44: Chapter XLIV.
<< 43: Chapter XLIII. || 45: Chapter XLV. >>
At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give
orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to
encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at
daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and
endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained;
if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate
against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary
Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move
without further orders from me.
The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole
field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It
remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view,
and officers—presumably staff officers—could be seen coming
and going constantly.
The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was
almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A
low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and
near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two
hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy
was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground
was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the
first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see,
and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held
the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east
base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported
by two brigades of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his
brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to
be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east
side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and
with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced
rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan
L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the
railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail
from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from
the position we had gained, but without success. The contest
lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander,
was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened both
Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to
weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From
the position I occupied I could see column after column of
Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun
that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged
up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command,
over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both
artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the
enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a
heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back,
followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops
into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they
charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.
Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith
from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a
division to reinforce him. Baird's division was accordingly
sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a
considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to
reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the same
direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be
late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see
Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and
compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also.
The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I
expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge
over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the
roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no
obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above
named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek,
and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his
forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But
Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for
his relief could not be delayed any longer.
Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from
early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I
now directed Thomas to order the charge at once 16. I watched
eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that
there was no indication of any charge being made. The centre of
the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I
stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning
to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to
see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to
make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour
before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had
heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a
moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was
off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering
was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance
before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were
strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us,
and had a second line half-way down and another at the base.
Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of
rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel
and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the
same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under
the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that
were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating
hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to
fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest
position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to
reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over
that and on for the crest—thus effectually carrying out my
orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th 17 for this
charge.
I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along
the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the
air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the
ammunition expended. The pursuit continued until the crest was
reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the
Confederate barriers at different points in front of both
Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that
Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many
were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their
flight.
Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River
at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some
resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of
Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body
and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but
Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward
up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention
of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the
movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a
hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many
prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army
of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of
the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day.
Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not
have been accomplished.
While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General
Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the
corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard
Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment
the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defence,
I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I
rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time.
Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the
enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to
the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the
charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left,
in Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against
Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted
longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's
division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of
musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I
could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The
enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left
giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the
extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received
orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.
As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front
he directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the
Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the
Chickamauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Station. He
ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where
there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow
Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was
ordered to reconnoiter the tunnel to see if that was still
held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both
armies. The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow
Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad
towards Graysville.
Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the
destruction of the bridge at that point. He got his troops
over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream
at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow
when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the
remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank
of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along
the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as
many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were
captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was
near Rossville, extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his
left, on the road to Graysville.
During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been
defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if
he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our
victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the
valley to relieve Burnside.
Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for
the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas
was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at
Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and
ammunition. Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of
the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to
Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies
transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of
ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.
In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the
Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of
the Cumberland participated. In fact, the accidents growing out
of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so
mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept
together, under their respective commanders, during the
battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the 12th
corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th
corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army
of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army,
Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C.
Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no
jealousy—hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or
men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling
of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took
it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and
it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end
was accomplished.
The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds,
considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was
accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's
making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his
ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second,
in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third,
in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his
impregnable position.
It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on
Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It
was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a
serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding
this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to
be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and
Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been
three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation,
for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the
Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him
occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there
might be an irreconcilable difference between them.
Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man,
professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright.
But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally
disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most
correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble.
As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his
commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post
commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.
I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of
Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several
companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself
commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as
post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieutenant at
the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As
commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster—himself—for something he wanted. As
quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed
on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As company
commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition
called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was
the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he
still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the
post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter
referred, exclaimed: "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled
with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with
yourself!"
Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his
superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his
own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never
on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as
anybody when intentionally given.
It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the
reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of
his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing
two birds with one stone." On several occasions during the war
he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR
Military GENIUS.
I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his
military capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer
to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency.
Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the
downfall of the Confederacy.
My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of
Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary
Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout
Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get
across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker
had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to
assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived, however, the
order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The
waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the
bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to
be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's
orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were
originally.
_____
NOTE.—From this point on this volume was written (with the
exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been
previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in
April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made
by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.
__________
16In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
the ridge.
17 Chattanooga, November 24,1863.
Major-General. Ceo. H. Thomas,
Chattanooga
General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the
rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's
position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable
road.
U. S. Grant,
Major-General.
<< 43: Chapter XLIII. || 45: Chapter XLV. >>
