15: The Peace of Righteousness
<< 14: The Monroe Doctine and the Panama Canal || Appendix A
There can be no nobler cause for which to work than the peace of
righteousness; and high honor is due those serene and lofty souls who
with wisdom and courage, with high idealism tempered by sane facing of
the actual facts of life, have striven to bring nearer the day when
armed strife between nation and nation, between class and class,
between man and man shall end throughout the world. Because all this
is true, it is also true that there are no men more ignoble or more
foolish, no men whose actions are fraught with greater possibility of
mischief to their country and to mankind, than those who exalt
unrighteous peace as better than righteous war. The men who have stood
highest in our history, as in the history of all countries, are those
who scorned injustice, who were incapable of oppressing the weak, or
of permitting their country, with their consent, to oppress the weak,
but who did not hesitate to draw the sword when to leave it undrawn
meant inability to arrest triumphant wrong.
All this is so obvious that it ought not to be necessary to repeat it.
Yet every man in active affairs, who also reads about the past, grows
by bitter experience to realize that there are plenty of men, not only
among those who mean ill, but among those who mean well, who are ready
enough to praise what was done in the past, and yet are incapable of
profiting by it when faced by the needs of the present. During our
generation this seems to have been peculiarly the case among the men
who have become obsessed with the idea of obtaining universal peace by
some cheap patent panacea.
There has been a real and substantial growth in the feeling for
international responsibility and justice among the great civilized
nations during the past threescore or fourscore years. There has been
a real growth of recognition of the fact that moral turpitude is
involved in the wronging of one nation by another, and that in most
cases war is an evil method of settling international difficulties.
But as yet there has been only a rudimentary beginning of the
development of international tribunals of justice, and there has been
no development at all of any international police power. Now, as I
have already said, the whole fabric of municipal law, of law within
each nation, rests ultimately upon the judge and the policeman; and
the complete absence of the policeman, and the almost complete absence
of the judge, in international affairs, prevents there being as yet
any real homology between municipal and international law.
Moreover, the questions which sometimes involve nations in war are far
more difficult and complex than any questions that affect merely
individuals. Almost every great nation has inherited certain
questions, either with other nations or with sections of its own
people, which it is quite impossible, in the present state of
civilization, to decide as matters between private individuals can be
decided. During the last century at least half of the wars that have
been fought have been civil and not foreign wars. There are big and
powerful nations which habitually commit, either upon other nations or
upon sections of their own people, wrongs so outrageous as to justify
even the most peaceful persons in going to war. There are also weak
nations so utterly incompetent either to protect the rights of
foreigners against their own citizens, or to protect their own
citizens against foreigners, that it becomes a matter of sheer duty
for some outside power to interfere in connection with them. As yet in
neither case is there any efficient method of getting international
action; and if joint action by several powers is secured, the result
is usually considerably worse than if only one Power interfered. The
worst infamies of modern times—such affairs as the massacres of the
Armenians by the Turks, for instance—have been perpetrated in a time
of nominally profound international peace, when there has been a
concert of big Powers to prevent the breaking of this peace, although
only by breaking it could the outrages be stopped. Be it remembered
that the peoples who suffered by these hideous massacres, who saw
their women violated and their children tortured, were actually
enjoying all the benefits of "disarmament." Otherwise they would not
have been massacred; for if the Jews in Russia and the Armenians in
Turkey had been armed, and had been efficient in the use of their
arms, no mob would have meddled with them.
Yet amiable but fatuous persons, with all these facts before their
eyes, pass resolutions demanding universal arbitration for everything,
and the disarmament of the free civilized powers and their abandonment
of their armed forces; or else they write well-meaning, solemn little
books, or pamphlets or editorials, and articles in magazines or
newspapers, to show that it is "an illusion" to believe that war ever
pays, because it is expensive. This is precisely like arguing that we
should disband the police and devote our sole attention to persuading
criminals that it is "an illusion" to suppose that burglary, highway
robbery and white slavery are profitable. It is almost useless to
attempt to argue with these well-intentioned persons, because they are
suffering under an obsession and are not open to reason. They go wrong
at the outset, for they lay all the emphasis on peace and none at all
on righteousness. They are not all of them physically timid men; but
they are usually men of soft life; and they rarely possess a high
sense of honor or a keen patriotism. They rarely try to prevent their
fellow countrymen from insulting or wronging the people of other
nations; but they always ardently advocate that we, in our turn, shall
tamely submit to wrong and insult from other nations. As Americans
their folly is peculiarly scandalous, because if the principles they
now uphold are right, it means that it would have been better that
Americans should never have achieved their independence, and better
that, in 1861, they should have peacefully submitted to seeing their
country split into half a dozen jangling confederacies and slavery
made perpetual. If unwilling to learn from their own history, let
those who think that it is an "illusion" to believe that a war ever
benefits a nation look at the difference between China and Japan.
China has neither a fleet nor an efficient army. It is a huge
civilized empire, one of the most populous on the globe; and it has
been the helpless prey of outsiders because it does not possess the
power to fight. Japan stands on a footing of equality with European
and American nations because it does possess this power. China now
sees Japan, Russia, Germany, England and France in possession of
fragments of her empire, and has twice within the lifetime of the
present generation seen her capital in the hands of allied invaders,
because she in very fact realizes the ideals of the persons who wish
the United States to disarm, and then trust that our helplessness will
secure us a contemptuous immunity from attack by outside nations.
The chief trouble comes from the entire inability of these worthy
people to understand that they are demanding things that are mutually
incompatible when they demand peace at any price, and also justice and
righteousness. I remember one representative of their number, who used
to write little sonnets on behalf of the Mahdi and the Sudanese, these
sonnets setting forth the need that the Sudan should be both
independent and peaceful. As a matter of fact, the Sudan valued
independence only because it desired to war against all Christians and
to carry on an unlimited slave trade. It was "independent" under the
Mahdi for a dozen years, and during those dozen years the bigotry,
tyranny, and cruel religious intolerance were such as flourished in
the seventh century, and in spite of systematic slave raids the
population decreased by nearly two-thirds, and practically all the
children died. Peace came, well-being came, freedom from rape and
murder and torture and highway robbery, and every brutal gratification
of lust and greed came, only when the Sudan lost its independence and
passed under English rule. Yet this well-meaning little sonneteer
sincerely felt that his verses were issued in the cause of humanity.
Looking back from the vantage point of a score of years, probably
every one will agree that he was an absurd person. But he was not one
whit more absurd than most of the more prominent persons who advocate
disarmament by the United States, the cessation of up-building the
navy, and the promise to agree to arbitrate all matters, including
those affecting our national interests and honor, with all foreign
nations.
These persons would do no harm if they affected only themselves. Many
of them are, in the ordinary relations of life, good citizens. They
are exactly like the other good citizens who believe that enforced
universal vegetarianism or anti-vaccination is the panacea for all
ills. But in their particular case they are able to do harm because
they affect our relations with foreign powers, so that other men pay
the debt which they themselves have really incurred. It is the
foolish, peace-at-any-price persons who try to persuade our people to
make unwise and improper treaties, or to stop building up the navy.
But if trouble comes and the treaties are repudiated, or there is a
demand for armed intervention, it is not these people who will pay
anything; they will stay at home in safety, and leave brave men to pay
in blood, and honest men to pay in shame, for their folly.
The trouble is that our policy is apt to go in zigzags, because
different sections of our people exercise at different times unequal
pressure on our government. One class of our citizens clamors for
treaties impossible of fulfilment, and improper to fulfil; another
class has no objection to the passage of these treaties so long as
there is no concrete case to which they apply, but instantly oppose a
veto on their application when any concrete case does actually arise.
One of our cardinal doctrines is freedom of speech, which means
freedom of speech about foreigners as well as about ourselves; and,
inasmuch as we exercise this right with complete absence of restraint,
we cannot expect other nations to hold us harmless unless in the last
resort we are able to make our own words good by our deeds. One class
of our citizens indulges in gushing promises to do everything for
foreigners, another class offensively and improperly reviles them; and
it is hard to say which class more thoroughly misrepresents the sober,
self-respecting judgment of the American people as a whole. The only
safe rule is to promise little, and faithfully to keep every promise;
to "speak softly and carry a big stick."
A prime need for our nation, as of course for every other nation, is
to make up its mind definitely what it wishes, and not to try to
pursue paths of conduct incompatible one with the other. If this
nation is content to be the China of the New World, then and then only
can it afford to do away with the navy and the army. If it is content
to abandon Hawaii and the Panama Canal, to cease to talk of the Monroe
Doctrine, and to admit the right of any European or Asiatic power to
dictate what immigrants shall be sent to and received in America, and
whether or not they shall be allowed to become citizens and hold land
—why, of course, if America is content to have nothing to say on any
of these matters and to keep silent in the presence of armed
outsiders, then it can abandon its navy and agree to arbitrate all
questions of all kinds with every foreign power. In such event it can
afford to pass its spare time in one continuous round of universal
peace celebrations, and of smug self-satisfaction in having earned the
derision of all the virile peoples of mankind. Those who advocate such
a policy do not occupy a lofty position. But at least their position
is understandable.
It is entirely inexcusable, however, to try to combine the unready
hand with the unbridled tongue. It is folly to permit freedom of
speech about foreigners as well as ourselves—and the peace-at-any-
price persons are much too feeble a folk to try to interfere with
freedom of speech—and yet to try to shirk the consequences of freedom
of speech. It is folly to try to abolish our navy, and at the same
time to insist that we have a right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine,
that we have a right to control the Panama Canal which we ourselves
dug, that we have a right to retain Hawaii and prevent foreign nations
from taking Cuba, and a right to determine what immigrants, Asiatic or
European, shall come to our shores, and the terms on which they shall
be naturalized and shall hold land and exercise other privileges. We
are a rich people, and an unmilitary people. In international affairs
we are a short-sighted people. But I know my countrymen. Down at
bottom their temper is such that they will not permanently tolerate
injustice done to them. In the long run they will no more permit
affronts to their National honor than injuries to their national
interest. Such being the case, they will do well to remember that the
surest of all ways to invite disaster is to be opulent, aggressive and
unarmed.
Throughout the seven and a half years that I was President, I pursued
without faltering one consistent foreign policy, a policy of genuine
international good will and of consideration for the rights of others,
and at the same time of steady preparedness. The weakest nations knew
that they, no less than the strongest, were safe from insult and
injury at our hands; and the strong and the weak alike also knew that
we possessed both the will and the ability to guard ourselves from
wrong or insult at the hands of any one.
It was under my administration that the Hague Court was saved from
becoming an empty farce. It had been established by joint
international agreement, but no Power had been willing to resort to
it. Those establishing it had grown to realize that it was in danger
of becoming a mere paper court, so that it would never really come
into being at all. M. d'Estournelles de Constant had been especially
alive to this danger. By correspondence and in personal interviews he
impressed upon me the need not only of making advances by actually
applying arbitration—not merely promising by treaty to apply it—to
questions that were up for settlement, but of using the Hague tribunal
for this purpose. I cordially sympathized with these views. On the
recommendation of John Hay, I succeeded in getting an agreement with
Mexico to lay a matter in dispute between the two republics before the
Hague Court. This was the first case ever brought before the Hague
Court. It was followed by numerous others; and it definitely
established that court as the great international peace tribunal. By
mutual agreement with Great Britain, through the decision of a joint
commission, of which the American members were Senators Lodge and
Turner, and Secretary Root, we were able peacefully to settle the
Alaska Boundary question, the only question remaining between
ourselves and the British Empire which it was not possible to settle
by friendly arbitration; this therefore represented the removal of the
last obstacle to absolute agreement between the two peoples. We were
of substantial service in bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the
negotiations at Algeciras concerning Morocco. We concluded with Great
Britain, and with most of the other great nations, arbitration
treaties specifically agreeing to arbitrate all matters, and
especially the interpretation of treaties, save only as regards
questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital
national interest. We made with Great Britain a treaty guaranteeing
the free use of the Panama Canal on equal terms to the ships of all
nations, while reserving to ourselves the right to police and fortify
the canal, and therefore to control it in time of war. Under this
treaty we are in honor bound to arbitrate the question of canal tolls
for coastwise traffic between the Western and Eastern coasts of the
United States. I believe that the American position as regards this
matter is right; but I also believe that under the arbitration treaty
we are in honor bound to submit the matter to arbitration in view of
Great Britain's contention—although I hold it to be an unwise
contention—that our position is unsound. I emphatically disbelieve in
making universal arbitration treaties which neither the makers nor any
one else would for a moment dream of keeping. I no less emphatically
insist that it is our duty to keep the limited and sensible
arbitration treaties which we have already made. The importance of a
promise lies not in making it, but in keeping it; and the poorest of
all positions for a nation to occupy in such a matter is readiness to
make impossible promises at the same time that there is failure to
keep promises which have been made, which can be kept, and which it is
discreditable to break.
During the early part of the year 1905, the strain on the civilized
world caused by the Russo-Japanese War became serious. The losses of
life and of treasure were frightful. From all the sources of
information at hand, I grew most strongly to believe that a further
continuation of the struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and
an even worse thing for Russia. Japan was already suffering terribly
from the drain upon her men, and especially upon her resources, and
had nothing further to gain from continuance of the struggle; its
continuance meant to her more loss than gain, even if she were
victorious. Russia, in spite of her gigantic strength, was, in my
judgment, apt to lose even more than she had already lost if the
struggle continued. I deemed it probable that she would no more be
able successfully to defend Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria
than she had been able to defend Southern Manchuria and Korea. If the
war went on, I thought it, on the whole, likely that Russia would be
driven west of Lake Baikal. But it was very far from certain. There is
no certainty in such a war. Japan might have met defeat, and defeat to
her would have spelt overwhelming disaster; and even if she had
continued to win, what she thus won would have been of no value to
her, and the cost in blood and money would have left her drained
white. I believed, therefore, that the time had come when it was
greatly to the interest of both combatants to have peace, and when
therefore it was possible to get both to agree to peace.
I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that,
naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the
other should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative.
I then sent an identical note to the two powers proposing that they
should meet, through their representatives, to see if peace could not
be made directly between them, and offered to act as an intermediary
in bringing about such a meeting, but not for any other purpose. Each
assented to my proposal in principle. There was difficulty in getting
them to agree on a common meeting place; but each finally abandoned
its original contention in the matter, and the representatives of the
two nations finally met at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire. I previously
received the two delegations at Oyster Bay on the U. S. S. Mayflower,
which, together with another naval vessel, I put at their disposal, on
behalf of the United States Government, to take them from Oyster Bay
to Portsmouth.
As is customary—but both unwise and undesirable—in such cases, each
side advanced claims which the other could not grant. The chief
difficulty came because of Japan's demand for a money indemnity. I
felt that it would be better for Russia to pay some indemnity than to
go on with the war, for there was little chance, in my judgment, of
the war turning out favorably for Russia, and the revolutionary
movement already under way bade fair to overthrow the negotiations
entirely. I advised the Russian Government to this effect, at the same
time urging them to abandon their pretensions on certain other points,
notably concerning the southern half of Saghalien, which the Japanese
had taken. I also, however, and equally strongly, advised the Japanese
that in my judgment it would be the gravest mistake on their part to
insist on continuing the war for the sake of a money indemnity; for
Russia was absolutely firm in refusing to give them an indemnity, and
the longer the war continued the less able she would be to pay. I
pointed out that there was no possible analogy between their case and
that of Germany in the war with France, which they were fond of
quoting. The Germans held Paris and half of France, and gave up much
territory in lieu of the indemnity, whereas the Japanese were still
many thousand miles from Moscow, and had no territory whatever which
they wished to give up. I also pointed out that in my judgment whereas
the Japanese had enjoyed the sympathy of most of the civilized powers
at the outset of and during the continuance of the war, they would
forfeit it if they turned the war into one merely for getting money—
and, moreover, they would almost certainly fail to get the money, and
would simply find themselves at the end of a year, even if things
prospered with them, in possession of territory they did not want,
having spent enormous additional sums of money, and lost enormous
additional numbers of men, and yet without a penny of remuneration.
The treaty of peace was finally signed.
As is inevitable under such circumstances, each side felt that it
ought to have got better terms; and when the danger was well past each
side felt that it had been over-reached by the other, and that if the
war had gone on it would have gotten more than it actually did get.
The Japanese Government had been wise throughout, except in the matter
of announcing that it would insist on a money indemnity. Neither in
national nor in private affairs is it ordinarily advisable to make a
bluff which cannot be put through—personally, I never believe in
doing it under any circumstances. The Japanese people had been misled
by this bluff of their Government; and the unwisdom of the
Government's action in the matter was shown by the great resentment
the treaty aroused in Japan, although it was so beneficial to Japan.
There were various mob outbreaks, especially in the Japanese cities;
the police were roughly handled, and several Christian churches were
burned, as reported to me by the American Minister. In both Russia and
Japan I believe that the net result as regards myself was a feeling of
injury, and of dislike of me, among the people at large. I had
expected this; I regarded it as entirely natural; and I did not resent
it in the least. The Governments of both nations behaved toward me not
only with correct and entire propriety, but with much courtesy and the
fullest acknowledgment of the good effect of what I had done; and in
Japan, at least, I believe that the leading men sincerely felt that I
had been their friend. I had certainly tried my best to be the friend
not only of the Japanese people but of the Russian people, and I
believe that what I did was for the best interests of both and of the
world at large.
During the course of the negotiations I tried to enlist the aid of the
Governments of one nation which was friendly to Russia, and of another
nation which was friendly to Japan, in helping bring about peace. I
got no aid from either. I did, however, receive aid from the Emperor
of Germany. His Ambassador at St. Petersburg was the one Ambassador
who helped the American Ambassador, Mr. Meyer, at delicate and
doubtful points of the negotiations. Mr. Meyer, who was, with the
exception of Mr. White, the most useful diplomat in the American
service, rendered literally invaluable aid by insisting upon himself
seeing the Czar at critical periods of the transaction, when it was no
longer possible for me to act successfully through the representatives
of the Czar, who were often at cross purposes with one another.
As a result of the Portsmouth peace, I was given the Nobel Peace
Prize. This consisted of a medal, which I kept, and a sum of $40,000,
which I turned over as a foundation of industrial peace to a board of
trustees which included Oscar Straus, Seth Low and John Mitchell. In
the present state of the world's development industrial peace is even
more essential than international peace; and it was fitting and
appropriate to devote the peace prize to such a purpose. In 1910,
while in Europe, one of my most pleasant experiences was my visit to
Norway, where I addressed the Nobel Committee, and set forth in full
the principles upon which I had acted, not only in this particular
case but throughout my administration.
I received another gift which I deeply appreciated, an original copy
of Sully's "Memoires" of "Henry le Grand," sent me with the following
inscription (I translate it roughly):
Paris, January, 1906.
"The undersigned members of the French Parliamentary Group of
International Arbitration and Conciliation have decided to tender
President Roosevelt a token of their high esteem and their
sympathetic recognition of the persistent and decisive initiative
he has taken towards gradually substituting friendly and judicial
for violent methods in case of conflict between Nations.
"They believe that the action of President Roosevelt, which has
realized the most generous hopes to be found in history, should be
classed as a continuance of similar illustrious attempts of former
times, notably the project for international concord known under
the name of the 'Great Design of Henry IV' in the memoirs of his
Prime Minister, the Duke de Sully. In consequence they have sought
out a copy of the first edition of these memoirs, and they take
pleasure in offering it to him, with the request that he will keep
it among his family papers."
The signatures include those of Emile Loubet, A. Carnot,
d'Estournelles de Constant, Aristide Briand, Sully Prudhomme, Jean
Jaurés, A. Fallieres, R. Poincare, and two or three hundred others.
Of course what I had done in connection with the Portsmouth peace was
misunderstood by some good and sincere people. Just as after the
settlement of the coal strike, there were persons who thereupon
thought that it was in my power, and was my duty, to settle all other
strikes, so after the peace of Portsmouth there were other persons—
not only Americans, by the way,—who thought it my duty forthwith to
make myself a kind of international Meddlesome Mattie and interfere
for peace and justice promiscuously over the world. Others, with a
delightful non-sequitur, jumped to the conclusion that inasmuch as I
had helped to bring about a beneficent and necessary peace I must of
necessity have changed my mind about war being ever necessary. A
couple of days after peace was concluded I wrote to a friend: "Don't
you be misled by the fact that just at the moment men are speaking
well of me. They will speak ill soon enough. As Loeb remarked to me
to-day, some time soon I shall have to spank some little international
brigand, and then all the well-meaning idiots will turn and shriek
that this is inconsistent with what I did at the Peace Conference,
whereas in reality it will be exactly in line with it."
To one of my political opponents, Mr. Schurz, who wrote me
congratulating me upon the outcome at Portsmouth, and suggesting that
the time was opportune for a move towards disarmament, I answered in a
letter setting forth views which I thought sound then, and think sound
now. The letter ran as follows:
Oyster Bay, N. Y.,
September 8, 1905.
My dear Mr. Schurz: I thank you for your congratulations. As to
what you say about disarmament—which I suppose is the rough
equivalent of "the gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens
imposed upon the world by armed peace"—I am not clear either as
to what can be done or what ought to be done. If I had been known
as one of the conventional type of peace advocates I could have
done nothing whatever in bringing about peace now, I would be
powerless in the future to accomplish anything, and I would not
have been able to help confer the boons upon Cuba, the
Philippines, Porto Rico and Panama, brought about by our action
therein. If the Japanese had not armed during the last twenty
years, this would indeed be a sorrowful century for Japan. If this
country had not fought the Spanish War; if we had failed to take
the action we did about Panama; all mankind would have been the
loser. While the Turks were butchering the Armenians the European
powers kept the peace and thereby added a burden of infamy to the
Nineteenth Century, for in keeping that peace a greater number of
lives were lost than in any European war since the days of
Napoleon, and these lives were those of women and children as well
as of men; while the moral degradation, the brutality inflicted
and endured, the aggregate of hideous wrong done, surpassed that
of any war of which we have record in modern times. Until people
get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly
as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as
an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a
limited amount to advance its coming on this earth. There is of
course no analogy at present between international law and private
or municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the
former, while there is for the latter. Inside our own nation the
law-abiding man does not have to arm himself against the lawless
simply because there is some armed force—the police, the
sheriff's posse, the national guard, the regulars—which can be
called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar
international force to call on, and I do not as yet see how it
could at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only
because some strong and on the whole just power has by armed
force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder. In a
very interesting French book the other day I was reading how the
Mediterranean was freed from pirates only by the "pax Britannica,"
established by England's naval force. The hopeless and hideous
bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan was stopped, and
could only be stopped, when civilized nations in the shape of
Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true of
Burma and the Malay States, as well as Egypt, with regard to
England. Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed
interference of a civilized power which, relatively to its
opponent, was a just and beneficent power. If England had disarmed
to the point of being unable to conquer the Sudan and protect
Egypt, so that the Mahdists had established their supremacy in
northeastern Africa, the result would have been a horrible and
bloody calamity to mankind. It was only the growth of the European
powers in military efficiency that freed eastern Europe from the
dreadful scourge of the Tartar and partially freed it from the
dreadful scourge of the Turk. Unjust war is dreadful; a just war
may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and
civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarisms
with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which
the calamities caused by all the wars of the nineteenth century
would be trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by
international agreement state exactly which power ceases to be
free and civilized and which comes near the line of barbarism or
despotism. For example, I suppose it would be very difficult to
get Russia and Japan to come to a common agreement on this point;
and there are at least some citizens of other nations, not to
speak of their governments, whom it would also be hard to get
together.
This does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to make the
effort. It may be that some scheme will be developed. America,
fortunately, can cordially assist in such an effort, for no one in
his senses would suggest our disarmament; and though we should
continue to perfect our small navy and our minute army, I do not
think it necessary to increase the number of our ships—at any
rate as things look now—nor the number of our soldiers. Of course
our navy must be kept up to the highest point of efficiency, and
the replacing of old and worthless vessels by first-class new ones
may involve an increase in the personnel; but not enough to
interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested. But
before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such
way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I
would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action
presented.
It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the war
navies of the world might be a good thing; but I would not like
to speak too positively offhand. Of course it is only in
continental Europe that the armies are too large; and before
advocating action as regards them I should have to weigh matters
carefully—including by the way such a matter as the Turkish army.
At any rate nothing useful can be done unless with the clear
recognition that we object to putting peace second to
righteousness.
Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt
Hon. Carl Schurz, Bolton Landing,
Lake George, N. Y.
In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace
was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world. I had become
convinced that for many reasons it was essential that we should have
it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other
peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic,
and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other
of the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that such a voyage
would greatly benefit the navy itself; would arouse popular interest
in and enthusiasm for the navy; and would make foreign nations accept
as a matter of course that our fleet should from time to time be
gathered in the Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in
the Atlantic, and that its presence in one ocean was no more to be
accepted as a mark of hostility to any Asiatic power than its presence
in the Atlantic was to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any
European power. I determined on the move without consulting the
Cabinet, precisely as I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet. A
council of war never fights, and in a crisis the duty of a leader is
to lead and not to take refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a
multitude of councillors. At that time, as I happen to know, neither
the English nor the German authorities believed it possible to take a
fleet of great battleships round the world. They did not believe that
their own fleets could perform the feat, and still less did they
believe that the American fleet could. I made up my mind that it was
time to have a show down in the matter; because if it was really true
that our fleet could not get from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it was
much better to know it and be able to shape our policy in view of the
knowledge. Many persons publicly and privately protested against the
move on the ground that Japan would accept it as a threat. To this I
answered nothing in public. In private I said that I did not believe
Japan would so regard it because Japan knew my sincere friendship and
admiration for her and realized that we could not as a Nation have any
intention of attacking her; and that if there were any such feeling on
the part of Japan as was alleged that very fact rendered it imperative
that that fleet should go. When in the spring of 1910 I was in Europe
I was interested to find that high naval authorities in both Germany
and Italy had expected that war would come at the time of the voyage.
They asked me if I had not been afraid of it, and if I had not
expected that hostilities would begin at least by the time that the
fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that I did not
expect it; that I believed that Japan would feel as friendly in the
matter as we did; but that if my expectations had proved mistaken, it
would have been proof positive that we were going to be attacked
anyhow, and that in such event it would have been an enormous gain to
have had the three months' preliminary preparation which enabled the
fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they
left I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the
trip would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take
exactly the same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if
we were at war with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse
of any kind would be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any
kind and we were taken unawares.
My prime purpose was to impress the American people; and this purpose
was fully achieved. The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad;
boasting about what we have done does not impress foreign nations at
all, except unfavorably, but positive achievement does; and the two
American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the
first dozen years of this century were the digging of the Panama Canal
and the cruise of the battle fleet round the world. But the impression
made on our own people was of far greater consequence. No single thing
in the history of the new United States Navy has done as much to
stimulate popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. This
effect was forecast in a well-informed and friendly English
periodical, the London Spectator. Writing in October, 1907, a month
before the fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, the Spectator said:
"All over America the people will follow the movements of the
fleet; they will learn something of the intricate details of the
coaling and commissariat work under warlike conditions; and in a
word their attention will be aroused. Next time Mr. Roosevelt or
his representatives appeal to the country for new battleships they
will do so to people whose minds have been influenced one way or
the other. The naval programme will not have stood still. We are
sure that, apart from increasing the efficiency of the existing
fleet, this is the aim which Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. He has a
policy which projects itself far into the future, but it is an
entire misreading of it to suppose that it is aimed narrowly and
definitely at any single Power."
I first directed the fleet, of sixteen battleships, to go round
through the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. From thence I
ordered them to New Zealand and Australia, then to the Philippines,
China and Japan, and home through Suez—they stopped in the
Mediterranean to help the sufferers from the earthquake at Messina, by
the way, and did this work as effectively as they had done all their
other work. Admiral Evans commanded the fleet to San Francisco; there
Admiral Sperry took it; Admirals Thomas, Wainwright and Schroeder
rendered distinguished service under Evans and Sperry. The coaling and
other preparations were made in such excellent shape by the Department
that there was never a hitch, not so much as the delay of an hour, in
keeping every appointment made. All the repairs were made without
difficulty, the ship concerned merely falling out of column for a few
hours, and when the job was done steaming at speed until she regained
her position. Not a ship was left in any port; and there was hardly a
desertion. As soon as it was known that the voyage was to be
undertaken men crowded to enlist, just as freely from the Mississippi
Valley as from the seaboard, and for the first time since the Spanish
War the ships put to sea overmanned—and by as stalwart a set of men-
of-war's men as ever looked through a porthole, game for a fight or a
frolic, but withal so self-respecting and with such a sense of
responsibility that in all the ports in which they landed their
conduct was exemplary. The fleet practiced incessantly during the
voyage, both with the guns and in battle tactics, and came home a much
more efficient fighting instrument than when it started sixteen months
before.
The best men of command rank in our own service were confident that
the fleet would go round in safety, in spite of the incredulity of
foreign critics. Even they, however, did not believe that it was wise
to send the torpedo craft around. I accordingly acquiesced in their
views, as it did not occur to me to consult the lieutenants. But
shortly before the fleet started, I went in the Government yacht
Mayflower to inspect the target practice off Provincetown. I was
accompanied by two torpedo boat destroyers, in charge of a couple of
naval lieutenants, thorough gamecocks; and I had the two lieutenants
aboard to dine one evening. Towards the end of the dinner they could
not refrain from asking if the torpedo flotilla was to go round with
the big ships. I told them no, that the admirals and captains did not
believe that the torpedo boats could stand it, and believed that the
officers and crews aboard the cockle shells would be worn out by the
constant pitching and bouncing and the everlasting need to make
repairs. My two guests chorused an eager assurance that the boats
could stand it. They assured me that the enlisted men were even more
anxious to go than were the officers, mentioning that on one of their
boats the terms of enlistment of most of the crew were out, and the
men were waiting to see whether or not to reenlist, as they did not
care to do so unless the boats were to go on the cruise. I answered
that I was only too glad to accept the word of the men who were to do
the job, and that they should certainly go; and within half an hour I
sent out the order for the flotilla to be got ready. It went round in
fine shape, not a boat being laid up. I felt that the feat reflected
even more credit upon the navy than did the circumnavigation of the
big ships, and I wrote the flotilla commander the following letter:
May 18, 1908.
My dear Captain Cone:
A great deal of attention has been paid to the feat of our
battleship fleet in encircling South America and getting to San
Francisco; and it would be hard too highly to compliment the
officers and enlisted men of that fleet for what they have done.
Yet if I should draw any distinction at all it would be in favor
of you and your associates who have taken out the torpedo
flotilla. Yours was an even more notable feat, and every officer
and every enlisted man in the torpedo boat flotilla has the right
to feel that he has rendered distinguished service to the United
States navy and therefore to the people of the United States; and
I wish I could thank each of them personally. Will you have this
letter read by the commanding officer of each torpedo boat to his
officers and crew?
Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt
Lieutenant Commander Hutch I. Cone, U. S. N.,
Commanding Second Torpedo Flotilla,
Care Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.
There were various amusing features connected with the trip. Most of
the wealthy people and "leaders of opinion" in the Eastern cities were
panic-struck at the proposal to take the fleet away from Atlantic
waters. The great New York dailies issued frantic appeals to Congress
to stop the fleet from going. The head of the Senate Committee on
Naval Affairs announced that the fleet should not and could not go
because Congress would refuse to appropriate the money—he being from
an Eastern seaboard State. However, I announced in response that I had
enough money to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the
fleet would certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to
appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in
the Pacific. There was no further difficulty about the money.
It was not originally my intention that the fleet should visit
Australia, but the Australian Government sent a most cordial
invitation, which I gladly accepted; for I have, as every American
ought to have, a hearty admiration for, and fellow feeling with,
Australia, and I believe that America should be ready to stand back of
Australia in any serious emergency. The reception accorded the fleet
in Australia was wonderful, and it showed the fundamental community of
feeling between ourselves and the great commonwealth of the South
Seas. The considerate, generous, and open-handed hospitality with
which the entire Australian people treated our officers and men could
not have been surpassed had they been our own countrymen. The fleet
first visited Sydney, which has a singularly beautiful harbor. The day
after the arrival one of our captains noticed a member of his crew
trying to go to sleep on a bench in the park. He had fixed above his
head a large paper with some lines evidently designed to forestall any
questions from friendly would-be hosts: "I am delighted with the
Australian people. I think your harbor the finest in the world. I am
very tired and would like to go to sleep."
The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was the reception given to
our fleet in Japan. In courtesy and good breeding, the Japanese can
certainly teach much to the nations of the Western world. I had been
very sure that the people of Japan would understand aright what the
cruise meant, and would accept the visit of our fleet as the signal
honor which it was meant to be, a proof of the high regard and
friendship I felt, and which I was certain the American people felt,
for the great Island Empire. The event even surpassed my expectations.
I cannot too strongly express my appreciation of the generous courtesy
the Japanese showed the officers and crews of our fleet; and I may add
that every man of them came back a friend and admirer of the Japanese.
Admiral Sperry wrote me a letter of much interest, dealing not only
with the reception in Tokyo but with the work of our men at sea; I
herewith give it almost in full:
28 October, 1908.
Dear Mr. Roosevelt:
My official report of the visit to Japan goes forward in this
mail, but there are certain aspects of the affair so successfully
concluded which cannot well be included in the report.
You are perhaps aware that Mr. Denison of the Japanese Foreign
Office was one of my colleagues at The Hague, for whom I have a
very high regard. Desiring to avoid every possibility of trouble
or misunderstanding, I wrote to him last June explaining fully the
character of our men, which they have so well lived up to, the
desirability of ample landing places, guides, rest houses and
places for changing money in order that there might be no delay in
getting the men away from the docks on the excursions in which
they delight. Very few of them go into a drinking place, except to
get a resting place not to be found elsewhere, paying for it by
taking a drink.
I also explained our system of landing with liberty men an unarmed
patrol, properly officered, to quietly take in charge and send off
to their ships any men who showed the slightest trace of
disorderly conduct. This letter he showed to the Minister of the
Navy, who highly approved of all our arrangements, including the
patrol, of which I feared they might be jealous. Mr. Denison's
reply reached me in Manila, with a memorandum from the Minister of
the Navy which removed all doubts. Three temporary piers were
built for our boat landings, each 300 feet long, brilliantly
lighted and decorated. The sleeping accommodations did not permit
two or three thousand sailors to remain on shore, but the ample
landings permitted them to be handled night and day with perfect
order and safety.
At the landings and railroad station in Yokohama there were rest
houses or booths, reputable money changers and as many as a
thousand English-speaking Japanese college students acted as
volunteer guides, besides Japanese sailors and petty officers
detailed for the purpose. In Tokyo there were a great many
excellent refreshment places, where the men got excellent meals
and could rest, smoke, and write letters, and in none of these
places would they allow the men to pay anything, though they were
more than ready to do so. The arrangements were marvelously
perfect.
As soon as your telegram of October 18, giving the address to be
made to the Emperor, was received, I gave copies of it to our
Ambassador to be sent to the Foreign Office. It seems that the
Emperor had already prepared a very cordial address to be
forwarded through me to you, after delivery at the audience, but
your telegram reversed the situation and his reply was prepared. I
am convinced that your kind and courteous initiative on this
occasion helped cause the pleasant feeling which was so obvious in
the Emperor's bearing at the luncheon which followed the audience.
X., who is reticent and conservative, told me that not only the
Emperor but all the Ministers were profoundly gratified by the
course of events. I am confident that not even the most trifling
incident has taken place which could in any way mar the general
satisfaction, and our Ambassador has expressed to me his great
satisfaction with all that has taken place.
Owing to heavy weather encountered on the passage up from Manila
the fleet was obliged to take about 3500 tons of coal.
The Yankton remained behind to keep up communication for a few
days, and yesterday she transmitted the Emperor's telegram to you,
which was sent in reply to your message through our Ambassador
after the sailing of the fleet. It must be profoundly gratifying
to you to have the mission on which you sent the fleet terminate
so happily, and I am profoundly thankful that, owing to the
confidence which you displayed in giving me this command, my
active career draws to a close with such honorable distinction.
As for the effect of the cruise upon the training, discipline and
effectiveness of the fleet, the good cannot be exaggerated. It is
a war game in every detail. The wireless communication has been
maintained with an efficiency hitherto unheard of. Between
Honolulu and Auckland, 3850 miles, we were out of communication
with a cable station for only one night, whereas three [non-
American] men-of-war trying recently to maintain a chain of only
1250 miles, between Auckland and Sydney, were only able to do so
for a few hours.
The officers and men as soon as we put to sea turn to their
gunnery and tactical work far more eagerly than they go to
functions. Every morning certain ships leave the column and move
off seven or eight thousand yards as targets for range measuring
fire control and battery practice for the others, and at night
certain ships do the same thing for night battery practice. I am
sorry to say that this practice is unsatisfactory, and in some
points misleading, owing to the fact that the ships are painted
white. At Portland, in 1903, I saw Admiral Barker's white
battleships under the searchlights of the army at a distance of
14,000 yards, seven sea miles, without glasses, while the
Hartford, a black ship, was never discovered at all, though she
passed within a mile and a half. I have for years, while a member
of the General Board, advocated painting the ships war color at
all times, and by this mail I am asking the Department to make the
necessary change in the Regulations and paint the ships properly.
I do not know that any one now dissents from my view. Admiral
Wainwright strongly concurs, and the War College Conference
recommended it year after year without a dissenting voice.
In the afternoons the fleet has two or three hours' practice at
battle maneuvers, which excite as keen interest as gunnery
exercises.
The competition in coal economy goes on automatically and reacts
in a hundred ways. It has reduced the waste in the use of electric
light and water, and certain chief engineers are said to keep men
ranging over the ships all night turning out every light not in
actual and immediate use. Perhaps the most important effect is the
keen hunt for defects in the machinery causing waste of power. The
Yankton by resetting valves increased her speed from 10 to 11 1/2
knots on the same expenditure.
All this has been done, but the field is widening, the work has
only begun.
* * * * * * *
C. S. SPERRY.
When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of
administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a
foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the
world with whom a war cloud threatened, no nation in the world whom we
had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the
battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful
an outlook.
When the fleet returned after its sixteen months' voyage around the
world I went down to Hampton Roads to greet it. The day was
Washington's Birthday, February 22, 1907. Literally on the minute the
homing battlecraft came into view. On the flagship of the Admiral I
spoke to the officers and enlisted men, as follows:
"Admiral Sperry, Officers and Men of the Battle Fleet:
"Over a year has passed since you steamed out of this harbor, and
over the world's rim, and this morning the hearts of all who saw
you thrilled with pride as the hulls of the mighty warships lifted
above the horizon. You have been in the Northern and the Southern
Hemispheres; four times you have crossed the line; you have
steamed through all the great oceans; you have touched the coast
of every continent. Ever your general course has been westward;
and now you come back to the port from which you set sail. This is
the first battle fleet that has ever circumnavigated the globe.
Those who perform the feat again can but follow in your footsteps.
"The little torpedo flotilla went with you around South America,
through the Straits of Magellan, to our own Pacific Coast. The
armored cruiser squadron met you, and left you again, when you
were half way round the world. You have falsified every prediction
of the prophets of failure. In all your long cruise not an
accident worthy of mention has happened to a single battleship,
nor yet to the cruisers or torpedo boats. You left this coast in a
high state of battle efficiency, and you return with your
efficiency increased; better prepared than when you left, not only
in personnel but even in material. During your world cruise you
have taken your regular gunnery practice, and skilled though you
were before with the guns, you have grown more skilful still; and
through practice you have improved in battle tactics, though here
there is more room for improvement than in your gunnery.
Incidentally, I suppose I need hardly say that one measure of your
fitness must be your clear recognition of the need always steadily
to strive to render yourselves more fit; if you ever grow to think
that you are fit enough, you can make up your minds that from that
moment you will begin to go backward.
"As a war-machine, the fleet comes back in better shape than it
went out. In addition, you, the officers and men of this
formidable fighting force, have shown yourselves the best of all
possible ambassadors and heralds of peace. Wherever you have
landed you have borne yourselves so as to make us at home proud of
being your countrymen. You have shown that the best type of
fighting man of the sea knows how to appear to the utmost possible
advantage when his business is to behave himself on shore, and to
make a good impression in a foreign land. We are proud of all the
ships and all the men in this whole fleet, and we welcome you home
to the country whose good repute among nations has been raised by
what you have done."
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