2001 Donald J. Mabry
Long before the turn of the century, the United States was
determined to build a trans-isthmian canal to foster its
international trade and to assert US superiority in the Caribbean;
the ease with which Spain was muscled out of the Caribbean in 1898
gave notice to all rivals that United States power must now be
taken seriously. Gone were the days when it could only protest the
incursions of Europeans or, occasionally, block their efforts.
Under the 1848 free transit treaty, the United States intervened
in Panama nine times at the request of Colombia,(1)
but none of these actions sped the construction of the canal. Sole
US control of a trans-isthmian canal was blocked by the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty (1850) it had signed with Britain. The Senate refused to
ratify the McLane-Ocampo Treaty (1859) with Mexico which would
have circumvented Clayton-Bulwer by granting transit rights across
Mexico to the United States. By 1880, however, President
Rutherford B. Hayes announced a policy of exclusive US control of
a canal, a view echoed the next year by President Garfield, whose
secretary of state unsuccessfully fought for a revision of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Such assertions only signified a change in
policy for Washington did not block the efforts of the
French-owned Panama Canal Company in the 1880s nor aid the private
US company which started construction of a Nicaraguan canal in
1887 only to fail from under capitalization by 1893.
After the failure of the French company, the United States
moved to overcome the next major obstacle, the treaty commitment
to Great Britain. Washington bellicosity in the Venezuelan
boundary controversy, British problems in the Eastern Hemisphere,
and the German-British naval arms race at the turn of the century
induced the British government to begin transferring its forces to
other parts of the world.
Throughout the war with Spain in 1898, the British maintained a
friendly neutrality towards the United States. Thus encouraged,
Congress created the Walker Commission to investigate the
engineering problems of the rival routes, principally either
through Nicaragua or Colombia. On December 5, 1898, President
McKinley in a message to Congress, stressed the need for an inter-oceanic waterway; the long voyage of the USS Oregon to the
Caribbean during the Spanish-American War had emphasized the
difficulty of fighting a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy. By
January, 1899, the first draft of the Hay-Paunceforte treaty
between the United States and Great Britain had been completed..
It was signed the following 5th of February, having been delayed
by the unsuccessful British attempt to tie an Alaskan boundary
question to it. The proposed treaty did not supersede Clayton-Bulwer,
for it only allowed the United States to build the canal but not
under its sole control.
The expansionists of 1898, including Theodore Roosevelt, Henry
Cabot Lodge, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, opposed it because they
thought the US gained little and that the superior British fleet
would have the advantage. The Senate refused to ratify it. The
Secretary of State almost gave up but the British agreed to
renegotiate. By November, 1901, the two had signed the second Hay-Paunceforte
treaty which implicitly conceded the right of the United States to
build, control, and fortify an isthmian canal but with the proviso
that all nations would have equal access in peacetime.
Ratifications were exchanged on February 21, 1902.
Once the British agreement was achieved, the United States
decided on the canal route. The Walker Commission favored the
Nicaraguan route, traditionally the US choice. This route used a
lake and the San Juan River; dam construction would be easier;
excavation could proceed more rapidly if enough labor were
available; health conditions would be better; and more economic
development in the area would probably take place. Moreover,
Nicaragua was closer to the United States, thus shortening the
distance ships would have to travel. The cost was estimated at
$190 million less than the route through Colombia's Panama
province. In anticipation of these findings, the United States
signed agreements with Nicaragua and Costa Rica (the San Juan
River was part of its border)(2) in
1900 to negotiate further if the United States acquired control of
the territory needed for the canal. In January, 1902, the House of
Representatives passed a bill authorizing the construction of the
Nicaraguan canal.
At this point representatives of the French New Panama Canal
Company stepped into the course of events and reversed the
decision in favor of the Panamanian route. The Panama route had
its advantages: shorter actual length, the existence of a railroad
and harbors which would cut building time by one year, an adequate
labor force, the necessity of fewer locks and curves, the existing
French company works, the experience of former employees, the
necessity of dealing with only one country, and a lower estimated
construction cost.(3)
The Walker Commission had found the Panamanian route more
expensive because the French company wanted $109 million for its
concession rights and existing works. Fearing that all would be
lost if they did not act quickly, Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, chief
engineer and a principal company stockholder, and William Nelson
Cromwell, US counsel for the company, had the purchase price
dropped to $40 million, making the Panama route cheaper. Since
there was some question as to whether the French company could
legally sell its rights, they produced evidence that said they
could.(4) Cromwell then drew upon
his Republican Party connections and got Senator Mark Hanna to
champion the Panama cause in the Senate. This Panama lobby managed
to convince the majority of the Senate that the Panama route would
be faster, cheaper, and safer; the Spooner Amendment of June 28,
1902 authorized President Roosevelt (who also favored the Panama
route) to buy the French company's rights for no more than $40
million and to negotiate the necessary treaty with Colombia within
a reasonable length of time.
The genius of the Panama lobby had given the French company a
stay of execution. Bunau-Varilla, who would soon reveal other
talents, helped turn the tide in the Senate by attacking the
Nicaraguan route because that country had active volcanoes. When
the pro-Nicaraguan faction minimized the danger of their route,
Bunau-Varilla placed a Nicaraguan stamp showing a volcanic
eruption on each Senatorial desk. The problem after the Spooner
Amendment was to get a satisfactory treaty from Colombia before
the "reasonable length of time" expired; otherwise, the
canal would be built through Nicaragua.
Negotiations with Colombia did not go smoothly. Colombians had
a vested interest in having the canal pass through their
Panamanian province but several factors complicated their approach
to the negotiations. Panama was a distant province, reachable only
be sea, and its separatist tendencies might be encouraged by a
foreign presence. The devastating Colombian civil war of 1899-1902
had just ended. Colombian politicians were reluctant to make
decisions which might reopen festering wounds. Further, since the
United States wanted complete control over the canal and the canal
zone, even sovereignty, any Colombian government yielding too much
to a foreign country faced possible rebellion. Colombia recognized
that this resource should be exploited to its maximum financial
advantage. The French concession was to expire in 1904; if no
canal agreement wore reached before then, Colombia would be able
to obtain additional revenue (since the French company refused to
split the $40 million). On the other hand, if Colombia waited
until 1904, the canal might be built through Nicaragua. Colombian
diplomats tried to obtain better terms from the United States
without avail. The Spooner Amendment limited the price and going
back to Congress threatened the Panama route. Negotiations
appeared stalemated.
The United States government, aided by Cromwell and
Bunau-Varilla, unsuccessfully pressured Colombia to agree to
Washington's demands. When the Colombian ambassador refused and
left Washington, the Colombian chargé d'affaires, Tomás Herrán,
yielded and, on January 22, 1903, signed the Hay-Herrán treaty,
which had been drafted by Hay, Cromwell, and Bunau-Varilla. By
this treaty, Colombia would recognize the right of the French
company to sell its concession and the United States would receive
the exclusive right to a ten kilometer wide zone through which it
could construct and fortify a canal, the right to maintain order,
including the use of armed force with Colombia's consent, and the
right to supervise public health. In return, Colombia would
receive a lump sum of $10 million plus an annuity of $250,000. The
United States ratified this treaty in March and sent it to
Colombia where it became a hot political issue.
Critics of the Colombia government charged that the nation
should receive more compensation from the United States and some
from the French company. During the summer of 1903, Washington
seat indiscreet and threatening notes to Colombia in an attempt to
force ratification. When the Colombian president released these
notes to the Colombian senate in August, that chamber unanimously
rejected the treaty. The Colombian congress adjourned on October
31st without taking further action.
Whatever the reason for its actions, the Colombian congress had
not realized the determination of the pro-Panama canal group or
Roosevelt. The Spooner Amendment seemed to require that the canal
now be built through Nicaragua since the Hay-Herrán treaty had
been rejected, but President Roosevelt was now committed to the
Panamanian route and angry. He loudly denounced the Colombians as
"homicidal corruptionists" and "monkeys"(5)
and seriously considered building the canal without Colombian
permission. He even obtained a lengthy opinion which
"justified" such an action under the Now Granada treaty.(6)
Roosevelt never used this device, however, because he found a
way to make it unnecessary.
Historians agree that the New Panama Canal Company and its New
York subsidiary, the Panama Railroad Company, actively plotted and
executed the revolution. The key figures in this group were
Cromwell, Bunau-Varilla, and Dr. Manuel Amador of Panama. There
was also active participation by Panamanian nationalists who
wanted to run their own affairs, especially after Colombia's
action threatened their future prosperity. Without these groups,
there would have been no revolution. They organized the
demonstrations and propaganda, bribed army officers, and prevented
the transport of Colombian troops from Colón, where they landed
from their ship, to Panama City, where the revolution was staged.
The role of the Roosevelt government is not as clear.
Bunau-Varilla went to see Roosevelt, Hay, and other officials and
discussed the possibility of a revolution in Panama. He apparently
failed to obtain the assurance of aid he undoubtedly sought; all
parties at least assert that this was so. He realized, however,
that the impatient Roosevelt wanted to build the canal through
Panama and would welcome a Panamanian revolution. Whether
Roosevelt or his advisors told the Frenchman that US warships
would be sent to Panamanian waters with order to "maintain
free and uninterrupted transit" or whether Bunau-Varilla
deduced the probability of its occurrence and the date of arrival
from the general conversation and the published sailing notices is
not known. We do know that Bunau-Varilla assured the Panamanians
that the ships would be there and that he sent Dr. Amador back to
Panama with $100,000 and instructions for the revolution. In
exchange for his services, Bunau-Varilla was to be appointed the
first Panamanian minister to Washington.
As everyone knew would be the case, American intervention
determined the fate of the revolution. Colombia sent troops to
Colon and managed to land 400 men before the USS Nashville arrived
on the afternoon of November 3rd. This small army was probably
sufficient to prevent the revolution, but it never reached Panama
City, nor did the U.S. Navy allow any more soldiers to land. The
problem of the Colombian army was solved by Colonel J. R. Shaler, Super indent
of the
Panama Railroad Company, when he managed to send the officers
across the isthmus with the promise that the rest of the army
would follow when he found more railroad cars. In Panama City, the
liberal use of bribes neutralized key commanders. That afternoon,
independence was declared. Colombian feeble attempts that day and
afterwards to reverse the revolution were stymied by the United
States. On November 6, the U.S. recognized Panamanian
independence. Colombia promised to give the United States a better
treaty if it could have its territory back, but the U.S. refused.
On November 18th, the United States and Panama
signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty which gave the United States
more than it ordinarily could have expected to obtain.
Bunau-Varilla, the instant Panamanian ambassador, acted without
instructions and before the instructed Panamanian delegation
reached Washington. The Panamanian government ratified the treaty
but, under the circumstances, it had little choice. For a $10
million initial payment and a $250,000 annuity, the United States
"acquired the perpetual right to control "as if it were
sovereign,"(7) a ten-mile-wide
strip of Panama bifurcating the country on which the United States
could construct, control, and fortify a canal. In addition, the
United States could take additional land outside the zone an
needed for canal purposes. Finally, the United States was given
the right to intervene in Colon and Panama City for health reasons
or to maintain order. Since these two cities contained the vast
majority of the nation's inhabitants, this provision made Panama a
protectorate. In short, Panama had signed its own Platt Amendment.(8)
Roosevelt's role in this affair was arrogant and unnecessary.
His contempt for Latins, his childish impetuosity, and egotistical
desire to create a monument to himself before he left office, (his
1904 reelection was unforeseen) overrode decency and statesmanship.
The United States could have negotiated a treaty more favorable to
Colombia or built the Nicaraguan canal. Instead, Roosevelt took
every action short of actually starting the Panamanian revolution
or seizing the zone only because Bunau-Varilla and his cohorts did
the actual dirty work. In 1909, Roosevelt boasted to Henry Cabot
Lodge that "the vital work of getting Panama as an
independent Republic...was done by me without the aid or advice of
anyone...and without the knowledge of anyone" and, in 1911,
to a university audience that "I took the Canal Zone."
Although those self-aggrandizing statements of an egotist are not
entirely accurate, they represent the essence of what occurred,
Roosevelt's decision to obtain the Panamanian route on the terms
he dictated decided the outcome.
Roosevelt asked Elihu Root, his Secretary of State, if he had successfully
defended himself in the face of bitter denunciations in the press.
Root replied "You certainly have, Mr. President. You have shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you were
guilt of rape."
Defenders of the acquisition of the Panamanian route agree with
the above interpretation but see mitigating circumstances. They
credit Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell with sufficient intelligence and
determination to exploit what was an obvious situation. They also
stress that Panamanians wanted independence and that aiding them
was a noble act, that the world as well as the United States
needed the canal, and that Colombian greed or short-sightedness
could not be allowed to prevent the construction of the canal.(9)
Some apologists note the political and economic benefits gained by
Panama as won as the payment to Colombia which would have been
unable to hold its remote province anyway. Another group, rarely
vocal in recent years, simply asserts that great powers have
always taken what they wanted from minor powers and nothing
further need be said.
1. Panamá was a province of Colombia.
2. Costa Rica didn't like being ignored. It
had some say in what happened in the San Juan River. The protocol
with Costa Rica was necessary because President Cleveland's
arbitral accord of 1888 forbade Nicaragua from making grants for
canal purposes without consulting Costa Rica.
3. After the bankruptcy of the old company,
the French government forced stockholders to create the new
company. Its principal assets were its concession from Colombia,
its partially constructed works, and the determination of its
leaders to turn a profit.
4. The original 1878 concession had been
extended in 1890 to require completion in 1904, but in 1900 the
Colombian president used emergency powers to extend the concession
for six more years in return for a cash payment. Some Colombians
asserted this was an illegal act.
5. Roosevelt's comments would have been
actionable, for they clearly constituted slander, but heads of
state tend to get away with outrageous comments. Even given the
racial bigotry of most Euro-Americans of his day, Roosevelt's
comments were horrible. Surprisingly, perhaps, even today
historians rarely, if ever, call him down on it.
6. Professor John Basset Moore, a former
legal advisor and assistant secretary in the State Department,
asserted that the US could twist the language of the 1848 treaty
to grab the canal route and that, "once on the ground and
clearly installed, this Government would find no difficulty in
meeting questions as they arose." In other words, steal and
the dare anyone to take it back.
7. US citizens, including Ronald Reagan,
have ignored this provision of the treaty by claiming that the
Canal Zone was US territory. Courts in the United States have
consistently held that it was Panamanian territory and that the US
only had the right of usufruct.
8. The Platt Amendment established Cuba as a
US protectorate, allowing the US to interfere in Cuban domestics
affairs at its whim.
9. Roosevelt also defended his actions in
these terms. That a nation seeks the best possible remuneration or
does not predict the irrational fury of a U.S. president is
certainly not greed or short-sightedness. US efforts to pay as
little as possible for canal rights was also greed. The defense
that the canal would not have been built without the actions the
U.S. took is no defense since Colombia did not refuse to grant
construction rights and the Nicaraguan route was always available.
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