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What's Behind a Statement
by LÁSZLÓ TÕKÉS
ethnic cleansing of the
Hungarian minority in Rumania
Coat of Arms of Transylvania
Vörösberény, 1993.
© László Tõkés
Reproduced with the permission of the author, 1995.
In February of this year, a statement was uttered at one of the press
conferences of the Washington-based National Press Club. I had declared that in a subtle,
bloodless way, an "undeniable ethnic cleansing" had been taking place in
Romania now for over seventy years, the result of which hundreds of thousands of ethnic
minorities--who, at the time of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty inhabited this
region in significant numbers--had disappeared: either by having become assimilated, or by
having been forced to leave their place of birth.
As a result of an expertly prepared and systematically executed nation-wide provocation
campaign, helped by the diversionist, Iliescu-sympathizing Romanian national
television, the objectionable statement soon became the topic of the day in the country's parliament
- highly susceptible to such disturbances - and through the "reporting" of
the lawmakers and the conveniently manipulated press it soon became the central
topic of the similarly manipulated Romanian public opinion, provoking a general
uproar and many outcries.
In a fashion similar to that used by more or less all Romanian governments that have
come since Trianon, including the present one, this provocative action, as is well
known, elicited unified antipathy and strong protests from within the entire political and
public sphere, and in a rarely seen occurrence, it was able to synthesize nearly complete
"unity" within the entire majority population, drawing together nearly all
Romanian political forces.
What is behind this stance? What is its root cause, how can we find an
explanation for the exceptional strength, the unmatched power of the political parties'
and public opinion's uproar, for the "national" outcry which often degenerated
into political hysteria and severe personal insults?
One would be mistaken to believe that the sole reason for this outburst is the by now
famous statement, and its truth content.
The use of the expression ethnic cleansing with respect to Romania is by no
means new. Without going into an exhaustive process to document this, it should
suffice to say that András Sütõ has made use of this conceptualization several times
during the past few years, and what's more, shortly before the artificially and
purposefully provoked scandal which was ignited at the beginning or March of this year, we
had two opportunities to read this very expression in our domestic press. In these cases
however, our fastidious policy-makers did not even raise their eyebrows to the
much-decried similar later use of these words.
In the middle of February, more than 94 well-known Hungarian and German intellectuals
from Kolozsvár (Cluj) issued a written protest against the policies and practices carried
out by Gheorghe Funar - the city's mayor and the president of the Romanian National Unity
Party - who, in their words: "in one of Romania's and Europe's important cultural
centres, concentrates his primary activities at conducting a cultural ethnic cleansing
directed at the Hungarian collective spirit, affecting nearly every sphere of Hungarian
historical and cultural traditions."
Such a summary of the situation that can be experienced in Kolozsvár
corresponds, in meaning, to the content of the expression used in Washington. The
reference made is to the "undeniable", "refined and sophisticated",
"peaceful" method, which over many decades has made the situation of the
Hungarians of Romania almost unbearable. The situation is mirrored by the weight of
Sándor Makkai's words, the one-time bishop who was forced to leave his parish and his
homeland, who said: "It is not possible," and the paradoxical nature of
existence here is reinforced by the poet Sándor Reményik, one attached by "teeth
and claws" to his homeland, who echoes the tragic compromise: "As is
possible."
The nation-wide uproar in March, the hysterical pseudo- outcries, the unified positions
reminiscent of the Ceausescu-era nationalist loyalty-campaigns show not even a trace of
any attempt, by the accusers, to familiarize themselves, investigate the
facts and their weight, before making their own statements. By completely ignoring,
or downplaying and denying the actual reality, the badly-informed supporters of
national loyalty branded the statement a dogmatic outburst, singularly denied, and
ex-catedra discarded even the possibility of the existence of any form of ethnic
cleansing. Without critical thinking, they unleashed a barrage of insults and
attacks at the imagined and greatly overblown "Hungarian enemy",
characterizations which included: "lies", "baseless slander",
"defamation", "mean-spirited falsification of Romanian realities",
"extremist anti-Romanian diatribe", "irredentism",
"separatism", "they sold out the country", "the bishop is the
devil's pawn", and so on.
In their massive outcry many sought to defend the "Romanian people" -
as if the charge of ethnic cleansing had been leveled against them, and not against
the homogenizing, nationalist governing authority. We have thus summarized the actual
background of the nation-wide political scandal that was raised around the statement.
If there is - and there certainly is - a credible explanation and an actual
motivation for the general public uproar, then it is exactly the national
self-esteem and dignity of the mislead Romanian masses, which was used and exploited
by the well- paid experts of manipulation and provocation. The noble self- defence
reflexes, aimed at protecting those national feelings which merit respect and
appreciation, and the - well undermined - natural mechanisms of protecting collective
self- respect, mislead even the best members of the democratic opposition and other
undenyingly well-meaning Romanians. The governing authority, fearfully protective of its
power, and obsessed with the phobia of territorial loss - which it transposes onto the
masses as well - wants to gain wider support and popular legitimacy, to mobilize society
on its own side precisely by exploiting the psychosis of vulnerability, and the most
noble nationalist sentiments, and through this process it wishes to realize its own
selfish goals and interests.
The anti-Hungarian crusade around the ethnic cleansing statement was primarily a
well-prepared trap, set up by the government and its allies for the - as yet - weak
opposition and infant Romanian democracy. The deception was so successful, that in
sporadic locations even the intimidated Hungarian population became confused, forcing
several of its political leaders to directly or indirectly distance themselves, in this
way unwillingly equating their own position with that of the government.
The Hungarians of Romania, however, unlike their fellow ethnic Romanian
citizens, have an actual basis for, and a greater degree of "things to fear",
and their own no less noble national sentiments have been, for decades, and
continue to be concretely offended daily. It is true that the totalitarian power
takes advantage of both nationalities' sentiments and conducts vulgar political games -
but in the case of the Hungarian minority these games carry a much greater risk. The
possible risk for Romanian society is "at most" democracy and freedom - while at
the same time, in contrast, the governing authority puts the Hungarian community's very
existence at risk: its continued survival becomes questionable
It is cheap demagoguery or naiveté, and a falsification of reality, a short-sighted
simplification to group together the livelihood of the minority Hungarians and the
state-forming Romanians, to one-sidedly equate the situation of the two ethnic
groups, by saying that in the post-communist misery "Romanians and Hungarians suffer
alike . . . they suffer hunger and cold alike, stand in line and feel intimidated
alike." This is also partly true - at the level of certain basic needs, and in the
case of certain social classes. The Hungarian and other minorities, however, suffer double
discrimination and oppression: not only as ordinary citizens do, but due their
nationality, their difference.
When democracy is dealt a blow, they feel it the most.
According to the "classic" practice used by governing nationalities, the
minorities serve as the source for the distracting "enemy picture": on
top of this, they are also suitable for the scapegoat role. According to the
"substitute victims" law, they can be sacrificed in the interest of the
government and the constitutionally-sanctioned "Romanian nation-state."
It is misleading then to speak of a majority and minority nationalism in the same
breath, to call Romanian extremist nationalism and Hungarian national
"radicalism" symmetrical, and to grant them the same value.
Minority nationalism is fundamentally of a defensive nature: disadvantaged from
the start, it seeks to protect self-identity in the face of the majority nation's
artificially-developed aggressive, devastating nationalism.
In Romania it is a misconception - one produced by the cynical manipulation of
the government and the extreme nationalists - to believe that Romanians need fear the
so-called "radical" or "irredentist" or "separatist"
Hungarian "extremists." The nationalist-communist regime, relying on
nationalist ideology, achieves a dual goal by exploiting this misconception: it is able to
keep the opposition and the nation's progressive forces occupied with the minorities,
while at the same time, it uses the majority to strike at the minorities, who, in their
struggle for freedom, pose a - democratic - threat to its survival. It practices a nationalist,
divisive policy, on the basis of which the minorities naturally always come up short.
It is in this majority-oriented power policy that the practice of ethnic cleansing
forms an organic part. This is the policy which is behind the provocations, which -
drawing on the analogy of the bloody Bosnian events - have shocking effects. Just like in
the fables, as predators are apt to do, it is once again the wolf who warns the -
sacrificial - lamb: "do not disturb the waters!"
* * *
We have been able to see what behind the words, what function did this singular, out-of-context
statement - deprived of its actual content or purposefully misinterpreted - serve
in the hands of the pseudo-democratic totalitarian regime and the well-oiled propaganda
machine of the national-communist power.
In the following section, free from any political tendency or nationalist government
manipulation, we shall examine what the facts actually say. Let reality - one
widely avoided, or purposefully ignored due to prejudice - the numbers, data, surveys,
statistics, and our own painful experiences speak about the ethnic cleansing
which has caused such a storm.
In 1930, on the present-day territory of Romania, the population was 14,281,000; today
it is 22,760,000, an increase of more than 8 million. In contrast, the growth of
the Hungarian population - according to official Romanian statistical data - was minimal,
an increase of no more that 66,000 people: in 1930, there were 1,554,000, while in 1992
there were 1,620,000.
Analyzing the statistics or Transylvania: during 82 years (1910-1992) the Romanian
population doubled, while the Hungarian population declined from 1,664,000 to
1,599,000, and its percentage in the total population of the region dropped from the
nearly one-third (31.6%) to barely a fifth (20.7%)
TABLE 1.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF ROMANIA
Romania |
1930 |
1948 |
1956 |
1966 |
1977 |
1992 |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
18,057
13,181
73.6
1,554
8.6 |
15,873
13,598
85.7
1,500
9.4 |
17,489
15,081
86.2
1,654
9.5 |
19,103
16,771
87.8
1,652
8.6 |
21,560
19,000
88.1
1,714
7.9 |
22,760
20,353
89.4
1,620
7.1 |
Note: Using the statistics from the 1930 census, the total population inhabiting
the territory of present-day Romania was 14,281,000 of which 10.88% were Hungarians.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF TRANSYLVANIA
Transylvania |
1910 |
1920 |
1930 |
1948 |
1956 |
1966 |
1977 |
1992 |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
5,263
2,830
53.8
1,664
31.6 |
5,063
2,931
57.9
1,306
25.8 |
5,548
3,233
58.2
1,481
26.7 |
5,761
3,752
65.1
1,482
25.7 |
6,232
4,081
65.5
1,616
25.9 |
6,720
4,570
68.0
1,626
24.2 |
7,500
5,321
70.9
1,651
22.0 |
7,710
5,671
73.6
1,599
20.7 |
The data from those Transylvanian counties actually by Hungarians paints an even
clearer picture of the unnatural population drop. In Kolozs County for
example, one of the counties most heavily targeted by artificial Romanianization, during
82 years the Romanian population (rounding the numbers) increased from 231,000 to
571,000 - in contrast, the Hungarians dropped from 156,000 to 145,000, or from
39.3% to 19.8% of the population.
TABLE 2.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL HUNGARIAN POPULATION
AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TRANSYLVANIAN COUNTIES
County |
Population |
Census year |
1910 |
1920 |
1930 |
1956 |
1966 |
1977 |
1992 |
ARAD |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
570,7
294,2
57.9
130,6
25.7 |
482,3
289,4
60.0
105,4
21.9 |
488,4
307,6
63.0
103,2
21.1 |
475,6
322,3
69.9
86,8
18.2 |
481,2
346,0
71.8
78,3
16.3 |
512,0
375,5
73.3
74,1
14.5 |
487,4
392,2
80.5
60,9
12.5 |
BESZTERCE-
NASZÓD |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
212,6
147,5
69.5
29,2
13.7 |
201,2
144,5
71.8
19,1
9.5 |
223,5
166,4
74.6
20,5
9.2 |
255,8
220,8
86.3
23,6
9.2 |
268,6
238,8
89.0
21,6
8.0 |
286,6
259,8
90.6
21,5
7.5 |
327,2
295,9
90.4
21,2
6.5 |
BIHAR |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
475,9
242,0
50.8
218,2
45.9 |
478,0
261,6
54.7
174,3
36.5 |
527,2
306,3
58.0
193,8
36.8 |
574,5
359,5
62.7
204,2
35.5 |
586,5
374,3
64.0
198,1
33.8 |
633,1
409,8
64.7
199,6
31.5 |
634,1
419,1
66.1
180,7
28.5 |
BRASSÓ |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
239,9
131,8
54.9
54,6
22.8 |
238,5
138,2
58.0
49,0
20.5 |
265,4
151,6
57.1
59,8
22.5 |
373,9
272,8
73.0
59,2
15.8 |
442,7
333,3
75.3
66,5
15.0 |
582,9
457,6
78.5
73,0
12.5 |
642,5
551,9
85.9
63,3
9.8 |
FEHÉR |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
330,8
262,9
79.6
45,5
13.7 |
320,6
264,1
82.3
35,0
10.9 |
346,6
290,6
83.8
34,0
9.8 |
370,8
327,2
88.2
27,3
7.4 |
382,8
341,4
89.2
26,7
7.0 |
409,6
360,7
88.1
27,2
6.6 |
414,2
373,5
90.2
24,8
6.0 |
HARGITA |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
240,6
14,6
6.1
223,1
92.7 |
231,8
25,3
10.9
202,1
87.2 |
250,2
22,5
9.0
223,1
89.1 |
274,0
25,2
9.2
247,0
90.2 |
282,4
30,5
10.8
250,7
88.7 |
326,3
44,8
13.7
227,6
85.1 |
347,6
48,8
14.0
294,3
84.6 |
HUNYAD |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
323,5
256,8
79.4
51,5
15.9 |
304,5
247,4
81.2
39,2
12.9 |
319,9
266,4
83.3
39,9
12.5 |
381,9
337,2
88.3
34,1
8.9 |
474,6
425,4
89.6
40,3
8.5 |
514,4
464,9
90.4
38,3
7.5 |
548,0
503,3
91.9
33,7
6.1 |
KOLOZS |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
397,4
230,7
58.0
156,3
39.3 |
416,8
261,9
62.8
127,8
30.7 |
475,5
299,0
62.8
149,6
31.5 |
580,3
404,1
69.6
169,0
29.1 |
631,1
459,5
72.8
166,1
26.3 |
715,5
532,5
74.4
171,4
24.0 |
735,1
530,7
77.6
145,4
19.8 |
KOVÁSZNA |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
148,9
17,1
11.5
130,2
87.4 |
147,0
24,9
16.9
120,4
81.9 |
152,6
25,2
16.5
126,1
82.7 |
172,5
30,7
17.8
140,7
81.6 |
176,9
33,8
19.1
142,3
80.5 |
199,0
38,9
19.6
156,1
78.4 |
232,6
54,5
23.4
175,0
75.2 |
KRASSÓ-SZÖRÉNY |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
342,0
251,0
73.3
13,5
4.0 |
309,7
233,8
75.5
5,8
1.8 |
319,3
242,4
75.9
6,9
2.2 |
327,8
267,7
81.0
8,0
2.5 |
358,7
297,6
83.0
8,8
2.4 |
385,6
323,1
83.8
9,2
2.4 |
375,8
325,0
86.5
8,1
2.2 |
MAROS |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
388,3
151,3
39.0
189,6
48.8 |
386,2
170,2
44.1
166,9
43.2 |
425,7
185,7
43.6
188,9
44.4 |
513,3
245,6
47.9
236,4
46.0 |
561,6
279,8
49.1
252,9
45.0 |
605,3
297,2
49.1
268,3
44.3 |
607,3
316,6
52.1
251,0
41.3 |
MÁRAMAROS |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
297,4
189,9
63.9
62,2
20.9 |
296,9
200,0
67.3
31,2
10.5 |
317,3
220,5
69.4
34,8
11.0 |
367,1
284,8
77.6
51,3
14.0 |
427,6
339,4
79.3
55,6
13.0 |
492,9
394,4
80.0
58,6
11.9 |
538,5
436,3
81.0
54,8
10.2 |
SZATMÁR |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
267,7
92,3
34.5
166,7
62.3 |
263,9
124,5
47.3
81,2
30.9 |
301,1
140,0
46.4
126,9
42.2 |
337,4
173,1
51.3
158,5
47.0 |
359,4
198,4
55.2
155,2
43.2 |
393,8
227,6
57.8
157,7
38.8 |
400,2
233,5
58.4
140,1
35.0 |
SZEBEN |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
270,6
155,7
57.5
20,4
7.5 |
270,5
158,4
58.5
14,5
5.4 |
307,0
181,4
59.0
19,2
6.3 |
372,7
262,6
70.4
17,9
4.8 |
414,8
295,3
71.2
19,9
4.8 |
481,6
349,7
72.6
21,9
4.5 |
452,8
397,8
87.8
19,2
4.2 |
SZILÁGY |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
223,1
150,2
67.3
66,7
29.9 |
218,8
150,5
68.7
55,1
25.2 |
240,8
169,9
70.6
57,6
23.9 |
272,0
201,0
73.9
67,5
24.8 |
263,1
195,1
74.2
64,0
24.3 |
274,6
194,4
73.5
64,0
24.2 |
266,3
192,2
72.2
63,2
23.7 |
TEMES |
Total
Romanian
%
Hungarian
% |
560,7
223,9
39.9
96,8
17.3 |
512,9
217,1
42.3
74,3
14.5 |
559,6
238,8
42.7
91,9
16.4 |
568,9
328,1
57.6
84,5
14.9 |
607,6
380,0
62.5
78,8
13.0 |
696,9
472,9
67.9
77,5
11.1 |
700,3
560,1
80.0
63,4
9.1 |
Note: The population figures are in thousands, for example: 45,8=45,800.
The same picture is presented by enclosed graphical representations, complementing the
graphs which serve as partial representations of the spectacular declines or other
nationalities.
and
The steep change in proportions, as well as the decline in Hungarian-inhabited
territory is even more conspicuous if we inspect the development of the demographic
make-up of several of Transylvania's larger cities. In 1910, and even between the
two world wars, the Hungarian majority in the more important cities contributed to 70.1%
of the urban population, which dwindled to 23.3% over eight decades, while the
urban Romanian population increased from 13.4% to 73.3%.
TABLE 5.
THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF VARIOUS LARGER TRANSYLVANIAN
CITIES, BASED ON CENSUS DATA
City |
Population |
Census year |
1910 |
1930 |
1956 |
1966 |
1977 |
1992 |
KOLOZSVÁR |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
62,7
51,2
81.6
8,9
14.2 |
100,8
54,8
54.3
37,0
35.6 |
154,7
74,2
47.3
74,6
48.2 |
185,7
76,0
41.4
|
262,4
85,4
32.5
147,9
56.3 |
328,0
74,5
22.7
248,3
75.7 |
NAGYVÁRAD |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
69,0
63,0
91.3
3,8
5.5 |
82,7
55,0
66.6
21,8
24.5 |
98,5
58,4
59.1
34,5
34.9 |
122,5
63,0
51.4
|
171,3
75,7
44.2
91,9
53.9 |
220,8
73,3
33.2
143,2
64.8 |
TEMESVÁR |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
72,6
28,6
39.3
7,6
10.4 |
91,6
27,7
30.2
24,1
26.3 |
142,3
30,0
21.1
76,2
53.5 |
174,2
33,1
17.8
|
268,8
36,2
13.5
166,8
62.1 |
334,3
32,0
9.6
274,2
82.0 |
MAROSVÁSÁRHELY |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
25,5
22,8
89.3
1,7
6.7 |
38,5
25,4
65.8
9,5
24.6 |
65,2
48,1
73.8
14,3
21.9 |
86,5
60,2
69.6
|
160,1
82,2
63.2
45,6
35.1 |
163,6
83,7
51.1
75,8
46.3 |
ARAD |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
76,4
48,4
63.4
14,6
19.1 |
77,2
30,0
38.8
30,4
36.2 |
106,5
31,9
30.0
59,1
55.5 |
126,0
31,0
24.6
|
171,1
34,3
20.0
101,5
59.3 |
190,1
29,8
15.7
151,3
79.6 |
BRASSÓ |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
41,1
17,8
43.4
11,8
28.7 |
59,2
23,3
39.3
19,4
32.7 |
124,8
22,7
18.3
88,7
71.6 |
163,3
27,8
17.0
|
257,2
34,0
13.2
195,7
76.3 |
323,8
31,3
9.7
287,6
88.8 |
SZATMÁR |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
34,9
33,1
94.8
1,0
2.8 |
51,5
30,3
58.9
13,9
27.1 |
52,1
31,2
59.9
15,8
30.3 |
69,8
34,5
49.4
|
103,6
47,6
45.9
41,3
39.9 |
131,9
53,8
40.8
72,9
55.3 |
NAGYBÁNYA |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
16,5
10,7
64.8
5,5
33.7 |
16,6
6,5
39.2
8,5
50.8 |
35,9
15,3
42.6
18,8
52.2 |
64,5
20,6
31.9
|
101,0
25,3
25.0
64,0
63.4 |
148,8
25,7
17.3
119,5
80.3 |
ZILAH |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
8,1
7,5
92.7
0,5
6.6 |
8,3
5,9
71.1
2,1
24.7 |
13,4
6,9
51.1
6,4
48.1 |
15,1
|
31,9
13,4
42.0
18,2
57.0 |
68,3
13,5
19.8
54,0
79.1 |
CSÍKSZEREDA |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
6,8
6,7
97.8
0,04
0.6 |
8,3
7,4
89.0
0,7
7.9 |
12,0
11,2
93.7
0,7
5.5 |
15,3
|
30,9
24,9
80.6
5,6
18.1 |
46,0
38,2
83.0
7,5
16.3 |
SEPSISZENTGYÖRGY |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
|
10,8
8,4
77.2
2,0
18.7 |
17,6
15,3
86.8
2,2
12.4 |
20,8
|
40,8
|
68,1
50,9
74.7
16,0
23.5 |
SZÉKELYUDVARHELY |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
|
10,0
8,7
87.5
1,0
9.5 |
14,2
13,6
96.2
0,5
3.2 |
18,2
|
28,7
|
40,0
38,9
97.4
0,8
2.1 |
TOTAL FOR
THE ABOVE CITIES |
Total
Hungarian
%
Romanian
% |
413,6
289,8
70.1
55,4
13.4
|
534,7
266,3
49.8
167,4
31.3 |
805,4
329,9
41.0
389,1
48.3 |
992,5
346,2
34.9
|
1528,3
459,0
30.0
878,5
57.5
|
1955,6
455,8
23.3
1434,3
73.3 |
- Note:
- - The population figures are in thousands, for example: 62,7=62,700.
- - The figures from the 1966 Census contain data only for the first eight cities on the
list.
The relevant graphical representations are downright shocking. For the purpose of observing the demographic
metamorphosis which took place in several cities, we need only cite the examples of
the cities of Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad (Oradea) and Temesvár (Timisoara).
.
It is easy to see that the drastic changes which are mirrored by the statistics
and the graphs are not the results of natural demographic processes. A secret
document, found at the end of 1989 in the city hall building of Marosvásárhely
(Tirgu Mures), gives us positive proof of the Romanian authorities' deliberate policies
aimed at artificially altering the ethnic composition various cities within Transylvania,
and of Transylvania as a whole . It is
these massive policies of Romanianizing Transylvania, achieved using administrative
tools, and the processes of industrialization and urbanization, that are to be looked as
explanations for the radical transformation of the ethnic composition of Transylvania. The
continuous resettlement , the so-called closed-cities system, the
unnecessary territorial and ethnic merging of villages, and other administrative
reorganizations are merely a few of the more outstanding methods of the systematically
planned reductions of the Hungarian community of Transylvania, the forcing of local
majority Hungarian populations into minority roles, and they are indicative of the
ever-present Romanian government's policies aimed at boosting artificial ethnic
assimilation.
The mislead Romanian population, however, is completely unaware of the above
processes. Instead of abandoning its anti-minority policies - as it promised during the
changes in 1989 - which draw on traditional practices, the government is
contributing to he increase of the anti-Hungarian atmosphere, and directly or indirectly
aids efforts aimed at national homogenization, which, our words, is synonymous with
ethnic cleansing.
An outstanding example, the founding pillar and an unappealable document of this
nationalist course is the first clause of the Romanian Constitution, which defines
our country - inhabited by several millions of other nationalities - as a "unitary
nation-state." Consequently, the homogenizing, "cleansing" policies are
codified and consecrated into a national-political program by the most fundamental
law of the country.
The weak Romanian opposition, lacking a well-developed concept of national
policy, or due to its unfamiliarity with the situation, mostly assists the
constitutionally-sanctioned anti- minority program of the Romanian government and the
parties in power. Other than its weak expressions of sympathy for the minorities, it is
either seemingly poisoned by the Greater- Romanian nationalism or it is under its forceful
domination, and is unable to offer a realistic and just political alternative fro
the country's minorities, for two million-strong Hungarian community. It is unable to even
grasp a deeper understanding of minority problems, and cannot even come to face the facts
of ethnic cleansing - as rightly evidenced by the opposition parties' unified
stance on the side of the inciteful, nationalist, provocative scandal-making forces of
authority.
Unfortunately, neither the opposition, nor the well-meaning but mislead Romanian
citizens have yet realized that with alternating, refined methods, ethnic cleansing
continues even today, with a special emphasis on lowering the social status of Hungarians,
on forcing them either out or into the background.
The Germans and the Hungarians - Transylvanians in general - are emigrating,
leaving their homelands forever in much greater numbers than their proportions in the
national population would warrant
TABLE 15.
EMIGRATION STATISTICS 1990-1992
Year |
Total |
Romanian |
German |
Hungarian |
Other |
1990 |
144,543 |
25,583 |
95,900 |
18,821 |
4,239 |
1991 |
43,544 |
18,307 |
16,767 |
7,494 |
976 |
1992 |
34,583 |
17,922 |
8,845 |
6,673 |
1,143 |
Totals |
222,670 |
61,812 |
121,512 |
32,988 |
6,358 |
Total minorities: |
160, 858 |
Percentage of total emigrants: |
Romanians - 27.76%
Other ethnic groups - 72.24% |
- In absolute numbers, the number of Romanian emigrants is merely 1.87 times that of
- the Hungarians; however, if the emigration ratio were to follow the population ratios
- for the entire country, the number of Romanians emigrating should have been 6.7
- times greater than the number of Hungarians, that is in addition to the 32,988
- Hungarians who actually left their homeland, 414,447 ethnic Romanians should have
- followed them.
and Table 16.).
The reasons for the Hungarian emigration - besides economic ones - are chiefly
ones of ethnic nature. One example is Marosvásárhely, whose Hungarian inhabitants
and whose youth have left their place of birth by the thousands, in wake of the
intimidating atmosphere created by the Vatra pogrom- attempts of March 1990. The discriminating
judicial decisions, handed down against a number of the participants of the December
1989 events in the Székelyföld region (i.e., an area of Transylvania where the Szeklers
live) (Zetelaka, Oroszhegy), have had the same alienating effect among the Hungarian
minority.
A similar reaction is produced amongst the Hungarian masses when we consider our
disadvantaged educational situation, the higher-than-average unemployment ratio
of Hungarian workers, our large-scale displacement from various spheres of social
life (government and institutional leadership, administration, the rail, postal and health
institutions, etc.), or the autocratic reduction of the length of the Hungarian
language television program, and the unjust appointment of ethnic Romanian prefects
in the counties of Hargita and Kovászna.
The enclosed charts realistically mirror the fact that a significant percentage (31%),
nearly one-third of Hungarian students have no opportunity to be educated in their
mother tongue. It is specifically in the area of academic studies and technical
training that the determinative importance of the disadvantaged, under-represented
situation of the Hungarian students can be seen: only 60.4% of collegiate and 22.7% of
technical school students can study in their mother tongue . The situation is also critical in the area of teacher- training - 26% of
the pedagogues who participate in native language instruction are unqualified! - which
further damages our relations with educational authorities.
Hungarians have been nearly entirely squeezed out of local and county state
administration. There are nearly no Hungarian employees in the prefectures and mayoral
offices. Our representation in the institutes of justice is also ridiculously low.
In counties like Bihar, Szatmár and Szilágy, where Hungarians make up a significant
number of the population, there is not a single Hungarian notary public.
TABLE 18.
THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE HUNGARIANS OF ROMANIA FROM VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS
County or City |
Percent of the Hungarian
population |
Prefectorate |
County Council |
Mayoral Office |
|
% |
Hungarians vs.
Rumanians |
Hungarians
% |
Hungarians vs.
Rumanians |
Hungarians
% |
Hungarians vs.
Rumanians |
Hungarians
% |
Arad County |
12.5 |
|
|
5:110 |
4.5 |
|
|
City of Arad |
15.7 |
|
|
|
|
1:66 |
1.5 |
Bihar County |
28.5 |
4:117 |
3.4 |
3:183 |
1.6 |
|
|
City of Nagyvárad |
33.2 |
|
|
|
|
3:89 |
3.4 |
Szatmár County |
35.0 |
18:129 |
14.0 |
|
|
|
|
City of
Szatmárnémeti |
40.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Szilágy County |
23.7 |
|
9.0 |
|
|
|
|
City of Zilah |
19.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
7.5 |
Kolozs County |
19.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
City of
Kolozsvár |
22.7 |
|
|
|
|
8:168 |
4.8 |
Hargita County |
84.7 |
14:41 |
34.1 |
75:85 |
88.2 |
|
|
City of
Csíkszereda |
83.0 |
|
|
|
|
47:56 |
83.9 |
Kovászna County |
75.2 |
13:51 |
39.4 |
|
|
|
|
City of
Sepsiszentgyörgy |
74.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
County or City |
Percent of the Hungarian
population |
Notaries Public |
Lawyers |
Councilliors |
Judges |
|
% |
Hung. vs.
Rum. |
Hungarians
% |
Hung. vs.
Rum. |
Hungarians
% |
Hung. vs.
Rum. |
Hungarians
% |
Hung. vs.
Rum. |
Hungarians
% |
Arad County |
12.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1:38 |
2.6 |
City of Arad |
15.7 |
|
|
4:66 |
6.1 |
|
|
|
|
Bihar County |
28.5 |
- |
0 |
|
|
1:12 |
8.3 |
1:12 |
8.3 |
City of Nagyvárad |
33.2 |
- |
0 |
9:122 |
7.4 |
1:17 |
5.9 |
2:21 |
9.5 |
Szatmár County |
35.0 |
- |
0 |
|
|
1:7 |
14.3 |
1:7 |
14.3 |
City of
Szatmárnémeti |
40.8 |
- |
0 |
8:36 |
22.2 |
1:10 |
10.0 |
0:14 |
0 |
Szilágy County |
23.7 |
- |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
18.0 |
C |
Hungarians are also discriminated against in economic spheres. In state
companies, a Hungarian individual can very rarely reach an executive position. Even in
Kovászna County, which has an absolute Hungarian majority, the number of Hungarian
business executives is proportionally small.
TABLE 19.
RATIO OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS AMONGST THE LEADERSHIP
OF THE STATE-OWNED COMPANIES IN VARIOUS COUNTIES AND CITIES
COUNTY/CITY |
HUNGARIANS |
TOTAL |
PERCENTAGE |
BIHAR County |
21 |
173 |
12.1% |
City of NAGYVÁRAD
(Oradea) |
5 |
96 |
5.2% |
SZATMÁR County |
11 |
114 |
9.6% |
SZILÁGY County |
|
|
|
6.2% |
KOVÁSZNA County |
50 |
88 |
56.8% |
TABLE 20.
RATIO OF HUNGARIAN STREET-NAMES IN VARIOUS
LARGER TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES
CITY |
HUNGARIANS |
TOTAL |
PERCENTAGE |
ARAD |
11 |
680 |
1.6% |
NAGYVÁRAD
(Oradea) |
8 |
746 |
1.2% |
KOLOZSVÁR |
21 |
750 |
2.8% |
MAROSVÁSÁRHELY |
9 |
370 |
2.4% |
SZATMÁRNÉMETI |
9 |
350 |
2.6% |
We can hardly reach the end of the obvious, well-documented facts and results of state
policies which discriminate against minorities, and treat them as second-class citizens.
Consequently, this is what is meant by the expression ethnic cleansing, as
interpreted by the Hungarians of Romania. These are the facts - the rest is
ignorance, political evasion, misinterpretation, or purposeful nationalist instigating
propaganda. The White Book of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in
Romania (RMDSZ), currently being prepared, will doubtlessly present an even wider and
consequently more convincing picture of the reality of the Hungarian minority's
existence in Romania.
I write these lines from within the - now twice - confiscated Bishop's Office of
the Királyhágómellék Reformed Church District, facing possible eviction at any given
moment. I am writing them in a street named after Marshall Ion Antonescu, the fascist
dictator, pondering that here, in this city founded by King Saint László, only eight (!)
of the 746 streets have names of Hungarian origin.
Dated at Nagyvárad,
April 21, 1993.
László Tõkés,
Bishop,
District of Királyhágómellék, Transylvania
|