7: In the Wan Light of the Crescent
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Meanwhile, Columbus had long sailed to and already returned from the New World (1492);
actually he had repeated the journey three times. The lines of power in Europe were also
redrawn. As a result, the proud Adriatic declined into an insignificant waterway on the
periphery of the Mediterranean; Dalmatian ports that had recently been resplendent
city-states not so long ago became miserable fishing villages. Venice was experiencing its
golden age, though a long agony awaited it. Replacing Italy, the Iberian Peninsula became
the temporary center for the flow of economic power. What came to be called capitalism
took its first steps on the backs of fat sheep and skinny peasants in England's textile
industry.
In the meantime, Martin Luther posted his manifesto on the door of the castle church at
Wittenberg (1517). This period is also called that "long sixteenth century"
which arched from the middle of the 1400s to the thirties of the 1600s, which made
wage-earners out of serfs in new centers shifting to northwestern Europe and gave birth to
the Protestant ethic, and in which the citizenry, tolerated only in some places under
feudalism, had begun to forge weapons for future victory.
We want to add two remarks to the preceding. A view over a longer time span would give
them true meaning. One: in the wake of the discoveries and conquests overseas, surplus of
precious metals suddenly replaced the scarcity of such metals in Europe, while prices and
the terms of trade underwent great realignment. Two: the numbers of inhabitants in Hungary
and England at the time of Matthias Corvinus were approximately equal. Today, the ratio is
one to five.
The greediness of the Szapolyai-Werböczi faction, which triumphed over the peasants in
1514, deprived the Fuggers of their mining concessions, who meanwhile "forgot"
to pay the miners wages. Then a miners uprising followed that of the peasants ending in
defeat and vengeance. Is it any wonder that, after all this, there was not enough money
for the war against the Turks, even though fortifications were falling in the south one
after the other? The bells rang in vain; even legendary Nándorfehérvár fell in 1521.
Five years later, in 1526, Suleiman the Magnificent decided to wage an all-out military
campaign, at a time when the trauma of the brutal drowning of the 1514 peasant uprising in
blood still deeply pervaded the country. However, because they were longer lasting, the
nobles' more severe acts of vengeance were not their immediate physical reprisals but
their stripping the peasants of their rights to movement and ownership, the strict
subordination of the peasants to the landowner. Although the radical laws on this matter
-like laws generally- were never completely enforceable, they nevertheless cast a dark
shadow on Hungary for centuries.
The son of Wladislas II, King Louis II (1516-1526), then a twenty-year-old,
puny-looking youth, was able to dispatch a total of twenty-six thousand men to the south;
meanwhile, he waited in vain for Szapolyai's army of ten thousand coming from
Transylvania. To this day, some still debate whether or not Szapolyai, who coveted the
throne, was intentionally late. The Hungarian army did not attempt to block the
strategically sensitive river-crossings along the frontier; instead, it waited on an open
field at Mohács and allowed the Turkish army with three to four times the number of
troops and even greater fire power to advance. The defeat was disastrous. The archbishops
of Kalocsa and Esztergom, five bishops, enormous numbers of nobles, and some ten thousand
soldiers were killed. Louis fled, his horse stumbled in a swollen brook and buried the
king under him. According to another version, enraged nobles finished him off. (His widow,
Maria Habsburg, loaded the king's treasures on a boat and fled upstream on the Danube.
Later, she energetically promoted the validity of her family's claim to the Hungarian
throne; then she was successful governor of the Netherlands for a quarter of a century;
she lived out her last years in Spain.)
"Mohács is the burial ground of our national greatness . . ." The
conventional wisdom of the nation holds that Mohács was a reversal of fortune to the
Hungarians like that of Waterloo and Verdun to the French and Wagram to the Austrians.
Correctly, with reason? Not long ago, archaeologists stumbled across several of the
long-looked-for mass graves on the battlefield at Mohács. In 1526, Louis II first ordered
the mobilization of one-fifth of the serfs, then one-half, and finally all of them. And
some time still remained... But, perhaps because of the ominous recollection of 1514, all
this mobilization failed to come about. The bulk of the dead identified in the mass graves
at Mohács turned out to be foreign mercenaries. Though the ranks of Hungarian leaders
suffered enormous casualties at Mohács, the genuinely Hungarian military forces remained
nearly intact after the battle.
Suleiman could still pillage unimpeded with his army; he reduced tens of thousands to
slavery. He even entered Buda Castle, which was left undefended. And what Queen Maria had
not carried off, he now loaded on boats, including the codices in Matthias Corvinus's
library. After that, however, he evacuated the castle, then the entire country, and
returned home. This Turkish behavior was only seemingly illogical. Suleiman the
Magnificent wanted to demonstrate his power, and hereafter he appeared willing to accept a
Hungarian ruler who was content to exercise sovereignty.
John Szapolyai (152~1540), chosen to be king with full awareness of Suleiman's
position, waged war with varying success against the rival Habsburg king, Ferdinand I
(152~1564), the brother of Queen Maria and Charles V, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire
and King of Spain. Let us describe this period with three events. (1) Almost to the very
day of the first anniversary of the battle, Suleiman again pitched his tents on Mohács's
bloody fields, ordered Szapolyai, that is, King John I, into his presence, who paid homage
to him there by kissing his hand. (2) In 1529, the Turks seized Buda by assault from
Ferdinand I's forces but then handed it -together with the Holy Crown, which Suleiman had
obtained in the meantime over to King John. (3) The Fuggers, who had been recalled to the
country, entered into contracts for the right to work the mines in Upper Hungary with one
king and then another.
A decade and a half passed in this manner -meanwhile, the sultan tried to capture
Vienna several times- then, in 1541, Suleiman again came to Hungary, apparently to assure
Szapolyai's son, the infant King John Sigismund, of his support as guardian. A few hundred
of the sultan's Janissaries, encamped below Buda, "strolled" into the castle and
suddenly raised their flag. This is how the capital city of Hungary came into Turkish
hands for a century and a half (1541-1686). The country, divided in two after Mohács, now
split into three parts:
-Its western and northern strip was apart of the dynamic Habsburg Empire; within this,
it was a kind of border region of Austria's hereditary provinces, a buffer zone at the
time of the Turks' deployments against Vienna, and a bridge-head for the hoped-for
additional eastern conquests.
-The middle triangle, the peak of which extended far beyond Buda, and which embraced
the fertile Alföld, the eastern half of Transdanubia, some part of the central mountain
range in the north, and the lower tip of Transylvania, was in time increasingly absorbed
into the Ottoman Empire.
-The Transylvanian Principality emerged quickly in what was Szapolyai's eastern
kingdom; sometimes it was more independent, sometimes less so, though from the viewpoint
of the future preservation of Hungarian national aspirations, it was of vital importance
and was imbued with a predominantly Protestant character.
Let us proceed from the east to the west. Because his internal support was slight and
unstable and the sultan apparently sided with him only so long as it lay in the interest
of Turkish expansion to the west, John Sigismund eventually renounced the Hungarian throne
and was content to occupy the throne of the Prince of Transylvania. He was followed in
this post by István Báthory (1571-1586), who was soon chosen king of Poland as well.
Báthory, who was one of the most brilliant figures in Polish history, gained his most
dazzling victories against the Russian czar, Ivan IV, mainly with Transylvanian and
Székely military forces. On his death, Transylvania was again left to its own devices. Or
quite the contrary, it could find even less respite under the immense pressure of the two
rivals, but it was also tormented by its own "split personality". First, the
hope arose that the Turks could be driven out with the help of the Habsburgs, and then,
amid the vast shedding of blood and tears, the independent principality temporarily ceased
to exist. Later, the sultan sent a royal crown to István Bocskai (1605-1606), who was
once again turning to the Turks, though he did not pledge full allegiance. He remained
prince, maneuvered, and gathered strength.
Here we must mention the main source of Bocskai's strength, -who unfortunately died
soon: the military forces of the Székely and the Haiduks. The origin and the settlement
history of the Székely living in a part of Transylvania and essentially a Hungarian
ethnic group are a long-standing source of controversy in Hungarian prehistory and
history. This much is certain, that they arrived very long ago -perhaps not with the
Árpáds but even earlier, or perhaps not long after them- on the southeastern as well as
the southwestern borders of the Carpathian Basin, and there they supplied the border
guards for the emerging Hungarian state. The autonomy of the troops in the southwest
quickly faded; on the other hand, those in Transylvania preserved with varying success
through the length of the centuries their free legal status, which was comparable to the
lesser nobility's, while efforts were made time and again to thrust them into serfdom. As
a dreaded military people, the Székely were prepared to support militarily every
leadership favoring or tolerating their freedom; in contrast, they resisted efforts to
subjugate them in a series of uprisings. Meanwhile, they fell en masse as victims to the
most various kinds of military reprisals; they fell -often as Turkish mercenaries- into
the havoc created by the Tatar invasions of Transylvania as well as in the recurring
epidemics. In the meantime, Saxons continued to move in and settle next to them, and
Rumanian shepherds intermingled with them, who had for a long time been infiltrating from
Moldavia and Wallachia, first taking cover in the hills and then settling in the valleys,
progressively transforming the ethnic map of Transylvania.
Even hazier is the origin of the Haiduks, who had already participated in the Dózsa
uprising. In all probability, they were, in part, Southern Slavs who withdrew to the north
from the Turks, joined by drovers participating in the breeding and transportation of
cattle and by runaway serfs. Supposedly this was how this marauding society developed,
which willingly entered military service but was libertine even when measured by the
standard of the age and which later, on settling down, amalgamated into a group of people
stubbornly defending its Haiduk freedom -essentially the freedom of peasant life- and
could almost be defined as a separate ethnic group. (Haiduks, apparently of the same
origin, played a role in the history of the Balkans in the wars against the Turks.)
The dilemma of Transylvania -and not much less that of Royal Hungary- whether it was
better to fight with the Turks against the Habsburgs or with the Habsburgs against the
Turks, was interwoven by a religious schizophrenia caused by the particularly strong
Protestantism in Transylvania and then by the Counter-Reformation rising in Vienna, not a
purely spiritual, religious division by any means. An unusual situation came about here.
While it was not at all true in every case that everyone siding with Vienna was Catholic,
and those siding with Transylvania were Protestant, the Principality of Transylvania
itself, for instance, under Gábor Bethlen (1613-1629), presented a model of freedom of
religion admired in and marveled at throughout Europe. The Turks, in turn, did not care
very much about religious matters, and hardly pressed conversion to Mohammedanism;
Christian priests functioned quite openly, and a large Jewish community, not Ashkenazi but
Sephardic, existed in Buda. Religious intolerance and aggressive evangelizing under the
aegis of a militant Counter-Reformation were confined to the Habsburg section of the
country.
At the same time, Bethlen, tolerant at home and farsighted, fought very actively on the
side of the Protestants on the international battlefields of the Thirty Years' War; on
occasion he alone, it seemed, was successful on the frontlines, gaining breathing space
for his German, English, Dutch, and Danish allies. (It was in his armies that the typical
Hungarian light cavalry, the Hussars, emerged, which then also became an accepted branch
of the military in foreign countries, for example, in France.)
About this time, the wandering of Hungarian students from university to university was
particularly widespread, and the children of serfs were able to study beside the offspring
of the nobility. While earlier we came across Hungarian names in the account books of
Italian and then Cracow and Danzig (Gdansk) universities, now they could be also found on
those of universities in Germany, Holland, and England (at Cambridge and Oxford).
Meanwhile, Gabor Bethlen founded his own college at Nagyszombat (Trnava).
The Rákóczi dynasty was very successful in developing culture, particularly
education, but less so in the military and diplomatic field when ruling the Transylvanian
Principality. Among them, György Rákóczi II (1648-1660), blinded by the example of
István Báthory, began an unsuccessful battle for the Polish throne. For this, the
sultan, letting his Tatar auxiliaries loose on him, taught him a grave lesson. Afterwards,
drained of blood and crippled, the Transylvanian Principality, which was not only the
defensive bastion of Hungarian aspirations to that time but also the place whose
intellectual attainments radiated throughout Central Europe, lost its earlier role.
The Turks gradually extended their occupation of the country's middle region and
reinforced it militarily. Though border fortresses existed earlier and would be found
again later, the century and a half contemporaneous with the occupation of Buda embraced
the period that came to be known as the Wars of the Border Fortresses. Located on the
shifting boundaries of the Turkish and Royal Hungarian territories -at times wedged
together like sawteeth- the border fortresses faced each other crammed with soldiers who
were badly paid and barely held in check by distant company officers, who were reduced to
looting, longed for military fame, and were fiery-tempered. The age was filled with
breaches of peace, arbitrary raids, and romantic single combat: usually, neither war nor
peace existed, sometimes easygoing, sometimes bloody and merciless showdowns occurred
between defenders in the border fortresses and the Turks occupying the countryside.
Thus the people under foreign occupation lived in a hopeless situation, where they had
not already been hauled off or had not escaped. Major campaigns decimated them, minor ones
afflicted them; marauding soldiers often preyed upon their cattle; in the interest of
repairing the damaged fortresses, they had to serve as thralls on both sides. True, the
Turks allowed them to keep their possessions and generally taxed them so that they would
have some means left; after all, they had to have something to pay their taxes with on the
morrow. They remained under a vestigial Hungarian administration; it was supplemented
rather than supplanted by a Turkish administration and judicature. In the mean-time, they
also had to pay taxes to Hungarian landowners who had escaped from the occupied territory
but showed up one after the other to collect the tax.
Nevertheless, the occupied part of the country was not crippled entirely. In the
Alföld, the settlement system underwent realignment: the population of smaller
settlements withdrew into market towns, or boroughs, surrounded by large uninhabited land.
These towns achieved some measure of peace and independence by paying taxes jointly. And
the export to the west of cattle raised in the open Alföld, if not undisturbed, continued
unbroken. The herds were driven on foot from the Turkish section of Hungary to Austrian,
German, and Italian cities; meanwhile, the sultan's deputies were content with the customs
collected at crossings on the rivers Tisza and Danube; traders even achieved tariff
reductions by bribing customs officials.
The Hungarian tourist is dumbfounded by the Turkey of today: awareness of the ethnic
relationship between Turks and Hungarians is much more alive there than in Hungary. Turks
consider the time after Mohács, the
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reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, to be their country's most glorious period, the time
when their boundaries stretched the farthest. "Then", they say to us, "we
ruled Hungary together, didn't we!" We view the situation differently. But the darkly
painted picture of the Turkish occupation is not tenable either. The terrible destruction
Hungary suffered can be put rather at the beginning and the end of the period, the times
when the battles raged most fiercely. In the time between, the Turks' arrangements for a
long-lasting stay were sensible. The tax rolls testify to good management. The bulk of the
non-military buildings in Hungarian territories under Turkish rule were either religious -türbe
(sepulchral chapels), djami (mosques), and minarets (towers attached to
mosques) or inns, baths, wells, and fountains. (It is worth mentioning that quite a few
members of the highest leadership of the Ottoman state came, in time, from Hungarian
children who were kidnaped and raised in a Janissary school.) The real standstill was
caused by the fact that the nation stepped out of the main current of European development
for a century and a half to two centuries -this interim, in part, forever unrecoverable-
and that many places of the country had to be repopulated with foreign settlers, thus
significantly altering its ethnic character.
Arriving now at the third part of the country, the royal or the Habsburg third, the
region of Upper Hungary, extracted a measure of profit, even though it was exposed to the
struggles between Transylvania and Vienna and changed masters several times; for example,
it benefitted from the fact that many merchants traveled through this region to avoid the
Turks. Western Transdanubia and Croatia were, on the other hand, borderlands, and they
served as terrains and scenes for deployment in countless battles. True, Vienna -and this
was no small disappointment to those who hoped the Habsburgs would act against the Turks-
embroiled in other wars, entered into several disgraceful peace agreements with the sultan
to protect its rear. But these agreements were fragile, and the interests of the Hungarian
and Croatian nobles also thwarted them. The high command in Vienna paid the Hungarian
troops in the border fortresses especially poorly; it frequently sent to Hungary
unreliable and pillaging mercenaries who were worse than the occupying Turks themselves.
We have mentioned different kinds of schizophrenia. Let us take one more splendid
example, the case of two Hungarian nobles, a certain Maylád and a certain Nádasdy.
"Maylád himself sided with King Ferdinand's faction, but in Transylvania, where his
estates lay, this faction was driven back sharply, and it became apparent to everyone that
Ferdinand's rule could not take root there. So, to hold on to his estates, Maylád wanted
to support Szapolyai. The matter was quite different with Nádasdy, who was supporting
Szapolyai at the moment. He was preparing to take a wife, and the estates of his
betrothed, the immensely wealthy Orsolya of Kanizsa, lay in Western Hungary, in
Ferdinand's part of the country. His interests dictated that he returned to the Habsburg
camp. And the two nobles actually agreed at Berzence that Maylád would help Nádasdy
cross over to Ferdinand's side, while Nádasdy would facilitate Maylád's switching over
to Szapolyai..." Oh well, that is how things went...
And if, having broken the chronology, we have already returned to the 1500s, let us
state that one of the most tragic episodes in Hungary's war history is linked to the year
1566. Its hero was a Croatian-Hungarian scion of the wealthy Zrinyi family which possessed
huge estates from Transdanubia to the Adriatic: Miklós Zrinyi (the general, to
distinguish him from his great-grandson, the poet of the same name who, however, was also
a noted soldier and as a writer not only penned verses but was also a superb author of
military theory).
Miklós Zrinyi, under siege in the fortress at Szigetvár, which was surrounded by
marshes, delayed from August 6 to September 8, 1566, the armies of the victor at Mohács,
Suleiman the Magnificent, who was heading for Vienna. At the end of the siege, the sultan
himself died in his camp, though his leaders, keeping his death a secret from the army,
ordered a last assault -supposedly, with the sultan "watching" the battle from
his open tent fully dressed and seated on a throne. In this hopeless situation, Zrinyi
burst from the fortress with the few remaining survivors without any hope of breaking out
of the blockade. They all perished. But the Turks did not reach Vienna. At Györ, a major
force of Austrian troops, standing guard with weapons at their sides, marched off as if
they had carried out their duties well.
It is, perhaps, proper to single out precisely this pyrrhic victory from among the
numerous deeds of the border fortresses. Of course, it is also certainly worth mentioning
the heroic defense of Eger in 1552, when István Dobó, commander of the castle, drove
from its walls a Turkish army of 150 thousand with two thousand of his troops and the
inhabitants of the city and its environs. But then, how shall we treat the second siege of
Eger in 1596 when the Turks gained an easy victory?
On the basis of the first defense of Eger, the deed at Szigetvár, and similar sacred
bursts of activity, Hungarian public opinion holds that-"for one nation between two
pagans"-the obdurate and self-sacrificing battles at the Hungarian border fortresses
impeded the further expansion of the Turks through Vienna and the Vienna Basin to the
interior of Europe. However, let us also look at the dates: they can be decisive. On most
occasions the Turks, when they came to Hungary with a combat-worthy main force, reached
the southern border -the line of the River Drava and there Eszék (Osijek, the ancient
Mursia, where the Romans had already built a bridge) only at the end of July and in
August. They had, thus, two months for battle, if any, and then, whether they wanted to or
not, whether victorious or not, they had to return to their homeland. In other words,
given the period's logistical conditions, Hungary, and chiefly the Vienna Basin, lay at
the far end of the range of the main Turkish army's operation. Perhaps, only once did the
Turks actually manage to arrive below Vienna in mid-July.
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