Like a shooting star flashing across the heavens, Pancho Villa burned his way into the
Mexican consciousness during the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920. To many on both sides
of the border, Villa's exploits made him a Robin Hood figure, an avenger of the poor, a righter of
wrongs. Others viewed him as nothing more than a bloodthirsty bandit, driven by greed and an
insatiable desire for violence. Yet to this day, many in Mexico consider Villa a patriot and a hero
of the Mexican Revolution, seeing in him the personification of the spirit of the Mexican masses,
yearning for freedom and a better standard of living.
This paper seeks to evaluate the images of Villa. The questions that drove this research
were, "Why was Villa seen in such contradictory images?" Can any one viewpoint encapsulate
Villa? Was Pancho Villa much worse than his contemporaries during the Revolution in regards to
bloodshed?
The conclusion drawn from a survey of secondary sources is that Villa produced
contradictory reactions in people because his life was filled with contradictions. He wanted to
give Mexicans more freedom yet he ruled like the autocrat Porfirio Diáz. He believed education
could solve the problems of Mexico, yet achieved his goals with the barrel of a gun. He loved
children but could kill an enemy in the blink of an eye. The populace in northern Mexico hailed
Villa as a hero, yet he never woke up in the place he initially bedded down in. Many love him,
but he trusted no one. The violent times in which he lived marked Villa, and though he sought
to improve Mexico, in the end his goals exceeded his grasp.
To understand the motivations of Villa, one must understand the context in which he
lived. By 1876, Mexico came under the sway of Cinco de Mayo hero Porfirio Diáz. Under Diáz's
regime (1876-1910), Mexico progressed economically and industrially. Foreign investment came
into Mexico. Yet, Diáz's measures tended to serve only the elite and further impoverished the
peon class. Under Diáz, Mexico retrogressed socially. To keep the support of the obscenely
wealthy hacendados, Diáz allowed these landed gentry to begin a program of massive land
expropriation.1
The hacendados stripped the local villages, ejidos, of their holdings. Much of the
land and its natural resources (copper, silver, oil), as well as the railroads, was owned and
exploited by foreign investors.2
By 1910, almost half of Mexico was owned by less than three
thousand families.3
Into this web of tyranny came Doroteo Arango, born in 1878. Doroteo's father and mother,
Augustín and Micaela, were poor people living in the
northern state of Durango. They worked on the El Gorgojito ranch, owned by the López Negrete
clan. Augustín was the illegitimate son of Jésus Villa. When his father died, young Doroteo found
himself the man of the house, forced to provide for four younger siblings.4
This is where the Villa
legend begins.
Historians are divided over the actual events that occurred in 1894. The story goes that
Doroteo, age 16, shot Agustín López Negrete for trying to rape Doroteo's sister Martina.
Surprisingly, Negrete did not order Doroteo arrested or killed. Villa scholar, Friedrich Katz,
questioned this train of events because when Doroteo, now Francisco Villa, was arrested in 1898,
the charges brought were mule and gun theft, not the attempted murder of a wealthy hacendado.
For whatever reason, Doroteo took to the outlaw life by 1894.5
He changed his name to Francisco
Villa. The surname may have been in honor of his grandfather.
Historians have pointed out that the choices for peons in northern Mexico were
severely limited. Villa may have been running from the repercussions of his violent act against
Negrete, or he may have decided that the outlaw life was the only way to survive. By the time
young Doroteo became Pancho Villa, the wealthy Terrazas-Creel clan dominated northern Mexico. Luis Terrazas and his nephew and son-in-law, Enrique
Creel, owned enough acreage to be the size of Costa Rica as well as cattle, banks, and railroads.
peons were left with the choice of being virtual slaves of the hacendados, with little recourse of
protest, or starve.6
Also, northern Mexico was steeped in a tradition of violence. This area served as the
frontier, the buffer zone between the marauding Apaches and central Mexico. Mexicans had lived
in military colonies in this area, and learned to fight in order to survive. Two centuries of fighting
Indians had produced in these Mexicans a sense of independence.7
They did not mind the modernization that the Porfiriato brought to Mexico, they protested that the modernization came
at the loss of their own economic and political freedom while padding the pockets of foreigners
and the hacendados.8
Peons were expected to accept these oppressive conditions. The Rurales, or rural
police, loosely defined what made a criminal. A peon who protested or ran away
could be executed under the ley fuga, the law of flight. Unruly peons
could face impressment into the army.9
Looking at the backdrop of the oppression and poverty that pervaded the lives of Mexican
peons, it becomes easier to understand why young Doroteo
Arango became Pancho Villa the outlaw.
From 1894 to 1910, Villa veered between banditry and legitimate work. Villa at times
worked as a butcher, a miner, and a bricklayer.10
From looking at his life, it seems that Villa sought to legitimize his life many times, but his violent and impulsive nature, as well as outside
influences, pushed Villa outside the bounds of respectability. Northern Mexico differed greatly
from the agricultural setting in Morelos which spawned revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. Northern
Mexico was cattle country, and dominated by the Terrazas-Creel clan. Villa became popular to
many in northern Mexico because he rustled the cattle of the Terrazas-Creels. Villa was arrested
for robbery in 1901 and sentenced to serve in the army. Deserting in 1902, he started a butcher
shop in Hidalgo del Parral in Chihuahua, but the Terrazas monopoly muscled Villa out. Like
many who later joined the Revolution, Villa joined not out of a national vision for Mexico, but
because of frustration and anger over local injustices.11
There is little doubt that Villa committed
crimes as an outlaw during the period from 1894 to 1910, but the economic and social context
must always be considered.
In 1910, Porfirio Díaz announced that he would retire and not seek reelection. He was
shocked when Francisco Madero took him seriously. Madero ran on a no-reelection campaign
against Diaz, and the reality that the Porfiriato might end sparked the Mexican Revolution. The
fires of revolution eventually burned all over Mexico. Not allied with Madero, Emiliano Zapata
led peons in revolt for agrarian reform in the state of Morelos in the south. In 1910, Villa met
with Abraham González, Madero's anti-electionist leader in Chihuahua. González must have
viewed Villa as more than a bandit because he convinced Villa to join the Revolution. At the
least, González and later Madero, understood that Villa could be an effective tool in promoting
the overthrow of Diáz.12
Villa scholars have pointed out several motives for Villa joining the Revolution. Revenge
against hacendado oppression provided a prime motive. Also, the Revolution gave Villa an
opportunity for absolution for his past and a vehicle for legitimizing his future. Villa's
background futher reveals another reason. Villa came from fighting stock. He solved problems
astride a horse, a pistol in his hand. Also, Villa saw in men like Madero the avenue to a better
future for Mexico. Barely literate, Villa always bemoaned his lack of education and
sophistication. The Revolution offered Mexicans like Villa a chance at a better way of life.13
The revolt began in the north in Chihuahua. It is important to understand the difference
between the struggle in the north and in the south. Whereas Zapata led mostly peons in revolt
in the south, the revolt in northern Mexico contained people from every aspect of society.
Lawyers, shop keepers, miners, federal army deserters, vaqueros, as well as
peons, joined the
struggle. Some fought against the local jefe políticios, local political bosses. Some joined to fight
the hacendados. Some joined the revolt for the excitement. All were committed to the idea that
Diáz was the source of all the problems and thus had to go.14
From these people, Villa gained his support.
Under the leadership of Pascual Orozco, Jr., Villa and the rebel guerillas inflicted great
damage on the federalist forces of Diáz. By May 10, 1911, the rebel forces captured the border
city of Ciudad Juárez. Diáz saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned. Yet the rejoicing over
his departure would soon be replaced by more fighting. The Revolution, in reality, had just
begun.15
The Revolution over, in his mind, Villa retired to Chihuahua City and opened a meat
packing plant. The claim that Villa was simply a bandit cannot stand since he did not return to
banditry, but tried to be a legitimate businessman. And while in the army, he did not seek to
acquire a personal fortune, instead, he made sure that his men and their families were well
compensated.16
Despite the lofty intentions, the coalition under Madero crumbled. Orozco grew
dissatisfied and rebelled against Madero. Villa rejoined the fight to put down the rebellion against
Madero. Villa served under the command of Victoriano Huerta. Huerta viewed Villa as a threat,
and on a pretext, ordered Villa arrested and executed.17
Villa managed to escape and make it
over the border to El Paso.
Men recognized, respected, and were drawn to the machismo and charisma of Villa. By
March 1913, Villa formed an army of more than three thousand to take on Huerta and avenge
Huerta's murder of Madero.18
Villa and his army of the North drove Huerta's forces out of
successive towns. By late 1913, only three major cities in Chihuahua were left. Villa took
Torreón on October 1, 1913. After a frontal assault of Chihuahua City was repulsed in
November, Villa demonstrated his military ingenuity. Using a faked telegram, he snuck two
thousand men in box cars into Ciudad Juárez later that month. The Trojan horse tactic worked
and Villa took the city. The federal forces in Chihuahua City fled. In December, 1913, Villa
entered Chihuahua City and proclaimed himself governor of Chihuahua. To the crowds, Villa
became known as "the Centaur of the North" and "the Invincible General."19
It is during the two year term of Villa that one can see what he wished to accomplish.
Villa did not seek to enrich himself at the expense of the people, instead he sought to bring reform
to his native area. Villa expropriated the money, the land, and the cattle from the hacendados and
paid his army. He set up pensions for his army widows and orphans. Villa organized a state
bank. Well meaning but ignorantly, he printed his own money to just start the economy. He
lowered the cost of basic necessities. He used his army to improve the infrastructure of
Chihuahua (setting up phones, increasing electrification, improving water supply, and distributing
food). Villa cared about children, especially orphans, and set up schools for their education.20
Katz pointed out that Villa certainly was not a nationalist. He did not desire to rule the country,
only his own region. Villa wanted to return to the old days for northern Mexico, when this area
was split up into military colonies. These times had been marked by a freedom of action and no
central power.21
Yet this positive side of Villa must be balanced with his darker and common elements.
Villa certainly was no democrat. In his own way, Villa proved as autocratic as Diáz. He
tolerated no dissent, and if dissent came, he silenced it with a gun or knife. Villa intentionally
overlooked the savagery of subordinates like Rodolfo Fierro.
Fierro once sought to execute three
hundred prisoners, ten at a time. Only one prisoner escaped, only because Fierro's trigger finger
cramped.22
Villa's violence many times was impulsive and random. Emiliano Zapata, on the other
hand, used violence in a purposive manner. Unlike Zapata who believed in agrarian reform for all
of Morelos, Villa made sure his army got most of the benefits. He believed in giving land only to
those who fought. Zapata gained a more committed following because he promised land for all.
When Villa later encountered disastrous defeats, those peons he could have aided with land
distribution, but did not, turned against him.23
Despite his military bravado and ingenuity, Villa lacked the intellectual and political
sophistication to make lasting social changes. This was seen especially in his dealings with United
States mining and railroad companies. Villa's popular and material support came from the
northern states of Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Zacatecas, and Aguascalientes. The vast
majority of Mexico's railroads, mines, and smelters were situated in these states. To the
detriment of northern Mexicans, American companies owned seventy-eight percent of the mines.
Villa depended on their largess for support and thus protected American interests in northern
Mexico. U. S. companies subsidized Villa's military efforts, but refused to open the mines when
metal prices dropped in 1913. While the closing of the mines increased the poverty of Mexicans
in northern Mexico, Villa proved powerless to provoke the U. S. companies to reopen the mines.
At their bequest, Villa prohibited strikes, and eventually gave in to every demand of the mining
companies. Villa was out of his element and the American companies capitalized on this reality.
Ironically, Villa fought for the Revolution but actually prevented revolutionary goals from being
met in his native land. When Villa suffered several military setbacks in 1915, the American mining
companies abandoned him.24
Political, economic, and military realities, as well as personal
inadequacies, limited Villa's effectiveness as leader of Chihuahua between 1913 and 1915.
Villa's military fortunes began to sour as well after 1914. Villa was not the only northern
leader to revolt against Huerta. In 1913,
Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, and Alvaro
Obregón, commander of the anti-government forces in Sonora, declared they would not support
Huerta. Representatives from Villa, Carranza, and Obregón signed the Plan de Guadalupe,
pledging their opposition to Huerta. The plan named Carranza as the "First Chief" of the
Constitutional army and that he or another would become interim president after Huerta was
ousted. Zapata never allied himself fully with the Constitutional forces, but he continue to fight
Huerta's forces.25
Huerta abdicated in 1914. Carranza grew jealous over Villa making all the
headlines for his military exploits. To make the rivalry even more heated, Carranza delayed
sending coal that Villa needed for his trains in order to reach Mexico City. This allowed
Obregón's forces to be the first to enter the capitol city after Huerta's departure. This enraged
Villa. Even more inflammatory was the fact that Carranza did not invite Villa to the month long
victory celebration in Mexico City.26
Carranza called for a constitutional meeting, and it took place at the neutral site of
Aguascalientes. Villa and Carranza grew to hate and fear each other. Katz stated
that the revolutionary forces split between the urban elites (led by Carranza) and the rural
conventionalists (led by Zapata and Villa). Carranza feared barbarians like Villa and Zapata
would take over. Villa and Zapata feared a Carranza dictatorship. Villa wanted a weak central
government, Carranza wanted strong central government.27
Villa wanted Carranza to retire.
Carranza wanted Villa and Zapata to disband. Neither happened. To Carranza's chagrin, the
convention elected Eulalio Gutiérrez as interim president. On November 23, 1914, Carranza left
Mexico City and set up a provisional government at Vera Cruz.28
With Obregón supporting
Carranza, the stage was set for even more bloody and awful civil war. Villa's conventionalists
and Carranza's constitutionalists declared war on each other.
Villa met his match in Obregón. Whereas Villa succeeded on bravado and ingenuity,
Obregón used logic and strategy. Obregón picked the town of Celaya, over 100 miles northwest
of Mexico as "the anvil on which to break Villa's back." Obregón had studied the tactics used in
the ongoing war in Europe. He knew that Villa liked to used overwhelming cavalry charges.
Obregón planned accordingly. He used staggered trenches, interlocking fields of machine gun
fire, and tight strands of barbed wire. He also held back his calvary for a murderous counter-attack. Villa rejected the advice of his top military adviser
Felipe Ángeles, and on April 6, 1915,
made a frontal assault. In three battles Obregón totally annihilated Villa's army. 29
The ruinous defeats by Obregón started Villa's decline as a national power.
The disastrous defeats by Obregón turned U. S. sentiment against him as well. Once the
darling of the American press, the feature of an American movie, and the recipient of arms and
monies by U. S. companies, Villa was relegated to the level of outlaw once again. The Mexican
Revolution had brought collateral damage to American border towns. Roving Mexican bandits
had attacked U. S. targets. President Woodrow Wilson, despite his distaste for the nationalistic
Carranza, thought that the Carranza government would bring more control and safety to the U. S.
border. 30
The United States also worried that Germany would use the unrest in Mexico to tie
America down and prevent it from getting involved in the war in Europe. Historian James Sandos
has given evidence that German subversives sought to prompt Villa to attack the United States.31
On October 19, 1915, the Wilson administration recognized the Carranza government. To Villa's
outrage, Wilson allowed Carranza's forces to cross into the United States and travel to the town
of Agua Prieta. The battle lasted from November 1 to November 3, 1915. Obregón's forces, led
by Plutarcho Calles, further devastated Villa's forces. Villa was convinced that the Americans
provided the spotlights that outlined Villa's men in the dark and thus made them easy targets for
Calles' army.32
The defeats by Obregón and Calles forced Villa to take up the guerilla lifestyle he
had lived before 1913.
One historian compared Villa's personality and impact to that of a blind and destructive
tornado. Others argue that he was like a wild animal. 33
Despite the desertion of the United States
and the terrible military defeats, Villa still possessed the will to fight. A wounded animal, backed
into a corner, becomes much more dangerous to its foes. Villa considered loyalty preeminent, and
his memory docketed the smallest slight. If possible, he always wreaked his revenge.34
By early 1916, relegated once again to outlaw status and feeling betrayed, he turned his wrath on his once
great benefactor and now Judas, the United States.
To this day, historians grapple with Villa's motivations for attacking Columbus, New
Mexico on March 9, 1916. The attack left seventeen Americans dead. The most obvious reason
that for Villa's attack was the desire for personal revenge.35
Friedrich Katz took a different tack and argued that Villa's primary reason for the attack was that he feared that Carranza was selling
out Mexico to the United States. Villa wanted to disrupt relations between Mexico and the United States, cripple Carranza, punish the United States, and rally Mexicans to a nationalistic
fervor.36
Both political and personal reasons played a part in Villa's actions.37
Villa's efforts, while garnering him more local support, actually helped to further weaken
his own cause. Wilson ordered the Punitive Expedition, and military units led by John J. Pershing
launched out into to Mexico to either find Villa or at least inflict heavy damage on his forces.
While the U. S. expended great effort to find Villa, he remained elusive. Some consider the
Punitive Expedition as a complete failure.38
Yet the United States did inflict great damage on Villa's forces. American forces killed over 400 Villistas and forced Villa's army to scatter. Many
of Villa's generals and colonels were either captured or killed. Carranza's anger over the U. S.
intervention, as well the growing demands of the European war, convinced Wilson to withdraw
the American forces. It would seem that Villa survived more by the effect of outside forces than
his own initiative.39
To many American's and Mexican's surprise and disappointment, Villa continued to fight
on after the American forces left Mexico. Between late 1916 and 1920, he continued to raid
cities and haciendas to stay afloat. Katz argued in his massive work on Villa that the once great
general suffered from a moral decline in the last years of his military career. Whereas before many
joined Villa voluntarily, in these latter years he forcibly took conscripts from the villages he
traversed through. He allowed his men to slaughter, pillage, and rape in some of the areas that
once supported him. Many Chihuahuans, tired of the war, sided with Carranza.40
Villa held out until his old nemesis Carranza was deposed. An old comrade, Adolfo de la
Huerta, came to power in 1920. Tired of fighting, Villa agreed to peace. Despite initial
misgivings, even his old military foe, Alvaro Obregón agreed to leave Villa in peace.41
Villa was given a 25,000 acre hacienda named Canutillo in Durango. Some historians like Henry Bamford
Parkes have said that Villa eventually succumbed to the lure of money and allowed himself to be
bribed into peace.42
Its true that Villa became a large and prosperous hacienda owner, but Katz
pointed out that this military like outpost guaranteed his survival against the myriads of enemies
he had made over the years. Yet unlike other hacendados who did nothing for his
peons, Villa
built a school that educated over 300 students from his own haciendas as well as children from the
surrounding ranches.43
Violence many times recoils on the violent. Villa remained content to run his hacienda for
three years, but by 1923 he suffered the same violent end as Madero, Carranza, Zapata, and later
Obregón. Villa died in a hail of bullets while driving his car in Perral in 1923. Villa had made
rumblings that he would support de la Huerta against the Sonorans (Obregón and Calles). Many
historians including Friedrich Katz have argued that Obregón and Calles organized his
execution.44 Others have said the assassination of Villa concerned personal disputes more than
political ones.45 Whatever the cause, the man Pancho Villa died in 1923, but the legend lives on.
Trying to evaluate the life and motivations of Pancho Villa in a few pages is like trying to
corral a tornado. The text and notes of Friedrich Katz's massive biography of Villa numbers over
900 pages alone. If a phrase can capture Villa, it would be "extreme contradiction." Francisco
"Pancho" Villa was a man of extremes. He suffered from deep emotional depressions, yet he
could laugh easily. He felt great compassion for children, yet he could kill those he deemed
enemies without mercy. He demanded loyalty from all of his men but trusted few of them. He
amassed great amounts of property and cash through his raids, yet he did not desire personal
fortune, spending a large amount on his soldiers and their families. He conducted numerous
sexual affairs, yet he abstained from alcohol and cigarettes. To some he proved an avenger of the
poor, a Mexican Robin Hood. To others Villa's exploits made him a bloodthirsty bandit. Yet his
life must be seen against the backdrop of the violence of the times. Villa and his men killed many
people, but he and his followers certainly were not the only hands stained with blood. The lasting
irony concerning Villa is that he is considered a hero revolution. Yet once in power, he ruled like
the hacendados and politicians he hated.
Because of his intellectual and educational shortcomings, as well as his authoritarian
nature, Pancho Villa was not the man who could have led average Mexicans to a better life, but he
did help dismantle the hacendado system and the old regime.46
With all of his faults and
shortcomings, he helped pave the way for a better Mexico.
Notes
1. Clarence C. Clendenen,
The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 8-10.
2. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit . (New York: Random House, 1970), 27.
3. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969, 3rd
edition), 305.
4. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata: A History of the Mexican Revolution. (New York:
Carroll and Graf, 2000, 2001), 58.
5. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa. (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1998), 805.
6. Ibid. , 794, 799, 805.
7. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power; A History of Modern Mexico. (New
York: Harper Collins, 1997), 307.
8. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 800.
9. Ibid. , 805; Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, 10.
10. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 60.
11. Ibid. , 60, 63; Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 806.
12. Ibid. , 103.
13. Ibid. , 73-74; Haldeen Braddy, Cock of the Walk: The Legend of Pancho Villa. (Port
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970), 90; Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 69
Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 308, 317, 319.
14. Michael C. Myer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, The Course of Mexican
History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 7th edition), 480.
15. Ibid. , 483-485.
16. Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, 316.
17. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 141-142.
18. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 39; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History
of Mexico, 338.
19. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 39-40.
20. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 315.
21. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 808-809.
22. Ibid. , 809; Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 318.
23. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 709, 808.
24. William K. Myers, "Pancho Villa and the Multinationals: United States Mining
Interests in Villista Mexico, 1913-1915," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (May 1991): 339-363.
25. Michael C. Myers, et als., The Course of Mexican History, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003, 7th edition), 503.
26. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 52.
27. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 810-811.
28. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 54.
29. Ibid. , 55-57.
30. James A Sandos, "Pancho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican
Diplomacy Reconsidered," Journal of Latin American Studies 13 (November 1981), 298.
31. Louis G. Kahle, "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Vensustiano Carranza," The
Hispanic American Historical Review, (August 1958), 353, 362; See James A. Sandos, "German
Involvement in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus Raid," The Hispanic
American Historical Review 50 (February 1970), 70-88.
32. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 61-62; Enrique Krauze, Mexico
Biography of Power, 326-328.
33. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 341; Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata,
188.
34. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 328.
35. Ibid. , 328; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 356.
36. Friedrich Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico," The
American Historical Review 83 (February 1978), 116, 125-126.
37. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 319-320.
38. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 329-330.
39. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 231; James A. Sandos, "Pancho Villa
and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy Reconsidered," 302-303;
Clarence Clendenden, The United States and Pancho Villa, 317-318.
40. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 623-624, 634-635, 709, 811.
41. Herbert Malloy Mason, The Great Pursuit , 237.
42. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 367.
43. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 733, 811.
44. Ibid. , 780; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 366; Joseph A. Stout, Jr.,
Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915-1920, (Fort Worth,
Texas: Texas Christian University, 1999), 142.
45. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 237-238.
46. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 817
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