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by Valentine M. Smith

American goals in Russia were murkily defined in the years 1914-17. On the face of things a prime goal was the restoration of a 1832 treaty that had been condemned in 1911, cancelled in 1912 because of United States' unhappiness with the behavior of the Russian government in regards to its Jewish population. A great deal of pressure was exerted by the American Jewish community to punish the Russians in some way for the mistreatment of Jews as reported by the thousands of immigrants from Russia to the United States from 1880 onward. (1)

Restoration of the treaty, or the negotiation of a new one became a prime goal for both the U.S. Ambassadors in the years 1914-18. They failed utterly. In 1917-18 the United States' goals were to keep Russia fighting in the world war then raging against Germany and Austria-Hungary, to try to keep the centrist, constitutionalist pro-war Kerensky government in power and to keep the leftist, anti-war Bolsheviks out. Though it was clear that the Tsar was gone irretrievably, the necessity remained that Russia stay in the war from the Allied point of view, so as to keep Germany and her allies fighting a two-front war. A centrist, pro-Ally government such as the Kerensky government appeared to be fit in with that Allied goal considerably better than the avowed Bolshevik goal of pulling Russia out of the war. There was no clear reason for the U.S. to support one government over another, though the preference was to stay away from the radical Bolsheviks because they appeared to Americans as against property rights, religion and the rule of law. Our policy was governed by a scant understanding of the country, and often our leaders were misinformed or operated from their own bias.

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Curtis Guild resigned officially in April, 1913, and though Henry Pindell was appointed in January, 1914, he declined the post. From April, 1913 to late October, 1914, there was no U.S. Ambassador in Petrograd. This "punishment" of the Tsarist regime left United States interests in Petrograd for eighteen months in the custody of Charles S. Wilson, the charge d' affaires. (2)

In July, 1914, with little apparent thought about the need for a trained expert to be in the Russian capital, Woodrow Wilson appointed a wealthy, 57 year old San Francisco banker with no background whatsoever in Russian affairs, George T. Marye, to be U.S. Ambassador to the court of the Romanovs. The world war had already begun and Wilson felt that the United States needed an Ambassador in Russia because of the war situation. Marye was ill-equipped to deal with the magnitude of problems the war would generate, nor was he acute enough to see past the Tsarist vantage point to see that there might be other views about how to deal with the conflict and the vast number of problems inside Russia that had led to Congress cancelling a treaty that had been in place eighty years. The Russians did and did not want an Ambassador, being that they were still angry about the treaty cancellation, but they did want a new treaty on their terms and they also looked to the U.S. for war materials and access to markets. (3)

Marye served as American Ambassador to Russia from October, 1914 to March, 1916. Some felt he had arrived too late to do any good, as he had arrived several weeks after he was appointed. (4) To his credit, he did meet with the new Russian Ambassador to the US, Boris Bakhmeteff, who had opposed sending an Ambassador because Bakhmeteff perceived the only reason one was being sent was to represent the interests of the belligerants Austria and Germany. Bakhmeteff indicated to Marye that for two years that it had alright with the US to have just Charles Wilson in charge, but as soon as Germany and Austria-Hungary asked the US to represent their interests too, as the US was then still a neutral, then "an Ambassador is hurried over to St. Petersburg over great difficulties." (5)

In late August, while Marye was still waiting on the State Department to give him the go-ahead to leave, the Charge d' Affaires Wilson in Petrograd sent a telegram to the State Department which said "Emperor has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that presence of Mr. Marye is not at all necessary if he prefers to delay coming. If he does come now Emperor will cordially receive him if he should be in St. Petersburg. He is here now but later movements doubtful." (6) It was apparent that the Russians were tepid at best on whether a new Ambassador came or not from the United States.

Marye also met with Jewish leaders Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall and Herman Bernstein about the passport problems of would-be Jewish immigrants from Russia and the difficulties of former Russian Jews' American passports being recognized, but indicated he felt they had given him little guidance as to arguments to offer the Tsarist government to change their policies. He was aware of the opposition to his going to Petrograd, both in Russia and the United States, but was determined to go anyway. In his book he wrote about his Ambassadorial years, Marye points out he was confirmed on 9 July, 1914, sailed for Great Britain 9 September, and arrived there 14 September. (7)

Marye makes it clear from beginning to the end of his time there that his primary orientation was increasing American-Russian business ties, monitoring the war on behalf of Germany and Austria in terms of keeping track of their prisoners held by the Russians and representing their interests in Moscow (until the U.S. entered the war April, 1917), and strengthening his social ties. There is scant indication as to how well Marye did his job; he disliked the Germans intensely and may have personally not been much involved in the German/Austrian prisoner matters, leaving such to Embassy staff.

RUSSIA OBSERVED: NEARING THE END IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA is basically Marye's journals of the period, published pretty much unedited and unchanged. He presents a man interested in the events of the day, reporting on the rise and fall of governments in and out of Russia, the progress (or lack of same) in negotiating a new trade agreement, social and funeral events in Petrograd, and speculations on the character and doings of Rasputin (who Marye had an interest in because of Rasputin's affect on government, and the Imperial family). But his interest was narrow, confined to the doings of the upper classes in Russia and elsewhere, with no real understanding of the masses and their aspirations, or the undercurrent of revolution that increased greatly during his tenure as Ambassador. The historian Rachel West wrote; "His assets were his wealth and his friendship with Bryan." (8)

Marye was quite pompous by today's standards, a bit of a social climber who knew all the right people and whom was quite attached to the Imperial Court, according to George Kennan, later an Ambassador to the Soviets himself. (9) He was apparently mostly caught up in the intrigues and affairs of the upper nobility, and there is little evidence to indicate he ever met a worker or peasant of the Russian masses.

In early February, 1916 Marye told Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonoff of Russia that he had resigned. Marye offered no specific reasons for resigning, only "that political combinations had arisen at home which affected me and that I felt impelled to withdraw." (10) In the sources available, there is no explanation of those "political combinations," nor does Marye ever illuminate what those problems were.

He had a keen eye in some respects, but his closeness to the Imperial family, and his upper-class orientation, made him totally unable to see what was happening to the people, or how they reacted to the government, all he could see is things like the vanishing of all the coins in the capital. He could perceive minutae, but had no grasp of the larger picture save in fragments, and with the upper-class bias he brought to the job.

On 24 October, 1914, Marye arrived in Petrograd to take up the duties of US Ambassador to Russia, having taken two months to get there, partially through delays by the State Department, partially via leisurely stops in London, the Hague, Berlin and Stockholm.

In January, 1915, Marye began journalling the events occurring in Russia, much about court life and intrigues, and speculations on the perambulations of the various bit players - Japan, Italy, Finland, and of the major ones, especially Russia, Britain, France, Germany and the US. He remained heavily preoccupied with the behaviors of the nobles, who he seemed to feel were his peers, court life, and renewing a treaty no Foreign Minister he ever met with wished to renegotiate, or so it would seem from the record. He asserted in the first week of February, 1915, that "Four-fifths of the work of the embassy here now consists of looking out for German and Austrian prisoners." (11) He does not say to what degree he was involved in that work.

On 2 February, Marye reported rumors in Petrograd that Interior Minister Khovstoff is plotting to kill Rasputin (12) Marye seemed quite puzzled that Khovstoff would attempt to murder the man who reportedly gotten him the Interior Ministry post in the first place. In "gentlemanly society," one did not attempt to kill one's patron, and in this, Marye seemed to be rather naive in the ways and depths of Russian politics.

Marye predicted the post-war course on 6 March, saying "We feel very certain that after the war the part of Poland under Russian rule will receive a very full measure of autonomous government; that Constantinople and the Dardanelles will go to Russia; that Russia will have free access to the Mediterranean and will not be again shut in as she now is." Marye asserted that the Dardenelles agreement had already been agreed to by Russia, France and Britain in early 1915 (13) In addition, the Russians had promised Poland independence when the war broke out, to be tied to Russia "only in the person of the Tsar." By 1916, continued Russian adherence to that policy was to cause the dismissal of Foreign Minister Sazonoff over the protests of the British and French Ambassadors, and the Russian Emperor reneged on his support for such an idea. (14)

Marye for the most part did not realize that there was no basis in Russian political reality for the bulk of this speculation, it came solely from his perception of the post-war situation. Then he speculated on a possible Russo-Japanese alliance. (15) His ability to see forward was quite erroneus, an example of the non-existent training the United States offered to political diplomats.

In early April, Marye predicted that there would not be a revolution in Russia "when the war is over," though he reported a friend, an insurance executive, who had been in Russia some 18 years, believed there would be one. Marye says of the man that he spoke Russian, was a good observer with "keen intelligence," and that he looked upon him as his best source of information about conditions in the country. He did not say whether this informant ever was out of the capital into the countryside to have formed this opinion, but his business colleague appeared to have had a clearer view of Russia's future than did Marye.

Marye felt strongly that a revolution would not occur. He allowed that changes would happen, and that autocracy was an "anachronism" probably because he, and many other Americans, believed American style democracy ought to prevail everywhere, though he seemed to feel much more comfortable with the nobility from a social point of view. Marye thought a gradualist approach to change would be the course of Russia. He also believed the peasantry had gotten many concessions from the Tsarist government and would not seek its overthrow, and then he said, "The only chance of a revolution would be through a defection of the army. But the army is made up of the peasantry and the nobles, and there are certainly no revolutionary tendencies among the nobles." There is no significant evidence to indicate Marye ever met a peasant, or ever heard the point of view of that class. (16)

It is this refusal to believe a "best source of information" that led the writer to believe that Marye could not see the conditions of the Russian state because he was tied to the status quo ante, and that though he believed that the Emperor and royal family did not show themselves enough and were not aware what was going on in the country, that the Tsar would survive the war. Marye's understanding of the feelings of the people of Russia was almost non-existant, in that he was as ignorant as the Tsar or more so.

Marye was concerned that the Emperor was so enclosed in his own world, which ironically appeared to be a problem of his also, that Nicholas was unable to see what was happening in Russia, surrounded by a bureaucracy that tended to insulate the royal house from interacting with the subjects of the Empire. Marye could see the isolation, but was very much part of continuing the cocooning in that he went to the dinner parties, audiences with the Emperor and Empress, and many fruitless meetings with whoever the current Foreign Minister was about reviving the old treaty. The Romanov's were basically unconcerned about the treaty because of the U.S demands about the Jews. (17)

According to the historians W. Bruce Lincoln and E.M. Almedingen, who both wrote histories of the Romanov dynasty, Nicholas II was an anti-Semite as his father and grandfather had been, and he basically refused to listen to pleadings by anyone on their behalf. Lincoln, in more than one work, pointed out Nicholas' total inaction during government-inspired pograms in 1904 that slaughtered several hundred Jews, and the massacre of upwards of ten thousand Jews in the wake of the October Manifesto of 1905 that granted civil rights to all Russians and created a Duma as evidence of Nicholas' tendency to ignore the Jewish situation altogether. (18)

Marye noted at April's end the high officials stricken from the British Order of the Garter - the Emperor of Germany, of Austria-Hungary, the king of Wurtemberg, The Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince Henry of Prussia and two other Dukes. He paid quite a bit of attention to these kinds of events, and occasionally had a keen insight into what a ruler might be up to. (19) He felt strongly that the German Emperor was a criminal, went on at great length about Wilhelm's perfidity and criminality, and seemed to believe that these "punishnments" were the least Wilhelm and his allies deserved, expressing an interest in seeing the Emperor tried after the war for things like the sinking of the Lusitania. But he rarely observed what might be happening away from the capital, or in terms of what any other group besides the wealthy and the nobles were doing.

>From late April until early May came the Rockefeller Commission to Petrograd, "Messrs. Bricknell, Wadsworth and Earl." Their mission was to give assistance in the way of both money and food to any Poles inside German lines, and to aid any Poles who needed it within Russian lines. Why only Poles Marye does not explain, nor does any other source offer a clear explanation. Marye tried to arrange for them to see Foreign Minister Sazonoff. (20) The Commissioners told Marye that the Minister of Agriculture had persuaded them that their goals were not workable, and so they were not too upset at not meeting with Sazonoff. (21) If the Russian government chose not to deal with Americans, Marye had no ability or influence to persuade them otherwise.

But Marye occasionally did have fairly astute insights, such as one in late May, 1915, where he offered a penetrating comment about the Empress of Russia in his journal- "There is no agitation at this time in Continental countries for female suffrage, but, certain it is, that women in high places wield enormous power and have great influence, as witness the influence of Queen Sophia of Greece and that of the Empress of Russia here in Petrograd right now. Noble woman that she is, and devoted as she is to the interests of her husband and Russia, she is doing much to undermine and destroy the prestige of the Imperial family amd the authority of the Emperor through the support she gives to the interference of the meddling monk Rasputin in important affairs of Church and State." (22)

Marye reported on an Imperial rescript, "published in the name of the president of the Council of Ministers, Goremykin, ...the Emperor solemnly declares it to be the intention of the Russian Government and people to carry on the war to complete victory,..." (23) but does not explain in what context there might be reason for the necessity of such a statement from the Emperor. He could, and often did, describe visits to the opera, the yacht club, or the Imperial Court, but rarely did Marye offer many insights as to why events occurred, just that they did.

Marye reported on a 23 June meeting about a commercial treaty with Sazonoff, and on the turning tide against Russia militarily (24) and continued to believe the Imperial government would negotiate such a treaty. Again, Marye offered no details as to what was being left in or out of these drafts, just that Article so-and-so was left out, and another article was retained. He gives the impression that what was being discussed were technicalities, and not matters of substance. The passport issue was to be left for discussion as "negotiations proceeded."

Marye reported at length in mid-August on Rasputin's influence on the Court and the government (25) in which he alluded to the Tsarevich's illness, and how Rasputin is alleged to have "hypnotic eyes." Francis later also commented on this ability of Rasputin's. (26). Reportedly, few people knew of Tsarevich Alexis' hemophelia, including Marye, who in 1916 reported "We hear all kinds of stories about what was the matter with him, the best authenticated seems to be that he has some trouble of the circulation, ..." so therefore "Because the condition of the Tsarevich was never revealed, Russians never understood the power which Rasputin held over the Empress." (27)

Marye analyzed "German influence" in Russia (28). He did evidence some knowledge of the widespread belief that people in high places were stealing from the army, and that corruption was widespread. Francis, also leaned in this direction, (29)

Demonstrating perhaps his banker's bent, and one of the few reports of minutae that affected the common Russian citizenry that he ever offered, Marye reported in late August the vanishing of all coinage in Petrograd. He said that all "silver coins, roubles, half roubles and smaller coins, by a kind of common action, disappeared from circulation." (30) But, despite his noticing this event occurring, he offered no insight as to why nor in any way did he comment on what might have led to this happening.

In early September, Marye reported on the removal of Grand Duke Nicholas from command of the Armies. The Grand Duke's dismissal by the Emperor himself was considered by some as potentially disastrous for internal political unity. (31) Marye went to describe the Emperor's assumption of that command, and the proposed legislation in the Duma "about Jewish matters." (32) He believed that the Russian government might actually support these laws, which were part of a Duma the Tsar depised (33) and wanted to remove altogether. Marye could not see this attitude, in fact blamed the Duma for intransigence, and especially for taking action in an area he believed the Emperor's province. (34)

On 1 October, Marye reported that the Emperor had issued a rescript that all legal proceedings against Jews for carrying out business outside the Pale be ceased, "except in cases where persons against whom the proceedings were pending have established themselves in the capitol ..." This proposal, along with proposed measures of the preceding Duma, shows a decided disposition and tendency to mitigate and alleviate the harshness of the laws relating to the Jews. (35) Marye again clearly believed that the Tsar would follow through on these laws and see them enforced, and he did not understand or was blind to the Tsar's prejudices about the Jews.

At October's end, Marye offered an insightful commentary about the Emperor wherein he noted "He (the Emperor) could not do a wiser or more judicious thing than to show himself frequently to his troops and to the people. It has always seemed to me that the great weakness of this government was the remoteness of the ruler from the bulk of the people." He noted in this entry one of the few remarks he offered in his whole book about the lack of a middle class in Moscow, "... as there are not in Russia and intermediate classes rising in progressive rank from the people to the throne," but he offered no insight as to why that might be so. (36)

In early November, Marye commented on a conference held in Paris by the English and French, which is intended to be the precursor of larger meetings at which Russia and Italy will also be represented." The meetings were to tighten the military operations of the Allies to allow planning of a "greater unity of purpose and direction." He went on to say that the Allies were seeking a single line of control over military movements. He rattled on this entry at great length about the expelling of the King of Bulgaria from the French Order of the Holy Ghost for being allied with the German Emperor, showing once again his preoccupation with the doings of royalty and the powerful, which he gave considerably more attention to than the above meeting. (37)

On 3 December, Marye commented on the Austrian response to the Ancona sinking, the Ford "peace expedition" ("the American legation at Stockholm made it clear that the United States Government is in no way connected with the peace expedition sent over to Europe by Henry Ford.") and that "the collapse of Germany has been, and continues to be, only a question of time." (38) He was off slightly.

A few days later, Marye wrote about the war credits debate in the German Reichstag, and on the remarks of Geier and Ebert, the socialist opposition. He noted that though in the end the German Reichstag voted the money, that it ended up being less than was requested by the government. He pointed out in his 8 December entry that the reverses of the prior 6 months "have severely tried the whole structure of the Russian state." (39)

That led him to analyze in relative depth about the deficiencies of Nicholas II. In only one sentence was he relatively accurate, and after that, his tendency to be laudatory of royalty carried him off to inaccuracy almost completely. He says of Nicholas in comparison with Peter the Great," Peter the Great was a natural autocrat: Nicholas II does not possess the natural qualities to fit him for that difficult position." But then he claimed that Nicholas was "quite free of bigotry," claimed he had common sense, that he tried to use good judgement about choosing Ministers, and that he was "prudent" in the use of the powers he had. He did allow that Nicholas was "too tolerant of incompetency," but failed to understand how Nicholas could be quickly bamboozled about that issue of competency, usually by his wife or Rasputin. (40)

In late January, Marye commented at length about Rasputin and his influence including comments on his appearance, affect on people, especially women, his childhood and upbringing, drawing room behavior and religious beliefs. Marye regarded his influence as "ominous." He was able to see the potential for ruin Rasputin posed for the Tsar, yet he could not see how much damage Rasputin was really causing. He could only see the womanizing, the "orgies," though he did say Rasputin would never had the influence he did without the support he received from Tsarkoe Selo, though he had no clear understanding of why that support was occurring. He felt that Rasputin held the potential of destruction for the Romanovs. Marye, however, had only the vaguest cognizance about why Rasputin was dangerous to the ruling family, being more content to wallow in the gossip about him than do a serious analysis of his effect politically. (41)

On 3 February, Marye again returned to an analysis the Tsar's method of rule, but again gave him more credit than he was due, claiming it was the Russian system that was "outworn," not the Tsar. He did suggest that the need was for reforms to be enacted that gave the people a larger say in the process of public affairs and that autocracy could not govern such a vast place as Russia. He then claimed, wrongly, that if the Tsar was not interfered with, primarily by his wife, that he would "act with the Duma" which Lincoln says "Nicholas and his advisors regarded most of them as men of seditious and evil intentions." (42) Marye continued to misread most of the personalities around the throne, as he often did with the man sitting on it. (43)

In mid-February, Marye puzzled over the recall of "first secretary (Charles) Wilson" from Petrograd to Madrid, and discusses his own resignation and departure, and the appointment of David Francis as his successor. There may have been some tensions going on here that Marye never described, nor did any other observers seem to know much about. The Russians seemed mystified by the frequent changes in representitives by the US, Marye reports Sazonoff as saying. Marye also said that many Russians he talked with believed Wilson and he were being forced out so someone more friendly to the Germans could be brought in, as both Marye and Wilson were staunchly pro-Ally. (44)

Marye was charged to secure the agreement of the Imperial government to Francis' appointmeent, which he did. Marye lauded Francis highly to Sazonoff, without addressing who was the more friendly to Germany issue, saying at the last " I said I felt sure they would like Governor Francis, that I did not know him personally but that he had been a friend of my brother, General Marye, who like others whom I had heard speak of Mr. Francis, liked and admired him." On 11 March, Marye was awarded the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, had his last Imperial audience and departed Russia on 29 March, 1916. (45)

Marye was of "the Old Guard," a monied man of the old order, he could not dream that a revolution might come, or the Emperor would be swept away. He quit his post to deal with unidentified politcal questions at home, not realizing he had stepped off the stage just as the United States would face a need for a person of knowledge to fill his post, not that he had demonstrated any great capability of possessing such understanding and knowledgability. It is not clear in any source this writer perused as to why he left when he did. Marye doesn't explain 13 years after the resigNation, soon thereafter dying as a matter of fact. It remains a minor mystery as to why he removed himself from the picture as the situation began to deteriorate for Russia as far as the war was concerned. It would appear that he thought he had acquitted himself in good fashion, that he had done his best in the representation of German and Austrian interests, and that while he had failed to get a new trade treaty with the Russians, that right up through the final auduence with the Emperor, he was promoting American business investment in Russia.

About 6 weeks later, on 28 April, David Francis arrived in Moscow and assumed the post of US Ambassador. (46) A week later, Ambassador Francis was formally received by the Emperor. (47) Francis went to Russia in 1916, at sixty-five years of age, older by almost a decade than Marye was when he went to Russia in 1914, and apparently Marye was in better health than Francis. When the Bolshevik Revolution occurred, he had reached the age of sixty-seven. He was married and had several children, but unlike Marye, "for a variety of personal reasons he left his family at home, and proceeded on his mission alone, accompanied only by his personal secretary and by his Negro valet and butler, Mr. Philip Jordan." (48) He appeared to have been quite vigorous despite his age, and though he had some health problems not clearly discussed by him or other sources, conducted himself with relative clarity, energy and responsibility in the two and a half years he served there.

"Francis' tastes and habits were the robust and simple ones of the American Middle West at the turn of the century. As such, they had little affinity to the refined predilections of continental diplomatic society. Not that Francis was in any way an ascetic. On the contrary, he was so well known at home as a gourmet that is he mentioned in one of O. Henry's tales - "Heart of the West" in SEATS OF THE HAUGHTY (1916)..... But Francis' hedonism was of a genuinely American sort." Kennan goes on to say that Francis was much more a quiet man of simple tastes, albeit a bit eccentric, as he reported in a possibly apocryphal tale of a flapping lid-type spittoon owned by the Governor. Francis preferred a quiet card game with cronies over mixing with high society in Petrograd, he liked good whiskey and cigars, and that in part because of an amount of penuriousness on Francis' part and because he preferred the company of Americans, he rarely interacted with Russian society during most of his Ambassadorship. Some might have thought him a buffoon, or boorish by high society standards. (49)

"...this same awkwardness made itself felt in the Ambassador's relationships with his career associates. He could not help but be aware of their greater familiarity both with diplomatic life in general and with the Petrograd scene in particular. On the other hand, it was difficult for him to seek and accept their opinions without betraying his own ignorance and forfeiting the dignity of his position. This situation (not an uncommon one in American diplomatic experience) would have been unpleasent in the best of circumstances." (50)

However, Francis got himself in difficulty because of an "acquaintance" with a lady named Madame deCram, who he had met enroute to Russia and perhaps dallied with, though the evidence is none too clear on this point. After their arrival, she was revealed to perhaps have connections to the Germans. The charges were never found to be true, but the whole business cost him in prestige and dignity and may have been one reason for his tendency to stay out of the social whirl of Petrograd society. (51)

Kennan described Francis as an elderly man, though a vigorous one, and deeply out his depth in the situation he had been thrust in, yet lauds him for his fierce dedication to the job, his "courage and enthusiasm." He suggested that Francis exhibited a stormy temper, strong opinions, and that he deftly managed to survive the "manuevering" among his associates. Kennan's most damning description of him is that he vacillated a great deal. (52)

Francis' post-Ambassadorial book, and his extensive writing to the State Department, showed him to be informed to a greater degree than his predeccesor, while also opinionated, firm in his beliefs and what he thought his duties and obligations as Ambassador were. He does appear bemused by many of the doings of his subordinates. Francis did seem fully capable of handling men like Raymond Robins of the Red Cross and Edgar Sisson of the Committee on Public Information. Francis was also quite willing to listen and give credence to the input of competent men like the Consul Madden Summers down in Moscow.

In September, 1916, Francis wrote to Secretary of State Robert Lansing about a direct cable link between Russia and the US, American commercial investment in Russia, and that Russia had allocated $3 million towards such an plan. "...our government declined to participate on the ground that it could not engage in business enterprises." (53) His first months in the country appear to focus around commercial opportunities that the US and Russia might engage in, perhaps as a way to edge at the Russian trade obliquely, ignoring the lack of a trade treaty since the end of 1912. (54)

Francis had as main tasks being the "representitive" for what he said were 1.25 million Austrian prisoners of war, 250,000 German prisoner's of war, 200,000 German and 50,000 Austrian civilians interned, acting as their intermediary with the Russian government, through a "large corps of able assistants, known as the Relief Corps," which demanded from him his "personal attention for several hours daily." His numbers on the prisoners were probably low. He also was charged with the responsibility of negotiating a new trade treaty. He was on the watch for pro-German activities in the Russian government, and was later for a long time convinced that Lenin and Trotsky were on German payrolls. He promoted throughout his term in Russia American investment in Russia - a banking firm, a rail contract, a telegraph service among other things - though most of these enterprises came to naught in the wake of the October Revolution. Francis hoped that US investment could replace what he said in his memoirs had been a 49% German investment in Russian commercial enterprises just prior to the war. (55)

He also was the American "man on the spot" when the Revolutions occurred, though he did much of his communicating with the Bolsheviks through Raymond Robins. The US government did not recognize the Smolny government led by Lenin, and because he was the Dean of the Petrograd diplomatic corps by the time the October Revolution happened, Francis felt quite constrained to keep distance between himself as President Wilson's personal representitive to Petrograd which the Bolsheviks had seized from the Kerensky government. Francis always saw this government as illegitimate, even after the war and his return to the U.S., and only once did he treat with the Bolshevik leaders at Smolny himself, over the arrest of an Ambassador.

In early November, 1916, three months before the February Revolution, Francis wrote to Lansing "There have been manifestations lately of unrest among the workers in the factories and also among the long lines of people waiting to be served small amounts of sugar or meat in the shops where such things are distributed. I have heard it rumored that these rumblings are instigated by German money, and I've also heard it charged by an intelligent man who gave the information to me ... that the Government itself through its emissaries is attempting to bring about an uprising of the people in order to give Russia an excuse to negotiate a separate peace. Every Minister in the Government is solicitous about the tenure of his office. The Duma will meet in pursuance of adjournment on November 1st/14th." (56) He does not identify either in his book or the State Department's documents who this source was.

On 29-30 December, Rasputin was murdered (57) by Prince Felix Yussoupov (Yusupov), son of the wealthiest family in Russia, and four other noble conspirators. The princely assassin was married to a niece of the Tsar's. Rasputin's "prophecy," "So long as I live, the imperial family will also live; when I die, they will also perish," (58) started on its short trail to fulfillment, as the Royal family perished in July, 1918. (59)

Francis attended the last public reception of the Emperor and Empress, with the Diplomatic Corps at Tsarskoe-Selo on 14 January. No one there suspected the regime would be gone by mid-March, Francis among them. He liked the Tsar, felt he was a friendly and pleasant man dominated by his wife, and whom often vacillated in his decision-making. Francis thought the Tsar "dignified," and yet really had only the barest understanding of him, having only met with him twice in his tenure as Ambassador. He could see the unrest being talked of in the papers, and he knew that Rasputin's assassination had sent shock waves across Russia, but like his predecessor had no idea how close to the precipice of collapse the Russian monarchy and government were. (60)

On 23 February (O.S.), now styled 8 March (N.S.), the February revolution began. Two weeks later, on 22 March, "The government of the United States, through its Ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, conveyed to the Council of Ministers its official recognition of the new Russian Government:

"I have the honor, as the Ambassador and representitive of the Government of the United States accredited to Russia, to state, in accordance with instructions, that the Government of the United States has recognized the new Government of Russia, and I, as Ambassador, will be pleased to continue intercourse with Russia through the medium of the new Government. " (61) The recognition was the first by any government. A month later, Francis was commended in "Nation" in the United States by an unsigned editorial for his swift urgings for recognition of the Provisional Government; "You will observe, perhaps, that his advice to our Government to recognize the Provisional Government in Russia reached Washington about as soon as the news of the revolution; ... " (62)

The Root Commission went to Russia at about this time with the avowed reason of ascertaining the most immediate needs of Russia for conducting the war and working out better alliance communications. The mission was in Russia from 3 June to 21 July. (63) They met with the former Lvov ministry, and the so-called Second Provisional Government ministry that had taken over 18 May, 1917. (64) The Commission promoted education and propaganda, improvements of the railroad system, and better equipage of the Russian army. To a great degree, the mission provided information to the Wilson administration about conditions in Russia, and offered a set of recommendations that were not fulfilled.

The Commission's recomendations were thus: "(1) To encourgage hope and faith in the success of the effort of the Russian people to create and maintain adequate self-government; (2) To inspire confidence in the Provisional Government and an appreciation of the fact that the progress towards order lay through the maintenance of that Government; and (3) To promote a realization of the fact that the effective continuation of the war was the only course by which the opportunity for Russia to work out the conditions of her own freedom could be preserved from destruction by German domination." (65)

These recommendations were what became the contradictory policy the U.S. as a Nation, and in the person of Ambassador Francis, attempted to pursue after the February revolution. Indeed, the U.S. pursued this policy to the moment, and after, that the Bolsheviks seized power, and declared their intent to get out of the war. Americans, from President Wilson on down through the ranks of government, believed that a democratic Russia would emerge if they would stay in the war and defeat the imperialistic Germans. It was believed that the Kerensky government would accomplish all three goals, while the Bolsheviks inspired a concern that Russia out of the war would bring dictatorship at home, and prolong the war. As the war had already gone on longer than anyone believed the war would when it began, Russia getting out was dismaying to the Allies.

On 20 July, Francis reported to the Secretary of State on the reorganizing of the Ministry, and the coming to power of Kerensky as the President of the Council of Ministers. He stated, "Lvov much pleased, saying new Ministry was short-lived the elimination of Bolshevik faction eradicated German influence and insures success to revolution. Lvov says leading Bolsheviks including Lenin arrested, publication of Pravda stopped, ... Another crisis past and atmosphere clearer" (66). This was the continuation of one of Francis' misreadings of one wing of Russian politics - he kept insisting, for many months afterward, that the Bolsheviks were German-orientated, affected in no small amount by Edgar Sisson's purchase of documents that "proved" that the Bolsheviks were in the pay of the Germans. (67)

The Consul at Petrograd, North Winship, on 24 July wrote to the Secretary of State "That Kerensky, now Prime Minister in the cabinet that is socialist in all but name, has officially branded the Maximalists (the Bolsheviks), (68) as German agents, in orders to the army and the fleet,..." Winship saw this as Francis did, a good thing to be happening - unmask the Bolsheviks for what they were, in their minds anyway. (69)

The "branding" of the Bolsheviks as German agents was "when the government released information which appeared to show that Lenin had been working for the Germans, the people's anger turned against the Bolsheviks." Pravda's offices were wrecked, and Bolshevik headquarter's in the old palace of the ballerina Mathilda Kshesinskaya, (70) were invaded by a mob looking for the Bolshevik's leadership.

Lenin had returned to Russia 16 April, Trotsky came back 18 May, Stalin and Leon Kamenev of the Central Committee, had come to Petrograd from Siberian exile 25 March, while still other members of the Bolshevik Central Committee had been in hiding since the February Revolution inside Russia. (71) "But the Bolshevik leaders had gone underground. ... By the end of July the Bolsheviks were in disarray. Trotsky was in prison and Lenin was forced to write letters and pamphlets from Finland denying that he had worked for the Germans. ... However, if the Bolsheviks were in disarray, so was the government. Kerensky's economic policies had collapsed. There were strikes, mass unemployment and hunger. All confidence in his ability to govern was lost." (72) The failed uprising in July had put the Bolsheviks on the defensive, and had aroused the Kerensky's government's ire against the Bolsheviks.

Somewhere around the time of the bungled July uprising, there entered into the picture the third American examined here, Raymond Robins, who came to Russia in July by his account, and was gone by the following 1 June. (73) Raymond Robins was an American Red Cross representitive who came to Russia as a militant anti-Bolshevik from a business and Progressive background in Chicago. He had, according to the told-to biography Robins produced with William Hard in 1921, "...himself had been in his youth a common miner." (74) He had discovered gold in the Klondike, become quite rich, and developed a social conscience.

Several views of Robins have survived. One of the harshest came from a recent book by the conservative historian Richard Pipes, who called Robins a "devious individual" for expressing a pro-Bolshevik attitude in communications with Lenin and Trotsky, but then avowed he was an anti-Bolshevist when he returned and testified to a Senate sub-committee investigating Bolshevism in March, 1919. Robins was in favor of recognition of what he perceived to be the legitimate government of Lenin and Trotsky from the revolution in November onward to the moment of his departure in May, 1918, while Ambassador Francis remained opposed to such a policy from before Robins came to the moment Francis left Russia on 6 November, 1918. (75) Pipes and the anonymous writer in "Outlook" 19 March, 1919, apparently both believed Robins sailed under false colors by stating an anti-Bolshevism position, but at the same moment enthusiastically endorsed US recognition for the new Soviet state.

"Robins further promised, on his return, to "continue efforts" in interpreting "the new democracy" to the American people. However, testifying soon afterward before a Senate committee on conditions in Soviet Russia, Robins urged economic assistance to Moscow on the disingenuous grounds that it was a way of `disorganizing Bolshevik power.' " (76)

George Kennan, perhaps America's most eminent Sovietologist, saw Robins differently in his 1956 history of Russia in World War I. He offered similar, and more accurate, facts to the early part of Robins life than the would-be biographer of Robins, William Hard, offered in his 1921 work on Robins. Robins had been born in the East, worked as a miner in Colorado, and struck it rich during the Yukon Gold Rush in the late 1890s. Kennan also pointed out that Robins became spiritually affected by the stark beauty of the Canadian North, a basic impression that was never to leave him.

Robins came back to the plains. and made Chicago his base. Kennan describes him thus: "Here, being both a liberal and a devout Christian, he became a cross between a political and religious evangelist, taking a prominent part in the work of the early Chicago settlement houses and in other liberal causes." Robins started out politically as a Democrat, but he changed in 1912 to the side of Theodore Roosevelt and became one of the founders of the Progressive Party. He campaigned for Senator in Illinois in 1914 on the Republican-Progressive ticket, but lost. Robins apparently became a memner of the Red Cross Commission in 1917 as a result of the support of Theodore Roosevelt, though he never said why or how he got involved in the Commission in Hard's book.

When Robins came to Russia in July, August or September, 1917 (Kennan gives both dates, Hard says 7 August, Robins in 1919 said July) Robins had a number of abilities which suited him for the role he was about to take on: energy, executive ability, a way with words, a familiarity with the US labor movement and an interest in the Russian revolutionary scene. He was hindered in that his education had been scanty. and he was weak in his knowledge of Russian language, culture and its written history and literature.

Kennan went on to say of Robins' role," Robins' contribution to the analysis of Soviet realities was generally received with suspicion and rejected at home, but it was not wholly devoid of merit. He had a hatred of what he called the "indoor" absorption of knowledge. He believed in getting out and getting around, and this he did in no uncertain way. He was constantly on the move, dashing from one place to another, seeing a most extraordinary variety of people. Unquestionably, he saw more of the Soviet leaders in the early months and years of their power than any other single American. While this did not always lead to accurate judgements on his part, at least it enabled him to avoid a number of the erroneus impressions that fastened themselves onto the thinking of other foreigners. Thus his views about the Revolution, while spotty in their factual foundation and often vaguely expressed, were never trivial or uninteresting. They were marked, above all, by the realization that the irritating aspects of the communist personality were no reason for ignoring its impressive aspects and no reason for not giving it serious study. No American who has long been exposed to the Soviet scene can read without deep admiration and sympathy the words with which Robins endeavoured, in 1919, to explain to the members of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary how it was possible than an intense interest in the Soviet Union and respect for the formidable qualities of its leaders did not necessarily mean sympathy with its ideology or desire to succeed in its world revolutionary aspirations." (77)

Bruce Lockhart, the young and independent-minded British diplomat who was to become influential himself in Petrograd, stated that "Lenin was amused by Robins' hero-worship, and of all foreigners Robins was the only man whom Lenin was always willing to see `and who ever succeeded in imposing his own personality on the unemotional Bolshevik leader,' according to one of Lenin's many biographers, Ronald Clark. Later in that biography, Clark said "And he freely expressed his admiration for Raymond Robins whom he saw as being open to new ideas." (78)

Still another view, from the afore-mentioned as-told-to biographer of Robins, William Hard, said, "To-day, because he opposes American and Allied intervention in Russia, certain hasty or malevolent persons try to stamp the stigma of Bolshevism on him. ... Robins has been consistantly and continuously anti-Bolshevik, in America and Russia; ... " and at this point, Hard credits Robins with the ability to see American policy towards Russia had failed, and acted accordingly. (79)

The reason for such accusations were what both Kennan and Hard referred to as the "indoor mind." (80) Hard quotes Robins as saying, "Never, says Robins, never in this age of emotions of peoples, will diplomacy be able to deal with foreign politics till it discards the Indoor for the Outdoor Mind." (81) He basically believed there was no substitute for getting out there in the field and seeing what was happening. Though he never said so, this view appears to be a reason for why he may have held fellow progressive Francis in some disdain, as Francis relied almost completely on subordinates and Robins for his views of Russia, though he never said anything specifically against the Ambassador.

Kennan probably provided the most in-depth look at Robins. Kennan saw Robins as an epitome of the liberal prior to the war. Robins was "enthusiastic," sincere, confident and capable of great activity, but he was also "provincial," weak in his knowledge of Russia's past, and was "erratic" intellectually. From this melange came his Christian passion, and "his faith in human progress," but also he was not well-rounded in his knowledge, and he had no patience with political realities, "...which was to make his career as a figure in Russian-American relations so stormy ..." He was a strong Progressive, a friend of former President Theodore Roosevelt, who helped Robins get appointed to the Commission to Russia, and Robins was a man who believed firmly that man's lot in life could be improved. (82)

Robins and Ambassaador Francis would differ sharply on the issue of American recognition for the second revolutionary government; Robins favored recognition, Francis opposed recognition, even though he had been the first Ambassador to extend recognition to the Kerensky government when it took over from the Tsar in March. Yet, both men were firm believers, to a greater degree than Marye had been, that all humanity could better itself, what they disagreed about was methods and processes that might accomplish that result. The Bolsheviks were different. Francis believed them under the influence of the Germans, and still believed that in 1919 when he testified at the Senate Judiciary Hearings on Bolshevik propaganda. Both men were gentlemen, by the standards of the day, and their interaction was always "pleasant," according to Ambassador Francis. Basically, they agreed to disagree. Robins never lost his view that Francis, Summers and many others were of the "indoor mind" kind of people, and that Lockhart, Judson, Thompson and himself were of the the "outdoor mind" camp. Actually, Francis and Robins agreed on many things, and generally got along quite well. (83)

3-6 August saw another crisis, another shuffling of cabinet posts, a new direction for the changed leadership, with Kerensky still at the head. (84) Throughout August and September, the government floundered, changing the commander of the Army, contending with Bolshevik demonstrations in early September, with Francis writing to the Secretary of State on the 12th of September that he had not suggested "mediation" between the Kornilov revolt and the central regime as reported in the Petrograd that day. (85) He was almost defensive about the fact that the Russian press might have thought such a thing of him.

On 7 August, in a letter to a colleague, Charles Moser, the American Consul at Harbin, China, Francis wrote, erroneously as it turned out, that Lenin was now a fugitive, "supposed to be in Germany." ... "The Bolsheviks are now in great disfavor, and their leaders are being arrested - one, Trotzky, was arrested yesterday; he was an exiled Russian Jew, who returned from America two or three months ago and immediately set his mouth going since which it has never ceased to operate." (86) His disdain for the Bolshevik leaders was set in place long before the October Revolution and their accession to power, and never really went away, just changed to a lesser degree of contempt for them and their ideas.

At the end of August, Woodrow Wilson sent a greeting to the Conference assembling in Moscow in August, 1917, expressing "confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals and democracy amd self-government against all enemies within and without, ... " (87). He definitely must have believed the Kerensky government capable of that, despite the fact that such an ideal was never realized, and despite the fact that his Ambassador to Russia kept reporting the mischief of the Bolsheviks. Wilson, too, was a subscriber to the idealism of the Progressive movement as perhaps was best indicated by the 14 Points program. (88)

Wilson specifically called for, in that program, in Point VI, "a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world..." to obtain a chance at self-determiNation, "political development" and a "national policy" that would allow Russia to join the comity of nations, and that Russia get whatever aid she needed. In Point XIII, Wilson called for "an independent Polish state," that would necessarily occur at the Russian's expense. (89)

Francis, in a series of dispatches to the Secretary of State from 25 August to 6 September, worried a great deal about the possible actions of the Bolsheviks of a revolutionary nature. Francis appeared convinced that the Bolsheviks, having tried in July to topple the Kerensky ministry by armed force, would try again. He was also concerned about the results and repurcussions of a great Moscow conference that convened 25 August that Francis decided not to attend because "no colleagues going," which says he might have. The Bolsheviks had not yet taken over, so the issue of recognition was not yet an issue. "Quiet here but Bolshevik demonstrations feared. Attempts thereof in Moscow yesterday failed." "Minister for Foreign Affairs who just left Embassy tells me death penalty restored in ranks by Council of Ministers and will be promulgated soon." "Internal situation again threatening." "Nervousness increasing. Rumors of Bolshevik demonstration for Sunday, 9th. If it materializes army less reliable than two weeks ago." (90)

Francis appeared quite concerned that a revolt was imminent, right up until it happened. He could see it coming, but really had no clear idea what to do about it, as representitive of the US President or as the "dean" of the Petrograd diplomatic corps. He also had at no point any clear instructions from his superiors in the State Department or from the President on how to proceed throughout the course of the summer. None of the American leadership appeared to be clear on a course of action to be taken, from Washington to Petrograd.

Also, the pressure of the Allies to keep Russia in the war proved in the end the very thing the American government wanted least, for such provided a force for destabilization, bringing about that which Washington and Francis feared most, the accession of the Bolsheviks. "Thus the demand of the Allies, including the United States, that Russia should renew and reinvigorate her war effort (bluntly expressed by Root in the formula "no fight, no loans") was actually in conflict with the other major aim of American policy toward the Provisional Government - namely, that the experiment in constitutional government should proceed sucessfully. Having once taken this attitude toward the Provisional Government, the United States government pursued it to the bitter end." (91) As had often been the case up to this time, and many times afterward, the U.S. pursued a policy bound to fail at one side or another because it was irreconcilable. The United States failed to have to have a clear decision at the very top as to which goal was paramount.

Other problems plagued the Russian people, though only a few people were affected. The Kornilov "revolt" occurred in mid-September. General Lavr Kornilov was a loyalist Tsarist General who appeared to have attempted in a three day span to be revolting against Kerensky. He failed. He was at the time the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. He was removed by Kerensky, and replaced by General Mikhail Alexseev. (92)

Another view of the Kornilov affair is offered in Hard: "Colonel (William) Thompson (Robin's superior officer on the Red Cross Commission) never took stock in the Kornilov adventure at any time at any price. He was not a trained observer of foreign political affairs. ... He was absolutely without diplomatic experience. Yet he went diplomatically absolutely right. Colonel Thompson used the methods of simple human inquiry, the methods of outdoor fact, instead of the methods of indoor gossip and surmise. By dwelling on fact he helped Robins see that adventures like Kornilov's were impossible in Russia at that time." Robins' fascination for the straight forward field inquirer type of person allowed him to admire a man who he initially clashed with when he he arrived in Russia. (93)

Francis described the action with a great deal of criticism for both Kerensky and Kornilov, with scorn for Kerensky, whom he accused of a "final and fatal blunder" by arming the workingmen of Petrograd, as many were Bolsheviks. He also poured scorn on the first head of the Provisional government, Lvov, calling him a "meddlesome rattle-brain," and then said, a few weeks after the revolt, "...had Kerensky been big enough to put his country's welfare above his own pride and seek some middle ground upon which he and Korniloff might have worked against the Bolsheviks - their common enemies - they might have rescued Russia, and the world from the curse of Bolshevism:..." (94)

In a letter to a friend, Walter Williams back in Missouri, Francis on the 24th of September suggested that the Bolsheviks had gained strength, "may soon attempt to overthrow the present Provisional Government and administer affairs through its own representives. If such a condition should eventuate, failure will undoubtably ensue in a short time..."(95). As political prophet about the fate of the Bolsheviks, Francis did not read the situation very well, as it turned out.

On 28 September, Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State of the US, wrote to Francis that Washington's information was indicating "that conditions there have been growing steadily worse until there exists to-day a condition of what one would call anarchy." He went on to comment on reports of increasing deterioration of morale and respect for officers in the (Russian) military, and stated to Francis, "Department will be pleased to receive your comments on this message." This message stemmed from the reports Lansing was receiving from all over Russia via Sweden from people coming out of out of the country. (96)

THe following week, after running bulletins to the Secretary about the Bolsheviks not giving up their arms, the progression of a conference of the Council of Ministers, and the placarding of Moscow over the alleged mistreatment of the "revolutionist Alexander Berkman" by the United States, on 4 October, Francis replied, in part, "Numerous outbreaks, some outrages, many defiances of authority, frequent acts of insubordiNation, have marked the progress of revolution, but not surprising when we consider the expanse of the country, inadequate, inefficient transportation, unsatisfactory communication by post and wire of 180,000,000 people oppressed by absolute monarchy for a thousand years. ... Problem extremely difficult but not insoluable. Deplorable conditions mainly attributable to returned exiles, majority from America, Trotsky being most troublesome. ... My sympathy with Russia deep, sincere and my conviction strong that the country will survive ordeal and be safe for democracy if we and other Allies are patient and helpful. ..." (97)

Some of Francis' rhetoric would be echoed about the Soviet Union as late as the 1980s. There were many factions vying for power at this juncture, and the "deplorable conditions" were as attributable to confusion about who was in charge, the country being on the verge of civil war, chaotic food distribution, and periodic bursts of violence by all factions. The returning emigres had a small piece of the responsibility for the chaos, but here Francis ignored that the Tsarist regime held primary responsibility for most of the conditions that set off the two revolutions. No one group could be held responsible for the mess Russia was in, despite Francis' comments.

The military attache, General William Judson, reported to Washington 7 October that the government was going through a "gradual disintegration of power ... in all directions." He reported that anti-American meetings have occurred, and that "Bolsheviks desire peace, separate or otherwise; distribution of land, and giving factories to workmen; all immediately." (98) He, too, was to later favor recognition of the fledgling Bolshevik government, with disastrous consequences for himself. It caused Judson's removal by direct orders from President Wilson in December, 1917.

Francis cabled Washington 27 October that the Bolsheviks plan an "outbreak" on 2 November, that they will have "assistance" from the Kronstadt military base, and that the first thing the rebels will do is "arrest" the Provisional Government. He then goes on to say that the newspapers are full of Bolshevik atrocity stories and that "Government has announced intention to suppress Bolshevik manifestation peacefully or otherwise." (99)

On 24-25 October, O.S, 7-8 November (N.S.) the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd began. (100) "In the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee Trotsky had declared that the Provisional Government no longer existed." (101) All the descriptions of the Revolution wildly differ, even to whether it was organized, inevitable or accident. Many historians seem to think that the October revolution was planned, though in a most disorganized way. Lenin was not reported in Moscow by some sources until 25 October/7 November, but by the 8th, the Bolsheviks were in control of Petrograd and Moscow.

Francis in Russia, Morris in Sweden reported to the Secretary of State that the Bolsheviks appeared to have taken over 7-8 November, Francis reports all Ministers save Kerensky were arrested. The following day Francis reported that the only action specifically taken by the Diplomatic Corps is that "each head of mission should act in such matters as his judgement dictated. No mention made of any new government or recognition thereof when and if established." He also stated that the Military Revolutionary Committee "has been directing all matters from Smolny Institute, headquarters of Petrograd Soviet." (102)

Several accounts exist of Kerensky's escape. In his dispatches of 8 & 9 November, all Francis tells Washington is that Kerensky is not among the arrested. (103) Pipes says Kerensky "slipped out of the Winter Palace disguised as a Serbian officer and in a car borrowed from a US Embassy official, flying the American flag, drove off to the front in search of help." (104) Trotsky did not believe Francis' report of what happened.

Trotsky wrote that the commandeering story was a polite fiction, and not at all true, and that the Americans had aided Kerensky's escape, thereby sowing seeds of emnity between Francis, who reported later that he went along with the fiction as did Trotsky, and the new regime of the Bolsheviks. (105) Kennan reported the car as belonging to American Assistant Military Attache Captain E. Francis Riggs, and said, "Francis, fearful of having the Embassy involved in the political events of the day, tried to hush up the incident, it naturally became known and led to a general impression that Kerensky had escaped in an American official car, under cover of the American flag." (106) The incident did not please the Bolsheviks, especially Trotsky, even though he did go along with what the Americans said had occurred.

The American journalist John Reed provides a moving picture of the new government's first hours on 8 November: "Smolny was tenser than ever, if that were possible. The same running men in the dark corridors, squads of workers with rifles, leaders with bulging portfolios arguing, explaining, giving orders as they hurried anxiously along, surrounded by friends and lieutenants. Men literally out of themselves, living prodigies of sleeplessness and work - men unshaven, filthy, with burning eyes who drove upon their fixed purpose full speed on engines of exaltation. So much they had to do, so much! Take over the government, organize the City, keep the garrison loyal, fight the Duma and the Committee for Salvation, keep out the Germans, prepare to do battle with Kerensky, inform the provinces what had happened, propagandize from Archangel to Vladivistok ... Government and Municipal Employees refusing to obey their Commissars, post and telegraph refusing them communication, railroads stonily ignoring their appeals for trains, Kerensky coming, the garrison not altogether to be trusted, the Cossacks waiting to come out ... Against them not only the organized bourgeoisie, but all the other Socialist parties except the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, a few Mensheviki Internationalists, and the Social Democratic Internationalists, and even they undecided whether to stand by or not. With them, it is true, the workers and the soldier-masses - the peasants an unknown quantity - but after all the Bolsheviki were a political faction not rich in trained and educated men ... " (107).

The revolution(s) were described by a Charles Johnston a few months later "To realize what has happened in Russia, we should remember this: That two antagonistic revolutions started in Russia at exactly the same time, and that they have, since March, 1917, been racing madly to best each other, first one and then the other gaining the upper hand." He described most Russians as "shocked" by these turns of events. "Most, but not all. The small but tremendously active class led by Nicolai Lenine, whose real name is said by some to be Ulyanof, and by others to be Zederblum, and by Trotsky, who formerly called himself Braunstein, is wildly elated over what has happened, and counts it as only a beginning, not for Russia only, but for the whole world. For we shall be wise to get it in our minds that the Lenine-Trotsky Bolsheviki, like the German Kaiser, aim at world domination." (108) Though Johnston appears very briefly on history's stage, he did discern more accurately than most the course the Bolshevik party would take after they consolidated their power in Russia. It may have been, given the naming usage he used, that he was a believer of the "Jewish conspiracy" idea, though there is no specific evidence to support such a thought.

Colonel House, Wilson's Special Representative to the Allies, was in London, met with Kerensky and others, and wired the President on 18 November that he believed the Allies should offer peace terms to the Germans that did not include dealing with indemnities or annexations. He believed Germany would not accept such a peace, that the move would "solidify Russia." He predicted that Germany would not make a separate peace for fear of "socialistic infection," but he cited Kerensky and others in saying that they believed that Petrograd and the western provinces would fall to Germany in the spring. (109) House was still another American official who failed to see the staying power the Bolsheviks would end up having on the Russian political scene, and more dangerous in his lack of vision in that he so strongly had the ear of the US President.

Francis sent a cable to the Secretary of State 20 November saying the Russians were demanding an Allied conference to declare the Allied war aims so as to "inspire Russia with renewed courage and resuscitate army which now demoralized." He personally doesn't oppose such a conference, but looked to Washington for advice. He points out that "Lenin attempting to administer" and that Trotsky had taken over the Foreign Office. (110)

The Bolsheviks consolidated their power after some internal fighting and announce formally through the Foreign Ministry over Trotsky's signature to the Allied Ambassadors on 22 November that Lenin is the chairman of the new government organized 8 November, and proposed an "armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations..." No specific request is made for recognition, none is offered in replies from "neutral" Norway, Holland, Spain, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden. (111) Francis had been given the text of this statement by the Foreign Ministry the day before it was formally announced, he sent it on to the Secretary of State without comment (112)

Later that day, Francis telegraphed the Secretary of State about a meeting held earlier in the day by Allied Ambassadors in Petrograd about the note offered by Trotsky. The key phrase in the document, other than some unsubstantiated comments about Lenin "working for Germany whose plan it is to encourage civil strife in Russia so that German troops will be called to restore order and then separate peace negotiated on terms favorable to Germany..." is, "Agreed furthermore that each chief request his Government not to direct him to to reply to communication, as pretended government established by force and not recognized by Russian people." (113)

Secretary of State Lansing replied to Francis 24 November, "For your information. In reply to an inquiry as to whether we would join with the Allies in an agreement not to recognize independently any new Russian government, the Department has informed the French Ambassador that we would be glad to exchange interviews with the Allies at any time on the subject but that we would not bind ourselves to a course which might look to Russia as a measure of compulsion." (114) Basically, Lansing told Francis that the Allies would not band together to deny recognition to the new government, nor would the Allies make it a quid pro quo that Russia stay in the war in exchange for recognition. But, as a matter of fact, this was exactly the course the Allies would end up taking.

That same day, Francis reported that he has managed to conduct certain kinds of business without dealing with Smolny directly, such as getting permission for 18 Americans to travel east on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and sending Henry Horn, a member of the railway experts commission then in Russia from the US from Petrograd to Moscow. He put it thusly, "Have managed to continue in touch with Department of Ways of Communication without recognizing Smolny,..." (115) He had begun using Robins as a go-between with the Bolsheviks right around this time, though there is no specific date offered in Francis' memoirs, Hard or Kennan, in Francis' communications with the State Department or in State Department communications with Francis as to when this role of Robins actually began.

On 25 November, Francis reports, in part, to the Secretary of State, on the beginning of elections for the Constituent Assembly in Russia. He said, "Assembly is authority to which all Russia has been looking since revolution began and is empowered to determine form of government without referring same back to people for confirmation. Assembly likely to be Bolshevik in sentiment but if so develops, will still have a semblance of representing the people ..." (116)

Consul General Madden Summers in Moscow offered, in a letter to Francis 24 November, some insights to the question, "Why did the Kerensky government fail?" He wrote some incisive remarks to the critical issue of character in the letter as to what had happened in Moscow during the October Revolution, criticizing heavily the American Red Cross, who he alleged were "annoying" in their attempts to get out of town "before anybody else," but he did not touch on the real upset he had with the Red Cross, and more specifically Robins. That was that Robins did not play by the diplomatic rules in his hobnobbing with the Bolsheviks, and was not controllable by normal channels of command. In Summers' view, such behavior was not gentlemanly. Then Summers offered comments as to Kerensky's specific errors. "Under these conditions, to keep these peasant soldiers fighting and at the same time build up a democratic government in a land that had only known despotism for hundreds of years was a task for a leader with the iron nerve of Cromwell and the far-seeing wisdom of Lincoln. Not such a man was Kerensky! ... He was also, in my belief, a patriotic Russian with the welfare of his country at heart. But he was weak, and twice in the brief tenure of his power he blundered fatally; first, when after the failed Revolution of July, he failed to execute as traitors, Lenin and Trotzky. second, when during the Korniloff episode, he failed to seek to conciliate General Korniloff and instead turned to the Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies and distributed ammunition among the workers of Petrograd. By this singularly inept stroke he alienated his own army and armed his enemies." (117)

The US Military Attache' wrote to the Chief of the Russian General Staff 25 November, "The American Government has announced that no shipments of military supplies and provisions to Russia will be effected until the situation of this country will be established. ... The exports to Russia will be resumed only after the formation of a steady government which can be recognized by the United States, but if the Bolsheviks will remain in power and will put through their program of making peace with Germany, the present embargo on exports to Russia will remain in force." (118) This was a critical part of the U.S. position. Fighting, the Russians could get materials from the United States. Making peace made it imperative to stop supplies. Recognition tied into the embargo by mandating that a "steady government" stay in the war to continue getting supplies and gaining recognition.

Trotsky offered a statement to the Allies on 27 November that said, in part, "We did not demand a parliamentary "recognition." We are reognized by the people. ... That negative attitude with which our peace initiative is being met from the side of several of the Allied Governments, cannot in in the slightest change the course of our policy. ... As long as Allied governments answer with bare "no recognition" of us and our intiative we follow our own course appealing to the peoples after the governments. Should the results of the appeal bring separate peace, which we do not want, responsibility will fall completely upon the Allied governments." (119) Francis wrote to the Secretary of State, commenting on this note on the 28th of November, "Trotsky note in my 2084 (the numbers refer to State Dept. dispatch numberings) is presuming and insulting to Allied governments. It threatens appeals to peoples of countries whose Governments will not recognize him or refuse to propose armistice and peace. ... (120)

George Kennan observed, "On Tuesday and Wednesday (the 27th and 28th), the State Department received sheaves of new reports about the Russian situation, all affecting in one or another the question of recognition. ... Together with the news of the unfriendly reception of the Allied military protest, it indicated clearly that the question of contact between the Allied representitives and the Soviet authorities was becoming acute, and that if something weren't done soon to clarify the United States position, complications might ensue at any time." (121)

On 28 November, Trotsky notifies the Allied governments that he will be having preliminary meetings with Germany on the peace, and hostilities on the Russian front with the Germans had ceased. He invited the Allied governments to paricipate in the "preliminary negotiations" on 2 December. (122) They did not take him up on his offer, probably a mistake on the part of the Allies.

29 November saw rumors become part of official reports on the subject of recognition. Francis telegraphed the Secretary of State to tell him that the British Ambassador "has changed position" and recommended recognition of the Soviet government. He suggested that he would convene a meeting of Allied Ambassadors the next day to see whether this is true or not. (123)

"At some time on ..., November 29 or 30, Lansing appears to have either seen the President or communicated with him in some way on problems of policy towards Russia. ... Clearly, Wilson and Lansing agreed that there was as yet insufficient reason either to respond to the Bolshevik peace offer or to enter into any other form of communication with the Bolshevik authorities. But no statement of this policy was made at that time to the public." (124)

On the 1st of December, Francis reported to the State Department, "British Ambassador in authorized interview published today says: `In an interview according to Reuter correspondent Lord Cecil is reported to have said that His Majesty's Government could not recognize the present Russian Government and the Ambassador has further been instructed to abstain from any action that could be taken as implying recognition.' (125)

4 hours after this dispatch was sent, Secretary of State Lansing replied, "Your 2034, November 27; 2039, November 28; and 2040, November 29. You are to make no reply to communications mentioned in these telegrams and are informed that this Government awaits further developments. The President has made no statement." (126) Nor would he. This was a critical telegram from Lansing - it basically told Francis to hang on, operate from the ongoing non-recognition stance without clear instructions, and at some point, some guidance as to what to do next would be forthcoming. That guidance came really in the form of no directions at all, from which Francis derived correctly that Wahington was sticking to the course of non-recognition of the Bolsheviks.

The Secretary of State drafted a memorandum 2 December to the President. In it, he said that many people were advising a course on Russia, in his mind the best information received had been to do nothing. He said, "With this latter policy I'm in total accord." He pointed out that the Root Mission "recommendations had been predicated on the success of the Provisional Government" and that government had failed. He suggested that the "Bolsheviki are anarchists rather than socialists" and could not see how such a hostile bunch could claim to be a government. He stated that recognizing the Bolsheviks would encourage similar elements in other countries. Lansing went on, "The correct policy for a government which believes in political institutions as they now existand based on nationality and private property is to leave these dangerous idealists alone and have no direct dealings with them. To recognize them would give them an exalted idea of their own power, ... and win their contempt, not their friendship."

Lansing stated that while the Teutonic governments were recognizing the Bolshevik regime, it was a short-sighted policy. He predicted the downfall of the Bolsheviks. He stated his sureness "trhat it would be unwise to give recognition to Lenin, Trotsky and their crew of radicals." He offered that the probable result would be several states managing their own affairs. (He was off by 74 years). He offered his feelings of dubiousness about the Bolshevik leaders, accusing them of having no regard for decent virtues. He accused them of planning to "destroy civilization by mob violence." He predicted correctly that civil war would ensue, but picked the Germans to be the benefactors of such a conflict. He stated that a "Terror" would bvefall Russia, worse than that in France in the 1790s. He suggested that the only remedy might be a "strong ... personality" to emerge, and with force maintain a government. He concluded the memo by saying," `Do nothing' should be our policy until the black period of terrorism comes to an end and the rising tide of blood has run its course. It cannot last forever, but Russia will sink lower before better days come." (127)

On 4 December, Lansing sent another draft memo to the President, stating basically the points he had made in his 2 December comments. Lansing asserts, "The President did not think it was opportune to make a public declaration of this sort at the time it was suggested." Lansing said that Wilson "approved in principle the position I had taken" and directed that actions be taken along those lines of thinking. "From that time forward the policy of non-recognition of the Bolsheviki was pursued without variation, and was at last proclaimed by Secretary (of State) Colby in the summer of 1920." (128) "The policy of non-recognition thus may be said to date from that moment - December 4, 1917 - and Lansing's unused memorandum may be regarded as its first authoritative expression." (129)

Francis was now slightly stuck. He had been feeling since late November that the Department had little idea of what he was facing in Russia, saying in a letter to Lansing 24 November, "I have not received any from you indicating you are aware of the situation here." (130) Francis was not told of Wilson's decision not to publicly state that America favored non-recognition, nor was he made aware of Wilson's move for quite some time, and all he had to go on was the 1 December statement to him about awaiting further developments. This really was very little information to make decisions or act upon them in such a momentous matter, and showed the lack of understanding in the American State Department about how far and much to instruct an Ambassador in the field. Francis was not informed of all this for some months (in February, 1918). However, he was aware of conditions inside the country from myriad reports from Consuls at Tiflis, Odessa, Riga, Petrograd and Moscow, and was aware of their contacts with opponents of the Bolsheviks. He showed remarkable ability to operate with the paucity of instructions from Washington, and the almost dangerous reports he received from the field outlining the activities of the Bolshevik opposition, any of which could have aroused the Bolshevik's ire.

On 2 December, Francis cabled to Washington that the Military Attache's visit to Smolny on 1 December was "exciting comment" among various Allied embassies that the United States was recognizing Russia's new rulers. He says "Judson has insisted for some time that Soviet is de facto government and relations therewith should be established." Francis said he had not authorized Judson to go, that he had instructed that a subordinate go to discuss "armistice only," and that he did not know until after the fact that Judson had gone. Francis enclosed the test of a message from Trotsky published in "oficial Soviet organs," which said, in part,

"General Judson informed Comrade Trotsky that at present he has no opportunity to of speaking in the name of the American Government since recognition of Soviet authority is not yet an accomplished fact, but he appeared for the purpose of establishing relations, elucidate certain circumstances and dispel misunderstandings. ..." (131)

Francis went on to say that Judson had told him that the visit was "... personal, not official, ..." and that he had only asked questions and received assurances that now "all negotiations will be openly conducted." (132)

Hard points out that it "was absolutely necessary" for the Allies to keep in touch with Trotsky on "some subjects," despite the allusion to the recall of Judson for doing so. He goes on to say, "they had embassies in Petrograd; and these embassies had to get police protection, for instance, and telegraph-service, and similar courtesies and facilities. For the American embassy Robins was the `unofficial' talker. He was not a member of the club, so to speak; and accordingly, he could go to Smolny on behalf of the American Ambassador without in the slightest degree compromising the American Ambassador. He went, and he kept on going, month after month, at the American ambassador's request. He was `unofficial,' but he was recognized. In all that follows it should, therefore, be thoroughly understood that Robins was not going to Smolny in any merely private capacity." (133)

Hard went on to point out that Robins is now the head of the Red Cross mission, Colonel Thompson apparently having left in the first days of December. (134) Also, "...Robins was the American ambassdor's "unofficial" aide in all dealings with Smolny. Once an order came from Washington forbidding Robins to go to Smolny any more. The ambassador secured its cancellation. He wanted Robins to go." (135) The documentation shows that Francis did ask Washington on 12 December about Robins' role, and on 15 December he was forbidden to have contact with Smolny. On 29 December, he assertd after the war, he received a telegram that was "unclear as to what he should do." (136) The record is mute about Hard's assertion, it would appear that Washington just ignored the situation as Robins' role served their purposes without having to formally recognize the Bolsheviks. This statement glosses over the fact that while Francis did want Robins to continue interacting with the Bolsheviks, had the US government put its foot down, he would have been duty-bound to yank Robins out of the arena of contact with Smolny.

Francis acknowledged the 1 December Washington cable of the Secretary of State on 4 December, informing the State Department "Have made no replies to communications designated. ... The position of the Washington government is founded on the assumption that a large part of Russia does not sympathize with the aims of the Bolsheviks and more than that their success is by no means assured. ..." Francis concluded his telegram with a vaguely ominous sentence, "Trotsky issued an order three days ago removing all (foreign) diplomats averse Soviet government." (137) Which diplomats were to be expelled is never clearly spelled out by Francis. Even though Francis is given no specific instructions about recognition, he followed his own inclinations, which happened to dovetail into the stance President Wilson wanted taken. In the issue of recognition and to a degree also the issue of intervention, Francis served as he was supposed to - the personal representive of the President, with some latitude for discretion, which he clearly exercised.

Also on 4 December, a telegram from the US Ambassador in Sweden, Ira Morris, stated that through "Colonel Thompson, head of Red Cross, William Sands and others who have just come from Russia," that the Russians are seeking recognition from somebody, anybody, ... one of the neutral powers..." The Russians clearly hoped that recognition by somebody would give them some weight in the international community. (138)

Francis sent a cable 7 December which in part stated he had "seen no American paper since this revolution began." He pointed out who was currently in Russia, correspondents from the Chicago News and the New York world, and said, "I think both correspondents would like to see the Soviet government recognized." (139) The following day, Francis is chastised by the State Department for offering viewpoints in a cable earlier in the month that "enunciates views totally at variance with the announced policy of this Government." Secretary Lansing advised him that they wish "recommendations on the political situation" from Francis, and they wanted to hear from Francis, privately, on his own views, but they definitely did not want him talking to the press. (140)

In perusing the two years of comments offered by Francis to the State Department, he rarely missed an opportunity to say what he thought ought to be done. It appears that what the Department periodically would react to was Francis commenting publicly on what ought to happen, when in some cases, for a variety of reasons, the Department had not yet heard his views, or wanted him to take a certain view that he had expressed in public differently. Considering that he often felt, with some justification, that he was being asked to carry a large burden without much information from Washington, it remains surprising that there was not more acrimony from Francis to his noiminal superiors about their carping at him to tell them more. He was not happy about the critical telegrams, and on 9 December sent a long and detailed defense of his actions. (141)

The next day, 10 December, Francis sent another fairly long telegram to Washington wherein he asserts that a "source worth of credence," (whom he never identifies) says that "the Smolny government absolutely under the control of German General Staff." He then asked on what to do if the Germans occupied Petrograd with the Embassy staff and so on, and that he had planned to remain there no matter what, and that he would rely on the Russian people themselves for help and protection. He goes on to report, "Trotsky gives widest possible circulation to any favors requested even by subordinates of Allied missions, hoping thereby to convince Russian people that his government is recognized by Allies as that would be most effective argument for its recognition in Russia." (142) Francis did correctly perceive the desperation the new government has to be recognized, as if the Bolsheviks can see coming the long civil war that erupted in late 1918, in part, because no legitmate government wants to recognize them for fear of igniting Bolshevism in their country.

On 12 December, the British informed the US Secretary of State that they were discussing recognition in the Cabinet, but would not be recognizing the Bolshviks in the near term. Morris in Sweden that same day reported "Russian Minister, Copenhagen, informs me that Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that Danish Government would take no action with reference to recognition of Bolshevik government for the present and await developments." (143) Slowly, from around the world, Lansing learned that the Allied, and neutral, governments are holding to non-recognition of the Bolshevik government as December winged by.

Then Robins reportedly held out the possibility of U.S. aid and recognition, according to newspapers in Petrograd, Francis reported. In the first of two telegrams sent that same day, the Ambassador stated, "Trotsky in speech Sunday night reported in Bolshevik paper as saying, `The chief of the American Red Cross came to Smolny and said straight that in Russia there never had been any such strong government as ours and that America of course will give us all kinds of supplies except munitions ...' Suppose Robins is meant, as he is acting since Thompson's departure. This was in morning paper the 11th. Are Red Cross members wearing uniform included in your 1883, December 6, 2 p.m., which says, "The President desires American representitives withhold all direct communications with the Bolshevik government?" (144) This issue of the Red Cross and what their role was to be ended up being brushed aside, so Francis continued to use Robins as a go-between and ignoring the recognition question in that regard, while publicly refusing to treat with the Smolny government in any way.

On 14 December, Francis reported without personal comment that Trotsky had stated in an "official bulletin," "Judson came to us and said it isn't true that England is preparing to deprive us of supplies and Colonel Robins said he had never seen a firmer government. He thinks his government will be the first to recognize us ... " (145) Judson lost his job over his willingness to "recognize" the Bolsheviks, and Robins was, as it turned out, quite wrong about the US government's willingness to recognize the new government in Russia.

Then arose the armistice between Germany and Russia. "On 15 December, German-Soviet negotiations, which had actually been inaugerated in Brest-Litovsk on December 3, were finally brought to an end by the signing of an armistice agreement. ... Trotsky had officially communicated these terms to the Allied governments in a note dated December 6 (146) and delivered that same day in Petrograd. ... There is no record that this communication was ever given any special consideration in Washington, or that it was ever acknowledged in any way. In the absence of any reply from the western governments, the Soviet delegation returned to Brest and the talks were resumed December 12. On the evening of Friday, December 14, rumors began to circulate in Petrograd of the signing of the agreement, ... The agreement was actually signed the following day, but the news was not released in Petrograd until Sunday, December 16." (147)

Francis on the scene, and Lansing in Washington, missed a golden opportunity to have perhaps caused havoc with the idea of a German-Russian armistice simply by having sent someone to Brest-Litovsk and accepting Trotsky's invite. THe US decision to not treat with the Bolsheviks, and Francis' willingness to fall in line with that attitude, perhaps did our long-range and war interests great harm. One strong American voice at the talks could have disrupted them greatly. Francis was innately cautious however, and would have never made such a move without Washington's approval, and it appears that the Wilson government never discerned the possibility they had at hand.

Judson having been barred from further interacting with Smolny, the job of contact with the Soviet authorities was allowed to rest on Robins' shoulders. On Sunday evening, as the news of the armistice was spreading throughout Petrograd, Robins had another of his frequent meetings with Trotsky. Trotsky apparently slightly bamboozled Robins or "Robins seems to have failed to understand..." that the armistice would allow the Germans to move troops around at will, that there would probably be trade or shipping of war materials with and to the Germans. (148)

The "so-called Kalpashnikov affair," which occurred at about this time, revolved around Trotsky's resentment of the Allies not joining in the armistice talks, and the failure for world revolution to occur. He had no great love for the Allies, indeed there was "evidences of the sharpest resentment on Trotsky's part, directed against the Allied representitives in Petrograd." Kalpashnikov had shipped a number of ambulances and trucks to Russia for the use of the Red Cross. He shipped out to Petrograd on the same ship to Petrograd that Trotsky did, and when the British detained Trotsky at Halifax, Kalpashnikov "allowed himself to be used by the British security officers on this occasion as an interpreter in Trotsky's interrogation, a fact Trotsky understandably resented and found it difficult to forget or forgive." (149) Trotsky did't forget.

Apparently, after Kalpashnikov got to Russia, his ambulances, semi-assembled, were being put together in Petrograd when Kerensky was overthrown. For reasons not completely clear, Kalpashnikov and Colonel H.W. Anderson of the Romanian Red Cross Commission decided "that the ambulances might well be used in Rumania rather than left in Russia, where obviously there would be no further need for them." Anderson wired the head of the Red Cross in Washington, Henry Davison, in early December asking for permission to transfer the ambulances to Romania. Kalpashnikov appeared in Petrograd 18 December with "a letter to Francis from Anderson asking the Embassy's help in getting the vehicles to Jassy (the headquarters of both the Romanian Red Cross and the government)." (150)

Then somewhere along the way, Anderson decided that he wanted the ambulances in Rostov. He wrote Francis later that he sent them there as a safety move, so that the vehicles might go to the south if someone decided on the need. Anderson sent messages to Kalpashnikov with instructions about the ambulances, and to the Embassy asking for monetary help to get them there. Anderson sent Francis letters explaining in more detail what he was up to, though they conflicted with earlier communications, which had been sent "in the clear" and that the Bolsheviks knew about by 7 December. "The Embassy at Petrograd failed to turn the messages over to Kalpashnikov or the Petrograd Red Cross Commission, nor does anything appear to have been said to either of these parties about them. ... Why the Embassy held up their transmission remains a mystery. Was it just inefficiency and dilatoriness? Or was there some backstairs collusion with Robins which prevented their delivery?" Kennan indicated that the record as left offered no clue as to what really occurred. But Trotsky did not want motor vehicles in the hands of the Bolshevik's many enemies and as there wren't too many vehicles in Russia, they were seized. (151)

A short interlude occurred. Kennan offered information gleaned from Robins' pocket diary entries indicating that he had some knowledge of the telegrams bottled up by the Embassy, probably having been shown them by the Russians 5 or 7 December. Another entry on 11 December made it clear that "Robins by this time had some knowledge of the messages concerning the ambulances." On 17 December, Robins and Major Roger Perkins of Anderson's staff quarrelled over the ambulances, "with Robins walking out in a huff." The following day, Robins received written instructions that the trainload of supplies headed to Romania could go, sans motorcars. On 20 December, Kalpasnikov, determined to get his motorcars out of Petrograd, appealed to the US Naval Attache, Walter Cosley, for help. In Kalpashnikov's book written in 1920, A Prisoner of Trotsky's, according to Kennan, he recounted a whole conversation he held with the Ambassador about Robins' desire to cause trouble for Francis, Robins' aspirations for Francis' job, and the Ambassador's vehement opposition to recognizing the Bolshevik government. On the night of 20-21 December, Kalpashnikov was arrested by the Soviets. (152)

The Secretary of State sent to US diplomatic representitives in Europe, Japan, China and Siam on 15 December, "Pending further instructions you should have no official relations with Russian diplomatic officers who recognize or are appointed by Bolshevik government. (153) Lansing sent a telegram to the US Consul at Tiflis, Felix Smith, on 15 December, which said, "Your telegrams December 4, 9 p.m. and subsequent dates including December 13, 6 p.m. received. Department appreciates your thorough reports on situation, is in touch with Allied Governments and hopes to give you definite instructions shortly on whole subject. Meanwhile do not commit this Government. No country either belligerant or neutral has recognized Bolshevik government, Petrograd." (154)

That same day, Maddin Summers, US Consul General in Moscow, sent to the Department from Petrograd a lengthy analysis they didn't get until 30 January the following year "in regard to political developments during the first half of December." The analysis was detailed, covered all the fronts, factions and personalities, and covered the elections to the Constitutional Convention extensively. (155) Summers' sudden death in May, 1918, was to deprive both Francis and the US Department of State of a very cogent and objective analyst of the situation at a relative critial juncture.

Francis told the Department on 17 December that an armistice ageeement had been made for 4 weeks "subject to termination on seven day's notice,..." He said that Trotsky thought he had "achieved a success,..." Francis went on to say, "It means, in my judgement, that Russia is out of the war. ... " (156) In that flat statement, though Brest-Litovsk was not agreed on for three more months, Francis did see what had happened more clearly than they did in Washington. On 18 December, Summers, cabled the preliminary agreement between the Germans and the Russians. According to the document as it appears in Foreign Affairs, Volume I., it was not received at the State Department until 2 March, 1918. (157) The technical problems of communicating between Russia and Washington have never been adequately discussed by most sources, but Francis mentioned the difficulties periodically in his State Department communiques.

Robins reacted to the arrest by the Soviets of Kalpashnikov the night 20 December detailed above by meeting with first Francis, and then with letters from the Counselor of the Embassy, J. Butler Wright, saying that Kalpashnikov had gotten no money from the Embassy for any purpose. "To send Robins to the Soviet authorities involved a departure by the Ambassador from the very policy of "no contact" which he himself had recommended to Washington; but in the heat of the moment, and in the face of the lively apprehensions which he and the others were experiencing for their own safety, this aspect of the matter evidently appeared to have lost its importance." (158) The "problem" referred to by Wright was never really addressed by anyone - a link to Smolny was fairly vital until both Francis and Robins moved out of range of contact with Smolny the following spring.

Robins met with Trotsky that afternoon. Trotsky was reported by Francis as "refusing to listen to Robins' explanation thereof, because Robins could not state sent by me, ..." (159), this despite the fact that Robins had the letter from Wright explaining what the US had done, and also had the offending telegrams the Embassy had been holding. That night, Trotsky denounced Kalpashnikov in very harsh terms, accusing him of attempting to place the autos in the hands of an anti-Bolshevik group. Robins was exonerated by Trotsky as having no part in the affair. (160) Francis reported that Trotsky had attacked him for colluding in the affair with aid to opponents of the regime in mind, which Francis denied in both his cable, and a comment to the press (161) on 22 December.

"At the conference on the morning of December 22, it was also apparently decided that to send Robins to the Smolny once more" to represent the US positions on the incident and to try and secure Kalpashnikov's release. That same day, the State Department word barring Robins from contact with the Bolsheviks AND the Red Cross instructions to the same end both arrived at the Embassy that same morning. "This meant Robins was NOT to have contact with the Soviet authorities. The source of this dictum, it must be remembered, was a Presidential directive." (162)

"At the Embassy, Robins mentioned this order. `What?' said the Ambassador. `Pay no attention to it.' `But,' Robins said, `it's an order.' `I'll take the responsibility,' said the ambassador. ` You keep on going to Smolny. Tear the order up.' `Well,' said Robins, `will you cable Washington to change the order?' `Certainly,' said the ambassador. " (163) According to Kennan, this dialogue occurred at the 22 December meeting. (164) Francis did ask for clarification, but Robins kept going to Smolny despite what Washington had to say.

Francis testified to a Senate "investigating committee" in 1919 that he had told Robins that he thought it unwise to sever the contacts with Smolny and that cessation of the visits might not be a prudent course. Francis wanted to know what the Bolsheviks were up to, Robins was his conduit to knowing, and a willing participant in the exchange in addition. Francis went on at the hearings to say he had cabled the government as to this decision and he did not receive a reply until 29 December, and that was unclear as to what he should do. "In this remarkable manner, Robins succeeded in escaping at the last moment from the operation of Washington's ban on contacts with the Soviet authorities. From that time on he proceeded vigorously with the pursuit of a series of associations with the Soviet leaders which appeared to him both necessary and desirable." (165) This whole situation really pointed up how unprepared the State Department was to deal with the complexity presented by Russia in the post-Tsarist period, and how to handle extraneous personnel like Robins who really was not under their control.

On 27 December, Robins sent the following telegram via Francis' wire access to Henry Davison, head of the Red Cross "from Robins:" "December 26, State Department 1920, December 21st. Please urge on the President the necessity of our continued intercourse with the Bolshevik government. Otherwise it is impossible to arrange transporation and distribution of supplies, particularly milk. Ambassador approves this statement and has advised the State depatment to the same efect. Alleged statement by Trotsky quoted in your message untrue. Statement made by me to Trotsky was from your cables regarding shipment of supplies." Francis adds the line, "Please note my above stated expression of approval." (C & P, 60). Lansing replied to Francis obliquely. He sidestepped the issue of Robins' contacts with Smolny, and said only that he hoped that the Red Cross work would continue. (166)

New Year's Day, 1918, Francis telegraphed the Secretary of State that Robins had met with Trotsky and (N.V) Krylenko on 31 December, and that they were "enraged" because of an alleged German "conspiracy," and wanted to "sever all negotiations" towards an end of the war with Germany as far as Russia is concerned. Robins reportedly had grasped the tail end of a conversation at Smolny, and believed a conspiracy was going to cause a break in the negotiating. Karl Radek, head of the Soviet propaganda bureau AND a negotiator in the talks with the Germans in the naval and economic areas, that same evening, proceeded to further lead on Edgar Sisson, the Committee for Public Information representative who had arrived on the scene 25 November, and by extension Robins and Francis, by alleging that the Bolsheviks would fight the Germans because they would all die if they didn't. Francis, Judson, Robins and Sisson all met in the Embassy that day, and Francis agreed to support "immediate assistance ... in the event of a resumption of hostilities." This same day, Judson was recalled, "the decision had ... the President's personal approval." Apparently the decision was oral, as the papers of the State Department, Lansing and Wilson's public papers do not specifically reflect Judson's recall, though Albert Rhys Williams claimed that Judson's recall was due to Sisson, whose boss, George Creel, was a close confidant of President Wilson, and Williams refers to a telegram that must have been sent from the Army. (167)

On 2 January, Robins, worried that Francis might squirm out of committment to aid the Russians if they broke off peace negotiations, brought two documents for Francis to sign. One was a draft to the State Department about aid to Russia if hostilities were renewed. The other was a draft of a "communication to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs," outlining a similar plan if "Soviet government decided to prosecute war against Germany and Austro-Hungary." Francis intialled them both, and a entire misconstruction arose from them. Later that day, the Department in the person of the Secretary of State made it clear to Francis that he was not to change course on recognition, and that they would instruct as to when that policy might change. (168)

Francis had only appoved these documents tentatively, and with only scant feeling that they would be used. However, the documents survived, and became objects of intense scrutiny from a variety of viewpoints. Robins, who testified before Francis in the 1919 hearings, and then again after, produced these documents as proof he had been acting with the Ambassador's approval. Trotsky was shown these documents by Robins three days before he left for renewed negotiations at Brest 5 January. However, Robins missed the import of Judson's recall, and Francis did not, which is perhaps why he hewed so close to his instructions on recognition. (169)

"Yet it was a serious matter that the Soviet authorities should have been permitted to rest under a misapprehension of such gravity at this crucial moment ... It was not the last time such confusion would flow from Robins' ambiguous position and his eagerness to be useful," says Kennan. (170) The authorities in Washington should have clarified what Robins could and could not do, Francis did not help at all in his reliance on this quasi-independent person for so much in terms of interacting with the despised Bolsheviks.

Wilson first offered his 14 Points program, in a long speech to Congress, on 8 January, 1918. The next day, the 9th, Francis cabled the State Department and says, "Robins, who visits Smolny often, says Trotsky enroute Brest addressed four armies who received him cordially and pledged themselves to fight rather than submit to a disgraceful peace. ... Beginning to think separate peace improbable perhaps impossible and inclined to recommend similtaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossacks Province snd Soviet de facto government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity. Understand another government organizing at Archangel and comprising territory equal to England, France and Germany combined. ..." (171) Wilson favored self-determination for all of Russia as one governmental unit, though in the 14 Points, he favored self-determination for much smaller political units. Lansing once suggested that he thought Russia might break into several smaller nations (172), but this never became a policy the U.S. embraced. Wilson never really explains why he takes one stance with Russia, another with Austria-Hungary.

This communique was one of the few waverings of Francis on the subject of recognition. He was ignored by Washington. 9 January also saw the Secretary of State cable Francis, "... President delivered speech to Congress yesterday stating war aims and attitude toward Russia. It was cabled you at once. Have it conveyed unofficially to Trotsky. Report results also of measures taken to circulate it." (173)

Francis was pondering an idea that had much circulation in Allied circles, especially the British, of recognizing everybody. The U.S. government "never warmed" to this idea. it also appears that Francis meant this is as a suggestion, not a formal proposal. Robins tried to send a telegram on the 15th to Thompson saying that these were formal proposals. Francis sat on the telegram and didn't send it. (174) Robins was apparently oblivious as to how much the Embassy, and Francis personally, interfered with his communications back to the United States, or he chose to ignore this behavior without comment.

Also on 9 January, the British Ambassador to Washington sent a momo to Lansing stating that they planned to keep informal exchanges going with the Bolsheviks, though the person of former Consul General (R.H. Bruce) Lockhart, and through the "newly appointed agent of the Bolsheviki in London, M. Litinov. As already explained, the Bitish Government consider it necessary to maintain relations in some way, ... the present system does not entail the recognition of the Trotsky-Lenin government either by the British Government or the Governments of the Allies." (175) This two-track behavior seems almost laughable almost 75 years later, but the decision to not "recognize" but to interact "informally" is a posture the U.S. was to take again, most notably with the People's Republic of China from 1949-72, and with Cuba from 1960 to the present time. So, as it has suited our needs, two-track stances have been a posture our government has embraced without concern for how confusing or hypocritical it might seem.

On the 12th, Francis replied to the Secretary about the Wilson 14 Points speech. "... Robins reports had an interview with Lenin who has wired President's message textually to Trotsky at Brest. Lenin said he approved of the message and thought it potential agency in promoting peace. Lenin also expressed himself as believing war would be resumed and no separate peace effected. ..." (176) Lansing cabled to Francis on the 15th that several governments had recognized Finland - including one of the Allies, France. Then he said France was planning to recognize the Ukraine as an independent state. "This government not disposed as yet to recognize any independent governments until the will of the Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject. The public utterances of the President have definedly clearly the sympathy of the United States for democracy and self-government." (177) It appears clear that no instructions to Francis about Brest-Litovsk, US attendence at those talks. or general recognition were forthcoming at a point a little over two months after the October Revolution.

Francis reported to the Department on 20 January that Allied Ambassadors had held a meeting in Petrograd on whether to stay or not, Francis wanting to stay because he thought leaving would aid the Germans and ensure that Russia would stop fighting. But, he wanted instructions - go or stay? That day also saw a 10 break in the Brest-Litovsk talks, asked for by Germany. (178) Later on that day, Robins met with Trotsky. They talked about recognition, the American Ambassador's feelings about recognition, and Judson's impending departure. Some time after his departure, Judson called "clever" Robins' statement to Trotsky that Judson was going for American assistance in case Brest-Lotovsk talks broke down. (179)

Robins asked to cable, and then did cable Colonel Thompson in New York City 23 January saying "Soviet Government stronger to-day than ever before. ... Cannot too strongly urge importance of prompt recognition of Bolshevik authority and immediate establishment of modus vivendi making possible generous and sympathetic co-operation. ... Sisson approves this text and requests you show this cable to Creel. ..." (180) "Francis agreed, rather unhappily, to this," ... and sent both the cable cited above, and the one he had been holding since the 15th. He indicated in an accompanying message that as Robins was helping him in keeping linked to the Bolsheviks, he couldn't well deny such requests, but he didn't agree with the contents. All he thought he was suggesting was "working relations" with the various de facto governments. (181)

"The Robins-Sisson recommendation of January 23 had no visible effect on the United States government. But whether the same could be said about the Soviet government is doubtful." (182) The differences between Robins and Francis on recognition come through very clear in these messages - what is amazing is that Francis would allow Robins to have such communications privileges without censoring or refusing them, and allowing Robins so much leeway solely on the basis of the linkage he provided to the Bolshevik government.

On 24 January, Trotsky summoned Robins to Smolny, and told him that he's leaving for Brest-Litovsk (183). Robins told this to Francis on the 25th. "Robins, who informed me yesterday morning of Trotsky's hasty departure for Brest, told me 11 last night that Trotsky had sent for him night before to tell him thereof and to ask whether knew what our government would do about his recognition and on receiving negative reply inquired whether Ambassador knew. Robins thought not but would ask. I told him I had no instructions concerning recognition and was satisfied Government would not act other than in concert with Allies. Robins telephoned today that Trotsky had returned, consequently I doubt whether he started; possibly this was scheme to force our hand. " (184) The old gentleman smelled a rat, and realized more clearly than Robins that Trotsky was manipulating a far too believing Robins and trying to force American action by getting Robins to spook Francis.

The Ambassador's canniness was probably correct in this instance. There is no indication that Trotsky left Petrograd at any time between January 23 and 25, or that he ever intended to. Kennan suggests that Trotsky deceived Robins deliberately in hopes of pushing the U.S. into a "hasty gesture of recognition." Trotsky was involved in several struggles internally where "...a promise - or even a semi-promise - of American recognition and assistance would have been a distinct boon to his position." (185)

On 29 January, "...Francis received from Chicherin, a former Tsarist diplomat who was to replace Trotsky as Foreign Affairs Commissar in March and who had returned to Russia earlier in the month, of whose status as a Foreign Office official he had had no previous notification, a handwritten note conveying the astonishing news that the Russian Consul in New York, Mr. Oustinoff, the Tsarist appointee, has been dismissed and Citizen John Reed has appointed Consul of the Russian Republic in New York." (186) As the United States had not recognized the Russian Government at all, an American representing the Russian's interests, especially an American currently residing in Russia, must have been abhorrent to all the diplomatic types in the State Department. Francis felt that way, and so did Washington. In any event, the idea was quickly squelched. (187) Francis wrote to Lansing 31 January "Endeavoring through Robins to get Lenin revoke Reed appointment with fair prospect of success." (188) Reed never filled the post.

The State Department on 1 February, through an Assistant Swecretary of State, in some anxiety, cabled Francis that they'd not heard from him in three days, but they were aware from Morris in Stockholm that Petrograd was isolated, and that they "have been trying to communicate by all possible channels..." (189) The Department was concerned about more data from the Ambassador were he to stay in Petrograd - weekly reports from the naval, military and commercial people, "also information from such other sources as you find available, which you can compound into a single brief cable report with background of your own views. Department believes this will enable you to supplement your valuable daily telegrams by weekly resume of situation which will be additionally helpful, the reports to be sent every Friday." (190)

It appears that the Assistant Secretary of State was speaking as bureaucrat, not a practical diplomat, and he appears to assume that Francis had all the time in the world to fill out such detailed reports. Francis responded, in part, to the telegram of 1 February on the 4th, "Your telegrams coming through regularly, consequently cannot account for the delays in mine. Not aware Petrograd communication with Europe severed until messages from Vladivistok. Archangel, London. Perhaps Soviet using this additional lever for recognition. Has given notice through official organ that missions of governments where Russia has deposits cannot procure funds until such governments recognize right of Soviet government to draw Russian funds deposited in those countries." (191)

On 8 February, Francis sent an intriguing telegram to the State Department. " ... consequently ask no change in Department's policy, certainly not before Brest negotiations are ended. Have absolutely reliable eveidence (the Samenev papers? He doesn't say, but Francis had seen the first of these from Sisson on the 5th) that Lenin, Trotsky accepted German money from June to October professedly for peace propaganda and army demoralization but I have not shown to Robins as might impair his effectiveness by weakening his implicit confidence in their sincerity. ... Still think that Soviet recognition would be a mistake for if separate peace concluded it would be much less binding upon Russian people and much less satisfactory to Germany without our previous recognition." (192)

What is intriguing is that Francis was apparently, and with quite a bit of justification, much more clear-eyed about Robins than the other way around. He clearly believed that Robins was totally enthralled with the Bolshevik government to the point of not being able to view it objectively. To some degree, it appeared that his belief had substance, though Francis was as pigheaded about non-recognition as was Robins on recognition's behalf. The two men had a fair amount of respect for each other, though it seems from the record that Francis was much more cautious about Robins than Robins realized.

Robins was often abrasive and strong-willed. He battled with Edgar Sisson, the representitive of the Committee on Public Information, as Sisson began accumulating a large number of documents, purportedly from Smolny, that reportedly indicated that the high Bolsheviks were in league with the German General Staff. "As Sisson's enthusiasm for the documents increased, together with the depth of his personal committment to the thesis of their authenticity, his suspicion of the Soviet leaders became highly inflamed. Robins, on the other hand, was utterly incredulous of the authenticity of the documents. ... " Robins continued to believe that treating the Bolsheviks fairly was the better course, and that to buy into the "dubious documents" offered by Eugene Semenev was to play the German game. (193) In this belief, it appears that Robins was much more level-headed about the Semenev "evidence" than either Sisson or Francis. To Francis' credit, he began to doubt the Semenev evidence not long after it first appeared. Sisson could, or would, not abandon the position he had taken on that material, and he continued even after the war to believe it true. (194)

On 7 February, Sisson attempted to have a meeting with Robins about the documents. Reportedly, Robins walked out of the meeting "abruptly." He apologized the next day, but refused to renew the discussion. "The incident had affected him deeply." He felt the issue at hand a "final showdown of power and faith..." (195) Russia repudiated its foreign debts on 8 February, and formally removed itself from the war 10 February. (196) Trotsky broke off the talks at Brest-Litovsk that same day. On the 11th, while discussing this development, Robins and Sisson quarreled again. The following morning they ate breakfast together without a word. "From the moment when that silent breakfast party disbanded, Robins and Sisson never spoke to each other again, either in Petrograd or anywhere else." (197)

On 12 February, Robins made a dramatic speech at Bruce Lockhart's house-warming, one of the first British people there to give his ideas credence, a story repeated by Kennan from Lockhart's book, British Agent. "Lockhart has left us a brilliant word-picture of Robins as he appeared at that luncheon party, three or four hours after his last breakfast with Sisson. Despite its length, this passage is too striking and illuminating not to be included:

During luncheon Robins spoke little, but afterwards, when we were assembled in the smoking room, his tongue was loosened. Standing by the mantelpiece, his black hair smoothed back with characteristic gesture, He made a moving appeal for Allied support of the Bolsheviks. He began quietly, analyzing the various Allied arguments against recognition and demolishing the ridiculous Allied theory that the Bolsheviks were working for a Germany victory. He drew a touching picture of a helpless people facing with courage and without arms the greatest military machine in history. We had nothing to hope from the demoralised Russian bourgeoisie, who were actually relying on German aid for the restoration of their rights and property. Then he began his eulogy of Trotsky. The Red Leader was a "four kind son of a bitch, but the greatest Jew since Christ. If the German General Staff bought Trotsky, they bought a lemon." As he worked up to his peroration, he became almost indignant over the folly of the Allies in `playing the German game in Russia.' Then he stopped dramatically and took a piece of paper from the flap pocket of his uniform. I can see him now. Consciously or not, he had provided himself with an almost perfect setting. Before him a semicircle of stolid Englishmen. Behind him the roaring log-fire, its tongues of flames reflected in wierd shadows on the yellow-papered walls. Outside, through the window, the glorious view of the slender spire of Peter and Paul with the great fire-ball of the setting sun casting rays of blood on the snow-clad waters of the Neva. Once again he pushed his hair back with his hand and shook his head like a lion. "Have any of you read this?" he asked. "I found it this morning in one of your newspapers." Then in a low voice, quivering with emotion, he read Major McCrae's poem:

We are the Dead. Short days ago We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow Loved and were loved, and now we lie In Flanders Fields. Take up our quarrel with the foe: To you from failing hands we throw The Torch; be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die We shall not sleep, though Poppies grow In Flanders Fields.

When he had finished, there was an almost deathly silence. For what seemed an eternity Robins himself turned away and looked out the window. When, squaring his shoulders, he came back at us. "Boys!" he said. "I guess we're all here for one purpose - to see that the German General Staff doesn't win this war."

Three quick strides, and he was by my side. He wrung my hand. "Good-bye, Lockhart." he said. Four more strides, and he was gone.

As a dramatic performance Robins' effort was immense. Today, it sounds like emotional hysteria. Doubtless, too, he had rehearsed all his effects before his shaving glass in the morning. But at the moment his words made a deep impression on every one who heard him. There was not a laugh or a smile." (198)

On the following day, Robins met with Lenin about the possibility of getting aid from the Americans for the Soviets. (199) On 14 February, the Gregorian calender was adopted in Russia. (200) On the 15th, Robins cabled Thompson in New York with a long analysis of the current situation, urging "Great values for Allied cause in resulting situation dependend on continuance of Bolshevik authority as long as possible." He stressed the greatest danger to the Allied cause might be trade relations between the Germans and the Bolsheviks, and that if a wedge could be shoved between Russia and Germany, "Revolutionary Russia ... will naturally turn to United States for commodities and supplies of non-military character ... (201).

"From the 15th of February, things moved, for the American Embassy in Petrograd, to a rapid and drastic conclusion." The next day, it was rumored that the Germans were about to renew hostilities. This news filtered slowly throughout Petrograd, but by the 18th many in Petrograd were aware that hostilities might resume very soon. Francis wasn't sure escape through Finland was possible, "nor was it certain that it was desirable for the Allied representitives to leave Russia entirely." (202) "(Captain Jacques) Sadoul and Robins had met occasionally with Lenin, Trotsky and the other Communist leaders after the Bolshevik coup. These contacts multiplied in the second half of February, 1918, during the interval between the Bolshevik acceptance of the German ultimatum (February 17) and the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty (March 14)." (203) It appears from a variety of sources that Robins had frequent, not "occasional," contact with the Bolshevik government from its birth to the point he left the country in May, 1918. Escape or departure became an ongoing theme in Francis' correspondence from this point until he left Russia in Movember.

Francis cabled Lansing on 20 February that the Soviet government was "demoralized," and on the verge of fleeing. He reported the German army near, and that they could be in control of Petrograd in 2 days. He said he planned to go "eastward" if he left, but "all arrangements indefinite." He planned to leave U.S. interests in the hands of the Norwegian Ambassador. (204)

By 21 February, the five Allied Ambassadors met in Petrograd, and "agreed they had no choice but to prepare for departure from Petrograd on short notice." (205) Later that day, Francis cabled Washington, suggesting the Soviets were in slightly chaotic shape, and that while Lenin and Trotsky may "not have been Germany's agents continuously," that their actions had been of great help to the Germans. "Last revolution has materially set back the cause of democracy in Europe and if the Allies cannot prevent will result in making Russia virtually German province of monarchial reform. History shows the Russians incapable of great movements or great achievements as whatever creditable that has been accomplished can be traced to foreign inspiration and leadership. Now is the time for the Allies to act. ..." The plucky old man then suggested that transport at Harbin (China) be held "until my arrival" but that he wan't coming until ordered to. He said "Planning to stop en route Vologda and another place if safe; awaiting developments Harbin or Vladivistok where I shall advise Department of conditions and get instructions. Unwilling to absolutely abandon Russia to Germans." (206)

Francis was strongly backed in this stance by many other Americans, especially those who had Russian friends beginning to worry about their lives. He also thought his presence in Russia might serve as a deterrant to the Germans shifting troops on the Eastern Front to the West. "Thus Francis decided not to leave Russia entirely unless actually forced out by physical compulsion." He chose Volgda because it was at a junction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Moscow-Archangel railroad, and 350 miles more distant from the Germans. He had a series of fallback positions beyond that planned. Robins testified in 1919 that Vologda was close to transport routes and communication links, and out of the possible route of a German military sweep. "Robins further related he went to Lenin and obtained the latter's agreement to make railway accomodations available for the official party." (207)

>From the 22nd to the 24th, the German advances against Moscow and Petrograd continued. Francis cabled Washington on the 24th, and tells them that "Japanses, Chinese and American missions sending special train with some of their nationals and portions of their staffs to Vologda today to await orders." The following day, the Secretary of State cabled the US Ambassador in Sweden to let Francis know that the Department was "relying on your judgement" and to destroy or burn all "seals, codes, cipher messages or translations." (208)

On 23 February, Francis wrote his son Charles that he planned to stay in Russia as long as he could. He said he would help any resistance force to the Germans he could, and that he was headed toward Vladivistok. "You may not conclude, therefore, that I am planning to return to America." (209) He, in fact, did not leave until 6 November.

On 24 February, Lenin issued a statement published the following day in Pravda. "In accordance with the decision adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet' of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies at 4:30 a.m. on February 24, the council of People's Commissars has resolved that the terms of peace proposed by the German Government be accepted and a delegation sent to Brest-Litovsk." (210)

Kennan described the dramatic departure of the Americans from Petrograd in better detail than any other source. "On February 25, ... Francis wrote a letter ... gives a good idea of the mood of the moment. He had outwaited the French and the British, he indicated, because as doyen of the diplomatic corps he did not want to be the first to leave. The Soviet government, he thought, was doomed. He was proud, now, that he had never recommended recognition. ... The next morning (Tuesday, the 26th) it was decided that departure could be delayed no longer. ... By evening all was ready. ... Thus the Ambassador made his departure in the sleigh, behind the horses with the American flags at their ears. ... The sleigh, ... moved off briskly and quietly down the darkened streets ... and to the Nikolayev Station. ... Another hitch occurred at the last moment. ... Robins, always the last recourse in emergency, was summoned to the rescue. " So Robins visited Lenin, and after some dramatic persuading on Robins' part, "Lenin yielded. Robins tore back to the station and, to make sure that nothing more went wrong, changed his plans and boarded the train himself. At two a.m. on Wednesday, February 27, 1918, the special train bearing Ambassador David R. Francis, his reduced staff, and a few of his diplomatic colleagues, pulled out of the Nikolayev Station, southbound ... A few miles out of town, the train took a switch to the east ..." (211). Francis himself was more direct about it. "I left Petrograd on the morning of February 27th, and arrived in Volgda about twenty-six hours later. ... I lived nearly a week on the train, ... After being in Vologda two days, I cabled the Department I had concluded to remain as long as it was safe." (212)

Robins and Lenin corresponded on the 28th, while Robins was still at Vologda. Robins' cabled, "Train of American Ambassador Francis arrived Vologda. All well. Express gratitude Council People's Commissaires for co-operation. What is the situation in Petrograd? What is the last news of German offensive? Was peace signed? Did the French and British Embassies leave? When and by what route? Tell about our arrival, Lockhart, British Embassy." Lenin replied in his usual terse manner, "Peace not signed. Situation without change. Rest will be answered by Petroff, Department of Foreign Affairs. Lenin" (213)

Francis sent Military Attache Colonel Ruggles and his assistant Captain Riggs on 5 March instructing them to confer with their equal numbers on the Soviet side about resisting the Germans. "Upon their arrival, Ruggles and Riggs found that their task had been largely accomplished by Robins." He had spoken with Trotsky the morning of 5 March and by that afternoon Trotsky produced a document. Together, ..., they repaired to Lenin's office and joined him in his frugal afternoon repast. The document was translated, and its terms explained, for Robins' benefit. Not only did it satisfy him, but he accepted it as a statement of highest significance." He showed it to Lockhart, and sent a copy to Francis. (214) While that was being done, Robins met with Charles Smith of AP, who, according to Hard, cabled AP the 6th and said, "Whether Moscow Congress approves or rejects peace apparently depends largely on attitude of Entente Allies toward Soviet Government." (215) In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Robins said he had also sent copies via an English reporter and Lockhart. (216)

The document Trotsky gave Robins was a series of questions to be transmitted to the US government relating to Brest-Litovsk; "In case (a) the all-Russian congress of the Soviets will refuse to ratify the peace treaty with Germany, or (b) if the German government, breaking the peace treaty, will renew the offensive in order to continue its robber's raid, or (c) if the Soviet government will be forced by the actions of Germany to renounce the peace treaty - before or after its ratification - and to renew hostilities -

In all these cases it is very important for the military and political plans of the Soviet power for replies to be given to the following questions:

1. Can the Soviet government rely on the support of the united States of North America, Great Britain and France in its struggle against Germany? 2. What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future, and on what conditions - military equipment, transportation supplies, living necessities? 3. What kind of support would be furnished particularly and especially by the United States?

Should Japan - in consequence of an open or tacit understanding with Germany or without such an understanding - attempt to seize Vladivistok and the Eastern-Siberian Railway, which would threaten to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean and would greatly impede the concentration of Soviet troops toward the East about the Urals - in such case what steps would be taken by the other allies, particularly and especially by the United States, to prevent a Japanese landing on our far East, and to insure uninterrupted communications with Russia through the Siberian route?

In the opinion of the Government of the United States, to what extent - under the above-mentioned circumstances - would aid be assured from Great Britain through Murmansk and Archangel? What steps would the Government of Great Britain undertake in order to assure this aid and thereby to undermine the foundation of the rumors of the hostile plans against Russia on the part of Great Britain in the nearest future?

All these questions are conditioned with the self-understood assumption that the internal and Foreign policies of the Soviet government will continue to be directed in accord with the principles of international socialism and that the Soviet government retains its complete independence of all non-socialist governments." (217) This document was given to Robins one week before the scheduled opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was to vote on the acceptance of the German terms offered at Brest-Litovsk. It proceeded to have a various curious life after being produced.

The document became of great importance to Robins, and he thought if the Allies accepted it, that ratifying Brest-Litovsk wouldn't be necessary. The message was sent to Francis, by military code. Riggs and Ruggles had the code books. The message was encoded to be sent to Washington on the 6th, after enormous problems. "The message was evidently held, however, for clearance with Ruggles. Ruggles must have decided, for some reason, not to dispatch it at that time." In any case, the records indicate he did not actually dispatch the message containing Trotsky's suggestions until March 22... Not only did Ruggles hold up dispatch of this message, but he failed to inform either ... Robins, or the Ambassador that he had done so. Robins thus remained under the impression that Trotsky's inquiry had gone forward to Washington. ..." On the 6th or 7th, "Robins went to see Lenin again and pleaded for a delay in the ratification of the treaty, in order to give him time to get an answer from the United States Government to Trotsky's questions." (218) A delay in the treaty's ratification did occur, though it appears unlikely that delay was related to Robins' plea.

"He added that the day after he saw Lenin, either the 7th or 8th, Izvestiya announced the opening date of the Congress (that was to ratify the treaty) had been postponed from the 12th to the 14th at lLenin's instance. He "thought" that the reason for postponement "was to give us time to answer." This assumption gained considerable historical currency, and has been frequently - and not unnaturally - accepted as valid." Kennan suggests at great length that the timing was coincidental, that Lenin was in favor of ratifying Brest-Litovsk all along, and that Robins believed, in error, that this message of Trotsky's might actually entice Washington into aiding the Bolshevik government. (219) The evidence does appear that Robins thought he had more weight with the Bolsheviks than he actually did.

Col. Robins met with Ambassador Francis at Vologda and he and a consul unidentified went back to "St. Petersburg" on 9 March, Francis cabled the Secretary of State. "I still believe Lenin, Trotsky accepted German money to corrupt and demoralize Russia ... " (220) That same day, Hard reports that "Robins carried Trotzky's message to Vologda personally. He got there on the night of March 8th. On the morning of the 9th the American ambassador sent Trotzky's message to Washington in the code of the State Department." Hard also asserts a copy was sent to the War Department. (221) Kennan says, in a footnote, "Hard, op. cit., p.144, says Francis did wire the text of Trotsky's questions to Washington on the morning of the 9th. I can find no confirmation of this in the National Archives." (222) No other evidence appears to indicate that the "questions" posed by Trotsky reached senior American hands prior to the Brest-Litovsk ratification by the Soviet Congress. Albert Rhys Williams indicates that though he wasn't aware of the "Soviet query" until later, "presumably meant for Wilson himself - or of its delays and amputations in arriving, of which Robins himself was then unaware." (223)

Williams went on to say, " The fate of Robins' reports once they finally reached Washington was another question." A reporter from a Phildelphia newspaper, Lincoln Colcord, later sent Robins' extracts from his journal of March, 1918, "to show that State Department and other officials who should have known knew nothing of the Lenin-Trotsky query. The reporter is quoted by Williams from a confidential letter he sent Robins 5 February, 1919. "The first news we had of it (the query) was when you arrived in the early summer. >From all this, I think it fair to assume that Polk [Frank Polk, Acting Secretary of State at the time Wilson sent the message to the Soviet Congress] knew nothing of this communication, and I shall always believe that the President did not see it. I think it went to Lansing and was pigeon-holed. As you know, Colonel House admitted to me on the 9th of August, a week after intervention had gone through, that he had never seen or heard of this communication before." Colcord also said about William Bullitt, later Ambassador to Russia in the Thirties and then a State Department aide, "Bullitt, who pretty much everything that came into the Department ... had no knowledge of the communication. " (224) The Lansing Papers in Foreign Relations, 1914-20, and his War Memoirs say nothing about this communication.

Francis sent another message to the State Department that one source says was sent 9 March, another dates it as 10 March "Robins arrived midnight reports that from Petrograd after important conference with Trotsky on 5th he wired me in Military Mission cipher result of the conference but Military Attache had left for Petrograd as you were advised, with code, consequently did not learn of conference until Robins arrived hour ago. " He goes on to say that the Petrograd, St. Petersburg and Moscow Soviets have all voted in favor of ratifying Brest Litovsk. (225)

The Congress was postponed, though exactly when and why remains slightly unclear. The postponement was only for a couple of days from the originally planned date. The Germans had said the treaty had 14 days to be ratified from the date they offered terms, 3 March. The original date was set 5 March. "But it was then decided to move the government to Moscow prior to the holding of the Congress. That meant a great deal had to be done in a short space of time. Most members of the Soviet of People's Commissars, including Lenin himself, proceeded to Moscow on Monday, March 11, which was plainly the earliest they could get away. ... This was presumably the reason for the postponement from the 12th to the 14th." (226)

Kennan goes on to say that neither Izvestia or Pravda had a notice about the postponement, and that Consul General Summers did not wire the State Department about the conference's postponement until 11 March. "Thus the known circumstances do not bear out in any way Robins' impression that a decision was taken March 6 or 7 to postpone the conference in order to give the United States government time to answer Trotsky's questions. One can only conclude that here again either he was the victim of the sort of misinformation that so frequently dogged his path during the months of his activity in Russia, or his memory failed him, or both." (227) A third possibility not suggested by Kennan is that Robins wanted so badly to believe what he was doing had value, and that he sincerely believed that the ratification had been halted because of the US plea.

"On arrival in Moscow, Robins was, as will be recalled, still under the impression that Trotsky's questions were being carefully pondered in Washington. He had tea with Lenin and his sister the day the Congress opened (the 14th). He found Lenin preparing to submit a resolution for ratification. ... Lenin asked what Robins had heard from his government. The answer was "Nothing." Robins, in his testimony to the Senate subcommittee in 1919 said that Lenin said, "You will not either. Neither the American government nor any of the allied governments will cooperate, even against the Germans, with the workman's and peasant's revolutionary government of Russia." (228) Lenin, as was often the case, was quite accurate in this assessment, both Robins and Francis never paid enough attention to what he said.

"Robins clung, though, to his one last hope. Lenin and Trotzky had written that memorandum. He awaited, they awaited, in Moscow, the reply from London, from Paris, from Washington." (229) They waited in vain. No such communication ever came, for it appears that Washington didn't even have the questions to respond to had they been inclined.

The Fourth All-Russian Congress met from 14-16 March, in Moscow, and Lenin argued in favor of ratification. Kennan and Hard both describe the scene, with only the slightest of variations from Robins' testimony before the Senate subcommitte hearings on Bolshevik Propaganda in 1919, "About an hour before midnight on the second night of the conference Lenin was sitting on the platform; I was sitting on a step of the platform, and I looked around at this man, and he motioned to me. I went to him. He said, "What have you heard from your government?" I said, "Nothing." I said, "What has Lockhart heard?" (Hard has Lenin asking this question) He said, "Nothing." He said, "I'm now going to the platform and the peace will be ratified." (230)

Kennan indicates how important Robins thought the Trotsky message had been, but Robins had misread how much weight the US government would give those questions. "These words conveyed, of course, the suggestion that had Robins been able to tell Lenin, at that moment, that his government responded favorably to Trotsky's questions, the treaty might never have been ratified. Robins was surely sincere in his belief that this was so, and he must have left the steps of the platform sick with disappointment at the inexplicable silence of his government." ... "It became one more stone in the structure of belief that the United States government, swayed by the fear and prejudice of American capitalists, had rejected the hand of friendship proffered by the Soviet leaders in the days of Brest Litovsk and had thus needlessly estranged them in the early days of their power, when they desperately needed sympathy and support." (231)

On 16 March, Brest-Litovsk is "duly ratified" by the Fourth Special All-Russian Congress of the Soviets (232) "The count was had: Not Voting, 204. Voting against ratification, 276. Voting in favor of ratification, 724. ... Robins sat still on the steps of the platform. The count was cried through the house. ... It was the decision of the most innovating and upsetting of all peoples in the world. From them, through him, a question had gone to Washington, and an offer, begging a response. No response came to him then. No response came to him any time afterward. " (233) His expectation and belief that Washington would respond perhaps indicates the level of his idealism and lack of common political sense. There is an indication that Robins first learned of the delays that August after he had returned to the United States. (234)

That same day, Francis cabled Robins in Moscow, asking about the results of the Congress. Robins reported that ratification had not yet occurred (before the vote). On the 17th, Robins reported the Congress "finally adjourned," and that Trotsky was to "open his office as war minister here tomorrow." He made no comment about his reaction to the result of the vote. (235)

Francis also issued a statement on the 16th with his reaction to the ratification vote, in a scattered kind of way. "I shall not leave Russia until forced to depart. My government and the American people are too deeply interested in the welfare of the Russian people to abandon the country and leave its people to the mercies of Germany." America is sincerely interested in Russia, and in the freedom of the Russian people. ... I have not yet seen an authentic copy of the peace treaty but am sufficiently acquainted with its provisions to know that if the Russian people submit thereto Russia will not only be robbed of ... but will eventually become virtually a German province and her people will lose the liberties ... My Government still considers America an ally of the Russian people... About four days after this appeared, Keuhlman, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a demand of the Bolshevik Government that I be sent out Russia. The German demand said: He is not only violating the laws of neutrality, but he has issued an address to the Russian people which is a virtual call to arms." Keuhlman's assessment is pretty close to what Francis was actually doing. Amazingly, the Bolsheviks did not expel Francis for this action. Francis then reported, "At this time cable communication with my Government was severed; it had become very unreliable and irregular since the Bolsheviks came into power. " (236)

Francis relied on Robins for a variety of things; on 20 March, he cabled Washington that he had directed Robins, at Trotsky's request, to send an American military officer out to Siberia to see what really was going on, in the face of garbled and conflicting reports on what was happening there. Robins sent someone from the Red Cross staff. On 26 March, Francis cabled the State Department that "documents in such a consecutive way as to convince me that Soviet leaders accepted German money to demoralize Russian Army ... Robins says absurd that Soviet working with Germans, but Sisson and Bullard convinced, are positive. Probably Sisson and Robins both influenced by pride of opinion and mutual animosity. I follow developments closely communicating with Summers and Robins daily, who also differ greatly." (237) This debate about the Bolsheviks being on the German payroll went on between Robins and Francis from the beginning to the end of their association, and was never resolved to either's satisfaction.

A bit of these differences appeared in a cable sent by Robins on the 23rd from Moscow to Francis at Vologda. "Regarding Consul Summers' reports it must be remembered that he considers all work of and cooperation with the Soviet government as unpromising. ... While he is an able businessman and delightful gentleman perhaps the opinion of the American, French, English and Italian officers who are now co-operating with Trotzki is of more value ..." (238). It appears that everyone, including Stalin, misunderstood Trotsky. Summers was quite pessimistic about the Bolsheviks in the months before his death. Francis never cottoned to them, and only met Lenin once, Trotsky never. Robins thought they were the wave of the future, and may have been the most correct in thinking the US, and others, were making a serious mistake in withholding support for the fledgling government.

Francis forwarded a cable from the head of Red Cross, Davison, to Robins, sent by Davison 21 March, forwarded 25 March; "... As to your movements am not informed. Assuming no personal risk involved, it is important that you remain in Russia in the interest of the Red Cross work which is to be done there. " (239) Francis cabled Robins 30 March, "We have had no commercial treaty with Russia since 1912 but that not interfering with commercial transactions ... " (240).

Throughout April, the question of intervention loomed large in the considerations of all parties, a debate that went on after Robins left in May, and was acted on from the summer of 1918 to the summer of 1920. (241) That debate resulted in a limited intervention later on by US and other Allied forces.

On 22 April, Robins cables Francis from Moscow, "It is possible that I shall leave for a few days from Petrograd and shortly thereafter be in Vologda. ... Wardwell (a Red Cross employee) reports all well in Petrograd and that our Red Cross work will be finished by first of May in that city." That same day, Francis replied in part, "Do not feel I should be justified in asking you to remain longer in Moscow to neglect prosecution of your Red Cross work, but this does not imply any want of appreciation of the sevice you have rendered me in keeping me advised concerning matters important for me to know, ... as well as being a channel of unofficial communications with the Soviet government." (242)

On 3 May, Francis cabled Robins, mostly reacting to the Bolshevik severing of telegraphic communciations save by their government. At the end of that message, Francis says, "There are many things which I would like to talk to you about. You are correct in thinking that I was not at all disturbed by the newspaper surmise that I was to be succeeded by yourself, not that I think such suggestion absurd but I did not for a moment feel that you were a party to such a move." The next day, Robins cabled back, "Orders issued restoring cipher rights allied embassies." (243) There appears to be no specific evidence that Robins lusted after the Ambassadorship, but he does appear to have thought he was a free agent with a great deal of power. Francis, unfortunately, did little to disabuse him of this notion.

On 13 May, Robins cabled Francis he was enroute to Volgda on his way to the U.S. "On the 15th of May I saw Colonel Robins who was on his way to the United States. .... After our conversation, Robins told ... that if he could get one hour with President Wilson he would persuade the President to recognize the Bolshevik government." (244) Also in May, DeWitt C. Poole arrived as Acting Consul General, replacing Madden Summers who had died early in the month. (245) In mid-May, Robins left Russia. If Robins got the hour with Wilson, and it does not appear he did, he probably would not have swayed Wilson to change course. Francis would have had trouble getting much of Wilson's time, so it would appear that Robins would have had almost no chance to express his views to the President.

Francis hung on until November, and he left via Archangel and was in Britain in time for Christmas, 1918, had surgery in England 4 January, 1919 and returned to the United States in February. "I left Paris on the special train with the President on the evening of February 14. ... In a note to the President, I said to him I awaited his pleasure for an audience. The President did not reply in writing, but two or three days later came to the cabin I was occupying. I outlined my recommendation about Russia to him. He replied sending American soldiers to Russia after the armistice had been signed would be very unpopular in America. I ventured to differ with him: ... I never broached the subject again to the President and did not see him after landing in Boston until his term expired, except for a moment when he arrived in New York from Paris July 8, 1919." (DF, 307-310).

CONCLUSIONS-

George Marye went to Russia ill-equipped, totally untrained, with a political/comercial goal as his immediate agenda. He was a society-orientated person, and spent much time cultivating the imperial court. There is no specific evidence to indicate that he in any way succeeded in convincing the Russians to write a new treaty to replace the abrogated treaty of 1832. He left abruptly in the spring of 1916, and fades from the record with no articles or comments about his time there until his 1929 book came out.

Raymond Robins came to Russia in the tulmultuous year of the Russian Revolutions, the fall of the monarchy and the death of the Romanov line, immersed himself in the affairs of the new fledging state. He had extraordinary access to Lenin and Trotsky, and was probably used the best he could be by Ambassador Francis in the absence of official American recognition. Yet he was impressionable, easily misled, highly opinionated on behalf of the Bolsheviks, and made many errors in judgement, though perhaps not in his quarrel with Sisson as much as in his belief that the United States would respond to Trotsky's "questions" of early March, 1918.

No one told him to go. His biographer in 1920 was amazed that Robins got from Petrograd to Vladivistok on the sheer authority of a note from Lenin giving Robins clearance to leave the country. He left, leaving behind but a skeleton crew of Red Cross people, with the apparent hope that when he got home, he could persuade the powers that be that America should recognize the Soviet government. He failed utterly to prevail in that persuasion. The United States did not recognize the Soviets until 1933.

David Francis was an old man by the standards of the time when he went to Russia in 1916. Yet, though he took a narrow view, and eventually and continuously opposed the Bolsheviks and favored Allied intervention into Russia's affairs, he did attempt to be and was a vigorous, if ineffectual voice, in the events surrounding the two Revolutions.

He was ill-equipped to his task, often at odds with those aiding him, yet he acquitted himself as he saw his duty to be, following what he perceived to be what his superiors in Washington wanted. He eventually left on 6 November, 1918, from Archangel, where he had gone from Vologda on 26 July, 1918. (247)

All three men were poorly equipped for their roles in terms of background knowledge, grasp of the Russian language or diplomatic niceties, which were apparently minimal in all three cases, and were not really controllable by their "superiors," save in instructions that might or, more probably, might not be feasible in the atmosphere of government enshrouding Russia during 1914-18. Only Robins of the three could be considered an activist, in a semi-adversarial, semi-cooperative fashion with Ambassador Francis and his underlings some of whom, like Summers and Sisson, resented Robins' role a great deal. None were able to serve the interests of the US completely, because Washington was, at first, of mixed minds about the Revolution, and was not at all sure what its interests were. Kerensky was supportable by Washington, the Bolsheviks became anathema.

The big issue that Francis and Robins came down on opposite sides about was the recognition of the Bolshevik government by the United States and other powers. Francis went along with Washington - no recognition, apparently because the ideology of the Bolsheviks was abhorrent to the capitalist-leaning Americans. Robins, a Progressive at home, seemed to believe that the Bolsheviks represented the future, were accepted by the people of Russia as legitimate, and should be recognized. The view of Francis and Washington prevailed.

Francis hung on at Vologda from February to July. Robins left in June. Francis then went on to Archangel, but he left in the late fall of 1918, as did all the other Allied contigents, and US involvement or understanding ceased occurring for some fifteen years as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

Marye returned to banking, wrote his book, died in 1933.

Robins lived to 1954. He testified about his role in 1919, returned to Russia in 1933 after recognition finally occurred, and lived out his days in quiet obscurity. (248)

Francis remained "nominal American Ambassador to Russia" until he submitted his resignation in March, 1921, and it was accepted by Warren Harding in May of that year. (249) He died in January, 1927. (250)

END NOTES

__________

1) George Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ, 1956), 32-33.
2) Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and U.S. Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1986 (Washington, 1986), 97.
3) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 34.
4) Rachel West, The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens, Ga., 1978), 105.
5) George Marye, Russia Observed: Nearing the End in Imperial Russia (Philadelphia, 1929), 17-18.
6) Ibid., 20.
7) Ibid., 15, 19-22.
8) West, The Department of State,., 105-106.
9) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 34.
10) Marye, Russia Observed, 460. Marye, Kennan nor any source available ever go beyond the comments Marye makes as to what Marye's "political combinations" were all about, or how they were resolved.
11) Ibid., 86.
12) Ibid., 84-85.
13) Ibid., 100-01.
14) Robert K. Massie. Nicholas and Alexandra, (New York, 1967), 350.
15) Marye, Russia Observed, 100-01.
16) Ibid., 132-34.
17) Ibid., 137-40.
18) E.M. Almedingen, The Romanovs, Three Centuries of An Ill-Fated Dynasty (New York, 1966), 298; W. Bruce Lincoln, In War's Dark Shadow, The Russians Before the Great War (New York, 1983), 331; W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs, Autocrats of All the Russias (New York, 1981), 641.
19) Marye, Russia Observed, 150-51.
20) Ibid., 148.
21) Ibid., 157.
22) Ibid., 169-72.
23) Ibid., 185.
24) Ibid., 190-92.
25) Ibid., 212-14.
26) David R. Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, April, 1916 - November, 1918 (New York, 1921), 42.
27) Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, , 162-63.
28) Marye, Russia Observed, 224-30.
29) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 185; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, 239. Francis' fellow Ambassador in Sweden, Ira Morris, also believed corruption in the Russian Army was rampant.
30) Marye, Russia Observed, 231-32.
31) Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, , 315-21.
32) Marye, Russia Observed, 238-43.
33) Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, , 220.
34) Marye, Russia Observed, 247-55.
35) Ibid., 273.
36) Ibid., 306.
37) Ibid., 312-16.
38) Ibid., 346-49.
39) Ibid., 357-60.
40) Ibid., 360-62.
41) Ibid., 444-50.
42) Lincoln, The Romanovs,, 665.
43) Marye, Russia Observed, 453-56.
44) Ibid., 459-63.
45) Ibid., 459-70; Department of State, Principal Officers, 97.
46) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 3.
47) Ibid., 12-18.
48) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 35.
49) Ibid., 36, 38.
50) Ibid., 38.
51) Ibid., 38-40.
52) Ibid., 40-41.
53) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 28-29.
54) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 33.
55) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 4-29.
56) Ibid., 35.
57) Ibid., 42-47; Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, , 368-81; Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990), 262-67; Rene Fulop-Miller, Rasputin, the Holy Devil (Leipzig, 1927), 320-68; Victor Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution (France, 1930), 48.
58) Fulop-Miller, Rasputin,, 341.
59) Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1958), 283-85; Bernard Pares, A History of Russia (New York, 1926); Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, 512-16; Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 745-88; Serge, Year One, 275-79.
60) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 47-51.
61) G.K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit, Russian-American Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920, Documents and Papers (New York, 1920), 6.
62) "Tattler" in Nation, (4/17/19), 469.
63) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , vol. 1, 131-53.
64) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, 19-20.
65) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , vol. 1, 144.
66) Ibid., 163-64.
67) Ibid., 370-380; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on Bolshevik Propaganda, 2/10-3/10/19, Senate Document #62, 66th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1919), 935-85, 1125-1158.
68) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , vol. 1, 165.
69) Ibid., 164-68.
70) Christopher Dobson and John Miller, The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow, The Allied War in Russia, 1918-20 (New York, 1986), 30.
71) Jesse Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York, 1961), 802-03.
72) Dobson and Miller, The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow , 30-31.
73) Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 763.
74) William Hard, Raymond Robin's Own Story (New York, 1920), 13.
75) Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 589-90; anonymous commentary column in "Outlook," (3/19/19); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 857-96.
76) Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 589-90; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 763-856, 1007-32.
77) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 62-63; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1007-32.
78) Ronald W. Clark, Lenin, A Biography (New York, 1988), 292, 452.
79) Hard, Raymond Robins , 5.
80) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 63.
81) Hard, Raymond Robins , 7.
82) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 64-65.
83) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 185; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1007-32.
84) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , vol. 1, 174-77.
85) Ibid., 188-89.
86) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 144.
87) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 177.
88) Albert Busnell Hart, ed. Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1918), 244-51; Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,68-74.
89) Hart, Selected Addresses, 248-49.
90) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 178-81.
91) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 24-25.
92) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 189.
93) Hard, Raymond Robins , 16.
94) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 156-57.
95) Ibid., 164.
96) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 198.
97) Ibid., 202-03.
98) Ibid., 204-05.
99) Ibid., 214.
100) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 224-25; F. W. Dupee, ed. Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1932), 336-477; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 71-74; Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, 234-57; Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 439-505; Serge, Year One, 68-75; John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (New York, 1919), 88-163.
101) Reed, Ten Days ,97.
102) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, 226-28.
103) Ibid., 226-27.
104) Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 491.
105) Dupee/Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, 380-81.
106) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 72-73.
107) Reed, Ten Days ,125-26.
108) Charles Johnston, "Russia's Two Revolutions," American Review of Reviews (January, 1918), 59-62.
109) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 243.
110) Ibid., 238-39.
111) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,44-46.
112) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 244.
113) Ibid., 245.
114) Ibid., 248.
115) Ibid., 264.
116) Ibid., 267.
117) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 193-94.
118) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,47.
119) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 250.
120) Ibid., 251-52.
121) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 152-53.
122) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,51.
123) Foreign Relations, 1918, vol.1, 272.
124) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 154.
125) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 276.
126) Ibid., 254; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 154.
127) Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, 1935), 339-342.
128) Ibid., 343-45.
129) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 158.
130) Ibid., 159.
131) Izvestia, 12/2/17, in Cumming and Pettit, 55; Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, 282-83.
132) Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918, vol.1, 282-83.
133) Hard, Raymond Robins , 70-71.
134) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 286.
135) Hard, Raymond Robins , 72, 119.
136) Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 935-985.
137) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 257.
138) Ibid., 286.
139) Ibid., 291.
140) Ibid., 292.
141) Ibid., 295-95.
142) Ibid., 296.
143) Ibid., 299-300.
144) Ibid., 301.
145) Ibid., 303.
146. Ibid., 258. Kennan calls this text a "poor translation."
147) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 191-92.
148) Ibid., 193.
149) Izvestia, 12/25/17, in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 195.
150) Ibid., 196.
151) Ibid., 199-201.
152) Ibid., 202-06.
153) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 317.
154) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 2 (Washington, 1931), 590.
155) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 304-15.
156) Ibid., 318.
157) Ibid., 260-63.
158) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 206-07.
159) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 321.
160) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 208.
161) Ibid., 211; Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol.1, 321.
162) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 211.
163) Hard, Raymond Robins , 119.
164) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 211-12.
165) Ibid., 212; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 935-85.
166) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 233.
167) Lucita Williams, ed. Albert Rhys Williams, Journey Into Revolution, Petrograd, 1917-1918 (Chicago, 1969), 197; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 233-37.
168) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 238-42, 521-522; Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,65-66.
169) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 238-39.
170) Ibid., 241.
171) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 336.
172) Lansing, War Memoirs, 343-45.
173) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 426.
174) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 397-98.
175) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 337.
176) Ibid., 426.
177) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 2, 743.
178) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 355.
179) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 398.
180) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,76-77.
181) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 356-57.
182) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 400.
183) Ibid.
184) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 358-59.
185) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 400-01.
186) Ibid., 405.
187) Ibid., 407-09.
188) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 363.
189) Ibid.
190) Ibid., 367-68.
191) Ibid., 368.
192) Ibid., 370.
193) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 420.
194) Senate Judiciary Committee Hearingss, 1125-1158.
195) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 421.
196) Cummings and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,77, 79.
197) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 421-22.
198) Ibid., 422-23; R.H. Bruce Lockhart, Secret Agent, (New York and London, 1933), 222-223.
199) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 423.
200) Serge, Year One, 388, note 25.
201) Cumming and Pettit, 79-80.
202) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 430-31.
203) Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 590.
204) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , 383.
205) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 433.
206) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , 384.
207) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 434-35; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 763-856.
208) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 387.
209) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 236.
210) V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 42 (Moscow, 1969), 60.
211) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 437-40.
212) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 236.
213) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,80-81.
214) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 495-97.
215) Hard, Raymond Robins , 144.
216) Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 857-896.
217) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,81-82.
218) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 497-500.
219) Ibid., 500-04; Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks (New York, 1965), 412. 220) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 2, 74.
221) Hard, Raymond Robins , 144.
222) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 508.
223) Williams, Journey Into Revolution, 262.
224) Ibid., 264.
225) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations; Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, 394-95.
226) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 504.
227) Ibid., 505.
228) Ibid., 514.
229) Hard, Raymond Robins , 105.
230) Ibid., 151-52; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 515-16; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, 857-896.
231) Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 516; Ulam, The Bolsheviks, 412.
232) Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 602-03.
233) Hard, Raymond Robins , 153.
234) Williams, Journey Into Revolution, 264.
235) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,101-03.
236) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 231-33.
237) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 483, 487.
238) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,110.
239) Ibid., 113-14.
240) Ibid., 122.
241) Ibid., 125-60; Betty Miller Unterberger, ed., American Intervention in the Russian Civil War (Lexington, Mass., 1969), 1-110.
242) Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations ,155-56.
243) Ibid., 161-63.
244) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 302.
245) Ibid., 320-21.
246) Ibid., 307-10.
247) Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, , , vol. 1, 625-40.
248) William. A. Williams, "The Outdoor Mind" in Nation (10/30/54), 384-85.
249) Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, 345-46.
250) New York Times (1/16/27), 30.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1. Almedingen, E. M. The Romanovs, Three Centuries of An Ill-Fated Dynasty. (New York, Chicago & San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

2. Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, War Leader. Volume 7 0f 8. (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1939; Reprinted, New York, Greenwood Press, 1968)

3. Clark, Ronald W. Lenin, A Biography. (Originally published in Great Britain by Faber and Faber Limited, under the title, Lenin: The Man Behind the Mask; New York, Harper and Row, 1988).

4. Cockfield, Jamie H. Dollars and Diplomacy, Ambassador David Rowland Francis and the Fall of Tsarism, 1916-17 (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1981)

5. Clarkson, Jesse D., A History of Russia. (New York, Random House, 1961).

6. Cumming, G.K., and Pettit, Walter W. Russia-American Relations, March, 1917 - March, 1920, Documents and Papers (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920).

7. Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John. The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow, The Allied War in Russia, 1918-20 (New York, Atheneum, 1986).

8. Dupee, F.W. The Russian Revolution, The Overthrow of Tzarism and The Triumph of the Soviets, Selected and edited from The History of the Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky, translated from the Russian by Max Eastman. (New York, Doubleday, 1959; New York, Simon and Schuster, 1932).

9. Francis, David R. Russia From the American Embassy (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921).

10. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement. (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1928).

11. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Volume I-II, (of 3), (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1931).

12. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-20. 2 Volumes, Vol. II. (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1939)

13. Fulop-Miller, Rene. Rasputin, the Holy Devil. (translated from the German by F.S. Flint & D.F. Taft) (Leipzig, Gerthlein & Co, 1927; Garden City, New York, Garden City Publishing Company, 1928).

14. Hard, William. Raymond Robin's Own Story (New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1920).

15. Hart, Albert Bushnell, edit. Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1918).

16. Heller, Mikhail and Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present. Translated from the Russian by Phyllis B. Carlos. (Originally published in Russian by Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1982; English language translation, New York, Summit Books, 1986).

17. Johnston, Charles. "Russia's Two Revolutions," American Review of Reviews, January, 1918, 59-62.

18. Kennan, George E. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, (2 vols.; Princeton, 1956). Volume I, Russia Leaves the War.

19. Lansing, Robert. War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State. (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935; reprinted New York, Greenwood Press, 1970).

20. Lenin, V. I. Collected Works, Volume 42, October, 1917 - March, 1923, translated from the Russian by Bernard Isaacs. (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969)

21. Lincoln, W. Bruce. In War's Dark Shadow, The Russians Before the Great War. (New York, The Dial Press, 1983).

22. Lincoln, W. Bruce. The Romanovs, Autocrats of All the Russias. (New York, The Dial Press, 191).

23. Lockhart, R.H. Bruce. Secret Agent. (New York and London, G.P. Putnam Sons, 1933)

24. March, Francis A and Beamish, Richard J. History of the World War. Philadelphia, Chicago and Toronto, The United Publishers of the United States and Canada, 1919).

25. Marye, George T. Russia Observed: Nearing the End in Imperial Russia (Phiadelphia, Dorrance and Company, 1929; New York, Arno Press & The New York Times, 1970).

26. Massie, Robert K. Nicolas and Alexandra. (New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1967; Dell Paperback edition, 1972)

27. Moorehead, Alan. The Russian Revolution. (New York, Harper and Row, 1958; New York, Carroll and Graf edition, 1967).

28. Nation; 4/19/17, editorial signed Tattler, 468-469.

29. Outlook, The; 3/19/19, commentary column, no author, 463-464.

30. Pares, Bernard. A History of Russia. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1926, 1928, 1937, 1944, 1947, 1953; New York, Vintage books edition, 1965).

31. Pipes, Richard. The Russian Revolution (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).

32. Reed, John. Ten Days That Shook the World. (New York, Boni and Liveright, Inc, 1919; London, 2nd Penguin edition, 1977)

33. Reshetar, Jr., John S. A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

34. Serge, Victor. Year One of The Russian Revolution, translated and edited by Peter Sedgwick. (France, as L' An I de la revolution russe, 1930; Chicago, NY & San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972).

35. Shaw, Warren and Pryce, David. The World Almanac of the Soviet Union from 1905 to the Present. (New York, World Almanac, an imprint of Pharos Books, 1990).

36. Senate, U.S. Judiciary Committee, Bolshevik Propaganda Hearings, February 11th-March 10th, 1919. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919. Senate Document 62, 66th Congress, 1st Session).

37. State, Department of. Principal Officers of the Department of State and U.S. Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1986 (Washington, Department of State Publication #9499, Government Printing Office, 1986).

38. Treadgold, Donald W. Twentieth Century Russia, Fifth Edition. (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1959, 1964; Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1981).

39. Ulam, Adam B. The Bolsheviks. (New York, The MacMillan Company, 1965).

40. Unterberger, Betty Miller, editor. American Intervention in the Russian Civil War. (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath and Company, 1969)

41. Unterberger, Betty Miller. The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia. (Chapel Hill, NC., University of North Carolina, 1989)

42. West, Rachel. The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War (Athens, Ga., University of Georgia Press, 1978).

43. Williams, Albert Rhys. Edited by Lucita Williams. Journey Into Revolution, Petrograd, 1917-1918. (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969).

44. Williams, Albert Rhys. "Sword and Bible," Nation, 10/30/54, 385.

45. Williams, William A. "The Outdoor Mind," Nation, 10/30/54, 384-385.