49: Chapter XLIX.
<< 48: Chapter XLVIII. || 50: Chapter L. >>
After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to
Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to
assume the duties of his new command. His military division was
now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory
west of the Allegheny Mountains and east of the Mississippi
River, together with the State of Arkansas in the
trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the
Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next
was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding;
the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson
commanding; and General Steele still commanded the
trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-named
department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate
with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and
it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to
that of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General
Banks, was in command.
The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former
Chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when
the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the
roads to be in a condition for the troops to march.
General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the
task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring
campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four
thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were
regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over sixty thousand
men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga; and
Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville.
With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand
men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general
advance, with a view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing
Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform himself as
to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally,
good.
One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of
getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation
of supplies forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to
warrant a movement. He found, when he got to that place, that
the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently
interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to
meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any
surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being
used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry,
and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once
changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry
horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be
marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting
supplies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance
before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.
As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly
one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The
country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in
mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton
is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of
the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing
south-west—this being the general direction which all the main
streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering
into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this
campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for
defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to
Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be
forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to
fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very
strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least
hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any
further. With a less skillful general, and one disposed to take
no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.
Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a
few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the
direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It
had been Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the
Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south
from there so as to have him come into the road running from
Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was
hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with
Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported
by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of
McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express
provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had
not yet expired, and they were not back.
Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J.
Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the
trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that
they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared
for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were
not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to no
purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that
the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was
therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a
road to the right of Thomas—the two coming together about
Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start
promptly on time.
Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it
was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even
to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was
a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and
Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a
railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the
valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to
pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come
out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.
This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided
to abandon his position at Dalton.
On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our
cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road
in the enemy's rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army
pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was
reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that
Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's army and
engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of
bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the
railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad
was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be
rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused
much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a
mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be
rebuilt.
The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate
skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another
all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without
a good deal of fighting—some of it very hard fighting, rising
to the dignity of very important battles—neither were single
positions gained in a day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at
some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed.
It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the
rear of Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit
brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very
strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. An
assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to
flank the enemy out of it. This was done by sending a large
force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear
of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found the
enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting
for about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left
our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as
they could get. They kept working still farther around to the
left toward the railroad. This was the case more particularly
with the cavalry. By the 4th of June Johnston found that he was
being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Allatoona was
left in our possession.
Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for
occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a
secondary base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to
that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided
for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance.
The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was
impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would
have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new
position.
While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to
it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been
on furlough.
Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kennesaw Mountain, where
strong intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our
troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got
their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining
considerable loss. But during the progress of the battle
Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his
left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These
operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at
once. Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the
railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. He had
intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of
ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the
Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.
About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting
easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below
him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so
frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he
fell back across the river.
Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old
tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta
began. Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood
superseded him.
Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with
much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond,
or of the people of that section of the South in which he was
commanding. The very fact of a change of commanders being
ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change
of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors—the
very thing our troops wanted.
For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right.
Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the
time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted
the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned
the contest and agreed to a separation.
Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a
circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition
to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken
before a close siege could be commenced.
Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy
was about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and
attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's
corps, and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were the principal
ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour;
but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their
main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this
day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was very badly
wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and
our troops were advanced. The investment had not been
relinquished for a moment during the day.
During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by
our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position
farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which
lasted most of the day of the 22d. At first the battle went
very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being
somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing they were
struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had
become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable
confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon
they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now
of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle
continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of
ground. Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was
driven back into the city 26.
It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one
column to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army
lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals.
Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the
railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of
Augusta. He was successful in this, and returned about the time
of the battle. Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a
small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River
about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard
pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of
Sherman, and reported to him about this time.
The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,
although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of
September. Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy
out of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines that
had to be maintained were very long. Our troops were gradually
worked around to the east until they struck the road between
Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified, as
were those to the north and west of the city—all as close up to
the enemy's lines as practicable—in order to hold them with the
smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an
army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down
south of Atlanta.
On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the
28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding,
with great vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that
means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great
deal of damage upon the enemy. These assaults were continued to
the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still
later in the day. The enemy's losses in these unsuccessful
assaults were fearful.
During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the
town. This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate
lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around
by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles;
the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every
day they remained there.
In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the
railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east
and, if possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville.
There were painful stories current at the time about the great
hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general
bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the
way in which they were fed. Great sympathy was felt for them;
and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon
the country it would be a great relief to them. But the attempt
proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was
first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having
inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also
taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely
superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners
and get back as best he could with what men he had left. He had
lost several hundred men out of his small command. On the 4th
of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a
thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as
lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The
rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days
after Colonel Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a
small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of
Stoneman with something less than a thousand men.
It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was
impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two
divisions. He covered the movement of these divisions to the
rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length
surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding
Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted
upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army
wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.
On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad
to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts
failed utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause
of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and
General Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a
question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield
had any right to command him. If he did raise this question
while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly
reprehensible.
About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of
Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman
off from communication with the North for several days. Sherman
responded to this attack on his lines of communication by
directing one upon theirs.
Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach
the Macon road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so,
passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was
back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. These
little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the
grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus
done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.
Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that
is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got
together to some point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced
this last movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of
September was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of
Atlanta. Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. A
battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before
night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of
his own accord. That night Hood blew up his military works, such
as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped.
The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was
commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of
Atlanta, and notified Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately
back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line
extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the centre,
with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to
the right.
The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the
most memorable in history. There was but little if anything in
the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticize at all,
and nothing to criticize severely. It was creditable alike to
the general who commanded and the army which had executed it.
Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division
and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the
efficiency of his command.
The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and
to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city
of Atlanta was turned into a military base. The citizens were
all compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the
assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow
in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from
trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers
for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are
made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the number of
these traders to one for each of his three armies.
The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously,
and set the country all aglow. This was the first great
political campaign for the Republicans in their canvass of
1864. It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more
effect in settling the election of the following November than
all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with
banners and bands of music in the North.
__________
26 General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and
General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of
forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the
enemy."
<< 48: Chapter XLVIII. || 50: Chapter L. >>
