked on in amazement at the
extraordinary rapidity of the German success, which, in two weeks
after Napoleon left Paris, had brought his power to the verge of
overthrow.
THE STRONGHOLD OF METZ
Towards the Moselle River and the strongly fortified town of
Metz, 180 miles northeast of Paris, around which was concentrated
the main French force, all the divisions of the German army now
advanced, and on the 14th of August they gained a victory at
Colombey-Nouilly which drove their opponents back from the open
field towards the fortified city.
It was Moltke's opinion that the French proposed to make their
stand before this impregnable fortress, and fight there
desperately for victory. But, finding less resistance than he
expected, he concluded, on the 15th, that Bazaine, in fear of
being cooped up within the fortress, meant to march towards
Verdun, there to join his forces with those of MacMahon and give
battle to the Germans in the plain.
The astute tactician at once determined to make every effort to
prevent such a concentration of his opponents, and by the evening
of the 15th a cavalry division had crossed the Moselle and
reached the village of Mars-la-Tour, where it bivouacked for the
night. It had seen troops in motion towards Metz, hut did not
know whether these formed the rear-guard of the French army or
its vanguard in its march towards Verdun.
In fact, Bazaine had not yet got away with his army. All the
roads from Metz were blocked with heavy baggage, and it was
impossible to move so large an army with expedition. The time
thus lost by Bazaine was diligently improved by Frederick
Charles, and on the morning of the 16th the Brandenburg army
corps, one of the best and bravest in the German army, had
followed the cavalry and come within sight of the Verdun road. It
was quickly perceived that a French force was before them, and
some preliminary skirmishing developed the enemy in such strength
as to convince the leader of the corps that he had in his front
the whole or the greater part of Bazaine's army, and that its
escape from Metz had not been achieved.
They were desperate odds with which the brave Brandenburgers had
to contend, but they had been sent to hold the French until
reinforcements could arrive, and they were determined to resist
to the death. For nearly six hours they resisted, with
unsurpassed courage, the fierce onslaughts of the French, though
at a cost of life that perilously depleted the gallant corps.
Then, about four o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Frederick
Charles came up with reinforcements to their support and the
desperate contest became more even.
MARS-LA-TOUR AND GRAVELOTTE
Gradually fortune decided in favor of the Germans, and by the
time night had come they were practically victorious, the field
of Mars-la-Tour, after the day's struggle, remaining in their
hands. But they were utterly exhausted, their horses were worn
out, and most of their ammunition was spent, and though their
impetuous commander forced them to a new attack, it led to a
useless loss of life, for their powers of fighting were gone.
They had achieved a fearful loss, amounting to about 16,000 men
on each side. "The battle of Vionville (Mars-la-Tour) is without
a parallel in military history," said Emperor William, "seeing
that a single army corps, about 20,000 men strong, hung on to and
repulsed an enemy more than five times as numerous and well
equipped. Such was the glorious deed done by the Brandenburgers,
and the Hohenzollerns will never forget the debt they owe to
their devotion."
Two days afterwards (August 16th) at Gravelotte, a village
somewhat nearer to Metz, the armies, somewhat recovered from the
terrible struggle of the 14th, met again, the whole German army
being now brought up, so that over 100,000 men faced the 140,000
of the French. It was the great battle of the war. For four hours
the two armies stood fighting face to face, without any special
result, neither being able to drive back the other. The French
held their ground and died. The Prussians dashed upon them and
died. Only late in the evening was the right wing of the French
army broken, and the victory, which at five o'clock remained
uncertain, was decided in favor of the Germans. More than 40,000
men lay dead and wounded upon the field, the terrible harvest of
those nine hours of conflict. That night Bazaine withdrew his
army behind the fortifications at Metz. His effort to join
MacMahon had ended in failure.
It was the fixed purpose of the Prussians to detain him in that
stronghold, and thus render practically useless to France its
largest army. A siege was to be prosecuted, and an army of
150,000 men was extended around the town. The fortifications were
far too strong to be taken by assault, and all depended on a
close blockade. On August 31st Bazaine made an effort to break
through the German lines, but was repulsed. It became now a
question of how long the provisions of the French would hold out.
NAPOLEON III AT SEDAN
The French emperor, who had been with Bazaine, had left his army
before the battle of Mars-la-Tour, and was now with MacMahon at
Chalons. Here lay an army of 125,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.
On it the Germans were advancing, in doubt as to what movement it
would make, whether back towards Paris or towards Metz for the
relief of Bazaine. They sought to place themselves in a position
to check either. The latter movement was determined on by the
French, but was carried out in a dubious and uncertain manner,
the time lost giving abundant opportunity to the Germans to learn
what was afoot and to prepare to prevent it. As soon as they were
aware of MacMahon's intention of proceeding to Metz they made
speedy preparations to prevent his relieving Bazaine. By the last
days of August the army of the crown prince had reached the right
bank of the Aisne, and the fourth division gained possession of
the line of the Meuse. On August 30th the French under General de
Failly were attacked by the Germans at Beaumont and put to flight
with heavy loss. It was evident that the hope of reaching Metz
was at an end, and MacMahon, abandoning the attempt, concentrated
his army around the frontier fortress of Sedan.
This old town stands on the right bank of the Meuse, in an angle
of territory between Luxembourg and Belgium, and is surrounded by
meadows, gardens, ravines, ditches and cultivated fields; the
castle rising on a cliff-like eminence to the southwest of the
place. MacMahon had stopped here to give his weary men a rest,
not to fight, but von Moltke decided, on observing the situation,
that Sedan should be the grave-yard of the French army. "The trap
is now closed, and the mouse in it," he said, with a chuckle of
satisfaction.
Such proved to be the case. On September 1st the Bavarians won
the village of Bazeille, after hours of bloody and desperate
struggle. During this severe fight Marshal MacMahon was so
seriously wounded that he was obliged to surrender the chief
command, first to Duerot, and then to General Wimpffen, a man of
recognized bravery and cold calculation.
Fortune soon showed itself in favor of the Germans. To the
northwest of the town, the North German troops invested the exits
from St. Meuges and Fleigneux, and directed a fearful fire of
artillery against the French forces, which, before noon, were so
hemmed in the valley that only two insufficient outlets to the
south and north remained open. But General Wimpffen hesitated to
seize either of these routes, the open way to Illy was soon
closed by the Prussian guard corps, and a murderous fire was now
directed from all sides upon the French, so that, after a last
energetic struggle, they gave up all attempts to force a passage,
and in the afternoon beat a retreat towards Sedan. In this small
town the whole army of MacMahon was collected by evening, and
there prevailed in the streets and houses an unprecedented
disorder and confusion, which was still further increased when
the German troops from the surrounding heights began to shoot
down upon the fortress, and the town took fire in several places.
SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY
That an end might be put to the prevailing misery, Napoleon now
commanded General Wimpffen to capitulate. The flag of truce
already waved on the gates of Sedan when Colonel Bronsart
appeared, and in the name of the king of Prussia demanded the
surrender of the army and fortress. He soon returned to
headquarters, accompanied by the French General Reille, who
presented to the king a written message from Napoleon: "As I may
not die in the midst of my army, I lay my sword in the hands of
your majesty." King William accepted it with an expression of
sympathy for the hard fate of the emperor and of the French army
which had fought so bravely under his own eyes. The conclusion of
the treaty of capitulation was placed in the hands of Wimpffen,
who, accompanied by General Castelnau, set out for Donchery to
negotiate with Moltke and Bismarck. No attempts, however, availed
to move Moltke from his stipulation for the surrender of the
whole army at discretion; he granted a short respite, but if this
expired without surrender, the bombardment of the town was to
begin anew.
At six o'clock in the morning the capitulation was signed and was
ratified by the king at his headquarters at Vendresse (2d
September). Thus the world beheld the incredible spectacle of an
army of 83,000 men surrendering themselves and their weapons to
the victor, and being carried off as prisoners of war to Germany.
Only the officers who gave their written word of honor to take no
further part in the present war with Germany were permitted to
retain their arms and personal property. Probably the assurance
of Napoleon, the he had sought death on the battle-field but had
not found it, was literally true; at any rate, the fate of the
unhappy man, bowed down as he was both by physical and mental
suffering, was so solemn and tragic that there was no room for
hypocrisy, and that he had exposed himself to personal danger was
admitted on all sides. Accompanied by Count Bismarck, he stopped
at a small and mean-looking laborer's inn on the road to
Donchery, where, sitting down on a stone seat before the door,
with Count Bismarck, he declared that he had not desired the war,
but had been driven to it through the force of public opinion;
and afterwards the two proceeded to the little castle of
Bellevue, near Frenois, to join King William and the crown
prince. A telegram to Queen Augusta thus describes the interview:
"What an impressive moment was the meeting with Napoleon! He was
cast down, but dignified in his bearing. I have granted him
Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, as his residence. Our meeting took
place in a little castle before the western glacis of Sedan.
THE EMPEROR A CAPTIVE; FRANCE A REPUBLIC
The locking up of Bazaine in Metz and the capture of MacMahon's
army at Sedan were events fatal to France. The struggle continued
for months, but it was a fight against hope. The subsequent
events of the war consisted of a double siege, that of Metz and
that of Paris, with various minor sieges, and a desperate but
hopeless effort of France in the field. As for the empire of
Napoleon III, it was at an end. The tidings of the terrible
catastrophe at Sedan filled the people with a fury that soon
became revolutionary. While Jules Favre, the republican deputy,
was offering a motion in the Assembly that the emperor had
forfeited the crown, and that a provisional government should be
established, the people were thronging the streets of Paris with
cries of "Deposition! Republic!" On the 4th of September the
Assembly had its final meeting. Two of its prominent members,
Jules Favre and Gambetta, sustained the motion for deposition of
the emperor, and it was carried after a stormy session. They then
made their way to the senate-chamber, where, before a thronging
audience, they proclaimed a republic and named a government for
the national defense. At its head was General Trochu, military
commandant at Paris. Favre was made minister of foreign affairs;
Gambetta, minister of the interior; and other prominent members
of te Assembly filled the remaining cabinet posts. The
legislature was dissolved, the Palais de Bourbon was closed, and
the Empress Eugenie quitted the Tuileries and made her escape
with a few attendants to Belgium, whence she sought a refuge in
England. Prince Louis Napoleon made his way to Italy, and the
swarm of courtiers scattered in all directions; some faithful
followers of the deposed monarch seeking the castle of
Wilhelmshohe, where the unhappy Louis Napoleon occupied as a
prison the same beautiful palace and park in which his uncle
Jerome Bonaparte had once passed six years in a life of pleasure.
The second French Empire was at an end; the third French Republic
had begun - one that had to pass through many changes and escape
many dangers before it would be firmly established.
"Not a foot's breadth of our country nor a stone of our
fortresses shall be surrendered," was Jules Favre's defiant
proclamation to the invaders, and the remainder of the soldiers
in the field were collected in Paris, and strengthened with all
available reinforcements. Every person capable of bearing arms
was enrolled in the national army, which soon numbered 400,000
men. There was need of haste, for the victors at Sedan were
already marching upon the capital, inspired with high hopes from
their previous astonishing success. They knew that Paris was
strongly fortified, being encircled by powerful lines of defense,
but they trusted that hunger would soon bring its garrison to
terms. The same result was looked for at Metz, and at Strasbourg,
which was also besieged.
Thus began at three main points and several minor ones a military
siege the difficulties, dangers, and hardships of which surpassed
even those of the winter campaign in the Crimea. Exposed at the
fore-posts to the enemy's balls, chained to arduous labor in the
trenches and redoubts, and suffering from the effects of bad
weather, and insufficient food and clothing, the German soldiers
were compelled to undergo great privations and sufferings before
the fortifications; while many fell in the frequent skirmishes
and sallies, many succumbed to typhus and epidemic disease.
No less painful and distressing was the condition of the
besieged. While the garrison soldiers on guard were constantly
compelled to face death in nocturnal sallies, or led a pitiable
existence in damp huts, having inevitable surrender constantly
before their eyes, and disarmament and imprisonment as the reward
of all their struggles and exertions, the citizens in the towns,
the women and children, were in constant danger of being shivered
to atoms by the fearful shells, or of being buried under falling
walls and roofs; and the poorer part of the population saw with
dismay the gradual diminution of the necessaries of life, and
were often compelled to pacify their hunger with the flesh of
horses, and disgusting and unwholesome food.
BISMARCK REFUSES INTERVENTION
The republican government possessed only a usurped power, and
none but a freely elected national assembly could decide as to
the fate of the French nation. Such an assembly was therefore
summoned for the 16th of October. Three members of the government
- Cremieux, Fourichon, and Glais-Bizoin - were despatched before
the entire blockade of the city had been effected, to Tours, to
maintain communication with the provinces. An attempt was also
made at the same time to induce the great Powers which had not
taken part in the war to organize an intervention, as hitherto
only America, Switzerland and Spain had sent official
recognition. For this important and delicate mission the old
statesman and historian Thiers was selected, and, in spite of his
three-and-seventy years, immediately set out on the journey to
London, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Florence. Count Bismarck,
however, in the name of Prussia, refused any intervention in
internal affairs. In two despatches to the ambassadors of foreign
courts, the chancellor declared that the war, begun by the
Emperor Napoleon, had been approved by the representatives of the
nation, and that thus all France was answerable for the result.
Germany was obliged, therefore, to demand guarantees which should
secure her in future against attack, or, at any rate, render
attack more difficult. Thus a cession of territory on the part of
France was laid down as the basis of a treaty of peace. The
neutral powers were also led to the belief that if they fostered
in the French any hope of intervention, peace would only be
delayed. The mission of Thiers, therefore, yielded no useful
result, while the direct negotiation which Jules Favre conducted
with Bismarck proved equally unavailing.
FALL OF THE FORTRESSES
Soon the beleaguered fortresses began to fall. On the 23d of
September the ancient town of Toul, in Lorraine, was forced to
capitulate, after a fearful bombardment; and on the 27th
Strasbourg, in danger of the terrible results of a storming,
after the havoc of a dreadful artillery fire, hoisted the white
flag, and surrendered on the following day. The supposed
impregnable fortress of Metz held out little longer. Hunger did
what cannon were incapable of doing. The successive sallies made
by Bazaine proved unavailing, though, on October 7th his soldiers
fought with desperate energy, and for hours the air was full of
the roar of cannon and mitrailleuse and the rattle of musketry.
But the Germans withstood the attack unmoved, and the French were
forced to withdraw into the town.
Bazaine then sought to negotiate with the German leaders at
Versailles, offering to take no part in the war for three months
if permitted to withdraw. But Bismarck and Moltke would listen to
no terms other than unconditional surrender, and these terms were
finally accepted, the besieged army having reached the brink of
starvation. It was with horror and despair that France learned on
the 30th of October, that the citadel of Metz, with its
fortifications and arms of defense, had been yielded to the
Germans, and its army of more than 150,000 men had surrendered as
prisoners of war.
This hasty surrender at Metz, a still greater disaster to France
than that of Sedan, was not emulated at Paris, which for four
months held out against all the efforts of the Germans. On the
investment of the great city, King William removed his
headquarters to the historic palace of Versailles, setting up his
homely camp-bed in the same apartments from which Lois XIV had
once issued his despotic edicts and commands. Here Count Bismarck
conducted his diplomatic labors and Moltke issued his directions
for the siege, which, protracted from week to week and month to
month, gradually transformed the beautiful neighborhood, with its
prosperous villages, superb country houses, and enchanting parks
and gardens, into a scene of sadness and desolation.
PARIS IS BESIEGED
In spite of the vigorous efforts made by the commander-in-chief
Trochu, both by continuous firing from the forts and by repeated
sallies, to prevent Paris from being surrounded, and to force a
way through the trenches, his enterprises were rendered fruitless
by the watchfulness and strength of the Germans. The blockade was
completely accomplished; Paris was surrounded and cut off from
the outer world; even the underground telegraphs, through which
communication was for a time secretly maintained with the
provinces, were by degrees discovered and destroyed. But to the
great astonishment of Europe, which looked on with keenly pitched
excitement at the mighty struggle, the siege continued for months
without any special progress being observable from without or any
lessening of resistance from within. On account of the extension
of the forts, the Germans were compelled to remain at such a
distance that a bombardment of the town at first appeared
impossible; a storming of the outer works would, moreover, be
attended with such sacrifices that the humane temper of the king
revolted from such a proceeding. The guns of greater force and
carrying power which were needed from Germany, could only be
procured after long delay on account of the broken lines of
railway. Probably also there was some hesitation on the German
side to expose the beautiful city, regarded by so many as the
"metropolis of civilization," to the risk of a bombardment, in
which works of art, science, and a historical past would meet
destruction. Nevertheless, the declamations of the French at the
vandalism of the northern barbarians met with assent and sympathy
from most of the foreign Powers.
Determination and courage falsified the calculations at
Versailles of a quick cessation of the resistance. The republic
offered a far more energetic and determined opposition to the
Prussian arms than the empire had done. The government of the
national defense still declaimed with stern reiteration: "Not a
foot's breadth of our country; not a stone of our fortresses!"
and positively rejected all proposals of treaty based on
territorial concessions. Faith in the invincibility of the
republic was rooted as an indisputable dogma in the hearts of the
French people. The victories and the commanding position of
France from 1792 to 1799 were regarded as so entirely the
necessary result of the Revolution, that a conviction prevailed
that the formation of a republic, with a national army for its
defense, would have an especial effect on the rest of Europe.
Therefore, instead of summoning a constituent Assembly, which, in
the opinion of Prussia and the other foreign Powers, would alone
be capable of offering security for a lasting peace, it was
decided to continue the revolutionary movements, and to follow
the same course which, in the years 1792 and 1793, had saved
France from the coalition of the European Powers. It was held
that a revolutionary dictatorship such as had once been exercised
by the Convention and the members of the Committee of Public
Safety, must again be revived, and a youthful and hot-blooded
leader was alone needed to stir up popular feeling and set it in
motion.
To fill such a part no one was better adapted than the advocate
Gambetta, who emulated the career of the leaders of the
Revolution, and whose soul glowed with a passionate ardor of
patriotism. In order to create for himself a free sphere of
action, and to initiate some vigorous measure in place of the
well-rounded phrases and eloquent proclamations of his colleagues
Trochu and Jules Favre, he quitted the capital in an air-balloon
and entered into communication with the government delegation at
Tours, which through him soon obtained a fresh impetus. His next
most important task was the liberation of the capital from the
besieging German army, and the expulsion of the enemy from the
"sacred" soil of France. For this purpose he summoned, with the
authority of a minister of war, all persons capable of bearing
arms up to forty years of age to take active service, and
despatched them into the field; he imposed war-taxes, and
terrified the tardy and refractory with threats of punishment.
Every force was put in motion; all France was transformed into a
great camp.
A popular war was now to take the place of a soldier's war, and
what the soldiers had failed to effect must be accomplished by
the people; France must be saved, and the world freed from
despotism. To promote this object, the whole of France, with the
exception of Paris, was divided into four general governments,
the headquarters of the different governors being Lille, Le Mans,
Bourges, and Besancon. Two armies, from the Loire and from the
Somme, were to march simultaneously towards Paris, and aided by
the sallies of Trochu and his troops, were to drive the enemy
from the country. Energetic attacks were now attempted from time
to time, in the hope that when the armies of relief arrived from
the provinces, it might be possible to effect a coalition; but
all these efforts were constantly repulsed after a hot struggle
by the besieging German troops. At the same time, during the
month of October, the territory between the Oise and the Lower
Seine was scoured by reconnoitering troops, under Prince
Albrecht, the southeast district was protected by a Wurtemberg
detachment through the successful battle near Nogent on the
Seine, while a division of the third army advanced towards the
south accompanied by two cavalry divisions. A more unfortunate
circumstance, however, for the Parisians was the cutting off of
all communication with the outer world, for the Germans had
destroyed the telegraphs. But even this obstacle was overcome by
the inventive genius of the French. By means of pigeon
letter-carriers and air-balloons, they were always able to
maintain a partial though one-sided and imperfect communication
with the provinces, and the aerostatic art was developed and
brought to perfection on this occasion in a manner which had
never before been considered possible.
DEFIANT SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH
The whole of France, and especially the capital, was already in a
state of intense excitement when the news of the capitulation of
Metz came to add fresh fuel to the flame. Outside the walls
Gambetta was using heroic efforts to increase his forces,
bringing Bedouin horsemen from Africa and inducing the stern old
revolutionist Garibaldi to come to his aid; and Thiers was
opening fresh negotiations for a truce. Inside the walls the Red
Republic raised the banners of insurrection and attempted to
drive the government of national defense from power.
This effort of the dregs of revolution to inaugurate a reign of
terror failed, and the provisional government felt so elated with
its victory that it determined to continue at the head of affairs
and to oppose the calling of a chamber of national
representatives. The members proclaimed oblivion for what had
passed, broke off the negotiations for a truce begun by Thiers,
and demanded a vote of confidence. The indomitable spirit shown
by the French people did not, on the other hand, inspire the
Germans with a very lenient or conciliatory temper. Bismarck
declared in a despatch the reasons why the negotiations had
failed: "The incredible demand that we should surrender the
fruits of all our efforts during the last two months, and should
go back to the conditions which existed at the beginning of the
blockade of Paris, only affords fresh proof that in Paris
pretexts are sought for refusing the nation the right of
election." Thiers mournfully declared the failure of his
undertaking, but in Paris the popular voting resulted in a
ten-fold majority in favor of the government and the policy of
postponement.
After the breaking off of the negotiations, the world anticipated
some energetic action towards the besieged city. The efforts of
the enemy were, however, principally directed to drawing the iron
girdle still tighter, enclosing the giant city more and more
closely, and cutting off every means of communication, so that at
last a surrender might be brought about by the stern necessity of
starvation. That this object would not be accomplished as
speedily as at Metz, that the city of pleasure, enjoyment, and
luxury would withstand a siege of four months, had never been
contemplated for a moment. It is true that, as time went on, all
fresh meat disappeared from the market, with the exception of
horse-flesh; that white bread, on which Parisians place such
value, was replaced by a baked compound of meal and bran; that
the stores of dried and salted food began to decline, until at
last rats, dogs, cats, and even animals from the zoological
gardens were prepared for consumption at restaurants.
Yet, to the amazement of the world, all these miseries,
hardships, and sufferings were courageously borne, nocturnal
watch was kept, sallies were undertaken, and cold, hunger, and
wretchedness of all kinds were endured with an indomitable
steadfastness and heroism. The courage of the besieged Parisians
was also animated by the hope that the military forces in the
provinces would hasten to the aid of the hard-pressed capital,
and that therefore an energetic resistance would afford the rest
of France sufficient time for rallying all its forces, and at the
same time exhibit an elevating example. In the carrying out of
this plan, neither Trochu nor Gambetta was wanting in the
requisite energy and circumspection. The former organized sallies
from time to time, in order to reconnoiter and discover whether
the army of relief was on its way from the provinces; the latter
exerted all his powers to bring the Loire army up to the Seine.
But both erred in undervaluing the German war forces; they did
not believe that the hostile army would be able to keep Paris in
a state of blockade, and at the same time engage the armies on
the south and north, east and west. They had no conception of the
hidden, inexhaustible strength of the Prussian army organization
- of a nation in arms which could send forth constant
reinforcements of battalions and recruits, and fresh bodies of
disciplined troops to fill the gaps left in the ranks by the
wounded and fallen. There could be no doubt as to the termination
of this terrible war, or the final victory of German energy and
discipline.
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED
Throughout the last months of the eventful year 1870, the
northern part of France, from the Jura to the Channel, from the
Belgian frontier to the Loire, presented the aspect of a wide
battlefield. Of the troops that had been set free by the
capitulation of Metz, a part remained behind in garrison, another
division marched northwards in order to invest the provinces of
Picardy and Normandy, to restore communication with the sea, and
to bar the road to Paris, and a third division joined the second
army whose commander-in-chief, Prince Frederick Charles, set up
his headquarters at Troyes. Different detachments were despatched
against the northern fortresses, and by degrees Soissons, Verdun,
Thionville, Ham, where Napoleon had once been a prisoner,
Pfalzburg and Montmedy, all fell into the hands of the Prussians,
thus opening to them a free road for the supplies of provisions.
The garrison troops were all carried off as prisoners to Germany;
the towns - most of them in a miserable condition - fell into the
enemy's hands; many houses were mere heaps of ruins and ashes,
and the larger part of the inhabitants were suffering severely
from poverty, hunger and disease.
The greatest obstacles were encountered in the northern part of
Alsace and the mountainous districts of the Vosges and the Jura,
where irregular warfare, under Garibaldi and other leaders,
developed to a dangerous extent, while the fortress of Langres
afforded a safe retreat to the guerilla bands. Lyons and the
neighboring town of St. Etienne became hotbeds of excitement,
the red flag being raised and a despotism of terror and violence
established. Although many divergent elements made up this army
of the east, all were united in hatred of the Germans.
Thus, during the cold days of November and December, when General
Von Treskow began the siege of the important fortress of Belfort,
there burst forth a war around Gray and Dijon marked by the
greatest hardships, perils and privations to the invaders. Here
the Germans had to contend with an enemy much superior in number,
and to defend themselves against continuous firing from houses,
cellars, woods and thickets, while the impoverished soil yielded
a miserable subsistence, and the broken railroads cut off freedom
of communication and of reinforcement.
The whole of the Jura district, intersected by hilly roads as far
as the plateau of Langres, where, in the days of Caesar, the
Romans and Gauls were wont to measure their strength with each
other, formed during November and December the scene of action of
numerous encounters which, in conjunction with sallies from the
garrison at Belfort, inflicted severe injury on Werder's troops.
Dijon had repeatedly to be evacuated; and the nocturnal attack at
Chattillon, 20th November, by Garibaldians, when one hundred
seventy horses were lost, affording a striking proof of the
dangers to which the German army was exposed in this hostile
country; although the revolutionary excesses of the turbulent
population of the south diverted to a certain extent the
attention of the National Guard, who were compelled to turn their
weapons against an internal enemy.
By means of the revolutionary dictatorship of Gambetta the whole
French nation was drawn into the struggle, the annihilation of
the enemy being represented as a national duty, and the war
assuming a steadily more violent character. The indefatigable
patriot continued his exertions to increase the army and unite
the whole south and west against the enemy, hoping to bring the
army of the Loire to such dimensions that it would be able to
expel the invaders from the soil of France. But these raw
recruits were poorly fitted to cope with the highly disciplined
Germans, and their early successes were soon followed by defeat
and discouragement, while the hopes entertained by the Paris
garrison of succor from the south vanished as news of the steady
progress of the Germans was received.
OPERATIONS BEFORE PARIS
During these events the war operations before Paris continued
uninterruptedly. Moltke had succeeded, in spite of the
difficulties of transport, in procuring an immense quantity of
ammunition, and the long-delayed bombardment of Paris was ready
to begin. Having stationed with all secrecy twelve batteries with
seventy-six guns around Mont Avron, on Christmas-day the firing
was directed with such success against the fortified eminences,
that even in the second night the French, after great losses,
evacuated the important position, the "key of Paris," which was
immediately taken possession of by the Saxons. Terror and dismay
spread through the distracted city when the eastern forts, Rosny,
Nogent and Noisy, were stormed amid a tremendous volley of
firing. Vainly did Trochu endeavor to rouse the failing courage
of the National Guard; vainly did he assert that the government
of the national defense would never consent to the humiliation of
a capitulation; his own authority had already waned; the
newspapers already accused him of incapacity and treachery, and
began to cast every aspersion on the men who had presumptuously
seized the government, and yet were not in a position to effect
the defense of the capital and the country. After the new year
the bombardment of the southern forts began, and the terror in
the city daily increased though the violence of the radical
journals kept in check any hint of surrender or negotiation. Yet
in spite of fog and snow storms the bombardment was
systematically continued, and with every day the destructive
effect of the terrible missiles grew more pronounced.
Trochu was blamed for having undertaken only small sallies, which
could have no result. The commander-in-chief ventured no
opposition to the party of action. With the consent of the mayors
of the twenty ARRONDISSEMENTS of Paris a council of war was held.
The threatening famine, the firing of the enemy, and the
excitement prevailing among the adherents of the red republic
rendered a decisive step necessary. Consequently, on the 19th of
January, a great sally was decided on, and the entire armed
forces of the capital were summoned to arms. Early in the morning
a body of 100,000 men marched in the direction of Meudon, Sevres
and St. Cloud for the decisive conflict. The left wing was
commanded by General Vinoy, the right by Ducrot, while Trochu
from the watch-tower directed the entire struggle. With great
courage Vinoy dashed forward with his column of attack towards
the fifth army corps of General Kirchbach, and succeeded in
capturing the Montretout entrenchment, through the superior
number of his troops, and in holding it for a time. But when
Ducrot, delayed by the barricades in the streets, failed to come
to his assistance at the appointed time, the attack was driven
back after seven hours' fierce fighting by the besieging troops.
Having lost 7,000 dead and wounded, the French in the evening
beat a retreat, which almost resembled a flight. On the following
day Trochu demanded a truce, that the fallen National Guards,
whose bodies strewed the battlefield, might be interred. The
victors, too, had to render the last rites to many a brave
soldier. Thirty-nine officers and six hundred and sixteen
soldiers were given in the list of the slain.
Entire confidence had been placed by the Parisians in the great
sally. When the defeat, therefore, became known in its full
significance, when the number of the fallen was found to be far
greater even than had been stated in the first accounts, a dull
despair took possession of the famished city, which next broke
forth into violent abuse against Trochu, "the traitor."
Capitulation now seemed imminent; but as the commander-in-chief
had declared that he would never countenance such a disgrace, he
resigned his post to Vinoy. Threatened by bombardment from
without, terrified within by the pale specter of famine,
paralyzed and distracted by the violent dissensions among the
people, and without prospect of effective aid from the provinces,
what remained to the proud capital but to desist from a conflict
the continuation of which only increased the unspeakable misery,
without the smallest hope of deliverance? Gradually, therefore,
there grew up a resolution to enter into negotiations with the
enemy; and it was the minister, Jules Favre, who had been
foremost with the cry of "no surrender" four months before, who
was now compelled to take the first step to deliver his country
from complete ruin. It was probably the bitterest hour in the
life of the brave man, who loved France and liberty with such a
sincere affection, when he was conducted through the German
outposts to his interview with Bismarck at Versailles. He brought
the proposal for a convention, on the strength of which the
garrison was to be permitted to retire with military honors to a
part of France not hitherto invested, on promising to abstain for
several months from taking part in the struggle. But such
conditions were positively refused at the Prussian headquarters,
and a surrender was demanded as at Sedan and Metz. Completely
defeated, the minister returned to Paris. At a second meeting on
the following day, it was agreed that from the 27th, at twelve
o'clock at night, the firing on both sides should be
discontinued. This was the preliminary to the conclusion of a
three weeks' truce, to await the summons of a National Assembly,
with which peace might be negotiated.
FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH
The war was at an end so far as Paris was concerned. But it
continued in the south, where frequent defeat failed to depress
Gambetta's indomitable energy, and where new troops constantly
replaced those put to rout. Garibaldi, at Dijon, succeeded in
doing what the French had not done during the war, in capturing a
Prussian banner. But the progress of the Germans soon rendered
his position untenable, and, finding his exertions unavailing, he
resigned his command and retired to his island of Caprera. Two
disasters completed the overthrow of France. Bourbaki's army,
85,000 strong, became shut in, with scanty food and ammunition,
among the snow-covered valleys of the Jura, and to save the
disgrace of capitulation it took refuge on the neutral soil of
Switzerland; and the strong fortress of Belfort, which had been
defended with the utmost courage against its besiegers, finally
yielded, with the stipulation that the brave garrison should
march out with the honors of war. Nothing now stood in the way of
an extension of the truce. On the suggestion of Jules Favre, the
National Assembly elected a commission of fifteen members, which
was to aid the chief of the executive and his ministers, Picard
and Favre, in the negotiations for peace. That cessions of
territory and indemnity of war expenses would have to be conceded
had long been acknowledged in principle; but protracted and
excited discussions took place as to the extent of the former and
the amount of the latter, while the demanded entry of the German
troops into Paris met with vehement opposition. But Count
Bismarck resolutely insisted on the cession of Alsace and German
Lorraine, including Metz and Diedenhofen. Only with difficulty
were the Germans persuaded to separate Belfort from the rest of
Loraine, and leave it still in the possession of the French. In
respect to the expenses of the war, the sum of five milliards of
francs ($1,000,000,000) was agreed upon, of which the first
milliard was to be paid in the year 1871, and the rest in a
stated period. The stipulated entry into Paris also - so bitter
to the French national pride - was only partially carried out;
the western side only of the city was to be traversed in the
march of the Prussian troops, and again evacuated in two days. On
the basis of these conditions, the preliminaries of the Peace of
Versailles were concluded on the 26th of February between the
Imperial Chancellor and Jules Favre. Intense excitement prevailed
when the terms of the treaty became known; they were dark days in
the annals of French history. But in spite of the opposition of
the extreme Republican party, led by Quinet and Victor Hugo, the
Assembly recognized by an overpowering majority the necessity for
the Peace, and the preliminaries were accepted by 546 to 107
votes. Thus ended the mighty war between France and Germany - a
war which has had few equals in the history of the world.
THE WAR AT AN END
Had King William received no indemnity in cash or territory from
France, he must still have felt himself amply repaid for the cost
of the brief but sanguinary war, for it brought him a power and
prestige with which the astute diplomatist Bismarck had long been
seeking to invest his name. Political changes move slowly in
times of peace, rapidly in times of war. The whole of Germany,
with the exception of Austria, had sent troops to the conquest of
France, and every state, north and south alike, shared in the
pride and glory of the result. South and North Germany had
marched side by side to the battle-field, every difference of
race or creed forgotten, and the honor of the German fatherland
the sole watchword. The time seemed to have arrived to close the
breach between north and south, and obliterate the line of the
Main, which had divided the two sections. North Germany was
united under the leadership of Prussia, and the honor in which
all alike shared now brought South Germany into line for a
similar union.
The first appeal in this direction came from Baden. Later in the
year plenipotentiaries sought Versailles from the kingdoms of
Bavaria and Wurtemberg and the grand duchies of Baden and Hesse,
their purpose being to arrange for and define the conditions of
union between the South and the North German states. For weeks,
this momentous question filled all Germany with excitement and
public opinion was in a state of high tension. The scheme of
union was by no means universally approved, there being a large
party in opposition, but the majority in its favor in Chambers
proved sufficient to enable Bismarck to carry out his plan.
<< 10: The Expansion of Germany || 12: Bismarck and the German Empire >>