30: Chapter XXX.
<< 29: Chapter XXIX. || 31: Chapter XXXI. >>
Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the
first high ground coming close to the river below Memphis. From
there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading
to all points of the Southern States. A railroad also starts
from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as
Shreveport, Louisiana. Vicksburg was the only channel, at the
time of the events of which this Chapter treats, connecting the
parts of the Confederacy divided by the Mississippi. So long as
it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was
prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the river between
Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their
fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.
The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November
as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the
following words: "I have commenced a movement on Grand
Junction, with three divisions from Corinth and two from
Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee] to-morrow, and
take command in person. If found practicable, I will go to
Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and
telegraph as I go."
At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad
from about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus,
Kentucky; the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its
junction with the Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston
from Corinth east to Bear Creek, and the Mississippi River from
Cairo to Memphis. My entire command was no more than was
necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the
defensive. By moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued,
or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us,
these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large
force for field operations. My moving force at that time was
about 30,000 men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me,
under Pemberton, at about the same number. General McPherson
commanded my left wing and General C. S. Hamilton the centre,
while Sherman was at Memphis with the right wing. Pemberton was
fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly Springs and
Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad. On the 8th
we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a
considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of
the railroad. The road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put
in running order as the troops advanced.
Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that
large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies
which they always covered and guarded in all forward
movements. There was delay therefore in repairing the road
back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front.
By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from
Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the
supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under
the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any
one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for
as government stores. The stock was bountiful, but still it
gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column
in an enemy's country from the country itself.
It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a
"Freedman's Bureau" took its origin. Orders of the government
prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of
the army, when they came in voluntarily. Humanity forbade
allowing them to starve. With such an army of them, of all ages
and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand Junction,
amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. There
was no special authority for feeding them unless they were
employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but
only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. This
labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. The
plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe:
men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed
in saving these crops. To do this work with contrabands, or to
have it done, organization under a competent chief was
necessary. On inquiring for such a man Chaplain Eaton, now and
for many years the very able United States Commissioner of
Education, was suggested. He proved as efficient in that field
as he has since done in his present one. I gave him all the
assistants and guards he called for. We together fixed the
prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the
government or to individuals. The cotton was to be picked from
abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated
price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for
picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the
cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government.
Citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the
privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same
terms.
At once the freedmen became self-sustaining. The money was not
paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for
their benefit. They gave me no trouble afterwards.
Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the
Mississippi River to supply the large number of steamers on that
stream. A good price was paid for chopping wood used for the
supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the
government had to supply with fuel). Those supplying their own
fuel paid a much higher price. In this way a fund was created
not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male
and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for
the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never
known before.
At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very much
disturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to
have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate
against Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two
commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in
this case I did not think the general selected had either the
experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a
position. I feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to
him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to
execute so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a
dispatch from General Halleck saying that I had command of all
the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the
enemy where I pleased. The next day my cavalry was in Holly
Springs, and the enemy fell back south of the Tallahatchie.
Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions
of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus,
Kentucky, except the few stores collected about La Grange and
Grand Junction. This was a long line (increasing in length as
we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. On the 15th
of November, while I was still at Holly Springs, I sent word to
Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were but forty-seven miles
apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to
take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the same
place. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I
gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march
them down the Mississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman,
who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten
miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him,
leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple
of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry.
Further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north
to Memphis. About this time General Halleck ordered troops from
Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was not under
my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear. The
expedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was
successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but
the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired.
The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the
railroad bridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on
the south side. A crossing would have been impossible in the
presence of an enemy. I sent the cavalry higher up the stream
and they secured a crossing. This caused the enemy to evacuate
their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition
of Hovey and Washburn. The enemy was followed as far south as
Oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles
farther by McPherson's command. Here the pursuit was halted to
repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in order to
bring up supplies. The piles on which the railroad bridge rested
had been left standing. The work of constructing a roadway for
the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid
for cars.
During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that
an expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and,
desiring to have a competent commander in charge, I ordered
Sherman on the 8th of December back to Memphis to take charge.
The following were his orders:
Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
Department of the Tennessee.
OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8,1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Right Wing:
You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present
command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of
all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's
forces at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize
them into brigades and divisions in your own army. As soon as
possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of
Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under
command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that
place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment,
may dictate.
The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc.,
necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The
Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you
transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself
deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the
deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of
Memphis.
On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with
Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.
Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you
will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold
the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such
manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.
Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient
officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the
siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d
of December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the
enemy south of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and
Memphis on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from
Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena troops were at my command
I though it would be possible to take them and the Memphis
forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus secure
Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same
day, the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold
the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000
troops at Memphis by the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I
sent Sherman with two divisions at once, informed the
general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether I should command
the expedition down the river myself or send Sherman. I was
authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment of the
great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.
As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a
desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my
direct supervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand,
who was his senior and who had authority from the President and
Secretary of War to exercise that particular command,—and
independently. I doubted McClernand's fitness; and I had good
reason to believe that in forestalling him I was by no means
giving offence to those whose authority to command was above
both him and me.
Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence
between us or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated
at the time my going further south than the Yallabusha.
Pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison
of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the defense of the
territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. I hoped to
hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held
the better.
It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself
that our movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could
not be held away from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that
time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the
Yallabusha. With that point as a secondary base of supplies,
the possibility of moving down the Yazoo until communications
could be opened with the Mississippi was contemplated.
It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his
command, that if the enemy should fall back I would follow him
even to the gates of Vicksburg. I intended in such an event to
hold the road to Grenada on the Yallabusha and cut loose from
there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the
Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to fall back upon in
case of failure. It should be remembered that at the time I
speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate
in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for
supplies. A halt was called at Oxford with the advance
seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the
latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions
to the front.
On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to
divide my command into four army corps, with General McClernand
to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the
army which was to operate down the Mississippi. This interfered
with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the
command in person. McClernand was at that time in Springfield,
Illinois. The order was obeyed without any delay. Dispatches
were sent to him the same day in conformity.
On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my
secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men
commanded by Colonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and
destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. The
capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not
to the troops under him. At the same time Forrest got on our
line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus,
Kentucky, doing much damage to it. This cut me off from all
communication with the north for more than a week, and it was
more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued
from stores obtained in the regular way. This demonstrated the
impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which
to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. I
determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior
with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and Grand
Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road
to Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to
draw supplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time.
The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the
cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. He had
start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many
places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as
guards to the railroad. All these he found warned of his coming
and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn did not succeed in
capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly Springs,
which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but
made no preparations to meet him. He did not even notify his
command.
Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had
evacuated Iuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans
denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and
punished. I sustained the colonel at the time because his
command was a small one compared with that of the enemy—not
one-tenth as large—and I thought he had done well to get away
without falling into their hands. His leaving large stores to
fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He
should, however, have destroyed them. This last surrender
demonstrated to my mind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's
conduct at Iuka was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was
most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of Colonel
Murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross
cowardice.
After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who
accompanied General Pemberton in his retreat from the
Tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. The roads
were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and
trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see. No
expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I
known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that
central Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would
have been in pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was
destroying the roads in my rear.
After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was
to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to
collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a
region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front
back to Grand Junction, leaving two months' supplies for the
families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the
quantity of supplies the country afforded. It showed that we
could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of
two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the
campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only
five days' rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was
great at Holly Springs, but it was more than compensated for by
those taken from the country and by the lesson taught.
The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of
our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in
Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating
intense joy, to ask what I was going to do now without anything
for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed;
that I had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the
food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side
of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so did the
inquiry. The next was, "What are WE to do?" My response was
that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern
resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had
been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it
could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would
starve in the midst of plenty. I advised them to emigrate east,
or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left.
<< 29: Chapter XXIX. || 31: Chapter XXXI. >>