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Prohibition was to many anti-alcohol advocates the most important social reform needed in the industrialized United States of the early twentieth-century. Alcohol temperance movements and eventually national prohibition functioned as victories over the saloon business interests, which were viewed as facades for organized criminal activity.[1] Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformers also railed against abject social and working conditions brought on by laissez-faire economics and against tactics used by anti-reformers to defend themselves. For years liquor interests tapped the voting block strength of illiterate or semiliterate voters, bought local elected officials, and basically frustrated all political movements for reform. Much like the rest of business in late-nineteenth-century America, the alcohol trade became national and industrial. Big breweries wielded influence over local saloons and protected its interests by buying local politicians and law enforcement officials. Liquor advocates launched fierce attacks upon political efforts to restrict their associated relationships to prostitution and gambling, and successfully blocked women's suffrage movements dedicated to reform.[2]

While the temperance and prohibition movements indeed may have been born out of altruistic idealism, U.S. leaders erred when they crafted anti-alcohol legislation as a moral project, which undermined its reform intent. A clear goal of protecting nuclear family stability from unhealthy alcohol overconsumption became clouded in a nebulous moral crusade against "sin." Organized, mainly religious, groups successfully transformed its tenets of sin into political legislation, which also attacked the drinking mores of a nationally vibrant, multi-cultural society. Anti-alcohol laws drew no distinction between a frugal and industrious individual enjoying a casual alcoholic beverage and a grotesquely drunken mother whose stupor caused the death of her young infant after falling from the mother's arms.[3] Thus, it seemed to many Americans that national anti-alcohol legislation exceeded the bounds of reason, and this attitude provided the impetus for seemingly unbridled smuggling and subsequent enforcement obstacles.

Hard-line religious moralists, however, cannot be held exclusively culpable for the excesses of prohibition. Anti-alcohol legislation also served as design for a better society envisioned by hosts of prewar progressives.[4] Many offered scientific, economic and socially-based arguments for prohibition in keeping with an ultimate goal of national utopia. Dry advocates often cited physiology to underpin the dangers of alcohol; safety-conscious employers blamed drunkenness as a major cause of accidents; and social workers believed prohibition could improve the lives of industrial workers living in economic squalor.[5] Undoubtedly such advocacy by scientific and social progressives also helped to convince U.S. leaders to view anti-alcohol legislation as a pragmatic option toward curing social and economic ills.

Many Americans drew upon bias, prejudice or ethnocentric stereotypes to stigmatize social drinking habits. Enjoyment of alcoholic beverages also became largely identified with nefarious plutocrats, corrupt politicians, and ignorant immigrants, who reformers most despised and feared. Socially upscale whites additionally feared depraved and criminal blacks, along with uneducated white men. Upper class whites developed a correlation between Negroes, immigrants and alcohol consumption, which served as a caveat of potential social disorder. Prohibitionists, meanwhile, took advantage of these social anxieties to forge a political consensus toward goals of temperance and later outright proscription.[6]

Although the federal government intended to strictly enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, it rapidly became apparent that the law caused a host of problems never anticipated by U.S. leaders.[7] Illicit distillations expanded almost immediately. The Eighteenth Amendment took effect on January 16, 1920, and by January 30 Congress was already advised of widespread liquor smuggling on the U.S. shores and borders.[8] By February 19, two Internal Revenue agents charged with prohibition enforcement were arrested in Baltimore for corruption.[9] The following June, an Illinois prohibition administrator estimated that Chicago physicians had issued 300,000 phony prescriptions; and the Justice Department complained bitterly that it could not keep up with the burgeoning prohibition case loads without additional funds.[10] Thus, only six months into national prohibition, it became apparent that anti-alcohol advocates and social reformers had miscalculated. The Eighteenth Amendment indeed had not engendered social responsibility, or fostered economic opportunity. Rather, an unremitting war was touched off between liquor financiers, consumers and the government.[11]

Initially, hordes of federal agents converged upon northern urban centers to check rampant bootlegging and smuggling, which included patrols along the Canadian border and eastern seaboard. Conversely, enforcement attention lagged behind other areas of the country, particularly the South where prohibition had its strongest support and areas where the anti-alcohol Methodist and Baptist churches also had their greatest strength.[12] The South also served as site of the Ku Klux Klan's reemergence, which supported prohibition, among other moral reforms.[13] Not surprisingly, federal officials reasoned that the optimum enforcement strategy called for placing the largest portion of manpower in the more urban regions, which tended to be in the North and where prohibition acceptance appeared tenuous at best.

Still, Coast Guard Commandant Rear Admiral Frederick C. Billard revealed that a lack of enforcement coordination existed among federal police leaders when he testified before a 1924 House subcommittee on prohibition enforcement. During the hearings, Billard indicated that he accepted no special responsibility toward enforcement of prohibition except as it pertained to the Coast Guard's normal coastal police sweeps. Coast Guard cutters saved lives and property, but were not built to chase fast rumrunning launches, Billard said. Committee members, meanwhile, reacted with incredulity to Billard's testimony. While Coast Guard efforts before 1925 had obviously been ineffective, Billard's indifference toward Coast Guard failures caught many committee members off-guard. Billard explained--to the surprise of the committee--that the Coast Guard limited its police sweeps only along the seacoasts. In fact, the Coast Guard made no patrols on inland waterways and bayous during the first five years of prohibition.[14]

Especially during the early twenties, other government enforcement agencies demonstrated similar laxness in its assaults on illegal alcohol trafficking. Botched raids were common, partly because the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department of Justice initially divided jurisdictional authority to enforce liquor laws. Uncertainty ensued between the two government agencies, which rumrunners and distillers conveniently exploited. In 1925, the federal government reacted by decentralizing its Washington-based Prohibition Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to better coordinate field forces between those of the Treasury and the Justice departments. Moreover, to foster even more efficiency, one assistant secretary within the Treasury Department oversaw all matters of smuggling enforcement within the Prohibition Unit, Coast Guard, Customs Service and the Narcotic Unit by April 1925.[15]

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Lincoln Andrews organized the Customs Service, Coast Guard, and the Prohibition Unit so all federal enforcement sources could be integrated. The Coast Guard served as the first line of defense against smuggling, making it the service primarily responsible for the interception of liquor boats before they reached the shores. The Customs forces constituted the next presence charged with intercepting smuggled liquor that actually reached the shore. The Prohibition Unit, meanwhile, enforced the law in the interior of the United States. Collectively, the enforcement reorganization yielded improved field coordination, which translated into more successful enforcement attacks after 1925.[16]

The agency reorganizations eliminated the pre-1925 structure of forty-nine federal prohibition directors and established twenty-two federal districts each headed by a prohibition administrator. Corruption among high state and even local federal officials prompted Secretary Andrews to discontinue allowing state boundary lines to serve as the jurisdictional borders for federal prohibition directors. Instead the new enforcement boundaries mirrored the federal judicial districts. The Prohibition Unit held the primary burden of law enforcement; matters of policy, regulation and uniformity thereafter became centrally directed and improved enforcement coordination. Furthermore, federal enforcement groups expected an abatement of foreign alcohol trafficking once State Department officials secured anti-alcohol pledges and agreements from foreign nations in the Caribbean and Europe.[17]

Fostering foreign support for American prohibition, however, unfolded as a troublesome diplomatic process. Government policing problems over domestic enforcement aggravated relations between the Departments of State, Treasury and Justice. Marine and border forays launched by the Treasury and Justice officials fomented inter-bureaucratic squabbles that made State Department diplomacy more difficult.[18] In one case, Coast Guard seizure of the British-registered rumrunning schooner Henry L. Marshall on August 4, 1921 nine miles off the coast of New Jersey breached Anglo-American diplomacy according to the British government, which staunchly advocated the three-mile limit designation. In fact, the British government had played a significant role in solidifying the three-mile limit as a defining component of international law during the 1882 North Seas Fisheries Convention when Britain balked at the Russian government's attempt to extend North Sea fishing claims to twelve miles.[19] Upon U.S. seizures of the Marshall and several other British-registered schooners suspected of rumrunning, these incidents developed into more than routine police matters for diplomats. The vessel seizures escalated Anglo-American diplomatic tensions and also ignited inter-governmental fights between the Justice and State departments, both of which vied for control over the formulation of policy to enforce prohibition.[20] Meanwhile, pressure mounted in Congress to stem rampant British smuggling, which led to a legislative provision added onto the Tariff Act of 1922. The stipulation authorized the Coast Guard to board and search all foreign vessels within twelve-miles of the coast whether the vessel was bound for the United States or not, and gave government approval to seize any vessel hauling illegal cargo.[21] President Warren G. Harding's Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes warned, however, that the Congressional action expanding territorial waters from three to twelve miles compromised international law, and he correctly predicted ensuing diplomatic quagmires.[22]

While federal authorities reshuffled their mainland enforcement structure, officials also intensified efforts at what was deemed the source--"ports of embarkation"--or more specifically, the foreign ports in the Caribbean basin and Europe. State Department officials, coupled with the Prohibition Unit's division of foreign control did eventually effect a series of anti-smuggling treaties with foreign governments. U.S. authorities negotiated either a treaty or a mutual agreement in connection with illicit alcohol trade with, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, France, Norway, Spain, Panama, Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico Honduras and El Salvador.[23] These agreements, however, proved marginally effective and only in a few instances did federal officials credit any smuggling declines to the existence of an international anti-liquor agreement.

The Anglo-American Liquor Treaty of 1924 represented the most significant of the foreign anti-liquor accords. In negotiating the agreement, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes linked a U.S. concession that respected British sealed- and transatlantic liquor trade within U.S. waters in exchange for Britain's recognition of a twelve-mile limit. While, tensions eased following the Anglo-American agreement, any optimism that the treaty would curb smuggling was short-lived.[24] "Rum Row" activity did recede some on the East coast in the aftermath of the Anglo-American agreement, but this was mostly the result of a southward migration of the smuggling trade and not necessarily attributable to the enforcement of a treaty.[25] The value of distilled spirits entering the United States actually increased by $10 million in 1924, and rumrunning and seizure disagreements between the U.S. and Britain continued.[26] Furthermore, the treaty contained an ambiguous restriction that limited "hot-pursuit" chases by U.S. cutters to a one-hour time limit. Defining "hot pursuit" prompted further diplomatic and legal disputes because of the obvious difficulties associated with verification. Finally, some U.S. legal advisors argued that only the Tariff Act of 1922 recognized a twelve-mile limit. All other U.S. statutes followed the widely-accepted three-mile limit. So, in effect, the Anglo-American Treaty stipulated pursuit terms and seizure of foreign rumrunning vessels, but prosecution of smugglers caught beyond the three-mile limit was a legal uncertainty.[27]

Other quandaries soon surfaced. Costs associated with enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment and prosecuting violators greatly taxed the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury Department's annual appropriations for the purpose of preventing smuggling of contraband liquor into the United States swelled every year except the year of repeal (see Table 1).

Table 1. Cost of Enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, Fiscal Years 1920-1933.

The time-span in Table 1 reveals that during the prohibition era, Treasury appropriations earmarked for enforcement alone totaled around $140 million. The Treasury recouped only about $12.2 million in fines and penalties associated with prohibition cases between 1920-33, plus an additional $53 million in court judgments (see Table 2).[28]

Indeed, the Treasury not only showed a negative balance between enforcement costs and revenues from fines, but cash flow from legally taxed liquor naturally declined following enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment. According to Table 2, Treasury revenues from taxed liquor alone during the pre-prohibition period of 1916-19 totaled $1.5 billion. During 1920-33, however, all aggregated Treasury revenues from legally taxed liquor, penalties and court judgements never make up the revenue lost because of the implementation and enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment.[29]

Despite increased congressional allocations for enforcement, court statistics revealed that a massive volume of ardent spirits still reached U.S. shores, which held difficult and deadly consequences for enforcement. Federal courts handled about 600,000 liquor cases over prohibition's thirteen-year span. Federal officers logged more than 831,000 arrests for prohibition violations between 1920-33. Considering the actual number of arrests to the limited force of federal employees charged with enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment (see Table 3), the total number of prohibition violators, although unknown, certainly can be projected to have been significantly higher.

Table 3. Total number of agents and investigators employed in enforcement of national prohibition (1920-1933)

Deaths recorded in connection with enforcement totaled about 254, including 111 government agents. Between 1921-26, forty-nine federal agents died in action, of which twenty-five died in southern states. From 1927 to 1933, sixty-two agents fell slain--thirteen collectively in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Texas and Louisiana. During the last five years of prohibition, federal agents made 6,022 prohibition arrests in Louisiana alone, while state officers tallied a scant 322. National arrests between 1921-26 totaled 361,356, which included one death every 10,000 arrests--arguably a low ratio given the tremendous activity.[30] Still, stemming rampant smuggling and distillations proved dangerous for federal officers, who toiled under difficult circumstances and received scant compensation.

For their efforts law enforcement agents earned meager salaries in comparison to the tremendous sums a successful rumrunner, moonshiner or bootlegger garnered. A prohibition administrator who oversaw one of the twenty-two enforcement districts earned about $6,000 annually; field agents under the administrator received around $150 a month in salary. The lack of personnel, automobiles, boats, and crime detection equipment presented federal agents with an unenviable task, and an absence of state or local concern further harried enforcement effectiveness.[31] Local officials directed too much responsibility into the lap of the federal government. Even within states that had enacted local anti-alcohol legislation, citizens commonly looked toward the federal forces to engage in law enforcement duties that were purely local.[32]

Just policing the marine trade proved a formidable undertaking for the federal government, which had to distribute personnel along 10,000 miles of U.S. coastline. Federal forces not only contended with liquor trafficking, but the smuggling of other merchandise including narcotics and luxury items. Higher duty requirements established by the Tariff Act of 1922 drove up prices for these items, thus creating the motivation to include these goods in with shipments of smuggled alcohol. In fact, merchandise smuggling alone reached such proportions that by 1923 the U.S. Customs Service requested a Congressional appropriation of $3.5 million solely to combat the additional smuggling of drugs, jewelry, laces and other expensive items. Like liquor, these goods could be stored in small compact areas and transported easily when landed. Rumrunners created markets for themselves and those smugglers connected to the liquor, narcotic and merchandise rings in Europe, Canada and the Caribbean basin. By 1922, U.S. authorities believed that the Treasury was losing millions of dollars annually in uncollected merchandise duties alone.[33]

Pressure to stem the rampant smuggling ushered the federal government into the era of clandestine enforcement. In 1928, a division of the Prohibition Unit first began using the wiretap for compiling evidence against smugglers and organized syndicates. Only one section of the Prohibition Unit, however, was authorized to initiate the wiretapping of telephones for investigative purposes. Federal wiretapping actually created a stir within the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (known later as the FBI) because Attorney General William D. Mitchell had earlier prohibited the Bureau from using wiretaps. At least initially, it appeared federal agents used the wiretap rarely, as evidenced by 106 wiretaps in 175,865 cases between 1928-30. The federal government, by comparison, actually trailed local authorities in the use of the wiretap as an evidence gathering tool. A lack of manpower and mounting pressure to ferret out major liquor racketeers prompted movements toward more sophisticated techniques by the federal government.[34]

The federal government, however, waged a hapless battle. Few prohibition leaders anticipated the monumental enforcement problems, and no U.S. leader was prepared to sustain the vigilance required to blunt liquor trafficking. Furthermore, domestic antagonism and bureaucratic squabbling significantly weakened enforcement, and the inability to command a well-funded and broadly supported movement eventually delivered a fatal blow to the police process. The splintering of dry groups on the issue of prohibition and the loss of public enthusiasm forecast a decline in real power for the movement.[35]

Many histories have recorded the wide-scale smuggling activity along the Eastern seaboard and Canadian border of the United States, but enforcement woes were not limited exclusively to these areas. For example, the statistical data contradicts that the South staunchly supported prohibition, especially along the Gulf Coast. By the mid-twenties, the high level of rumrunning and smuggling in the Gulf of Mexico in fact compelled the government to re-tool its enforcement machinery. Congress convened several hearings in attempts to shake-up its enforcement attack, which in many cases only served to further confuse federal personnel. The onslaught of smuggling, distilling and bootlegging not only further strained federal resources, but played roles in breeding those jurisdictional ambiguities discussed earlier. Law enforcement officials scored some successes, but police could not consistently control the volume of illegal alcohol reaching the shores of the Gulf Coast or the activities of crime groups that managed the illicit trade.

Highly organized crime syndicates stood at the top of the foreign maritime liquor trade, which in many instances operated without regard to national borders. Underworld organizations directed and subsequently profited from the illicit traffic to the United States from Caribbean and Cuban ports. Liquors were loaded onto ships--mostly schooners--at Havana or some other Latin American port where a syndicate wielded sufficient influence to conceal the cargo. Once loaded these vessels sailed to destinations off the Gulf Coast, where they anchored and waited for small craft to speed out from Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, or Texas. The federal government lacked the organization required and resources to contend with the developing sophistication of the underworld syndicates.

Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. government found itself ill-equipped to contend with problems associated with prohibition enforcement and diplomacy in the South. Even as the United States armed itself with agreements from state governments and treaties from its Caribbean neighbors, rampant distilling and smuggling in the South flourished. Not even beefed-up marine efforts by federal forces after 1925 proved effective. An onslaught of illegal spirits clearly moved in from southern waters in many instances more freely than in other regions of the country.[36](See Map 1).

[1]Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An Interpretation of American Prohibition, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), 3-4.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., 6-7.

[4]Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties: The United States From Armistice to Normalcy, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 166; James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-1920, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

[5]Noggle, Into the Twenties, 167.

[6]Times Picayune, Section 2, April 22, 1923; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, From Bryan to F.D.R., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 288; H.W. Rickey, "Prohibition Movement in the South," (Master's Thesis, Tulane University, 1924), 291; C.H. Gervais, The Rumrunners: A Prohibition Scrapbook, (Scarborough, Ontario: Firefly Books, 1980), 11.

[7]Charles Merz, The Dry Decade, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1931), 57.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.; cited from an Associated Press dispatch, Baltimore, February, 19, 1920.

[10]Ibid.,59.

[11]Ibid., 74.

[12]Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962), 24.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Refer to the testimony of Admiral Frederick Billard, Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Alcoholic and Liquor Traffic. Survey of Alcoholic Liquor Traffic and the Enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, 68th Cong., 2d. sess., February 19,1925, 34-5. Congressional Information Service (CIS) Microfiche.

[15]Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1925, 84-5; also see Robert Hartsell Russell, "New Orleans and Nation-wide Prohibition as Reflected in the Times Picayune, 1918-1920," (Master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1954), 9; also note that the Prohibition Unit was transferred again to the Department of Justice on July 1, 1930.

[16]Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1926, 142.

[17]Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1925, 84-5 and 383; Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1926, 138-9.

[18]Lawrence Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy: The United States, Great Britain, and Prohibition, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), 16.

[19]Foreign Office, Memorandum respecting Maritime Jurisdiction and the Seizure of Vessels outside the Three Mile Limit , May 1918, and March 2, 1923, respectively, quoted in Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 6-7.

[20]For a detailed account of these seizures and its diplomatic impacts see Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 15-26.

[21]Section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922; The Statutes at Large of the United States (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1923), 42:979; Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d sess. (August 19, 1922), 11593-96, cited from Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 19.

[22]New York Times, September 27, 1922; also see Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 20-1.

[23]Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1926, 142; also see Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, vol II, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 18 and 336-57; Annual Report of Commissioner of Prohibition, fiscal year ended June 30, 1930, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 6; Times Picayune, January 27, 1929.

[24]Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 89.

[25]Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee of the Ways and Means, Enforcement of Customs, Narcotic and Prohibition Laws, 69th Cong., 2d. sess., February 21, 1927, 444. Congressional Information Service (CIS) Microfiche.

[26]Ibid.; also see Malcom Willoughby, Rum War at Sea, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), 45-59.

[27]E.D. Dickinson, "Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing,?" American Journal of International Law, 20 (1926):444-52; "Self-Execution of Treaties under the Constitution," Columbia Law Review, 26 (1926):859-70, both sources cited in Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 98.

[28]Court judgment totals are not reflected in Table 2.

[29]United States Treasury Department Bureau of Industrial Alcohol, Statistics Concerning Intoxicating Liquors, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December, 1933), 91.

[30]Annual Report of the Commission of the Internal Revenue, July 1, 1926, U.S. Rep. Edwin Broussard papers; United States Treasury Department, Bureau of Industrial Alcohol, Statistics Concerning Intoxicating Liquors, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office for the years 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, and 1933), 47, 67, 76, 88, 136, 94-5; also see Joy Jackson, "Prohibition in New Orleans: The Unlikeliest Crusade," Louisiana History, vol 19, (Winter, 1978), 280.

[31]Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An Interpretation of American Prohibition, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), 161.

[32]Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, fiscal year ended June 30, 1926, 139-40; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Political and Social Growth of the American People, 1865-1940, (New York: The Macmillan Company), 502.

[33]Times Picayune, December 25, 1922 and December 23, 1923; also see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the fiscal year 1925, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), 87.

[34]Congressional hearings were held in 1931 to allay confusion associated with wiretap authorizations upon the Prohibition Unit's transfer from the Treasury Department to the Department of Justice in 1930; see Congress, House, Wire Tapping in Law Enforcement, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 71st Cong., 3rd. sess., February 19, 1931, 1-2. Congressional Information Service (CIS))Microfiche.

[35]Spinelli, Dry Diplomacy, 22; also see Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1963), 120-22; David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 26-32; Austin K. Kerr, Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-Saloon League, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985), 37-53.

[36]Jackson, "Prohibition in New Orleans," 277; Willoughby, Rum War at Seas, 16; Neville Williams, Contraband Cargoes, Seven Centuries of Smuggling, (New York: The Shoe String Press, 1961), 248.

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