16: Vaalkranz
<< 15: Spion Kop || 17: Buller's Final Advance >>
Neither General Buller nor his troops appeared to be dismayed by the
failure of their plans, or by the heavy losses which were entailed by
the movement which culminated at Spion Kop. The soldiers grumbled, it
is true, at not being let go, and swore that even if it cost them
two-thirds of their number they could and would make heir way through
this labyrinth of hills with its fringe of death. So doubtless they
might. But from first to last their General had shown a great—some
said an exaggerated—respect for human life, and he had no intention
of winning a path by mere slogging, if there were a chance of finding
one by less bloody means. On the morrow of his return he astonished
both his army and the Empire by announcing that he had found the key
to the position and that he hoped to be in Ladysmith in a week. Some
rejoiced in the assurance. Some shrugged their shoulders. Careless of
friends or foes, the stolid Buller proceeded to work out his new
combination.
In the next few days reinforcements trickled in which more than made
up for the losses of the preceding week. A battery of horse artillery,
two heavy guns, two squadrons of the 14th Hussars, and infantry drafts
to the number of twelve or fourteen hundred men came to share the
impending glory or disaster. On the morning of February 5th the army
sallied forth once more to have another try to win a way to
Ladysmith. It was known that enteric was rife in the town, that shell
and bullet and typhoid germ had struck down a terrible proportion of
the garrison, and that the rations of starved horse and commissariat
mule were running low. With their comrades—in many cases their
linked battalions—in such straits within fifteen miles of them,
Buller's soldiers had high motives to brace them for a supreme effort.
The previous attempt had been upon the line immediately to the west of
Spion Kop. If, however, one were to follow to the east of Spion Kop,
one would come upon a high mountain called Doornkloof. Between these
two peaks, there lies a low ridge, called Brakfontein, and a small
detached hill named Vaalkranz. Buller's idea was that if he could
seize this small Vaalkranz, it would enable him to avoid the high
ground altogether and pass his troops through on to the plateau
beyond. He still held the Ford at Potgieter's and commanded the
country beyond with heavy guns on Mount Alice and at Swartz Kop, so
that he could pass troops over at his will. He would make a noisy
demonstration against Brakfontein, then suddenly seize Vaalkranz, and
so, as he hoped, hold the outer door which opened on to the passage to
Ladysmith.
The getting of the guns up Swartz Kop was a preliminary which was as
necessary as it was difficult. A road was cut, sailors, engineers, and
gunners worked with a will under the general direction of Majors
Findlay and Apsley Smith. A mountain battery, two field guns, and six
naval 12-pounders were slung up by steel hawsers, the sailors
yeo-hoing on the halliards. The ammunition was taken up by hand. At
six o'clock on the morning of the 5th the other guns opened a furious
and probably harmless fire upon Brakfontein, Spion Kop, and all the
Boer positions opposite to them. Shortly afterwards the feigned
attack upon Brakfontein was commenced and was sustained with much fuss
and appearance of energy until all was ready for the development of
the true one. Wynne's Brigade, which had been Woodgate's, recovered
already from its Spion Kop experience, carried out this part of the
plan, supported by six batteries of field artillery, one howitzer
battery, and two 4.7 naval guns. Three hours later a telegram was on
its way to Pretoria to tell how triumphantly the burghers had driven
back an attack which was never meant to go forward. The infantry
retired first, then the artillery in alternate batteries, preserving a
beautiful order and decorum. The last battery, the 78th, remained to
receive the concentrated fire of the Boer guns, and was so enveloped
in the dust of the exploding. shells that spectators could only see a
gun here or a limber there. Out of this whirl of death it quietly
walked, without a bucket out of its place, the gunners drawing one
wagon, the horses of which had perished, and so effected a leisurely
and contemptuous withdrawal. The gallantry of the gunners has been
one of the most striking features of the war, but it has never been
more conspicuous than in this feint at Brakfontein.
While the attention of the Boers was being concentrated upon the
Lancashire men, a pontoon bridge was suddenly thrown across the river
at a place called Munger's Drift, some miles to the eastward. Three
infantry brigades, those of Hart, Lyttelton, and Hildyard, had been
massed all ready to be let slip when the false attack was sufficiently
absorbing. The artillery fire (the Swartz Kop guns, and also the
batteries which had been withdrawn from the Brakfontein demonstration)
was then turned suddenly, with the crashing effect of seventy pieces,
upon the real object of attack, the isolated Vaalkranz. It is
doubtful whether any position has ever been subjected to so terrific a
bombardment, for the weight of metal thrown by single guns was greater
than that of a whole German battery in the days of their last great
war. The 4-pounders and 6-pounders of which Prince Kraft discourses
would have seemed toys beside these mighty howitzers and 4·7's. Yet
though the hillside was sharded off in great flakes, it is doubtful if
this terrific fire inflicted much injury upon the cunning and
invisible riflemen with whom we had to contend.
About midday the infantry began to stream across the bridge, which had
been most gallantly and efficiently constructed under a warm fire, by
a party of sappers, under the command of Major Irvine. The attack was
led by the Durham Light Infantry of Lyttelton's Brigade, followed by
the 1st Rifle Brigade, with the Scottish and 3rd Rifles in support.
Never did the old Light Division of Peninsular fame go up a Spanish
hillside with greater spirit and dash than these, their descendants,
facing the slope of Vaalkranz. In open order they moved across the
plain, with a superb disregard of the crash and patter of the
shrapnel, and then up they went, the flitting figures, springing from
cover to cover, stooping, darting, crouching, running, until with
their glasses the spectators on Swartz Kop could see the gleam of the
bayonets and the strain of furious rushing men upon the summit, as the
Jast Boers were driven from their trenches. The position was gained,
but little else. Seven officers and seventy men were lying killed and
wounded among the boulders. A few stricken Boers, five unwounded
prisoners, and a string of Basuto ponies were the poor fruits of
victory—those and the arid hill from which so much had been hoped,
and so little was to be gained.
It was during this advance that an incident occurred of a more
picturesque character than is usual in modern warfare. The
invisibility of combatants and guns, and the absorption of the
individual in the mass, have robbed the battle-field of those episodes
which adorned, if they did not justify it. On this occasion, a Boer
gun, cut off by the British advance, flew out suddenly from behind its
cover, like a hare from its tussock, and raced for safety across the
plain. Here and there it wound, the horses stretched to their utmost,
the drivers stooping and lashing, the little gun bounding behind. To
right to left, behind and before, the British shells burst, lyddite
and shrapnel, crashing and riving. Over the lip of a hollow, the
gallant gun vanished, and within a few minutes was banging away once
more at the British advance. With cheers and shouts and laughter, the
British infantrymen watched the race for shelter, their sporting
spirit rising high above all racial hatred, and hailing with a 'gone
to ground' whoop the final disappearance of the gun.
The Durhams had cleared the path, but the other regiments of
Lyttelton's Brigade followed hard at their heels, and before night
they had firmly established themselves upon the hill. But the fatal
slowness which had marred General Buller's previous operations again
prevented him from completing his success. Twice at least in the
course of these operations there is evidence of sudden impulse to drop
his tools in the midst of his task and to do no more for the day. So
it was at Colenso, where an order was given at an early hour for the
whole force to retire, and the guns which might have been covered by
infantry fire and withdrawn after nightfall were abandoned. So it was
also at a critical moment at this action at Vaalkranz. In the
original scheme of operations it had been planned that an adjoining
hill, called the Green Hill, which partly commanded Vaalkranz, should
be carried also. The two together made a complete position, while
singly each was a very bad neighbour to the other. On the
aide-de-camp riding up, however, to inquire from General Buller
whether the time had come for this advance, he replied, 'We have done
enough for the day,' and left out this essential portion of his
original scheme, with the result that all miscarried.
Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan
successfully. So it must always be with the attack. The defence does
not know where the blow is commg, and has to distribute men and guns
to cover miles of ground. The attacker knows where he will hit, and
behind a screen of outposts he can mass his force and throw his whole
strength against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But in order
to do so he must be quick. One tiger spring must tear the centre out
of the line before the flanks can come to its assistance. If time is
given, if the long line can concentrate, if the scattered guns can
mass, if lines of defence can be reduplicated behind, then the one
great advantage which the attack possesses is thrown away. Both at the
second and at the third attempts of Buller the British movements were
so slow that had the enemy been the slowest instead of the most mobile
of armies, they could still always have made any dispositions which
they chose. Warren's dawdling in the first days of the movement which
ended at Spion Kop might with an effort be condoned on account of
possible difficulties of supply, but it would strain the ingenuity of
the most charitable critic to find a sufficient reason for the
lethargy of Vaalkranz. Though daylight comes a little after four, the
operations were not commenced before seven. Lyttelton's Brigade had
stormed the hill at two, and nothing more was done during the long
evening, while officers chafed and soldiers swore, and the busy Boers
worked furiously to bring up their guns and to bar the path which we
must take. General Buller remarked a day or two later that the way
was not quite so easy as it had been. One might have deduced the fact
without the aid of a balloon.
The brigade then occupied Vaalkranz and erected sangars and dug
trenches. On the morning of the 6th, the position of the British
force was not dissimilar to that of Spion Kop. Again they had some
thousands of men upon a hill-top, exposed to shell fire from several
directions and without any guns upon the hill to support them. In one
or two points the situation was modified in their favour, and hence
their escape from loss and disaster. A more extended position enabled
the infantry to avoid bunching, but in other respects the situation
was parallel to that in which they had found themselves a fortnight
before.
The original plan was that the taking of Vaalkranz should be the first
step towards the outflanking of Brakfontein and the rolling up of the
whole Boer position. But after the first move the British attitude
became one of defence rather than of attack. Whatever the general and
ultimate effect of these operations may have been, it is beyond
question that their contemplation was annoying and bewildering in the
extreme to those who were present. The position on February 6th was
this. Over the river upon the hill was a singgle British brigade,
exposed to the fire of one enormous gun—a 96-pound Creusot, the
longest of all Long Toms—which was stationed upon Doornkloof, and
of several smaller guns and pom-poms which spat at them from nooks and
crevices of the hills. On our side were seventy-two guns, large and
small, all very noisy and impotent. It is not too much to say, as it
appears to me, that the Boers have in some ways revolutionised our
ideas in regard to the use of artillery, by bringing a fresh and
healthy common-sense to bear upon a subject which had been unduly
fettered by pedantic rules. The Boer system is the single stealthy
gun crouching where none can see it. The British system is the six
brave guns coming into action in line of full interval, and spreading
out into accurate dressing visible to all men. 'Always remember,' says
one of our artillery maxims, 'that one gun is no gun.' Which is
prettier on a field-day, is obvious, but which is business—let the
many duels between six Boer guns and sixty British declare. With black
powder it was useless to hide the gun, as its smoke must betray
it. With smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only
by the detection with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on
the recoil that the officers were ever able to localise the guns
against which they were fighting. But if the Boers had had six guns in
line, instead of one behind that kopje, and another between those
distant rocks, it would not have been so difficult to say where they
were. Again, British traditions are all in favour of planting guns
close together. At this very action of Vaalkranz the two largest guns
were so placed that a single shell bursting between them would have
disabled them both. The officer who placed them there, and so
disregarded in a vital matter the most obvious dictates of
common-sense, would probably have been shocked by any want of
technical smartness, or irregularity in the routine drill. An
over-elaboration of trifles, and a want of grip of common-sense, and
of adaptation to new ideas, is the most serious and damaging criticism
which can be levelled against our army. That the function of infantry
is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in the Middle Ages; that the
first duty of artillery is so far as is possible to be invisible —
these are two of the lessons which have been driven home so often
during the war, that even our hidebound conservatism can hardly resist
them.
Lyttelton's Brigade, then, held Vaalkranz; and from three parts of the
compass there came big shells and little shells, with a constant
shower of long-range rifle bullets. Behind them, and as useful as if
it had been on Woolwich Common, there was drawn up an imposing mass of
men, two infantry divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, all
straining at the leash, prepared to shed their blood until the spruits
ran red with it, if only they could win their way to where their
half-starved comrades waited for them. But nothing happened. Hours
passed and nothing happened. An occasional shell from the big gun
plumped among them. One, through some freak of gunnery, lobbed slowly
through a division, and the men whooped and threw their caps at it as
it passed. The guns on Swartz Kop, at a range of nearly five miles,
tossed shells at the monster on Doornkloof, and finally blew up his
powder magazine amid the applause of the infantry. For the army it was
a picnic and a spectacle.
But it was otherwise with the men up on Vaalkranz. In spite of sangar
and trench, that cross fire was finding them out; and no feint or
demonstration on either side came to draw the concentrated fire from
their position. Once there was a sudden alarm at the western end of
the hill, and stooping bearded figures with slouch hats and bandoliers
were right up on the ridge before they could be stopped, so cleverly
had their advance been conducted. But a fiery rush of Durhams and
Rifles cleared the crest again, and it was proved once more how much
stronger is the defence than the attack. Nightfall found the position
unchanged, save that another pontoon bridge had been constructed
during the day. Over this Hildyard's Brigade marched to relieve
Lyttelton's, who came back for a rest under the cover of the Swartz
Kop guns. Their losses in the two days had been under two hundred and
fifty, a trifle if any aim were to be gained, but excessive for a mere
demonstration.
That night Hildyard's men supplemented the defences made by Lyttelton,
and tightened their hold upon the hill. One futile night attack caused
them for an instant to change the spade for the rifle. When in the
morning it was found that the Boers had, as they naturally would,
brought up their outlying guns, the tired soldiers did not regret
their labours of the night. It was again demonstrated how innocuous a
thing is a severe shell fire, if the position be an extended one with
chances of cover. A total of forty killed and wounded out of a strong
brigade was the result of a long day under an incessant cannonade. And
then at nightfall came the conclusion that the guns were too many,
that the way was too hard, and down came all their high hopes with the
order to withdraw once more across that accursed river. Vaalkranz was
abandoned, and Hildyard's Brigade, seething with indignation, was
ordered back once more to its camp.
<< 15: Spion Kop || 17: Buller's Final Advance >>
