60: Chapter LX.
<< 59: Chapter LIX. || 61: Chapter LXI. >>
As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River
between Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of
October, 1864. Thomas sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d
corps, together with three brigades of Wilson's cavalry to
Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November Hood started and
moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning
his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These,
with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men.
Schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's
orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the movements of
the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but
to fall back in case of an advance on Nashville, and to fight
the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's
movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his
trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the
21st, and then only to Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight
skirmish but no battle. From this place Schofield then retreated
to Franklin. He had sent his wagons in advance, and Stanley had
gone with them with two divisions to protect them. Cheatham's
corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp
at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.
Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring
Hill, where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without
molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates
were encamped. On the morning of the 30th he had arrived at
Franklin.
Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an
attack the same day. The fight was very desperate and
sanguinary. The Confederate generals led their men in the
repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual
proportions. This fighting continued with great severity until
long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew
off. General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union
troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was
wounded in the fight, but maintained his position.
The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was
1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the
hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as
officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104
captured and missing.
Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it
seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the
battle there. He simply ordered Schofield to continue his
retreat to Nashville, which the latter did during that night and
the next day.
Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive
Hood. The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with
strong garrisons at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and
Chattanooga. Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had
been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two divisions just returned
from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division and R. S.
Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been
organized and armed under the command of the chief
quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the
fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B.
Tower, of the United States Engineers.
Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that
place almost without interference. Thomas was strongly
fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe
against the attack of Hood. He had troops enough even to
annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was
unaccountable—sitting there and permitting himself to be
invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have
to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. It is
true the weather was very bad. The rain was falling and freezing
as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice,
that made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that the
enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas and manage to get
north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I apprehended
most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head
him off if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always
so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence.
I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from
City Point41 to make the attack at once. The country was
alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest
the very thing would take place which I have just described that
is, Hood would get north. It was all without avail further than
to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying that he was getting
ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making
preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas that
I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he
could.
General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and
knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave
him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I
directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it
until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to
deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. After
Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became
restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General
Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating
the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time.
He did move, and was successful from the start. This was on the
15th of December. General Logan was at Louisville at the time
this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington,
and proceeded no farther himself.
The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the
Union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the
combat. The next day the battle was renewed. After a
successful assault upon Hood's men in their intrenchments the
enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead,
their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field,
besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had fought
on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and
endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the
Granny White Road, but too much time was consumed in getting
started. They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the
battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind
intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing.
Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on
foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven in
great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed
the pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The
enemy already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them.
It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lead.
Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of
Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad
bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy
rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad
torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately, either
through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the
pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone
toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some
four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old
railroad bridge. Of course Hood got such a start in this time
that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for
some distance, but without coming upon him again.
_________
41 City Point, VA., December 2,1864.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville Tenn.
If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is
all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
employees, citizens, etc.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
City Point, VA., December 2, 1864.—1.30 P.M.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at
Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the
best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer
incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no
peace.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
City Point, VA., December 5, 1864.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be
getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens
him in all possibility as much as it does you.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
City Point, VA., December 6, 1864—4 P.M.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
back to the Ohio River.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
City Point, VA., December 8, 1864.—8.30 P.M.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the
enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the
contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of
States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except
in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities
ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at
your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
will resound from one end of the land to the other.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
City Point, VA., December 11, 1864.—4 P.M.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let
there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn
battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he
retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or
reinforcements.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
Washington, D. C., December 15, 1864.
Major-General Thomas,
Nashville, Tenn.
I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many
privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for
future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now
expected.
U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.
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