12: Chapter XII.
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On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released
convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. The
streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of
a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons
from house-tops, windows, and around corners. In this firing
the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, Garland, was badly
wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, was also
wounded mortally. He died a few days after, and by his death I
was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.4 I had gone
into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant,
and I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the
same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for
any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the
war than it ever had present at any one engagement. My regiment
lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat
explosions during the Mexican war. The Mexicans were not so
discriminating. They sometimes picked off my juniors.
General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in
state. I wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he
was not; at all events he was not hurt. He took quarters at
first in the "Halls of the Montezumas," and from there issued
his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered
city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts
already spoken of—orders which challenge the respect of all who
study them. Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of
Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The people
began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of
the invaders. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were
sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains,
four or five miles to the south and south-west.
Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner
in which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His
orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably
a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. On the
other hand, General Taylor's, I think, indicate that he
considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt
no responsibility resting on himself further than for the
faithful performance of his duties. Both generals deserve the
commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful
memory of this people to the latest generation.
Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached
after passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the
cities of Puebla and Mexico. The route travelled by the army
before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain
coming up from the south. This pass is very susceptible of
defense by a smaller against a larger force. Again, the highest
point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is
over Río Frío mountain, which also might have been successfully
defended by an inferior against a superior force. But by moving
north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla,
both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from
Perote to the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level
as the prairies in our West. Arriving due north from Puebla,
troops could have been detached to take possession of that
place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no
mountain would have been encountered before reaching the City of
Mexico. It is true this road would have brought troops in by
Guadalupe—a town, church and detached spur of mountain about
two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general
name—and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain,
which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but
troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only
a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as
they actually did on the south.
It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City
of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my
later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things
are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that
the most confident critics are generally those who know the
least about the matter criticized. I know just enough about the
Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but
to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important
city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it
may be natural that the direct road to it should have been
taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and
possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in
intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico
could have been approached without any danger of opposition,
except in the open field.
But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He
invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty
miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to
one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the
enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won
every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the
government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true,
but the plans and the strategy were the general's.
I had now made marches and been in battle under both General
Scott and General Taylor. The former divided his force of
10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving
from Puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that
an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist
his coming. The road was broad and the country open except in
crossing the Río Frío mountain. General Taylor pursued the same
course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even in smaller
bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility
of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their
profession. I supposed they moved in small bodies because more
men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with
their artillery and necessary trains. Later I found the fallacy
of this belief. The rebellion, which followed as a sequence to
the Mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger
bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than
was the custom under Scott and Taylor.
The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly
superior numbers. There were two reasons for this. Both
General Scott and General Taylor had such armies as are not
often got together. At the battles of Palo Alto and
Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was
composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill
and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest,
was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily,
but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars.
The rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of
which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in
all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and
then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. A
better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the
one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements
of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better
material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They
were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally
educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was
with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. They
became soldiers themselves almost at once. All these conditions
we would enjoy again in case of war.
The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The
private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the
inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was
poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. He was turned
adrift when no longer wanted. The officers of the lower grades
were but little superior to the men. With all this I have seen
as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever seen
made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than
that of the United States. They have a military school modeled
after West Point. Their officers are educated and, no doubt,
generally brave. The Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an
impossibility in this generation.
The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if
we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They
celebrate the anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as
of very great victories. The anniversaries are recognized as
national holidays. At these two battles, while the United
States troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of
life compared with what the Mexicans suffered. The Mexicans, as
on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever
did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the
officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit,
without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought
enough. Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic
over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with
pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the
end. With us, now twenty years after the close of the most
stupendous war ever known, we have writers—who profess devotion
to the nation—engaged in trying to prove that the Union forces
were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed
around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the
East from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion
gave out from sheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the
amount of romance in the two stories.
I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated,
nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation
and prayer; but I would like to see truthful history written.
Such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and
soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what
section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he
fought. The justice of the cause which in the end prevailed,
will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of
the land, in time. For the present, and so long as there are
living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be
people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which
they believed to be holy. As time passes, people, even of the
South, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their
ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which
acknowledged the right of property in man.
After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the
government of Mexico, it looked very much as if military
occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary.
General Scott at once began the preparation of orders,
regulations and laws in view of this contingency. He
contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the
occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon
the people. His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate
states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on
all imports. From the beginning of the war private property had
not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals,
without full compensation. This policy was to be pursued. There
were not troops enough in the valley of Mexico to occupy many
points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of
any size, reinforcements could be got from the Río Grande, and
there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all
by way of Vera Cruz. Military possession was taken of
Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca,
nearly as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great
importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. Vera Cruz,
Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in our possession.
Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of
Santa Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United
States commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate
with. A temporary government, however, was soon established at
Queretaro, and Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the
war. Before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back
to Washington, but General Scott prevailed upon him to remain,
as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the
administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making
such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. The
treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted
by the government at Washington. It is that known as the
"Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," and secured to the United States
the Río Grande as the boundary of Texas, and the whole territory
then included in New Mexico and Upper California, for the sum of
$15,000,000.
Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of
Generals Pillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott
became very marked. Scott claimed that they had demanded of the
President his removal. I do not know whether this is so or not,
but I do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. At
last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them
of insubordination and disrespect. This act brought on a crisis
in the career of the general commanding. He had asserted from
the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that
it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the
President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the
endeavor to procure the appointment of Benton: and the
administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. About the
middle of February orders came convening a court of inquiry,
composed of Brevet Brigadier-General Towson, the
paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing and
Colonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and
the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from
Washington, relieving Scott of the command of the army in the
field and assigning Major-General William O. Butler of Kentucky
to the place. This order also released Pillow, Worth and Duncan
from arrest.
If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was
agreeable to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have
heard expressions on the subject. There were many who regarded
the treatment of General Scott as harsh and unjust. It is quite
possible that the vanity of the General had led him to say and do
things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration
for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the
start. The court tried the accuser quite as much as the
accused. It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet
in Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and
never after had more than the nominal command of the army until
early in 1861. He certainly was not sustained in his efforts to
maintain discipline in high places.
The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals,
made them both candidates for the Presidency. General Taylor was
nominated in 1848, and was elected. Four years later General
Scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the
party nominating him died with his defeat.5
__________
4 NOTE.—It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of
the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He
recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum
thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund
were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the
war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the
Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
Kentucky.
The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never
had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.
5 The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
Taylor and Pierce—and any number of aspirants for that high
office. It made also governors of States, members of the
cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in
a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side
of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.
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