46: Chapter XLVI.
<< 45: Chapter XLV. || 47: Chapter XLVII. >>
Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to
distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north
to Nashville; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back
to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where
most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out
what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the
Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He
expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same
thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.
About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where
Hurlbut commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered
them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg
and out to where McPherson was in command, and had him organize
his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.
Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian
with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a
considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He
determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.
I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to
Sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman
got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered
him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about
7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be
south-east from Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the
1st of February.
While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of
Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain
the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the
information they could gather. When these scouts returned it was
through them that he got the information of General Polk's being
at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.
Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very
effective. Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest,
but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful
experience such as Forrest's men had had. The fact is, troops
who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their
victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that
can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result
is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are
officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest
had carried on neither army could present a more effective
officer than he was.
Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his
expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed
the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that
until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he
reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the
9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to
get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here,
however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the
enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur,
Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being
picked up.
He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having
retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in
Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and
south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who
he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had
gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers.
Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip
to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a
few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead
of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in
Forrest's favor.
Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative
movement with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I
disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other
important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a
few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain
absent must be limited. We must have them for the spring
campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive.
My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign
and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse,
until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January
I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at
the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my
arrival. While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to
turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep
the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all
parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had
remained at Nashville.
When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone
there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in
the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement
in Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at
Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the
south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for
the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.
I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already
sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to
operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in
East Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I
directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides
Stanley's division which was already to the east, into East
Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in
East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department
and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part
of the preparations for my spring campaign.
About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved
him 21, advised me that he thought it would be a good thing
to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly
quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there,
his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place
where it could effect the most for their cause. I thought the
advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the
orders for pursuit of Longstreet.
On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold
it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.
Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to
start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the
movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward
and might be in danger. Then again on the 21st, he not yet
having started, I asked him if he could not start the next
day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell back
from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could
not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor
teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads
were repaired. He soon fell back.
Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not
carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the
supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat,
would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces,
following, would be receding from theirs. On the 2d of March,
however, I learned of Sherman's success, which eased my mind
very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.
The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army
had passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of
February. My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st
of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to
Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the
day following that. The commission was handed to me on the
9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son,
those of my staff who were with me and a few other visitors.
The President in presenting my commission read from a
paper—stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the
delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my
disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in
advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The
President said:
"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done,
and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the
existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission
constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United
States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a
corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you,
so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add,
that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty
personal concurrence."
To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission,
with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of
the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our
common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint
your expectations. I feel the full weight of the
responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they
are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the
favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."
On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the
Potomac at Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and
pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the
commands there and giving general directions for the preparations
to be made for the spring campaign.
It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even
if I was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington
and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for
the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably,
resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to
desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined,
therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my
late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the
department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without
hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me
on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already
stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the
Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy Station, north of the
Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war,
but had not met him since until this visit. I was a stranger to
most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the
officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican
war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of
that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five
corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of
important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want
to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me
that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West,
mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he
begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged
that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand
in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. For
himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever
placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any
one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the
West.
This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade
than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is
men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we
may always expect the most efficient service.
Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to
him. He was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous
to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command
of the Army of the Potomac—except from the authorities at
Washington. All other general officers occupying similar
positions were independent in their commands so far as any one
present with them was concerned. I tried to make General
Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his
command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the
Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid
the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my
headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating
them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions
to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 11th I
returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the
armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my
old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had
telegraphed to join me in Nashville.
Sherman assumed command of the military division of the
Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together
for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way
back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about
which I wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my
new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished
to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his
command with mine when the spring campaign should commence.
There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with
the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary
war—the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved
from important commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont
in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the
West.
Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought
advisable for the command under me—now Sherman's. General J.
E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia
with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton,
about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of
the railroad from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to
Atlanta.
There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first
duty of the armies of the military division of the
Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that
important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I
wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching
campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected
that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of
all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies
east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move
upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and
assist to the best of its ability.22 The plan therefore was
for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible,
to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of
Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold
Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the
troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be
left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the
Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the
Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time
for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not
be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made,
the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all
lands.
In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from
important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after
those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for
the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no
assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the
matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the
assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance
that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the Secretary
told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to
accept the assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he
refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had
ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in
the old army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. All
of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as
brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining
service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to
report to.
On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th
took up my headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles
south of the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.
Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the
President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital
to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. I knew him,
however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by
officers under me at the West who had known him all their
lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates between
Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival
candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident
of Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest;
but I recognized then his great ability.
In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me
that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how
campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in
them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and
the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, WHICH
WAS ALWAYS With HIM, forced him into issuing his series of
"Military Orders"—one, two, three, etc. He did not know but
they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All
he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance
needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government
in rendering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the
best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as
possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview
ended.
The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I
knew him better.
While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against
giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so
kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that
some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should
have said that in our interview the President told me he did not
want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of
campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I
pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had
evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and
Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map
two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of
these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our
supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we
moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that
the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was
shutting us up.
I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to
the Secretary of War or to General Halleck.
March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and
the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.
________
21December 29, 1863.
Maj.-General U. S. Grant:
General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be
Granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible
that Schofield will be sent to your command.
H. W. Halleck
General-in-Chief.
(Official.)
22 See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.
<< 45: Chapter XLV. || 47: Chapter XLVII. >>
