32: Chapter XXXII.
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The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of
March. The effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence
and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable
about the same time.
At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or
channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing
Richmond, Louisiana, enter the Mississippi at Carthage
twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand Gulf. The Mississippi
levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or
channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river
below. In case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water
escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. The
dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by
overflow and the enemy's batteries, I determined to open these
other channels, if possible. If successful the effort would
afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our
transports. There was a good road back of the levees, along
these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains
over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days
of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the
other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new
one was undertaken.
As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about
this route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than
the other undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it
would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced
before the water had got all over the country.
The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply,
further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with
dense timber for a distance of several miles from their
source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before
letting in the water from the river. This work was continued
until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to
Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One small steamer
and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond
this it was no more successful than the other experiments with
which the winter was whiled away. All these failures would have
been very discouraging if I had expected much from the efforts;
but I had not. From the first the most I hoped to accomplish
was the passage of transports, to be used below Vicksburg,
without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that
city.
This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high
water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all
engaged about Vicksburg. The river was higher than its natural
banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had
suspended peaceful pursuits in the South, further than the
production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were
neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was
covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on
which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out among the
men. Measles and smallpox also attacked them. The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however,
that the loss of life was much less than might have been
expected. Visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories
to relate; Northern papers came back to the soldiers with these
stories exaggerated. Because I would not divulge my ultimate
plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and
unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my
removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my
simple removal, but named who my successor should be.
McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in
this connection. I took no steps to answer these complaints,
but continued to do my duty, as I understood it, to the best of
my ability. Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is
that in positions of great responsibility every one should do
his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent
authority, without application or the use of influence to change
his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon
that as the main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of
ever having any large command, nor did I suppose that I was
equal to one; but I had the vanity to think that as a cavalry
officer I might succeed very well in the command of a brigade.
On one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all
of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, I
said that I would give anything if I were commanding a brigade of
cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I believed I could do some
good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested that I make
application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I
then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and
mentioned this superstition.
In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making
his selections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended
with my doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place,
or obtained it through personal or political influence, my
belief is that I would have feared to undertake any plan of my
own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders
from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining important commands
by application or political influence are apt to keep a written
record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown
in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.
With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President
Lincoln and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the
campaign. I had never met Mr. Lincoln, but his support was
constant.
At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the
peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from
the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points
at Milliken's Bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown
the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success.
I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land
to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to
the possible but not expected success of some one of the
expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different
base. This could not be undertaken until the waters receded. I
did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my
staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the
start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter was the first one
to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navy was
absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation)
of such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command
Porter than he had to command me. It was necessary to have part
of his fleet below Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers
to use as ferries were also essential. The navy was the only
escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in
getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries.
Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had
better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to
run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work
better than soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not
only because I admitted his argument, but because it would
enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs.
Porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth
of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense
forests that intervened. Even spies could not get near him, on
account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of
some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously
up the river near the east shore, from the direction of
Vicksburg, towards the fleet. On overhauling the boat they
found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief,
set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in
case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers were brought
ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an
hour or more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to
return to Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was
a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his
flag.
Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers
for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great
essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and
to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. This he
accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and
boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of
hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same
way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain would be wanted
below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.
Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago,
yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. By
the 16th of April Porter was ready to start on his perilous
trip. The advance, flagship Benton, Porter commanding, started
at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes
by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the Price, lashed to
her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet—all of these being naval vessels. Next came the
transports—Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each
towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval
and transport steamers when below the batteries. The gunboat
Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soon after the start a battery
between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire across the
intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then
by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances,
probably without much effect. They were under fire for more
than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with
little damage to the gunboats. The transports did not fare so
well. The Henry Clay was disabled and deserted by her crew.
Soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers,
set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. The
burning mass, however, floated down to Carthage before
grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.
The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were
ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east
side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city
on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent, but
terrible. I witnessed it from the deck of a river transport,
run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was
prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learned that no
one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed
in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton
shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. All damage was
afterwards soon repaired under the direction of Admiral Porter.
The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this,
however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries
at Port Hudson with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and
visited me from below Vicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral
Porter had sent the gunboat Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander
George Brown commanding, below. She met Colonel Ellet of the
Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the
Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the
greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi
from Vicksburg 10 to the Red River.
The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some
days, and then started up the Mississippi. The Confederates
soon raised the Queen of the West, 11 and repaired her. With
this vessel and the ram Webb, which they had had for some time in
the Red River, and two other steamers, they followed the
Indianola. The latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow,
and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid
current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleet overtook her
just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th
of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them
away, but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an
hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight
times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and
reduced to a sinking condition. The armament was thrown
overboard and the vessel run ashore. Officers and crew then
surrendered.
I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the
29th of March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage,
hoping that he might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of
the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad,
scarcely above water yet. Some miles from New Carthage the
levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, overflowing
the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats were collected
from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the
troops across the overflowed interval. By the 6th of April
McClernand had reached New Carthage with one division and its
artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these
boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person, and saw
that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The
water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth
enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march
over. McClernand had already found a new route from Smith's
plantation where the crevasse occurred, to Perkins' plantation,
eight to twelve miles below New Carthage. This increased the
march from Milliken's Bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty
miles. Four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them
each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet
of bridging in all. The river falling made the current in these
bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the
"Yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were
soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so
substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in
crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains,
except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). This,
if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon
bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. These
bridges were all built by McClernand's command, under the
supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.
I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the
20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND,
LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.
Special Orders, No. 110.
* * * * *
* * VIII. The following orders are published for the
information and guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its
present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the
Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg can be approached by
practicable roads.
First.—The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A.
McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing.
Second.—The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.
Third.—The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B.
McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre.
Fourth.—The order of march to New Carthage will be from right
to left.
Fifth.—Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army
corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as
necessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions,
each division will remain under the immediate command of its
respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered
for a particular emergency.
Sixth.—Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper
facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp
equipage.
Seventh.—In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to
each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall
tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each
brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division
headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of
their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take
such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the
number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series of
1862.
Eighth.—All the teams of the three army corps, under the
immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their
returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and
ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army.
Ninth.—As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the
Seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn,
will be followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.
Tenth.—Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by
corps commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New
Carthage.
Eleventh.—General hospitals will be established by the medical
director between Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and
disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in
charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they
become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an
intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take
charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers
so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads
and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to
command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or
privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of
the line from Duckport to Milliken's Bend. They will furnish
all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and
with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish
all the details for loading and unloading boats.
Twelfth.—The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New
Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of
ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of
ordnance, required by previous orders.
Thirteenth.—Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect
all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the
line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of
articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens,
going into and searching houses without proper orders from
division commanders, are positively prohibited. All such
irregularities must be summarily punished.
Fourteenth.—Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to
the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the
line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is
called to General Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's
Office, Washington, of date March 20, 1863.
By order of
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.
McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of
McPherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. The
third had not yet arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its
way to Milliken's Bend and was to follow on arrival.
Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at
Duckport and Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under
orders to return from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been
sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our
transports.
It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by
a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road
between Milliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation. Accordingly
six more steamers were protected as before, to run the
batteries, and were loaded with supplies. They took twelve
barges in tow, loaded also with rations. On the night of the
22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting through more
or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the barges got
through with their needed freight.
When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with
river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were
willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers
were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any
capacity in navigating the western rivers. Captains, pilots,
mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to
take five times the number of vessels we were moving through
this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were from Logan's division,
composed generally of men from the southern part of Illinois and
from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commanded by
volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that
volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the
commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether
mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliver was master of
transportation on this occasion by special detail.
__________
10 Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.
11 One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade
on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.
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