11: The Republics of the Caribbean
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The course of events in certain of the republics in and around
the Caribbean Sea warned the Hispanic nations that independence
was a relative condition and that it might vary in direct ratio
with nearness to the United States. After 1906 this powerful
northern neighbor showed an unmistakable tendency to extend its
influence in various ways. Here fiscal and police control was
established; there official recognition was withheld from a
President who had secured office by unconstitutional methods.
Nonrecognition promised to be an effective way of maintaining a
regime of law and order, as the United States understood those
terms. Assurances from the United States of the full political
equality of all republics, big or little, in the western
hemisphere did not always carry conviction to Spanish American
ears. The smaller countries in and around the Caribbean Sea, at
least, seemed likely to become virtually American protectorates.
Like their Hispanic neighbor on the north, the little republics
of Central America were also scenes of political disturbance.
None of them except Panama escaped revolutionary uprisings,
though the loss of life and property was insignificant. On the
other hand, in these early years of the century the five
countries north of Panama made substantial progress toward
federation. As a South American writer has expressed it, their
previous efforts in that direction "amid sumptuous festivals,
banquets and other solemn public acts" at which they "intoned in
lyric accents daily hymns for the imperishable reunion of the
isthmian republics," had been as illusory as they were frequent.
Despite the mediation of the United States and Mexico in 1906,
while the latter was still ruled by Diaz, the struggle in which
Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Salvador had been engaged was
soon renewed between the first two belligerents. Since diplomatic
interposition no longer availed, American marines were landed in
Nicaragua, and the bumptious Zelaya was induced to have his
country meet its neighbors in a conference at Washington. Under
the auspices of the United States and Mexico, in December, 1907,
representatives of the five republics signed a series of
conventions providing for peace and cooperation. An arbitral
court of justice, to be erected in Costa Rica and composed of one
judge from each nation, was to decide all matters of dispute
which could not be adjusted through ordinary diplomatic means.
Here, also, an institute for the training of Central American
teachers was to be established. Annual conferences were to
discuss, and an office in Guatemala was to record, measures
designed to secure uniformity in financial, commercial,
industrial, sanitary, and educational regulations. Honduras, the
storm center of weakness, was to be neutralized. None of the
States was thereafter to recognize in any of them a government
which had been set up in an illegal fashion. A "Constitutional
Act of Central American Fraternity," moreover, was adopted on
behalf of peace, harmony, and progress. Toward a realization of
the several objects of the conference, the Presidents of the five
republics were to invite their colleagues of the United States
and Mexico, whenever needful, to appoint representatives, to
"lend their good offices in a purely friendly way."
Though most of these agencies were promptly put into operation,
the results were not altogether satisfactory. Some discords, to
be sure, were removed by treaties settling boundary questions and
providing for reciprocal trade advantages; but it is doubtful
whether the arrangements devised at Washington would have worked
at all if the United States had not kept the little countries
under a certain amount of observation. What the Central Americans
apparently preferred was to be left alone, some of them to mind
their own business, others to mind their neighbor's affairs.
Of all the Central American countries Honduras was, perhaps, the
one most afflicted with pecuniary misfortunes. In 1909 its
foreign debt, along with arrears of interest unpaid for
thirty-seven years, was estimated at upwards of $110,000,000. Of
this amount a large part consisted of loans obtained from foreign
capitalists, at more or less extortionate rates, for the
construction of a short railway, of which less than half had been
built. That revolutions should be rather chronic in a land where
so much money could be squandered and where the temperaments of
Presidents and ex-Presidents were so bellicose, was natural
enough. When the United States could not induce the warring
rivals to abide by fair elections, it sent a force of marines to
overawe them and gave warning that further disturbances would not
be allowed.
In Nicaragua the conditions were similar. Here Zelaya, restive
under the limitations set by the conference at Washington,
yearned to become the "strong man" of Central America, who would
teach the Yankees to stop their meddling. But his downfall was
imminent. In 1909, as the result of his execution of two American
soldiers of fortune who had taken part in a recent insurrection,
the United States resolved to tolerate Zelaya no longer. Openly
recognizing the insurgents, it forced the dictator out of the
country. Three years later, when a President-elect started to
assume office before the legally appointed time, a force of
American marines at the capital convinced him that such a
procedure was undesirable. The "corrupt and barbarous" conditions
prevailing in Zelaya's time, he was informed, could not be
tolerated. The United States, in fact, notified all parties in
Nicaragua that, under the terms of the Washington conventions, it
had a "moral mandate to exert its influence for the preservation
of the general peace of Central America." Since those agreements
had vested no one with authority to enforce them, such an
interpretation of their language, aimed apparently at all
disturbances, foreign as well as domestic, was rather elastic! At
all events, after 1912, when a new constitution was adopted, the
country became relatively quiet and somewhat progressive.
Whenever a political flurry did take place, American marines were
employed to preserve the peace. Many citizens, therefore,
declined to vote, on the ground that the moral and material
support thus furnished by the great nation to the northward
rendered it futile for them to assume political responsibilities.
Meanwhile negotiations began which were ultimately to make
Nicaragua a fiscal protectorate of the United States. American
officials were chosen to act as financial advisers and collectors
of customs, and favorable arrangements were concluded with
American bankers regarding the monetary situation; but it was not
until 1916 that a treaty covering this situation was ratified.
According to its provisions, in return for a stipulated sum to be
expended under American direction, Nicaragua was to grant to the
United States the exclusive privilege of constructing a canal
through the territory of the republic and to lease to it the Corn
Islands and a part of Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific coast, for use
as naval stations. The prospect of American intervention alarmed
the neighboring republics. Asserting that the treaty infringed
upon their respective boundaries, Costa Rica, and Salvador
brought suit against Nicaragua before the Central American Court.
With the exception of the Nicaraguan representative, the judges
upheld the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant had no
right to make any such concessions without previous consultation
with Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras, since all three alike
were affected by them. The Court observed, however, that it could
not declare the treaty void because the United States, one of the
parties concerned, was not subject to its jurisdiction. Nicaragua
declined to accept the decision; and the United States, the
country responsible for the existence of the Court and presumably
interested in helping to enforce its judgment, allowed it to go
out of existence in 1918 on the expiration of its ten-year term.
The economic situation of Costa Rica brought about a state of
affairs wholly unusual in Central American politics. The
President, Alfredo González, wished to reform the system of
taxation so that a fairer share of the public burdens should fall
on the great landholders who, like most of their brethren in the
Hispanic countries, were practically exempt. This project,
coupled with the fact that certain American citizens seeking an
oil concession had undermined the power of the President by
wholesale bribery, induced the Minister of War, in 1917, to start
a revolt against him. Rather than shed the blood of his fellow
citizens for mere personal advantages, González sustained the
good reputation of Costa Rica for freedom from civil commotions
by quietly leaving the country and going to the United States to
present his case. In consequence, the American Government
declined to recognize the de facto ruler.
Police and fiscal supervision by the United States has
characterized the recent history of Panama. Not only has a
proposed increase in the customs duties been disallowed, but more
than once the unrest attending presidential elections has
required the calming presence of American officials. As a means
of forestalling outbreaks, particularly in view of the
cosmopolitan population resident on the Isthmus, the republic
enacted a law in 1914 which forbade foreigners to mix in local
politics and authorized the expulsion of naturalized citizens who
attacked the Government through the press or otherwise. With the
approval of the United States, Panama entered into an agreement
with American financiers providing for the creation of a national
bank, one-fourth of the directors of which should be named by the
Government of the republic.
The second period of American rule in Cuba lasted till 1909.
Control of the Government was then formally transferred to José
Miguel Gómez, the President who had been chosen by the Liberals
at the elections held in the previous year; but the United States
did not cease to watch over its chief Caribbean ward. A bitter
controversy soon developed in the Cuban Congress over measures to
forbid the further purchase of land by aliens, and to insure that
a certain percentage of the public offices should be held by
colored citizens. Though both projects were defeated, they
revealed a strong antiforeign sentiment and much dissatisfaction
on the part of the negro population. It was clear also that
Gómez, intended to oust all conservatives from office, for an
obedient Congress passed a bill suspending the civil service
rules.
The partisanship of Gómez, and his supporters, together with the
constant interference of military veterans in political affairs,
provoked numerous outbreaks, which led the United States, in
1912, to warn Cuba that it might again be compelled to intervene.
Eventually, when a negro insurrection in the eastern part of the
island menaced the safety of foreigners, American marines were
landed. Another instance of intervention was the objection by the
United States to an employers' liability law that would have
given a monopoly of the insurance business to a Cuban company to
the detriment of American firms.
After the election of Mario Menocal, the Conservative candidate,
to the presidency in 1912, another occasion for intervention
presented itself. An amnesty bill, originally drafted for the
purpose of freeing the colored insurgents and other offenders,
was amended so as to empower the retiring President to grant
pardon before trial to persons whom his successor wished to
prosecute for wholesale corruption in financial transactions.
Before the bill passed, however, notice was sent from Washington
that, since the American Government had the authority to
supervise the finances of the republic, Gómez would better veto
the bill, and this he accordingly did.
A sharp struggle arose when it became known that Menocal would be
a candidate for reelection. The Liberal majority in the Congress
passed a bill requiring that a President who sought to succeed
himself should resign two months before the elections. When
Menocal vetoed this measure, his opponents demanded that the
United States supervise the elections. As the result of the
elections was doubtful, Gómez and his followers resorted in 1917
to the usual insurrection; whereupon the American Government
warned the rebels that it would not recognize their claims if
they won by force. Active aid from that quarter, as well as the
capture of the insurgent leader, caused the movement to collapse
after the electoral college had decided in favor of Menocal.
In the Dominican Republic disturbances were frequent,
notwithstanding the fact that American officials were in charge
of the customhouses and by their presence were expected to exert
a quieting influence. Even the adoption, in 1908, of a new
constitution which provided for the prolongation of the
presidential term to six years and for the abolition of the
office of Vice President—two stabilizing devices quite common in
Hispanic countries where personal ambition is prone to be a
source of political trouble—did not help much to restore order.
The assassination of the President and the persistence of
age-long quarrels with Haiti over boundaries made matters worse.
Thereupon, in 1913, the United States served formal notice on the
rebellious parties that it would not only refuse to recognize any
Government set up by force but would withhold any share in the
receipts from the customs. As this procedure did not prevent a
revolutionary leader from demanding half a million dollars as a
financial sedative for his political nerves and from creating
more trouble when the President failed to dispense it, the heavy
hand of an American naval force administered another kind of
specific, until commissioners from Porto Rico could arrive to
superintend the selection of a new chief magistrate.
Notwithstanding the protest of the Dominican Government, the
"fairest and freest" elections ever known in the country were
held under the direction of those officials—as a "body of
friendly observers"!
However amicable this arrangement seemed, it did not smother the
flames of discord. In 1916, when an American naval commander
suggested that a rebellious Minister of War leave the capital, he
agreed to do so if the "fairest and freest" of chosen Presidents
would resign. Even after both of them had complied with the
suggestions, the individuals who assumed their respective offices
were soon at loggerheads. Accordingly the United States placed
the republic under military rule, until a President could be
elected who might be able to retain his post without too much
"friendly observation" from Washington, and a Minister of War
could be appointed who would refrain from making war on the
President! Then the organization of a new party to combat the
previous inordinate display of personalities in politics created
some hope that the republic would accomplish its own redemption.
Only because of its relation to the wars of emancipation and to
the Dominican Republic, need the negro state of Haiti, occupying
the western part of the Caribbean island, be mentioned in
connection with the story of the Hispanic nations. Suffice it to
say that the fact that their color was different and that they
spoke a variant of French instead of Spanish did not prevent the
inhabitants of this state from offering a far worse spectacle of
political and financial demoralization than did their neighbors
to the eastward. Perpetual commotions and repeated interventions
by American and European naval forces on behalf of the foreign
residents, eventually made it imperative for the United States to
take direct charge of the republic. In 1916, by a convention
which placed the finances under American control, created a
native constabulary under American officers, and imposed a number
of other restraints, the United States converted Haiti into what
is practically a protectorate.
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