Coat of Arms of Transylvania

Vörösberény, 1993.

© László Tõkés

Reproduced with the permission of the author, 1995.

In February of this year, a statement was uttered at one of the press conferences of the Washington-based National Press Club. I had declared that in a subtle, bloodless way, an "undeniable ethnic cleansing" had been taking place in Romania now for over seventy years, the result of which hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities--who, at the time of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty inhabited this region in significant numbers--had disappeared: either by having become assimilated, or by having been forced to leave their place of birth.

As a result of an expertly prepared and systematically executed nation-wide provocation campaign, helped by the diversionist, Iliescu-sympathizing Romanian national television, the objectionable statement soon became the topic of the day in the country's parliament - highly susceptible to such disturbances - and through the "reporting" of the lawmakers and the conveniently manipulated press it soon became the central topic of the similarly manipulated Romanian public opinion, provoking a general uproar and many outcries.

In a fashion similar to that used by more or less all Romanian governments that have come since Trianon, including the present one, this provocative action, as is well known, elicited unified antipathy and strong protests from within the entire political and public sphere, and in a rarely seen occurrence, it was able to synthesize nearly complete "unity" within the entire majority population, drawing together nearly all Romanian political forces.

What is behind this stance? What is its root cause, how can we find an explanation for the exceptional strength, the unmatched power of the political parties' and public opinion's uproar, for the "national" outcry which often degenerated into political hysteria and severe personal insults?

One would be mistaken to believe that the sole reason for this outburst is the by now famous statement, and its truth content.

The use of the expression ethnic cleansing with respect to Romania is by no means new. Without going into an exhaustive process to document this, it should suffice to say that András Sütõ has made use of this conceptualization several times during the past few years, and what's more, shortly before the artificially and purposefully provoked scandal which was ignited at the beginning or March of this year, we had two opportunities to read this very expression in our domestic press. In these cases however, our fastidious policy-makers did not even raise their eyebrows to the much-decried similar later use of these words.

In the middle of February, more than 94 well-known Hungarian and German intellectuals from Kolozsvár (Cluj) issued a written protest against the policies and practices carried out by Gheorghe Funar - the city's mayor and the president of the Romanian National Unity Party - who, in their words: "in one of Romania's and Europe's important cultural centres, concentrates his primary activities at conducting a cultural ethnic cleansing directed at the Hungarian collective spirit, affecting nearly every sphere of Hungarian historical and cultural traditions."

Such a summary of the situation that can be experienced in Kolozsvár corresponds, in meaning, to the content of the expression used in Washington. The reference made is to the "undeniable", "refined and sophisticated", "peaceful" method, which over many decades has made the situation of the Hungarians of Romania almost unbearable. The situation is mirrored by the weight of Sándor Makkai's words, the one-time bishop who was forced to leave his parish and his homeland, who said: "It is not possible," and the paradoxical nature of existence here is reinforced by the poet Sándor Reményik, one attached by "teeth and claws" to his homeland, who echoes the tragic compromise: "As is possible."

The nation-wide uproar in March, the hysterical pseudo- outcries, the unified positions reminiscent of the Ceausescu-era nationalist loyalty-campaigns show not even a trace of any attempt, by the accusers, to familiarize themselves, investigate the facts and their weight, before making their own statements. By completely ignoring, or downplaying and denying the actual reality, the badly-informed supporters of national loyalty branded the statement a dogmatic outburst, singularly denied, and ex-catedra discarded even the possibility of the existence of any form of ethnic cleansing. Without critical thinking, they unleashed a barrage of insults and attacks at the imagined and greatly overblown "Hungarian enemy", characterizations which included: "lies", "baseless slander", "defamation", "mean-spirited falsification of Romanian realities", "extremist anti-Romanian diatribe", "irredentism", "separatism", "they sold out the country", "the bishop is the devil's pawn", and so on.

In their massive outcry many sought to defend the "Romanian people" - as if the charge of ethnic cleansing had been leveled against them, and not against the homogenizing, nationalist governing authority. We have thus summarized the actual background of the nation-wide political scandal that was raised around the statement.

If there is - and there certainly is - a credible explanation and an actual motivation for the general public uproar, then it is exactly the national self-esteem and dignity of the mislead Romanian masses, which was used and exploited by the well- paid experts of manipulation and provocation. The noble self- defence reflexes, aimed at protecting those national feelings which merit respect and appreciation, and the - well undermined - natural mechanisms of protecting collective self- respect, mislead even the best members of the democratic opposition and other undenyingly well-meaning Romanians. The governing authority, fearfully protective of its power, and obsessed with the phobia of territorial loss - which it transposes onto the masses as well - wants to gain wider support and popular legitimacy, to mobilize society on its own side precisely by exploiting the psychosis of vulnerability, and the most noble nationalist sentiments, and through this process it wishes to realize its own selfish goals and interests.

The anti-Hungarian crusade around the ethnic cleansing statement was primarily a well-prepared trap, set up by the government and its allies for the - as yet - weak opposition and infant Romanian democracy. The deception was so successful, that in sporadic locations even the intimidated Hungarian population became confused, forcing several of its political leaders to directly or indirectly distance themselves, in this way unwillingly equating their own position with that of the government.

The Hungarians of Romania, however, unlike their fellow ethnic Romanian citizens, have an actual basis for, and a greater degree of "things to fear", and their own no less noble national sentiments have been, for decades, and continue to be concretely offended daily. It is true that the totalitarian power takes advantage of both nationalities' sentiments and conducts vulgar political games - but in the case of the Hungarian minority these games carry a much greater risk. The possible risk for Romanian society is "at most" democracy and freedom - while at the same time, in contrast, the governing authority puts the Hungarian community's very existence at risk: its continued survival becomes questionable

It is cheap demagoguery or naiveté, and a falsification of reality, a short-sighted simplification to group together the livelihood of the minority Hungarians and the state-forming Romanians, to one-sidedly equate the situation of the two ethnic groups, by saying that in the post-communist misery "Romanians and Hungarians suffer alike . . . they suffer hunger and cold alike, stand in line and feel intimidated alike." This is also partly true - at the level of certain basic needs, and in the case of certain social classes. The Hungarian and other minorities, however, suffer double discrimination and oppression: not only as ordinary citizens do, but due their nationality, their difference.

When democracy is dealt a blow, they feel it the most.

According to the "classic" practice used by governing nationalities, the minorities serve as the source for the distracting "enemy picture": on top of this, they are also suitable for the scapegoat role. According to the "substitute victims" law, they can be sacrificed in the interest of the government and the constitutionally-sanctioned "Romanian nation-state."

It is misleading then to speak of a majority and minority nationalism in the same breath, to call Romanian extremist nationalism and Hungarian national "radicalism" symmetrical, and to grant them the same value.

Minority nationalism is fundamentally of a defensive nature: disadvantaged from the start, it seeks to protect self-identity in the face of the majority nation's artificially-developed aggressive, devastating nationalism.

In Romania it is a misconception - one produced by the cynical manipulation of the government and the extreme nationalists - to believe that Romanians need fear the so-called "radical" or "irredentist" or "separatist" Hungarian "extremists." The nationalist-communist regime, relying on nationalist ideology, achieves a dual goal by exploiting this misconception: it is able to keep the opposition and the nation's progressive forces occupied with the minorities, while at the same time, it uses the majority to strike at the minorities, who, in their struggle for freedom, pose a - democratic - threat to its survival. It practices a nationalist, divisive policy, on the basis of which the minorities naturally always come up short.

It is in this majority-oriented power policy that the practice of ethnic cleansing forms an organic part. This is the policy which is behind the provocations, which - drawing on the analogy of the bloody Bosnian events - have shocking effects. Just like in the fables, as predators are apt to do, it is once again the wolf who warns the - sacrificial - lamb: "do not disturb the waters!"

* * *

We have been able to see what behind the words, what function did this singular, out-of-context statement - deprived of its actual content or purposefully misinterpreted - serve in the hands of the pseudo-democratic totalitarian regime and the well-oiled propaganda machine of the national-communist power.

In the following section, free from any political tendency or nationalist government manipulation, we shall examine what the facts actually say. Let reality - one widely avoided, or purposefully ignored due to prejudice - the numbers, data, surveys, statistics, and our own painful experiences speak about the ethnic cleansing which has caused such a storm.

In 1930, on the present-day territory of Romania, the population was 14,281,000; today it is 22,760,000, an increase of more than 8 million. In contrast, the growth of the Hungarian population - according to official Romanian statistical data - was minimal, an increase of no more that 66,000 people: in 1930, there were 1,554,000, while in 1992 there were 1,620,000.

Analyzing the statistics or Transylvania: during 82 years (1910-1992) the Romanian population doubled, while the Hungarian population declined from 1,664,000 to 1,599,000, and its percentage in the total population of the region dropped from the nearly one-third (31.6%) to barely a fifth (20.7%)

TABLE 1.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF ROMANIA

Note: Using the statistics from the 1930 census, the total population inhabiting the territory of present-day Romania was 14,281,000 of which 10.88% were Hungarians.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF TRANSYLVANIA

The data from those Transylvanian counties actually by Hungarians paints an even clearer picture of the unnatural population drop. In Kolozs County for example, one of the counties most heavily targeted by artificial Romanianization, during 82 years the Romanian population (rounding the numbers) increased from 231,000 to 571,000 - in contrast, the Hungarians dropped from 156,000 to 145,000, or from 39.3% to 19.8% of the population.

TABLE 2.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TRANSYLVANIAN COUNTIES

Note: The population figures are in thousands, for example: 45,8=45,800.

The same picture is presented by enclosed graphical representations, complementing the graphs which serve as partial representations of the spectacular declines or other nationalities.

The steep change in proportions, as well as the decline in Hungarian-inhabited territory is even more conspicuous if we inspect the development of the demographic make-up of several of Transylvania's larger cities. In 1910, and even between the two world wars, the Hungarian majority in the more important cities contributed to 70.1% of the urban population, which dwindled to 23.3% over eight decades, while the urban Romanian population increased from 13.4% to 73.3%.

TABLE 5.

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF VARIOUS LARGER TRANSYLVANIAN
CITIES, BASED ON CENSUS DATA

Note:

- The population figures are in thousands, for example: 62,7=62,700.

- The figures from the 1966 Census contain data only for the first eight cities on the list.

The relevant graphical representations are downright shocking. For the purpose of observing the demographic metamorphosis which took place in several cities, we need only cite the examples of the cities of Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad (Oradea) and Temesvár (Timisoara).

.

It is easy to see that the drastic changes which are mirrored by the statistics and the graphs are not the results of natural demographic processes. A secret document, found at the end of 1989 in the city hall building of Marosvásárhely (Tirgu Mures), gives us positive proof of the Romanian authorities' deliberate policies aimed at artificially altering the ethnic composition various cities within Transylvania, and of Transylvania as a whole . It is these massive policies of Romanianizing Transylvania, achieved using administrative tools, and the processes of industrialization and urbanization, that are to be looked as explanations for the radical transformation of the ethnic composition of Transylvania. The continuous resettlement , the so-called closed-cities system, the unnecessary territorial and ethnic merging of villages, and other administrative reorganizations are merely a few of the more outstanding methods of the systematically planned reductions of the Hungarian community of Transylvania, the forcing of local majority Hungarian populations into minority roles, and they are indicative of the ever-present Romanian government's policies aimed at boosting artificial ethnic assimilation.

The mislead Romanian population, however, is completely unaware of the above processes. Instead of abandoning its anti-minority policies - as it promised during the changes in 1989 - which draw on traditional practices, the government is contributing to he increase of the anti-Hungarian atmosphere, and directly or indirectly aids efforts aimed at national homogenization, which, our words, is synonymous with ethnic cleansing.

An outstanding example, the founding pillar and an unappealable document of this nationalist course is the first clause of the Romanian Constitution, which defines our country - inhabited by several millions of other nationalities - as a "unitary nation-state." Consequently, the homogenizing, "cleansing" policies are codified and consecrated into a national-political program by the most fundamental law of the country.

The weak Romanian opposition, lacking a well-developed concept of national policy, or due to its unfamiliarity with the situation, mostly assists the constitutionally-sanctioned anti- minority program of the Romanian government and the parties in power. Other than its weak expressions of sympathy for the minorities, it is either seemingly poisoned by the Greater- Romanian nationalism or it is under its forceful domination, and is unable to offer a realistic and just political alternative fro the country's minorities, for two million-strong Hungarian community. It is unable to even grasp a deeper understanding of minority problems, and cannot even come to face the facts of ethnic cleansing - as rightly evidenced by the opposition parties' unified stance on the side of the inciteful, nationalist, provocative scandal-making forces of authority.

Unfortunately, neither the opposition, nor the well-meaning but mislead Romanian citizens have yet realized that with alternating, refined methods, ethnic cleansing continues even today, with a special emphasis on lowering the social status of Hungarians, on forcing them either out or into the background.

The Germans and the Hungarians - Transylvanians in general - are emigrating, leaving their homelands forever in much greater numbers than their proportions in the national population would warrant

TABLE 15.

EMIGRATION STATISTICS 1990-1992

Year	Total	Romanian	German	Hungarian	Other
1990	144,543	25,583	95,900	18,821	4,239
1991	43,544	18,307	16,767	7,494	976
1992	34,583	17,922	8,845	6,673	1,143
Totals	222,670	61,812	121,512	32,988	6,358
Total minorities:	160, 858
Percentage of total emigrants:	Romanians - 27.76% Other ethnic groups - 72.24%

In absolute numbers, the number of Romanian emigrants is merely 1.87 times that of

the Hungarians; however, if the emigration ratio were to follow the population ratios

for the entire country, the number of Romanians emigrating should have been 6.7

times greater than the number of Hungarians, that is in addition to the 32,988

Hungarians who actually left their homeland, 414,447 ethnic Romanians should have

followed them.

and Table 16.).

The reasons for the Hungarian emigration - besides economic ones - are chiefly ones of ethnic nature. One example is Marosvásárhely, whose Hungarian inhabitants and whose youth have left their place of birth by the thousands, in wake of the intimidating atmosphere created by the Vatra pogrom- attempts of March 1990. The discriminating judicial decisions, handed down against a number of the participants of the December 1989 events in the Székelyföld region (i.e., an area of Transylvania where the Szeklers live) (Zetelaka, Oroszhegy), have had the same alienating effect among the Hungarian minority.

A similar reaction is produced amongst the Hungarian masses when we consider our disadvantaged educational situation, the higher-than-average unemployment ratio of Hungarian workers, our large-scale displacement from various spheres of social life (government and institutional leadership, administration, the rail, postal and health institutions, etc.), or the autocratic reduction of the length of the Hungarian language television program, and the unjust appointment of ethnic Romanian prefects in the counties of Hargita and Kovászna.

The enclosed charts realistically mirror the fact that a significant percentage (31%), nearly one-third of Hungarian students have no opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue. It is specifically in the area of academic studies and technical training that the determinative importance of the disadvantaged, under-represented situation of the Hungarian students can be seen: only 60.4% of collegiate and 22.7% of technical school students can study in their mother tongue . The situation is also critical in the area of teacher- training - 26% of the pedagogues who participate in native language instruction are unqualified! - which further damages our relations with educational authorities.

Hungarians have been nearly entirely squeezed out of local and county state administration. There are nearly no Hungarian employees in the prefectures and mayoral offices. Our representation in the institutes of justice is also ridiculously low. In counties like Bihar, Szatmár and Szilágy, where Hungarians make up a significant number of the population, there is not a single Hungarian notary public.

TABLE 18.

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS OF ROMANIA FROM VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS

County or City	Percent of the Hungarian population	Prefectorate		County Council		Mayoral Office
	%	Hungarians vs. Rumanians	Hungarians %	Hungarians vs. Rumanians	Hungarians %	Hungarians vs. Rumanians	Hungarians %
Arad County	12.5			5:110	4.5
City of Arad	15.7					1:66	1.5
Bihar County	28.5	4:117	3.4	3:183	1.6
City of Nagyvárad	33.2					3:89	3.4
Szatmár County	35.0	18:129	14.0
City of Szatmárnémeti	40.8
Szilágy County	23.7		9.0
City of Zilah	19.8						7.5
Kolozs County	19.8
City of Kolozsvár	22.7					8:168	4.8
Hargita County	84.7	14:41	34.1	75:85	88.2
City of Csíkszereda	83.0					47:56	83.9
Kovászna County	75.2	13:51	39.4
City of Sepsiszentgyörgy	74.8

County or City	Percent of the Hungarian population	Notaries Public		Lawyers		Councilliors		Judges
	%	Hung. vs. Rum.	Hungarians %	Hung. vs. Rum.	Hungarians %	Hung. vs. Rum.	Hungarians %	Hung. vs. Rum.	Hungarians %
Arad County	12.5							1:38	2.6
City of Arad	15.7			4:66	6.1
Bihar County	28.5	-	0			1:12	8.3	1:12	8.3
City of Nagyvárad	33.2	-	0	9:122	7.4	1:17	5.9	2:21	9.5
Szatmár County	35.0	-	0			1:7	14.3	1:7	14.3
City of Szatmárnémeti	40.8	-	0	8:36	22.2	1:10	10.0	0:14	0
Szilágy County	23.7	-	0						18.0
C

Hungarians are also discriminated against in economic spheres. In state companies, a Hungarian individual can very rarely reach an executive position. Even in Kovászna County, which has an absolute Hungarian majority, the number of Hungarian business executives is proportionally small.

TABLE 19.

RATIO OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AMONGST THE LEADERSHIP
OF THE STATE-OWNED COMPANIES IN VARIOUS COUNTIES AND CITIES

COUNTY/CITY	HUNGARIANS	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
BIHAR County	21	173	12.1%
City of NAGYVÁRAD (Oradea)	5	96	5.2%
SZATMÁR County	11	114	9.6%
SZILÁGY County				6.2%
KOVÁSZNA County	50	88	56.8%

TABLE 20.

RATIO OF HUNGARIAN STREET-NAMES IN VARIOUS
LARGER TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES

CITY	HUNGARIANS	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
ARAD	11	680	1.6%
NAGYVÁRAD (Oradea)	8	746	1.2%
KOLOZSVÁR	21	750	2.8%
MAROSVÁSÁRHELY	9	370	2.4%
SZATMÁRNÉMETI	9	350	2.6%

We can hardly reach the end of the obvious, well-documented facts and results of state policies which discriminate against minorities, and treat them as second-class citizens. Consequently, this is what is meant by the expression ethnic cleansing, as interpreted by the Hungarians of Romania. These are the facts - the rest is ignorance, political evasion, misinterpretation, or purposeful nationalist instigating propaganda. The White Book of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), currently being prepared, will doubtlessly present an even wider and consequently more convincing picture of the reality of the Hungarian minority's existence in Romania.

I write these lines from within the - now twice - confiscated Bishop's Office of the Királyhágómellék Reformed Church District, facing possible eviction at any given moment. I am writing them in a street named after Marshall Ion Antonescu, the fascist dictator, pondering that here, in this city founded by King Saint László, only eight (!) of the 746 streets have names of Hungarian origin.

Dated at Nagyvárad,
April 21, 1993.

László Tõkés,
Bishop,
District of Királyhágómellék, Transylvania