2: Political Groping and Party Fluctuation
<< 1: A Transition Period || 3: The Advent of Cleveland >>
President Garfield's career was cut short so soon after his
accession to office, that he had no opportunity of showing
whether he had the will and the power to obtain action for the
redress of public grievances, which the congressional factions
were disposed to ignore. His experience and his attainments were
such as should have qualified him for the task, and in his public
life he had shown firmness of character. His courageous
opposition to the greenback movement in Ohio had been of great
service to the nation in maintaining the standard of value. When
a party convention in his district passed resolutions in favor of
paying interest on the bonds with paper instead of coin, he gave
a rare instance of political intrepidity by declaring that he
would not accept the nomination on such a platform. It was the
deliberate opinion of Senator Hoar, who knew Garfield intimately,
that "next to the assassination of Lincoln, his death was the
greatest national misfortune ever caused to this country by the
loss of a single life."
The lingering illness of President Garfield raised a serious question about presidential authority which is still unsettled.
For over two months before he died he was unable to attend to any duties of office. The Constitution provides that "in case of the
removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President." What is the practical significance of the term "inability"? If it
should be accepted in its ordinary meaning, a prostrating illness would be regarded as sufficient reason for allowing the
Vice-President to assume presidential responsibility. Though there was much quiet discussion of the problem, no attempt was
made to press a decision. After Garfield died, President Arthur, on succeeding to the office, took up the matter in his first
annual message, putting a number of queries as to the actual significance of the language of the Constitution—queries which have yet to be answered. The rights and duties of the
Vice-President in this particular are dangerously vague. The situation is complicated by a peculiarity of the electoral
system. In theory, by electing a President the nation expresses its will respecting public policy; but in practice the candidate
for President may be an exponent of one school of opinion and the candidate for Vice-President may represent another view. It is
impossible for a voter to discriminate between the two; he cannot vote for the candidate for President without voting for the
candidate for Vice-President, since he does not vote directly for the candidates themselves but for the party electors who are
pledged to the entire party ticket. Party conventions take advantage of this disability on the part of the voter to work an
electioneering device known as a "straddle," the aim of which is to please opposite interests by giving each a place on the
ticket. After Garfield was nominated, the attempt was made to placate the defeated faction by nominating one of its adherents
for Vice-President, and now that nominee unexpectedly became the President of the United States, with power to reverse the policy
of his predecessor.
In one important matter there was, in fact, an abrupt reversal of
policy. The independent countries of North and South America had
been invited to participate in a general congress to be held in
Washington, November 24, 1881. James Gillespie Blaine, who was
then Secretary of State, had applied himself with earnestness and
vigor to this undertaking, which might have produced valuable
results. It was a movement towards closer relations between
American countries, a purpose which has since become public
policy and has been steadily promoted by the Government.
With the inauguration of President Arthur, Blaine was succeeded
by Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who practically
canceled the invitation to the proposed Congress some six weeks
after it had been issued. On February 3, 1889, Blaine protested
in an open letter to the President, and the affair occasioned
sharp discussion. In his regular message to Congress in the
following December, the President offered excuses of an evasive
character, pointing out that Congress had made no appropriation
for expenses and declaring that he had thought it "fitting that
the Executive should consult the representatives of the people
before pursuing a line of policy somewhat novel in its character
and far-reaching in its possible consequences."
In general, President Arthur behaved with a tact and prudence
that improved his position in public esteem. It soon became
manifest that, although he had been Conkling's adherent, he was
not his servitor. He conducted the routine business of the
presidential office with dignity, and he displayed independence
of character in his relations with Congress. But his powers were
so limited by the conditions under which he had to act that to a
large extent public interests had to drift along without
direction and management. In some degree, the situation resembled
that which existed in the Holy Roman Empire when a complicated
legalism kept grinding away and pretentious forms of authority
were maintained, although, meanwhile, there was actual
administrative impotence. Striking evidence of the existence of
such a situation is found in President Arthur's messages to
Congress.
In his message of December 6, 1881, the President mentioned the
fact that in the West "a band of armed desperadoes known as
'Cowboys,' probably numbering fifty to one hundred men, have been
engaged for months in committing acts of lawlessness and
brutality which the local authorities have been unable to
repress." He observed that "with every disposition to meet the
exigencies of the case, I am embarrassed by lack of authority to
deal with them effectually." The center of disturbance was in
Arizona, and the punishment of crime there was ordinarily the
business of the local authorities. But even if they called for
aid, said the President, "this Government would be powerless to
render assistance," for the laws had been altered by Congress so
that States but not Territories could demand the protection of
the national Government against "domestic violence." He
recommended legislation extending to the Territories "the
protection which is accorded the States by the Constitution." On
April 26, 1882, the President sent a special message to Congress
on conditions in Arizona, announcing that "robbery, murder, and
resistance to laws have become so common as to cease causing
surprise, and that the people are greatly intimidated and losing
confidence in the protection of the law." He also advised
Congress that the "Cowboys" were making raids into Mexico, and
again begged for legal authority to act. On the 3rd of May, he
issued a proclamation calling upon the outlaws "to disperse and
retire peaceably to their respective abodes." In his regular
annual message on December 4, 1882, he again called attention "to
the prevalent lawlessness upon the borders, and to the necessity
of legislation for its suppression."
Such vast agitation from the operations of a band of ruffians,
estimated at from fifty to one hundred in number, and such
floundering incapacity for prompt action by public authority seem
more like events from a chronicle of the Middle Ages than from
the public records of a modern nation. Of like tenor, was a
famous career which came to an end in this period. Jesse W.
James, the son of a Baptist minister in Clay County, Missouri,
for some years carried on a bandit business, specializing in the
robbery of banks and railroad trains, with takings computed at
$263,778. As his friends and admirers were numerous, the elective
sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, and judges in the area of his
activities were unable to stop him by any means within their
reach. Meanwhile, the frightened burghers of the small towns in
his range of operations were clamoring for deliverance from his
raids, and finally Governor Crittenden of Missouri offered a
reward of $10,000 for his capture dead or alive. Two members of
his own band shot him down in his own house, April 3, 1882. They
at once reported the deed and surrendered themselves to the
police, were soon put on trial, pleaded guilty of murder, were
sentenced to death, and were at once pardoned by the Governor.
Meanwhile, the funeral ceremonies over Jesse James's remains drew
a great concourse of people, and there were many indications of
popular sympathy. Stories of his exploits have had an extensive
sale, and his name has become a center of legend and ballad
somewhat after the fashion of the medieval hero Robin Hood.
The legislative blundering which tied the President's hands and
made the Government impotent to protect American citizens from
desperadoes of the type of the "cowboys" and Jesse James, is
characteristic of Congress during this period. Another example of
congressional muddling is found in an act which was passed for
the better protection of ocean travel and which the President
felt constrained to veto. In his veto message of July 1, 1882,
the President said that he was entirely in accord with the
purpose of the bill which related to matters urgently demanding
legislative attention. But the bill was so drawn that in practice
it would have caused great confusion in the clearing of vessels
and would have led to an impossible situation. It was not the
intention of the bill to do what the President found its language
to require, and the defects were due simply to maladroit
phrasing, which frequently occurs in congressional enactments,
thereby giving support to the theory of John Stuart Mill that a
representative assembly is by its very nature unfit to prepare
legislative measures.
The clumsy machinery of legislation kept bungling on,
irresponsive to the principal needs and interests of the times.
An ineffectual start was made on two subjects presenting simple
issues on which there was an energetic pressure of popular
sentiment—Chinese immigration and polygamy among the Mormons.
Anti-Chinese legislation had to contend with a traditional
sentiment in favor of maintaining the United States as an asylum
for all peoples. But the demand from the workers of the Pacific
slope for protection against Asiatic competition in the home
labor market was so fierce and so determined that Congress
yielded. President Arthur vetoed a bill prohibiting Chinese
immigration as "a breach of our national faith," but he admitted
the need of legislation on the subject and finally approved a
bill suspending immigration from China for a term of years. This
was a beginning of legislation which eventually arrived at a
policy of complete exclusion. The Mormon question was dealt with
by the Act of March 22, 1882, imposing penalties upon the
practice of polygamy and placing the conduct of elections in the
Territory of Utah under the supervision of a board of five
persons appointed by the President. Though there were many
prosecutions under this act, it proved so ineffectual in
suppressing polygamy that it was eventually supplemented by
giving the Government power to seize and administer the property
of the Mormon Church. This action, resulting from the Act of
March 3, 1887, created a momentous precedent. The escheated
property was held by the Government until 1896 and meanwhile, the
Mormon Church submitted to the law and made a formal declaration
that it had abandoned polygamy.
Another instance in which a lack of agreement between the
executive and the legislative branches of the Government
manifested itself, arose out of a scheme which President Arthur
recommended to Congress for the improvement of the waterways of
the Mississippi and its tributaries. The response of Congress was
a bill in which there was an appropriation of about $4,000,000
for the general improvements recommended, but about $14,000,000
were added for other special river and harbor schemes which had
obtained congressional favor. President Arthur's veto message of
August 1, 1882, condemned the bill because it contained
provisions designed "entirely for the benefit of the particular
localities in which it is proposed to make the improvements." He
thus described a type of legislation of which the nation had and
is still having bitter experience: "As the citizens of one State
find that money, to raise which they in common with the whole
country are taxed, is to be expended for local improvements in
another State, they demand similar benefits for themselves, and
it is not unnatural that they should seek to indemnify themselves
for such use of the public funds by securing appropriations for
similar improvements in their own neighborhood. Thus as the bill
becomes more objectionable it secures more support." The truth of
this last assertion Congress immediately proved by passing the
bill over the President's veto. Senator Hoar, who defended the
bill, has admitted that "a large number of the members of the
House who voted for it lost their seats" and that in his opinion
the affair "cost the Republican party its majority in the House
of Representatives."
Legislation regarding the tariff was, however, the event of
Arthur's administration which had the deepest effect upon the
political situation. Both national parties were reluctant to face
the issue, but the pressure of conditions became too strong for
them. Revenue arrangements originally planned for war needs were
still amassing funds in the Treasury vaults which were now far
beyond the needs of the Government, and were at the same time
deranging commerce and industry. In times of war, the Treasury
served as a financial conduit; peace had now made it a catch
basin whose excess accumulations embarrassed the Treasury and at
the same time, caused the business world to suffer from a
scarcity of currency. In his annual message on December 6, 1881,
President Arthur cautiously observed that it seemed to him "that
the time has arrived when the people may justly demand some
relief from the present onerous burden." In his message of
December 4, 1882, he was much more emphatic. Calling attention to
the fact that the annual surplus had increased to more than
$145,000,000, he observed that "either the surplus must lie idle
in the Treasury or the Government will be forced to buy at market
rates its bonds not then redeemable, and which under such
circumstances cannot fail to command an enormous premium, or the
swollen revenues will be devoted to extravagant expenditures,
which, as experience has taught, is ever the bane of an
overflowing treasury."
The congressional agents of the protected industries were
confronted by an exacting situation. The country was at peace but
it was still burdened by war taxes, although the Government did
not need the accumulating revenue and was actually embarrassed by
its excess. The President had already made himself the spokesman
of the popular demand for a substantial reduction of taxes. Such
a combination of forces in favor of lightening the popular burden
might seem to be constitutionally irresistible, but by adroit
maneuvering the congressional supporters of protection managed to
have the war rates generally maintained and, in some cases, even
increased. The case is a typical example of the way in which
advantage of strategic position in a governmental system can
prevail against mere numbers.
By the Act of May 15, 1882, a tariff commission was created to
examine the industrial situation and make recommendations as to
rates of duty. The President appointed men who stood high in the
commercial world and who were strongly attached to the protective
system. They applied themselves to their task with such energy
that by December 4, 1882, they had produced a voluminous report
with suggested amendments to customs laws.
But the advocates of high protection in the House were not
satisfied; they opposed the recommendations of the report and
urged that the best and quickest way to reduce taxation was by
abolishing or reducing items on the internal revenue list. This
policy not only commanded support on the Republican side, but
also received the aid of a Democratic faction which avowed
protectionist principles and claimed party sanction for them.
These political elements in the House were strong enough to
prevent action on the customs tariff, but a bill was passed
reducing some of the internal revenue taxes. This action seemed
likely to prevent tariff revision at least during that session.
Formidable obstacles, both constitutional and parliamentary,
stood in the way of action, but they were surmounted by ingenious
management.
The Constitution provides that all revenue bills shall originate
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate has the right to
propose amendments. Under cover of this clause the Senate
originated a voluminous tariff bill and tacked it to the House
bill as an amendment. When the bill, as thus amended, came back
to the House, a two-thirds vote would have been required by the
existing rules to take it up for consideration, but this obstacle
was overcome by adopting a new rule by which a bare majority of
the House could forthwith take up a bill amended by the Senate,
for the purpose of non-concurrence but not for concurrence. The
object of this maneuver was to get the bill into a committee of
conference where the details could be arranged by private
negotiation. The rule was adopted on February 26, 1883, but the
committee of conference was not finally constituted until the 1st
of March, within two days of the close of the session. On the 3rd
of March, when this committee reported a measure on which they
had agreed, both Houses adopted this report and enacted the
measure without further ado.
In some cases, rates were fixed by the committee above the
figures voted in either House and even when there was no
disagreement, changes were made. The tariff commission had
recommended, for example, a duty of fifty cents a ton on iron
ore, and both the Senate and the House voted to put the duty at
that figure; but the conference committee fixed the rate at
seventy-five cents. When a conference committee report comes
before the House, it is adopted or rejected in toto, as it is not
divisible or amendable. In theory, the revision of a report is
feasible by sending it back to conference under instructions
voted by the House, but such a procedure is not really available
in the closing hours of a session, and the only practical course
of action is either to pass the bill as shaped by the conferees
or else to accept the responsibility for inaction. Thus pressed
for time, Congress passed a bill containing features obnoxious to
a majority in both Houses and offensive to public opinion.
Senator Sherman in his "Recollections" expressed regret that he
had voted for the bill and declared that, had the recommendations
of the tariff commission been adopted, "the tariff would have
been settled for many years," but "many persons wishing to
advance their particular industries appeared before the committee
and succeeded in having their views adopted." In his annual
message, December 4, 1883, President Arthur accepted the act as a
response to the demand for a reduction of taxation, which was
sufficiently tolerable to make further effort inexpedient until
its effects could be definitely ascertained; but he remarked that
he had "no doubt that still further reductions may be wisely
made."
In general, President Arthur's administration may therefore be
accurately described as a period of political groping and party
fluctuation. In neither of the great national parties was there a
sincere and definite attitude on the new issues which were
clamorous for attention, and the public discontent was reflected
in abrupt changes of political support. There was a general
feeling of distrust regarding the character and capacity of the
politicians at Washington, and election results were apparently
dictated more by fear than by hope. One party would be raised up
and the other party cast down, not because the one was trusted
more than the other, but because it was for a while less odious.
Thus a party success might well be a prelude to a party disaster
because neither party knew how to improve its political
opportunity. The record of party fluctuation in Congress during
this period is almost unparalleled in sharpness.(1)
In state politics, the polling showed that both parties were
disgusted with their leadership and that there was a public
indifference to issues which kept people away from the polls. A
comparison of the total vote cast in state elections in 1882 with
that cast in the presidential election of 1880, showed a decline
of over eight hundred thousand in the Republican vote and of
nearly four hundred thousand in the Democratic vote. The most
violent of the party changes that took place during this period
occurred in the election of 1882, in New York State, when the
Republican vote showed a decline of over two hundred thousand and
the Democratic candidate for Governor was elected by a plurality
of nearly that amount. It was this election which brought Grover
Cleveland into national prominence.
__________
(1) In 1875, at the opening of the Forty-fourth Congress, the House
stood 110 Republicans and 182 Democrats. In 1881, the House stood
150 Republicans to 131 Democrats, with 12 Independent members. In
1884, the Republican list had declined to 119 and the Democratic
had grown to 201, and there were five Independents. The Senate,
although only a third of its membership is renewed every two
years, displayed extraordinary changes during this period. The
Republican membership of 46 in 1876 had declined to 33 by 1880,
and the Democratic membership had increased to 42. In 1882, the
Senate was evenly balanced in party strength, each party having
37 avowed adherents, but there were two Independents.
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