1: A Transition Period
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A Transition Period
Politicians at Washington very generally failed to realize that
the advent of President Hayes marked the dismissal of the issues
of war and reconstruction. They regarded as an episode what
turned out to be the close of an era. They saw, indeed, that
public interest in the old issues had waned, but they were
confident that this lack of interest was transient. They admitted
that the emotional fervor excited by the war and by the issues of
human right involved in its results was somewhat damped, but they
believed that the settlement of those issues was still so
incomplete that public interest would surely rekindle. For many
years the ruling thought of the Republican party leaders was to
be watchful of any opportunity to ply the bellows on the embers.
Besides genuine concern over the way in which the negroes had
been divested of political privileges conferred by national
legislation, the Republicans felt a tingling sense of party
injury.
The most eminent party leaders at this time—both standing high
as presidential possibilities—were James G. Blaine and John
Sherman. In a magazine article published in 1880 Mr. Blaine
wrote: "As the matter stands, all violence in the South inures to
the benefit of one political party.... Our institutions have been
tried by the fiery test of war, and have survived. It remains to
be seen whether the attempt to govern the country by the power of
a 'solid South,' unlawfully consolidated, can be successful....
The republic must be strong enough, and shall be strong enough,
to protect the weakest of its citizens in all their rights." And
so late as 1884, Mr. Sherman earnestly contended for the
principle of national intervention in the conduct of state
elections. "The war," he said, "emancipated and made citizens of
five million people who had been slaves. This was a national act
and whether wisely or imprudently done it must be respected by
the people of all the States. If sought to be reversed in any
degree by the people of any locality it is the duty of the
national government to make their act respected by all its
citizens."
Republican party platforms reiterated such opinions long after
their practical futility had become manifest. Indeed, it was a
matter of common knowledge that negro suffrage had been undone by
force and fraud; hardly more than a perfunctory denial of the
fact was ever made in Congress, and meanwhile it was a source of
jest and anecdote among members of all parties behind the scenes.
Republican members were bantered by Democratic colleagues upon
the way in which provision for Republican party advantage in the
South had actually given to the Democratic party a solid block of
sure electoral votes. The time at last came when a Southern
Senator, Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina, blurted out in the
open what had for years been common talk in private. "We took the
government away," be asserted. "We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot
them. We are not ashamed of it.... With that system—force,
tissue ballots, etc.—we got tired ourselves. So we called a
constitutional convention, and we eliminated, as I said, all of
the colored people we could under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.... The brotherhood of man exists no longer, because
you shoot negroes in Illinois, when they come in competition with
your labor, and we shoot them in South Carolina, when they come
in competition with us in the matter of elections."
Such a miscarriage of Republican policy was long a bitter
grievance to the leaders of the party and incited them to action.
If they could have had their desire, they would have used
stringent means to remedy the situation. Measures to enforce the
political rights of the freedmen were frequently agitated, but
every force bill which was presented had to encounter a deep and
pervasive opposition not confined by party lines but manifested
even within the Republican party itself. Party platforms insisted
upon the issue, but public opinion steadily disregarded it.
Apparently a fine opportunity to redress this grievance was
afforded by the election of President Harrison in 1888 upon a
platform declaring that the national power of the Democratic
party was due to "the suppression of the ballot by a criminal
nullification of the Constitution and laws of the United States,"
and demanding "effective legislation to secure integrity and
purity of elections." But, although they were victorious at the
polls that year, the Republican leaders were unable to embody in
legislation the ideal proposed in their platform. Of the causes
of this failure, George F. Hoar gives an instructive account in
his Autobiography. As chairman of the Senate committee on
privileges and elections he was in a position to know all the
details of the legislative attempts, the failure of which
compelled the Republican leaders to acquiesce in the decision of
public opinion against the old issues and in favor of new issues.
Senator Hoar relates that he made careful preparation of a bill
for holding, under national authority, separate registrations and
elections for members of Congress. But when he consulted his
party associates in the Senate he found most of them averse to an
arrangement which would double the cost of elections and would
require citizens to register at different times for federal
elections and for state and municipal elections. Senator Hoar
thereupon abandoned that bill and prepared another which provided
that, upon application to court showing reasonable grounds, the
court should appoint officers from both parties to supervise the
election. The bill adopted a feature of electoral procedure which
in England has had a salutary effect. It was provided that in
case of a dispute concerning an election certificate, the circuit
court of the United States in which the district was situated
should hear the case and should award a certificate entitling the
one or other of the contestants to be placed on the clerk's roll
and to serve until the House should act on the case. Mr. Hoar
stated that the bill "deeply excited the whole country," and went
on to say that "some worthy Republican senators became alarmed.
They thought, with a good deal of reason, that it was better to
allow existing evils and conditions to be cured by time, and the
returning conscience and good sense of the people, rather than
have the strife, the result of which must be quite doubtful,
which the enactment and enforcement of this law, however moderate
and just, would inevitably create." The existence of this
attitude of mind made party advocacy of the bill a hopeless
undertaking and, though it was favorably reported on August 7,
1890, no further action was taken during that session. At the
December session it was taken up for consideration, but after a
few days of debate a motion to lay it aside was carried by the
Democrats with the assistance of enough Republicans to give them
a majority. This was the end of force bills, and during President
Cleveland's second term the few remaining statutes giving
authority for federal interference in such matters was repealed
under the lead of Senator Hill of New York. With the passage of
this act, the Republican party leaders for the first time
abandoned all purpose of attempting to secure by national
legislation the political privileges of the negroes. This
determination was announced is the Senate by Mr. Hoar and was
assented to by Senator Chandler of New Hampshire, who had been a
zealous champion of federal action. According to Mr. Hoar, "no
Republican has dissented from it."
The facts upon which the force bill was based were so notorious
and the bill itself was so moderate in its character that the
general indifference of the public seemed to betray moral
insensibility and emotional torpor. Much could be said in favor
of the bill. This latest assertion of national authority in
federal elections involved no new principle. In legalistic
complexion the proposed measure was of the same character as
previous legislation dealing with this subject, instances of
which are the Act of 1842, requiring the election of members of
the House by districts, and the Act of 1866, regulating the
election of United States Senators. Fraudulent returns in
congressional elections have always been a notorious evil, and
the partisan way in which they are passed upon is still a gross
blemish upon the constitutional system of the United States, and
one which is likely never to be removed until the principle of
judicial determination of electoral contests has been adopted in
this country as it has been in England. The truth of the matter
appears to be that the public paid no attention to the merits of
the bill. It was viewed simply as a continuation of the radical
reconstruction policy, the practical results of which had become
intolerable. However great the actual evils of the situation
might be, public opinion held that it would be wiser to leave
them to be dealt with by state authority than by such incompetent
statesmanship as had been common in Washington. Moreover, the man
in the street resented the indifference of politicians to all
issues save those derived from the Civil War.
Viscount Bryce in his American Commonwealth, the most complete
and penetrating examination of American political conditions
written during this period, gives this account of the party
situation:
"The great parties are the Republicans and the Democrats. What
are their principles, their distinctive tenets, their tendencies?
Which of them is for tariff reform, for the further extension of
civil service reform, a spirited foreign policy, for the
regulation of railroads and telegraphs by legislation, for
changes in the currency, for any other of the twenty issues which
one hears discussed in this country as seriously involving its
welfare? This is what a European is always asking of intelligent
Republicans and intelligent Democrats. He is always asking
because he never gets an answer. The replies leave him deeper in
perplexity. After some months the truth begins to dawn upon him.
Neither party has, as a party, anything definite to say on these
issues; neither party has any clean-cut principles, any
distinctive tenets. Both have traditions. Both claim to have
tendencies. Both certainly have war cries, organizations,
interests, enlisted in their support. But those interests are in
the main the interests of getting or keeping the patronage of the
government. Tenets and policies, points of political doctrine and
points of political practice have all but vanished. They have not
been thrown away, but have been stripped away by time and the
progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blotting out
others. All has been lost, except office or the hope of it."
That such a situation could actually exist in the face of public
disapproval is a demonstration of the defects of Congress as an
organ of national representation. Normally, a representative
assembly is a school of statesmanship which is drawn upon for
filling the great posts of administration. Not only is this the
case under the parliamentary system in vogue in England, but it
is equally the case in Switzerland whose constitution agrees with
that of the United States in forbidding members of Congress to
hold executive office. But somehow the American Congress fails to
produce capable statesmen. It attracts politicians who display
affability, shrewdness, dexterity, and eloquence, but who are
lacking in discernment of public needs and in ability to provide
for them, so that power and opportunity are often associated with
gross political incompetency.(1) The solutions of the great
political problems of the United States are accomplished by
transferring to Washington men like Hayes and Cleveland whose
political experience has been gained in other fields.
The system of congressional government was subjected to some
scrutiny in 1880-81 through the efforts of Senator George H.
Pendleton of Ohio, an old statesman who had returned to public
life after long absence. He had been prominent in the Democratic
party before the war and in 1864 he was the party candidate for
Vice-President. In 1868 he was the leading candidate for the
presidential nomination on a number of ballots, but he was
defeated. In 1869 he was a candidate for Governor of Ohio but was
defeated; he then retired from public life until 1879 when he
was elected to the United States Senate. As a member of that
body, he devoted himself to the betterment of political
conditions. His efforts in this direction were facilitated not
only by his wide political experience but also by the tact and
urbanity of his manners, which had gained for him in Ohio
politics the nickname of "Gentleman George."
In agreement with opinions long previously expressed in Story's
Commentaries, Senator Pendleton attributed the inefficiency of
national government to the sharp separation of Congress from the
Administration—a separation not required by the Constitution but
made by Congress itself and subject to change at its discretion.
He proposed to admit the heads of executive departments to
participation in the proceedings of Congress. "This system," said
he, "will require the selection of the strongest men to be heads
of departments, and will require them to be well equipped with
the knowledge of their offices. It will also require the
strongest men to be the leaders of Congress and participate in
the debate. It will bring those strong men in contact, perhaps
into conflict, to advance the public weal and thus stimulate
their abilities and their efforts, and will thus assuredly result
to the good of the country."(2) The report—signed by such party
leaders as Allison, Blaine, and Ingalls among the Republicans,
and by Pendleton and Voorhees among the Democrats—reviewed the
history of relations between the executive and legislative
branches and closed with the expression of the unanimous belief
of the committee that the adoption of the measure "will be the
first step towards a sound civil service reform, which will
secure a larger wisdom in the adoption of policies, and a better
system in their execution."
No action was taken on this proposal, notwithstanding the favor
with which it was regarded by many close students of the
political institutions of the country. Public opinion,
preoccupied with more specific issues, seemed indifferent to a
reform that aimed simply at general improvement in governmental
machinery. The legislative calendars are always so heaped with
projects that to reach and act upon any particular measure is
impossible, except when there is brought to bear such energetic
pressure as to produce special arrangements for the purpose, and
in this case no such pressure was developed. A companion measure
for civil service reform which was proposed by Senator Pendleton
long remained in a worse situation, for it was not merely left
under the congressional midden heap but was deliberately buried
by politicians who were determined that it should never emerge.
That it did emerge is due to a tragedy which aroused public
opinion to an extent that intimidated Congress.
Want of genuine political principles made factional spirit only
the more violent and depraved. So long as power and opportunity
were based not upon public confidence but upon mere advantage of
position, the contention of party leaders turned upon questions
of appointment to office and the control of party machinery. The
Republican national convention of 1880 was the scene of a
factional struggle which left deep marks upon public life and
caused divisions lasting until the party leaders of that period
were removed from the scene. In September 1879, General Grant
landed in San Francisco, after a tour around the world occupying
over two years, and as he passed through the country he was
received with a warmth which showed that popular devotion was
abounding. A movement in favor of renominating him to the
Presidency was started under the direction of Senator Roscoe
Conkling of New York. Grant's renown as the greatest military
leader of the Civil War was not his only asset in the eyes of his
supporters. In his career as President he had shown, on occasion,
independence and steadfastness of character. He stayed the
greenback movement by his veto after eminent party leaders had
yielded to it. He had endeavored to introduce civil service
reform and, although his measures had been frustrated by the
refusal of Congress to vote the necessary appropriations, his
tenacity of purpose was such that it could scarcely be doubted
that with renewed opportunity he would resume his efforts. The
scandals which blemished the conduct of public affairs during his
administration could not be attributed to any lack of personal
honesty on his part. Grant went out of the presidential office
poorer than when he entered it. Since then, his views had been
broadened by travel and by observation, and it was a reasonable
supposition that he was now better qualified than ever before for
the duties of the presidential office. He was only fifty-eight,
an age much below that at which an active career should be
expected to close, and certainly an age at which European
statesmen are commonly thought to possess unabated powers. In
opposition to him was a tradition peculiar to American politics,
though unsupported by any provision of the Constitution
according to which no one should be elected President for more
than two terms. It may be questioned whether this tradition does
not owe its strength more to the ambition of politicians than to
sincere conviction on the part of the people.(3)
So strong was the movement in favor of General Grant as President
that the united strength of the other candidates had difficulty
in staying the boom, which, indeed, might have been successful
but for the arrogant methods and tactical blunders of Senator
Conkling. When three of the delegates voted against a resolution
binding all to support the nominee whoever that nominee might be,
he offered a resolution that those who had voted in the negative
"do not deserve and have forfeited their vote in this
convention." The feeling excited by this condemnatory motion was
so strong that Conkling was obliged to withdraw it. He also made
a contest in behalf of the unit rule but was defeated, as the
convention decided that every delegate should have the right to
have his vote counted as he individually desired. Notwithstanding
these defeats of the chief manager of the movement in his favor,
Grant was the leading candidate with 304 votes on the first
ballot, James G. Blaine standing second with 284. This was the
highest point in the balloting reached by Blaine, while the
Grant vote made slight gains. Besides Grant and Blaine, four
other candidates were in the field, and the convention drifted
into a deadlock which under ordinary circumstances would have
probably been dissolved by shifts of support to Grant. But in the
preliminary disputes a very favorable impression had been made
upon the convention by General Garfield, who was not himself a
candidate but was supporting the candidacy of John Sherman, who
stood third in the poll. On the twenty-eighth ballot, two votes
were cast for Garfield; although he protested that he was not a
candidate and was pledged to Sherman. But it became apparent that
no concentration could be effected on any other candidate to
prevent the nomination of Grant, and votes now turned to Garfield
so rapidly that on the thirty-sixth ballot he received 399, a
clear majority of the whole. The adherents of Grant stuck to him
to the end, polling 306 votes on the last ballot and subsequently
deporting themselves as those who had made a proud record of
constancy.
The Democratic national convention nominated General Hancock,
which was, in effect, an appeal to the memories and sentiments of
the past, as their candidate's public distinction rested upon his
war record. The canvass was marked by listlessness and
indifference on the part of the general public, and by a fury of
calumny on the part of the politicians directed against their
opponents. Forgery was resorted to with marked effect on the
Pacific coast, where a letter—the famous Morey letter—in which
Garfield's handwriting was counterfeited, was circulated
expressing unpopular views an the subject of Chinese immigration.
The forgery was issued in the closing days of the canvass, when
there was not time to expose it. Arrangements had been made for a
wide distribution of facsimiles which exerted a strong influence.
Hancock won five out of the six electoral votes of California and
came near getting the three votes of Oregon also. In the popular
vote of the whole country, Garfield had a plurality of less than
ten thousand in a total vote of over nine million.
The peculiarities of the party system which has been developed in
American politics, forces upon the President the occupation of
employment agent as one of his principal engagements. The
contention over official patronage, always strong and ardent upon
the accession of every new President, was aggravated in
Garfield's case by the factional war of which his own nomination
was a phase. The factions of the Republican party in New York at
this period were known as the "Stalwarts" and the "Half-Breeds,"
the former adhering to the leadership of Senator Conkling, the
latter to the leadership of Mr. Blaine, whom President Garfield
had appointed to be his Secretary of State. Soon after the
inauguration of Garfield it became manifest that he would favor
the "Half-Breeds"; but under the Constitution appointments are
made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and both
the Senators from New York were "Stalwarts." Although the
Constitution contemplates the action of the entire Senate as the
advisory body in matters of appointment, a practice had been
established by which the Senators from each State were accorded
the right to dictate appointments in their respective States.
According to Senator Hoar, when he entered public life in 1869,
"the Senate claimed almost the entire control of the executive
function of appointment to office.... What was called 'the
courtesy of the Senate' was depended upon to enable a Senator to
dictate to the executive all appointments and removals in his
territory." This practice was at its greatest height when
President Garfield challenged the system, and he let it be
understood that he would insist upon his constitutional right to
make nominations at his own discretion. When Senator Conkling
obtained from a caucus of his Republican colleagues an expression
of sympathy with his position, the President let it be known that
he regarded such action as an affront and he withdrew all New
York nominations except those to which exception had been taken
by the New York Senators, thus confronting the Senate with the
issue whether they would stand by the new Administration or would
follow Conkling's lead.
On the other hand, Senator Conkling and his adherents declared
the issue to be simply whether competent public officials should
be removed to make room for factional favorites. This view of the
case was adopted by Vice-President Arthur and by
Postmaster-General James of Garfield's own Cabinet, who, with New
York Senators Conkling and Platt, signed a remonstrance in which
they declared that in their belief the interests of the public
service would not be promoted by the changes proposed. These
changes were thus described in a letter of May 14,1881, from the
New York Senators to Governor Cornell of New York:
"Some weeks ago, the President sent to the Senate in a group the
nominations of several persons for public offices already filled.
One of these offices is the Collectorship of the Port of New
York, now held by General Merritt; another is the consul
generalship at London, now held by General Badeau; another is
Charge d'Affaires to Denmark, held by Mr. Cramer; another is the
mission to Switzerland, held by Mr. Fish, a son of the former
Secretary of State.... It was proposed to displace them all, not
for any alleged fault of theirs, or for any alleged need or
advantage of the public service, but in order to give the great
offices of Collector of the Port of New York to Mr. William H.
Robertson as a 'reward' for certain acts of his, said to have
aided in making the nomination of General Garfield possible....
We have not attempted to 'dictate,' nor have we asked the
nomination of one person to any office in the State."
Except in the case of their remonstrance against the Robertson
appointment, they had "never even expressed an opinion to the
President in any case unless questioned in regard to it." Along
with this statement the New York Senators transmitted their
resignations, saying "we hold it respectful and becoming to make
room for those who may correct all the errors we have made, and
interpret aright all the duties we have misconceived."
The New York Legislature was then in session. Conkling and Platt
offered themselves as candidates for reelection, and a protracted
factional struggle ensued; in the course of which, the nation was
shocked by the news that President Garfield had been assassinated
by a disappointed once seeker in a Washington railway station on
July 2, 1881. The President died from the effects of the wound on
the 19th of September. Meanwhile, the contest in the New York
Legislature continued until the 22d of July when the deadlock was
broken by the election of Warner Miller and Elbridge G. Lapham to
fill the vacancies.
The deep disgust with which the nation regarded this factional
war, and the horror inspired by the assassination of President
Garfield, produced a revulsion of public opinion in favor of
civil service reform so energetic as to overcome congressional
antipathy. Senator Pendleton's bill to introduce the merit
system, which had been pending for nearly two years, was passed
by the Senate on December 27, 1882, and by the House on January
4, 1883. The importance of the act lay in its recognition of the
principles of the reform and in its provision of means by which
the President could apply those principles. A Civil Service
Commission was created, and the President was authorized to
classify the Civil Service and to provide selection by
competitive examination for all appointments to the service thus
classified. The law was essentially an enabling act, and its
practical efficacy was contingent upon executive discretion.
__________
(1) Of this regrettable fact the whole history of emancipation is a
monument. The contrast between the social consequences of
emancipation in the West Indies, as guided by British
statesmanship, under conditions of meager industrial opportunity,
and the social consequences of emancipation in the United States,
affords an instructive example of the complicated evils which a
nation may experience through the sheer incapacity of its
government.
(2) Senate Report, No. 837, 46th Congress, 3d session, February
4, 1881.
(3) The reasoning of The Federalist, in favor of continued
reeligibility, is cogent in itself and is supported by the
experience of other countries, for it shows that custody of power
may remain in the same hands for long periods without detriment
and without occasioning any difficulty in terminating that
custody when public confidence is withdrawn. American
sensitiveness on this point would seem to impute to the
Constitution a frailty that gives it a low rating among forms of
government. As better means are provided for enforcing
administrative responsibility, the popular dislike of third terms
will doubtless disappear.
Title Page || 2: Political Groping and Party Fluctuation >>
