33: Chapter XXXIII
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On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'
plantation. Reconnaissances were made in boats to ascertain
whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where
we might land above Grand Gulf. There was none practicable.
Accordingly the troops were set in motion for Hard Times,
twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite
Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our
transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water.
Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their
machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by
those less severely injured. All the troops, therefore, except
what could be transported in one trip, had to march. The road
lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be
crossed. They were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those
previously encountered. 12
On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and
McPherson's was following closely. I had determined to make the
attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon
as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand
was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our
transports and barges could carry. About 10,000 men were so
embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence the guns at
Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark
in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the
navy and carry the works by storm. The following order was
issued:
PERKINS PLANTATION, LA.,
April 27,1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND,
Commanding 13th A. C.
Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much
of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the
artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting
baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their
places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning.
All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain
behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you
see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is
ordered to send one division.
The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and
silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will
be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest
eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing
down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed
beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of,
and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid
separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The
first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain
themselves until such time as preparations can be made and
troops collected for a forward movement.
Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position
indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them
such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy
are silenced.
It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the
city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable
to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should
prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed,
when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be
expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this
case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to
where the men could land and move by forced marches to below
Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place.
There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate
that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand
Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops;
and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on
board.
Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be
left to run the blockade.
If not already directed, require your men to keep three days'
rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement
commences.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.
At 8 o'clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire
strength present, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half
hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of
the enemy. All this time McClernand's 10,000 men were huddled
together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a
landing if signalled. I occupied a tug from which I could see
the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the
enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not
calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were
being assailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet
withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. The
enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. I immediately
signalled the Admiral and went aboard his ship. The navy lost
in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. A
large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and
most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's
side and exploded between decks where the men were working their
guns. The sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as
I boarded the ship was sickening.
Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very
foot of it. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg
and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture
by a front attack. I therefore requested Porter to run the
batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the
transports, all of which would be wanted below.
There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending
towards Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from
about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction
from that point for about the same distance below. The land was
so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march
an army across but for a levee. I had had this explored before,
as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a
possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.
Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in
the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as
transports. I had intended to make this request, but he
anticipated me. At dusk, when concealed from the view of the
enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed his command on the west
bank. The navy and transports ran the batteries successfully.
The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our
whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges,
quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or
rather blue, with National troops.
When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was
expected that we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles
below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in
who informed me that a good landing would be found at
Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was
a good road leading to Port Gibson some twelve miles in the
interior. The information was found correct, and our landing
was effected without opposition.
Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the
morning of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by
moving his corps up the Yazoo and threatening an attack on
Haines' Bluff.
My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about
Vicksburg as I could, until I could secure a good footing on
high land east of the river. The move was eminently successful
and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about
Vicksburg and doubts about our real design. Sherman moved the
day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of
his command and eight gunboats which Porter had left above
Vicksburg.
He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to
attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at
Haines' Bluff. This move was made without a single casualty in
either branch of the service. On the first of May Sherman
received orders from me (sent from Hard Times the evening of the
29th of April) to withdraw from the front of Haines' Bluff and
follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he could.
I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation.
Now that all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible
that the enemy might fit out boats in the Big Black with
improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies.
McPherson was at Hard Times with a portion of his corps, and the
depot was protected by a part of his command. The night of the
29th I directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery
and send it up to Perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to
have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in
position.
The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's,
Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on
the morning of 30th of April McClernand's corps and one division
of McPherson's corps were speedily landed.
When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever
equaled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor
were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I
was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the
stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But
I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the
enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from
the month of December previous to this time that had been made
and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.
I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and
two brigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General
McPherson commanding—in all not more than twenty thousand men
to commence the campaign with. These were soon reinforced by
the remaining brigade of Logan's division and Crocker's division
of the 17th corps. On the 7th of May I was further reinforced by
Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total
force was then about thirty-three thousand men.
The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a
force of nearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east
of Vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. My first
problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base.
Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that
point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the
Mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. It was natural
to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and
prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. Bayou
Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg and, as it
is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to
intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point
where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more than doubled
the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold.
Our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army
across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of
the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during
the day, April 30th, and early evening. McClernand was advanced
as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could
be issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour before
sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to reach Port Gibson
and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy
could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting
point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.
McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port
Gibson at Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during
the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until
daylight. The enemy had taken a strong natural position with
most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight
thousand men, under General Bowen. His hope was to hold me in
check until reinforcements under Loring could reach him from
Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's
corps followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition
could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the
battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way.
The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it
were, the roads running along the ridges except when they
occasionally pass from one ridge to another. Where there are no
clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy
growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are
filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This
makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a
far superior one.
Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port
Gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than
a mile or two at the widest point. These roads unite just
outside the town. This made it necessary for McClernand to
divide his force. It was not only divided, but it was separated
by a deep ravine of the character above described. One flank
could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the
junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions of Hovey,
Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on
the left. I was on the field by ten A.M., and inspected both
flanks in person. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed
back, was at least not repulsing our advance. On the left,
however, Osterhaus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed
with some loss. As soon as the road could be cleared of
McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who was close upon
the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan's
division. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one
brigade (General John E. Smith's was selected) to support
Osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of
his position. This movement carried the brigade over a deep
ravine to a third ridge and, when Smith's troops were seen well
through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed to renew his front
attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy loss. The
enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left
followed before sunset. While the movement to our left was
going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me
frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with
him was not being pressed. I had been upon the ground and knew
it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. We
followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles
from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the
night.
__________
12 NOTE.—On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
of some of the State officers who accompanied him.
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